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A study in arrested development

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VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT

The catch-all party in Western Europe 1945-1990

A study in arrested development

ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT

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1 Introduction

1.1 The aim of this study

Few observers of West European politics would dispute the fact that political parties, competing in elections for decades or even over a century, have regularly adapted their organisational styles, electoral strategies and ideological and policy stances. Yet, the precise direction and extent to which these changes have occurred have rarely been subjected to comprehensive empirical comparative research. This book represents a systematic attempt to carry out such an analysis by simultaneously addressing the organisational, ideological and electoral changes which have been wrought in political parties, party systems and party families in Western Europe since the end of the Second World War.

In order to carry out this analysis, I have taken as my focus of inquiry Otto Kirchheimer's well-known thesis concerning the development of the so-called catch-all people's party, in which he asserted that class-based and denominational mass integration parties were transforming at the organisational, ideological as well as the electoral level. According to Kirchheimer's thesis, which was most clearly enunciated in a widely-cited article published in 1966 (Kirchheimer, 1966a), the catch-all party would no longer draw support from only a restricted social group by advocating a narrow ideological appeal, as mass integration parties had done in the past, but instead it would aim at more immediate electoral success by attracting a wider audience, and hence would modify its organisational and strategic character accordingly.

There are few concepts in political science that have been so frequently cited as the catch-all party. Ever since Kirchheimer first developed this concept *in nuce* (Kirchheimer 1954a), and argued that its emergence leads to a transformation of European party systems (Kirchheimer 1966a), it has become a familiar part of the conventional terms of reference of political scientists and political observers alike. However, despite the widespread currency of the catch-all concept and despite its familiarity, it has rarely been subject to rigorous cross-national empirical enquiry and assessment. For while Kirchheimer was fairly categorical in identifying the properties of this new party - including its ideological, organisational and electoral dimensions - there still remains a substantial confusion in the contemporary literature regarding precisely what a catch-all party is and precisely which parties can genuinely be regarded as catch-all.[1] Although such a lack of precision is not unknown to scholars involved more generally in the classification of party types, particularly to those working in the area of party organisation (Schlesinger 1984; Katz and Mair 1995), the sheer familiarity and common currency of the catch-all concept, on the one hand, and the relative precision with which it was first introduced by Kirchheimer, on the other, mark it out as a concept which has long required close empirical assessment.

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that in the present debate on democracy and party system change many of the topics Kirchheimer emphasised, namely the aloofness of parties towards civil society, the state-party cartel and the functional

[1] see, for example, Wolinetz 1979; 1991; Dittrich 1983; Mintzel 1984; Schmidt 1985; Keman 1988; Panebianco 1988; Mair 1989; Smith 1989; Koole 1992; Katz and Mair 1991; Müller 1991; 1992a; 1992b.

transformation of parties, are still central themes (Katz and Mair 1994). As we shall see, for example, Kirchheimer already argued more than three decades ago that political parties and the state were becoming increasingly interdependent. According to Kirchheimer the state seeks to legitimise its actions through the parties in parliament and these political parties depend more and more on the state for their resources. Incorporated into the state, parties are no longer principally opposed to the dominant regime and do not formulate policy programs that aim to fundamentally change society. Kirchheimer labelled this the waning (and even vanishing) of opposition (Kirchheimer 1957b; 1966b). All this results in a propensity of parties to progressively withdraw from civil society into a state-party cartel, which weakens the party's internal cohesion and facilitates the rationalisation of its structures and procedures. One consequence of this development is that the individual citizen can now, in contrast to the bygone era of the mass-party, play only a very modest and passive role in party politics.

At the heart of Kirchheimer's thesis lies the assumption that the catch-all party no longer represents a clearly defined social group; rather it aims to articulate and integrate the interests of different social strata. According to Kirchheimer, this reduces the legitimacy of political parties. The individual, being denied a real political alternative and the means to change his or her environment, withdraws from the public sphere as a citizen into a private existence as consumer (Kirchheimer 1962b; 1965b; 1966c; 1967). As the repressive tools of the state are becoming more subtle and sophisticated as well as the opportunities for repression more numerous, Kirchheimer had no doubts about the final victor in the struggle for political domination: against the party-state cartel the individual is rendered powerless. The political party has shed itself from its self-defined function of societal agent. The catch-all thesis, therefore, is useful in that an empirical test of its propositions can give insight into what extent there has been a weakening of party alignments, changes in the ideological orientation of political parties and their electoral support, the level of civic embeddedness of political parties and a transformation of the basic structures of mass politics in Western Europe in general.

This book intends to identify the extent to which political parties in Western European polities have indeed acquired the ideological, organisational and electoral characteristics of catch-allism. In addition, a concluding intention of this book is to indicate some of the consequences these changes may entail for the functioning of political parties in Western democracies. The analysis itself spans the period 1945 to 1990, and, for the first time, the concept and theory of catch-allism, in all of its fullness, will be tested against developments in more than eighty West European political parties. Moreover, these tests will always be empirically grounded, and will employ an extensive data set which combines all three major dimensions of party change. In view of this empirical analysis, the validity and reliability of the catch-all concept will be assessed and the study will show to what extent the catch-all concept can be employed to measure and assess party change in the real world.

1.2 The structure of the book

In part 1 of this research an empirical definition of the catch-all party will be developed. To maximise the validity of this definition and remain faithful to Kirch-

heimer's original conception of catch-allism, this study will use two methods to define and operationalize the catch-all thesis. First, chapter 2 will explore the introduction and development of the catch-all thesis in Kirchheimer's original texts. Secondly, utilising Sartori's (1984) method of reconstruction and formation of concepts, the third chapter identifies the core characteristics of catch-allism in Kirchheimer's texts as well as in the secondary literature in order to determine the empirical boundaries of the catch-all party concept. From this core definition an operational definition is subsequently developed to measure catch-allism empirically. To justify necessary choices of indicators and to avoid distortions by collective biases in the secondary literature, Kirchheimer's original texts and references will structure this process of concept formation and operationalization. Therefore, an elaborate and profound study of Kirchheimer's publications as well as some of his unpublished work and private notes precedes the (re)construction of the original meaning of the catch-all concept.

Part 2 of this study entails a rigorous empirical enquiry into the extent to which parties can be classified as catch-all parties. For the first time since the original proposition was advanced by Kirchheimer, there are now three principal sources of relevant cross-nationally comparable data available, each of which can be used to investigate the three dimensions which together constitute Kirchheimer's original definition. Firstly, and most crucially, in an effort to assess the extent to which there has been a "strengthening of top leadership groups...; [a] downgrading of the role of the individual party member...; [and a] securing access to a variety of interest groups" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190), chapter 4 will use the data-set on party organisational change and adaptation, which involves a systematic gathering of cross-nationally comparable data on developments inside party organisations between 1960 and 1990 (Katz and Mair 1992). Secondly, in an effort to assess the extent to which there has been a genuine "drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190), chapter 5 of this study will examine the findings from the updated data-set on party programmes (manifestos), which provide the most authoritative source of reliable and comparative data on party emphases and concerns (for a description of the data-set, see Budge et al., 1987; Volkens 1994). Thirdly, to assess to what extent there has been a veritable declining emphasis on "the classe gardeé, [the] specific social-class or denominational clientele" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190), chapter 6 of this research takes advantage of the now substantial accumulation of survey data in order to assess the degree to which the electoral profiles of parties spread right across the social spectrum (see, for example, Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992). Through the integration of these different data, it is the intention of the author to properly measure 'catch-allism', a task which has, up to now, proven most difficult. From the definition of the catch-all party, suitable empirical indicators of its properties are specified. Subsequently, on the basis of the comprehensive data-set, catch-all tendencies and their implications for the transformation of West European party systems, will be identified and charted.

Part 3 of this study, then, evaluates some of the consequences of the changing character of political parties. Chapter 7 seeks to gain insight in the interaction between the transformation of political parties and the functioning of democratic politics. In this section the variation in type and extent of party transformation and its consequences in the different West European countries, among the different party families and across time will be summarised.

1.3 The research question and method

Following from these considerations, the subsequent research question is formulated:

How can Kirchheimer's concept of the catch-all party be operationalised and catch-allism be measured, and to what extent can the degree of catch-allism be charted across West European countries and over time?

Kirchheimer formulated his catch-all thesis in a comparative perspective and specifically pointed to Germany, Italy, Austria, France and Great Britain to illustrate similarities in development. From observations in only a limited number of cases, in particular the Italian Democrazia Cristiana (DC), the German Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), the British Labour Party, the French Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) and the German Christlich Democratische Union (CDU), Kirchheimer (1966a) hypothesised that the catch-all development witnessed in these cases was likely to be prevalent in many countries in Western Europe and lead to a more or less generalised transformation of party systems. Therefore, this study will not be limited to the specific countries and political parties Kirchheimer enumerated, but instead will examine 83 parties in 12 Western European countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom (see appendix 1).

The number of countries is expanded beyond the larger democracies for three main reasons. First, while Kirchheimer primarily referred to the major parties within the larger West European countries, he also pointed to minor parties in the larger democracies as well as parties in the smaller European democracies when he depicted the catch-all development. As examples of small parties which seemed unable to evolve into catch-all parties, Kirchheimer singled out the Belgium Liberal Party, the Dutch Calvinists, the Swedish Agrarians, the Danish Justice Party and the Swiss South Tyrolian People's Party (Kirchheimer 1966a, 187-188). In addition, Kirchheimer mentioned the Swedish and Danish cases as examples of social democratic parties which are not transforming into catch-all parties and to the Austrian SPÖ as a party which, in contrast, "is becoming an eager and rather successful member of the catch-all club" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 188). The inclusion of these and other parties allows for comparison between major and minor parties within one political system as well as across party systems and allows us to compare parties with apparently differing likelihood's of developing in the catch-all direction.

Secondly, the inclusion of the smaller democracies provides the possibility to test Kirchheimer's hypothesis that parties in larger countries have a higher propensity to develop into catch-all parties, in comparison to parties in the smaller European countries. Kirchheimer advanced a multitude of hypotheses why certain countries or specific parties are not experiencing a transformation towards catch-allism. According to Kirchheimer the 'traditional framework of society', 'the pattern of social and professional stratification', 'the economic development and the welfare state', 'the party's ideology', 'regionality' and the size of the country all exercise their influence on the extent of catch-allism (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185-188). In order to assess whether catch-allism develops in certain countries or parties and not in others, the catch-all

phenomenon should be analysed over a wider range of political systems to increase the number of cases. If the adoption of a catch-all strategy is a response to decreasing loyalties to mass-parties in affluent societies, for example, then there are no reasons to limit the analysis to Britain, France, Germany and Italy as Kirchheimer did. Nor is it likely that the conditions of competition are different in the smaller democracies as Kirchheimer appears to have assumed (Wolinetz 1991). To assess to what extent catch-allism is variable, parties in both smaller and larger democracies are included in this study.

The third reason for including a larger number of countries is more methodological. In this study the most similar systems design is adopted.[2] Despite obvious differences between Western European nations, the most similar system design assumes that these countries share many historical, social, economic, cultural and political characteristics in comparison to countries not included in the study. Next to geographic proximity, the countries included in this book are similar in that all are multi-party democracies with highly industrialised economies characterised by extensive welfare provisions. Nevertheless, the political systems in these countries differ to such an extent that meaningful variation exists to allow for a comparative analysis. In some countries, political parties compete under the electoral regime of proportional representation, while in others parties put forward candidates in single-member constituencies (United Kingdom and France). Furthermore, some parties obtain executive power as single-party governments (United Kingdom) while in other countries coalition governments predominate (the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Finland, France and Italy) and in still other countries both types of government alternate (Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Sweden). Therefore, despite all the similitude of these democracies, political parties compete under distinctive circumstances in West European party systems.

Although ideally all parties in Western Europe should be incorporated into this analysis, lack of reliable comparative data hinders examination of the entire population of Western European countries and parties.[3] The selection of the political

[2] The concepts of 'most similar systems design' and 'most different system design' were advanced by Przeworski and Teune (1970). The 'most different' systems design compares different countries on their similarities, while the 'most similar' systems design compares similar countries on their differences (the comparable cases method). Both methods seek to isolate relationships between variables by excluding external variables and thus eliminate probable causal factors. In the most similar systems design, units are chosen which are similar on as many variables as possible, with the exception of the variables between which a relationship is hypothesized. Hereby the number of control variables is maximized. In the most different system design the units do not differ with respect to the variables to be examined, but are assumed to differ on a maximum of external variables (Frendreis 1983). The two methods differ in strategy: the most similar system design seeks to identify relevant systemic factors for the explanation of the phenomenon, while the most different system design can only eliminate irrelevant systemic factors. Both strategies also differ in the process of case selection. Case selection proceeds under two taxonomies, the spatial taxonomy where cases are selected on their proximity, and analytical taxonomy where cases are selected on the basis of their degree of similarity or difference (Smelser 1976). When cases are being compared which are similar on a large number of characteristics, the assumption is that only those variables differentiate, between which a relationship is hypothesized. The opposite method, of comparing completely different cases, assumes that two cases are assumed to differ in all respects, but for the hypothesized relation between the variables. This study, which limits itself to Western Europe can also be labeled an area study (Daalder 1987c; 1993).

[3] For this reason Luxembourg, Switzerland and Iceland had to be excluded. Spain and Portugal are not included because these countries were not multi-party democracies at the time Kirchheimer advanced his thesis. This does, by no means, allow for the conclusion that Spanish and Portuguese parties will not have catch-all characteristics (see Satrústegui 1992; Van Biezen 1998).

parties included in this study has been conducted on two criteria. First, the importance of the individual party for the particular party system was taken into account. In order to be included, a party must have competed in at least two consecutive elections allowing for an inquiry of possible transformation over time. This criterion is a minimum requirement; many of the parties competed in all elections of the post-war era. Secondly, parties must have gained parliamentary representation, otherwise inclusion is pointless with respect to the measurement of several indicators.

In this study the results of most analysis within chapters 4, 5 and 6 are not reported at the level of individual political parties but aggregated to national party systems as well as party family groupings, while both aggregates are also subject to cross-time comparisons. In effect, therefore, I take the empirical evidence of change at the level of the individual party, which constitutes the core unit of analysis within Kirchheimer's theory, in order to assess the changing degree of catch-allism over time within *national party systems* and within *cross-national party families*. These aggregations are necessary because a full presentation and discussion of the 83 individual parties through time would simply prove far too unwieldy. Nonetheless, the original building blocks for these aggregations, that is, the data on the individual parties themselves, are fully summarised in lengthy tables at the end of each chapter, where these parties are ranked within the different time-periods according to their degree of catch-allism. Such a comparison of levels of catch-allism within the different West European party systems should reveal whether Kirchheimer justifiably asserted a specific geographical pattern of this type of party transformation (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185-188). Parties are analysed by party-family to determine whether, as Kirchheimer (1966a, 185-191) inferred, catch-allism is also a function of the party's genetic origin, suggesting that almost regardless of country, certain families of parties will have proved more prone to catch-allism than others. The classification of parties on the basis of their genetic origin can be found in appendix 1.

1.4 The data

Seven principle data sources are combined for utilisation in this analysis of party transformation. Best suited for longitudinal cross-national inquiry of the organisation of political parties and their internal decision-making processes are the data compiled by Katz and Mair (1992; 1994). Their data include party membership, party finance, the size of party professional staffs and their official procedures of decision-making and policy-formulation. In addition, this study employs the data Janda (1980) collected on the internal organisation of political parties. The ideological evolution of political parties is primarily examined utilising the data gathered by the Manifesto Research Group (see Budge et al., 1987; Klingemann et al. 1994).[4] Furthermore, the data collected by Woldendorp et. al. (1993) on party control of government in parliamentary democracy provide the opportunity to evaluate the party composition of governments, the number of ministries each party controls, party preferences in portfolio's, parliamentary support of governments and their duration in office. Data for the analysis of electoral change, which include the composition and volatility of

[4] These data were kindly provided to me by Prof. H.D. Klingemann and Dr. A. Volkens of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

the electorate of parties, the level of party identification as well as the social background of their ministers, come from a wide range of sources (see appendix 4 for the sources of the social composition of party electorates). The studies by Blondel (Blondel 1985; Blondel and Thiebault 1991) provides the information on the social and professional background of ministers, while Katz and Mair (1992) summarise data on party identification. The principal sources of data on electoral volatility are the electoral data handbooks by Mackie and Rose (1974; 1991) as well as the influential study by Bartolini and Mair (1990).

To investigate variation over time, the analysis presented here covers the period from 1945 until 1990. Although most of the data were gathered on an annual basis, missing values appeared too numerous to maintain an annual format. To compensate for the number of missing values, the post-war era is aggregated into nine periods of five years (see appendix 2), resulting in a number of cases sufficiently numerous to allow for statistical analysis.[5]

The comprehensive character of this study allows, given the data collection, for a rigorous investigation into the type and extent of transformation of political parties in Western Europe according to the 'canons' of the comparative method in political science. In order to define and empirically assess catch-allism, the following chapter first summarises Kirchheimer's oeuvre, focusing mainly on his essays concerning political themes.

[5] The number of cases under analysis leads us to the most central problem of comparative politics: the problem of "many variables, small N" (Lijphart 1975, 159). The "many variables, small N" problem can be seen as the problem of the presence of more possible explanations than cases to control for these explanations (Ragin 1989, 69). There are two strategies to solve this: (1) maximizing the number of cases or (2) eliminating variability through case selection. In this study the number of cases are simply enlarged by taking time periods as units of observation: the set of parties is 83 (see appendix 1) and the post-war era is broken into nine periods of five years, the maximum number of cases is increased to 747 (83 parties x 9 periods). As not all parties existed in all periods, the actual number of cases is 628, when non-existing cases are omitted.

2 The catch-all thesis

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter the origin and development of Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all concept will be discussed. The ensuing sections will show that the catch-all thesis was developed over a period of more than ten years, primarily between 1954 and 1966, and that this thesis is part of an elaborate framework of ideas which reflect Kirchheimer's concerns with regard to problems facing modern democracies. Particularly the dramatic breakdown of the Weimar Republic, which forced Kirchheimer to leave Germany and live in exile in France and the United States, shaped his political ideas and influenced his scientific work. This shocking experience with total system breakdown, evidence of the frailty of democracy, was never again eradicated from Otto Kirchheimer's mind.

2.2 Otto Kirchheimer (1905-1965): A short intellectual biography

Otto Kirchheimer was born on November 11, 1905 in Heilbronn, Germany. His middle-class Jewish parents died when he was still a young child. His remaining relatives arranged for him to attend a private school in Ettenheim. In 1924, at the age of 19, Kirchheimer graduated from 'Gymnasium' and took up the study of philosophy and history at the University of Münster where among his lectors were the neo-Kantian philosophers Karl Vorlander and Max Scheler. Thereafter Kirchheimer studied 'Recht- und Staatswissenschaft' (Law and Statecraft) in Köln and Berlin, under the auspices of teachers such as Rudolf Smend, Heinrich Triepel and Herman Heller (Linne 1994). During his collegiate years, Kirchheimer was politically active in the Socialist Student Union. He finalised his dissertation in 1928 on "Die Staatslehre des Sozialismus und Bolschewismus" (The Socialist and Bolshevik Theory of the State) at the university of Bonn, where Carl Schmitt was his principal tutor.

In his dissertation[6] Kirchheimer argued that in democratic states political decisions are reduced to legal problems. Kirchheimer acknowledged that liberalism had been a promoter of democratic political liberties, but only up to the point where the working class demands full representation. Thereafter, democracy deteriorated into a (class) conflict between liberals and the bourgeoisie on one side and the proletariat on the other. Decisions which affect power relations, Kirchheimer argued, are avoided within the democratic state in order to maintain an equilibrium between these conflicting parties. When democracy is characterised by agreement on fundamental values, then the majority vote is the optimal decision-making procedure. On the other hand, when basic agreement is absent, majority rule means repression of minorities and decision-making deteriorates into rigid legal procedures. This process of transforming political decision-making into legal codification ('*Verrechtlichung*'), neutralises the class conflict. The resulting type of state ('*Rechtsstaat*') thus becomes a mere legal mechanism ('*reiner*

[6] The complete manuscript of Kirchheimer's dissertation is lost. Part of the text was published in "Zeitschrift für Politik" in 1928 under the title "Zur Staatslehre des Sozialismus und Bolshewismus" (On Socialist and Bolshevik Theory of the State) (Kirchheimer 1928/1969).

Rechtsmechanismus') (Kirchheimer 1928, 7-8). Kirchheimer considered a political system legitimate when no group in society is excluded from the democratic decision-making process, enabling the political structure to represent the social structure. This 'political exclusion' remained Kirchheimer's point of departure for his critique on the political developments in the Weimar Republic and other political systems. While, according to Kirchheimer, constitutions usually ratify victory or defeat of a social class, the Weimar constitution was a document without such resolution. He maintained that in most states, democratic or dictatorial, the judiciary had ceased to be an independent third power and had been reduced to a legal mechanism of formal democracy. This conclusion, that 'justice' is used for certain political ends, remained a central topic throughout Kirchheimer's entire work.

From 1930 Kirchheimer worked as a 'Doctor Juris' at the Bonn-university and began to lecture at trade union schools. In 1932 Kirchheimer was offered a position as a junior member of the Berlin bar. At the same time he was an active member of the SPD and often published articles in their official theoretical organ "Die Gesellschaft". During this period Kirchheimer was befriended by like-minded legal professionals, among whom Ernst Fraenkel, Franz Neumann, Otto Kahn-Freund and Martin Drath were the most influential (Luthard 1990). In the period spanning 1929 to 1933 Kirchheimer became progressively disillusioned by the events in the Weimar Republic in which the social and political situation further destabilised after the economic crisis of 1929. The radical parties on the left (KPD) and on the right (NSDAP) blocked the formation of stable democratic majorities. According to Kirchheimer, the abuse by President Von Hindenburg of article 48 (the right of the President to rule by decree) and article 25 (the right of the President to dissolve parliament) of the Weimar constitution, transformed Germany into a presidential dictatorship.

Kirchheimer's early writings show a great concern for this slow erosion of the Weimar democracy. On the basis of Marxist theories of the state and the constitution Kirchheimer critically analyses Brünings emergency decrees and the coup by Von Papen in July 1932. When the Brüning minority government (Centre Party), initially supported by the Reichspresident Von Hindenburg, could not convince parliament of its program, Von Hindenburg dissolved the Reichstag. The following elections on July 31, 1932 only increased polarisation in parliament. The Von Papen cabinet withdrew parliamentary powers and changed the electoral laws, but this new government was then also dismissed by Von Hindenburg. On January 30, 1933 Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler as Reichskansler. Regarding these developments Kirchheimer (1932c; 1932d) heavily criticised Hindenburg for breaking three constitutional rules: the Reichskansler dissolves parliament more than once for the same reason, secondly, Hindenburg does not provide any justification for this dissolution of parliament and finally he should have called for new elections according to the constitution.

The action of the federal authorities of the Weimar Republic against Prussia, where the government headed by the SPD was overthrown on July 20, 1932, was additional evidence for the emergence of a presidential dictatorship (*Präsidialdiktatur*). Kirchheimer argued that conflicts between the Reich and Länder should be decided by trial before an independent judicial institution (*Staatsgerichtshof*), not by a political presidential decree. Hindenburg had unconstitutionally intervened in Prussia and, with the replacement of the Prussian cabinet, the Reichspresident had rendered it impossible for a large proportion of the Prussian population to freely express their

will through elected government. The topic of political exclusion is reiterated here: no longer had all classes equal opportunity of representation (Kirchheimer 1932e). Kirchheimer argued that the re-election of Von Hindenburg as Reich President on April 10, 1932 was a reaction to the political crisis which Von Hindenburg himself had created (Kirchheimer 1932e). Furthermore, the parliamentary elections of July 31, 1932 demonstrated that the Weimar constitution no longer enabled the representation of the social structure.

Kirchheimer's perspective at this point in time can be characterised as 'radical' and 'leftist' (Tribe 1987). Normative point of departure for Kirchheimer was the assumption that state or governmental institutions and procedures, such as electoral laws, are not intrinsically good or bad, any more than specific constitutions. They all have a particular political purpose, usually that of maintaining the existing capitalist order. The constitutional principle of equality before the law is used by the capitalist interest groups as a bulwark against all changes of the economic status quo. One's attitude toward such institutions and procedures depends on what one wants politically (Kirchheimer 1930a). Although Kirchheimer's conceptualisation in this period resembled that of his tutor Carl Schmitt, Kirchheimer's ideas were, nonetheless, diametrically opposed to Schmitt's ideas (Fetscher and Münkler 1987, 296; Luthardt 1987, 147; Kvaternik 1994, 26). Schmitt, best described as an authoritarian conservative, was a prominent critic of the Weimar Republic and one of its leading jurists (Tribe 1987). Schmitt was abhorred by the increasing state intervention into the private and economic sphere as for him this evidenced the weakness of the state, not its strength. State intervention is used to construct a compromise and consensus between the different interest groups within society. According to Schmitt, the pluralist fragmentation of parliament and the colonisation of the state by interest groups diminish the authority of the state. Although Schmitt and Kirchheimer share their concern for the fragmentation of interests and colonisation of the state by organised interests, their solution to these problems differ radically. Whereas Kirchheimer emphasises the importance of articulate representation of the various social classes by different political parties, Schmitt opposes the pluralist parliamentary party state (Schmitt 1928; 1932a: 1932b). In the nineteenth century parliaments, Schmitt argues, political parties were merely voluntary organisations, fluid, loosely structured and lacking organisational complexity. Parties represented currents of opinion, free from any permanent bond with specific social groups. Parliament was a place for the national interest and the formation of public opinion, not for social interests. In the modern pluralist state, however, political parties embody the social interests of industrial mass society. Modern parties have complex organisational structures with powerful bureaucracies which aim to recruit a maximum of their members from specific social groups and provide this clientele with economic and cultural services. According to Schmitt, the subsequent pluralist fragmentation in parliament leads to a political deadlock of conflicting interests and politicisation of the society and the economy. In addition, political representatives lose their independence by the party dominance and the public debate is subverted into manipulation of the masses. In this manner liberal democracy weakens and colonises the state, a process which can only be countered by a strong authority wielding sufficient power to restore national unity and order. Logically, Schmitt had little difficulty in supporting Hitler and he became a member of the National Socialist movement in 1933. That Kirchheimer and Schmitt were men of different political

orientation was shown by the fact that the same year Kirchheimer left Germany in fear of Nazi persecution.

In 1933 it became clear that some parties in Germany were not prepared to adhere to democratic principles. Following the elections in March 1933 all parties, with the sole exception of the NSDAP, were banned and a totalitarian Nazi regime was established. When the Nazi's finally seized absolute power on March 24, 1933, Kirchheimer fled to Paris where he was employed by the exiled "*Frankfurter Institut für Sozialforschung*." During this period, Kirchheimer wrote articles on the political developments in France. From 1916 until 1940 the French 'Assemblée Nationale', Kirchheimer (1940) argued, gave the successive governments the possibility to govern by decree, without parliamentary control. Kirchheimer stressed that these transfers of parliamentary powers to the executive were not compatible with the French constitution. Based on his experience in the Weimar Republic, he knew that unlimited decree-rule weakens the political structure and inevitably leads to authoritarianism. As long as certain major parliamentary parties, and thus some groups in society are not represented in the government, parliamentary control of government actions remains essential for the proper expression of the popular will. Kirchheimer again showed his concern for political exclusion. In the French Third republic and the former Weimar republic, Kirchheimer saw identical processes. In both the lower strata were excluded from popular representation and this made the exercise of power illegitimate. Political decisions were rendered into law, thereby reducing the political class conflict into a legal battle over the democratic constitutional rules (Kirchheimer 1941a).

When the *Frankfurter Institut für Sozialforschung* moved to the New York Columbia University in 1937, Kirchheimer also emigrated to the United States. At the Institute Kirchheimer worked together with Franz Neumann, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Leo Löwental and Herbert Marcuse. In 1942, Kirchheimer left the Institute for Social Research and took up a position at Wellesly College, Massachusetts as a lecturer. Two years later, in 1944 Kirchheimer started to work for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Washington and was transferred to the Division of Research for Europe at the Department of State in 1945. Here he was reunited with Franz Neumann and Herbert Marcuse.

At the end of World War II, Kirchheimer did not return to Germany. He was tremendously disappointed by the post-war developments in Europe and in Germany in particular. Kirchheimer was dumbfounded that, instead of de-nazification, an anti-Communist attitude became dominant. His disillusion with German post-war developments is witnessed most emphatically in his critique on the political developments in the DDR. In his view, the German people had not learned much from the Nazi-period. Kirchheimer regarded East Germany as "a completely manipulated society" and "a totalitarian state" (Kirchheimer 1951, 131-134). He also stressed the lack of profound change in West Germany. Here too Kirchheimer conceived an absence of possibilities for political opposition and perceived severe restrictions on political freedoms. After a comparison of the post-war composition of the Reichstag with the last two free elections of the Weimar republic in 1928 and 1932, Kirchheimer concluded that neither the earthshaking political and social events since 1933, nor the changes in the electoral system during the last two decades, had substantially changed the traditional patterns of parliamentary representation (Kirchheimer 1950).

In 1950 Kirchheimer was promoted to Chief of the Central European Branch of the Office of Intelligence Research at the Office of Strategic Studies. During this

period Kirchheimer also lectured at Harvard University and at the American University in Washington. As of 1954 Kirchheimer left the State Department, most probably as a result of McCarthyist attacks upon 'communist influences' in the government of the United States (Herz, 1989, 13), and took up a position as Professor of Political Science at the New School for Social Research in New York. Finally, in 1961, Kirchheimer returned to Germany for one year where he was appointed as Fullbright Professor at the University of Freiburg. From 1962 Kirchheimer was employed as Professor of Public Law and Government at Columbia University in New York. Kirchheimer's career was tragically cut short when he died from a heart-attack in Washington D.C. airport on November 22, 1965.

2.3 The catch-all concept: first indications

During the 1950s, Kirchheimer concentrated increasingly on the transformation of political parties. As early as 1954, in an analysis of the West German political system, Kirchheimer (1954a, 250) introduced the concept of the catch-all party for the first time. Where Duverger (1954) and Neumann (1956)[7] saw a development towards 'parties of democratic integration', Kirchheimer envisaged the development of yet another party, the 'catch-all' party. He argued that in most Western European countries political opposition is ebbing and regarded the rapid economic development as the most important determinant for this transformation of mass parties into catch-all parties.

In West Germany, Kirchheimer argued, the inability of the political adversary (the SPD) to provide any real alternative for the official government policy of the CDU had resulted in a loyal opposition. A broader explanation for the stability and moderation of the post-war German political system was that, in contrast to the interbellum, group claims were now mediated in a collective bargaining process. The significant rise in prosperity allowed for the possibility that many of these claims were, at least in part, recognised. The social and governmental system of West Germany became even more coherent when the political militant left and right disappeared from the political scene. The majority of the working class no longer occupied the lower social milieus, but could rather be regarded as middle-class. In consequence, the individual seemed to isolate him- or herself from public and political affairs into private (consumerist) activities. Kirchheimer enumerated some catch-all characteristics: "Undoubtedly, the face of the modern parties is shaped more and more by universal suffrage and the related necessity to reach as many voters as possible by means of the latest technological developments (...). The resulting forms of competition dominate the structure and the organisational principles of the parties. They compel them to resort to simplifications and to the identification of programs with typifying personalities suitable for public exposure" (Kirchheimer 1954a, 246). This wider appeal resulted in far-reaching uniformity of behaviour of political parties. Kirchheimer additionally underscored the American condition, "under which the parties to a certain degree even today are primarily organisms dedicated to the purpose of winning the next election (...)" (Kirchheimer 1954a, 250). Kirchheimer considered it implausible that a social democratic-led government would adopt a

[7] These first attempts at theory building on party transformation focus primarily on the classification of different types of parties (see especially Duverger 1954).

significantly different policy program. Political competition in this 'one and one-half party system' was between a conservative catch-all party (CDU) and a democratic working-class party (SPD). Here, Kirchheimer (1954a, 250) asserted that the SPD could transform into a catch-all mass party and establish a two party system.

In another analysis of political transformation, or more specifically convergence of parties in Western Europe, Kirchheimer (1954b) differentiated three types of parties: the totalitarian party, the democratic mass party (which tries to appeal to a maximum of voters to take over the administration and carry into effect a definite program) and the older parliamentary party (Kirchheimer 1954b). There is no mention of the catch-all party concept in this article, yet Kirchheimer frames the transformation of parties within a broader thesis of the *state-party cartel*. He argued that both democratic mass and totalitarian parties, working under democratic conditions, try to combine two goals; first, to organise themselves in order to attract a maximum of voters and second, simultaneously avoiding to jeopardise internal cohesion and political freedom of action. According to Kirchheimer, the political party had become a functionally rational instrument for the realisation of group interests. Here Kirchheimer touched upon the emergence of a *state-party cartel*; he maintains there was evidence of a shift of the centre of gravity from parliament to parties. In their failure to present the electorate with a political alternative, political parties deprived the population of the essence of democracy: to choose its government and replace it by a more suitable one if wanted. The ramifications are an ever growing discipline of the parliamentary party which thereby transforms its relationship with the extra-parliamentary party organisation. Kirchheimer alleged that the parliamentary party and the central party organisation became so interwoven at the personal level that political freedom had suffered. Subsidies by interest groups and their institutional propaganda (the praising of certain political goals by non-political actors without open support for a party) had drawn the mass parties too close to the state. Kirchheimer asserted that, although this interrelatedness made the democratic institutions more effective, it deprived the democratic mass parties of their mobility and political dynamism. To perform their democratic function to the fullest, Kirchheimer thought parties should combine four elements: put forward demands of social groups close to them, submit themselves to the judgement of the electorate, give maximum disclosure of party finances and attempt to transform the state to their own image, instead of identifying themselves too much with the state.

This development, the elimination of major political opposition through government by party cartel, is further elaborated in another article in which Kirchheimer showed his concern that a parliamentary leader "may fall easy prey to the comfortable belief that his political chances increase by minimising rather than by magnifying the policy differences between opposition and government" (Kirchheimer 1957b, 297). In this process, every decision becomes a compromise. All parties have an interest in covering up inefficiency, waste and corruption of the partner, which results in the absence of the opposition's control function. For this reason, Kirchheimer considered multi-party governments to be weak. He regarded the transfer of votes to and from the opposition of principle to be of greater importance than the internal transfer of votes among the various other parliamentary groups. The causes of the waning of opposition can not be reversed by technical changes in the electoral system, as its causes lie in social developments. The most important cause is the emergence of a substantial new middle-class of skilled workers, the middle ranks

of white-collar workers and civil servants. Their interests converge, becoming indistinguishable from those of the old middle class. According to Kirchheimer, diminished social polarisation goes hand in hand with diminished political polarisation. To indicate the interchangeability of the doctrines of political parties Kirchheimer used the concept of catch-all parties once again (Kirchheimer 1957b, 314-315) and asserted that parties were reduced "to a rationally conceived vehicle of interest-representation." He argued that, although catch-all parties still functioned as intermediary between elements of formerly united groups, the working class was now torn asunder in the process of social transformation. Kirchheimer suggested that the lower social strata still accepted the parliamentary parties, not because of their social vision, but because these parties promised to give priority to their material claims. This weakened the party's aspiration to perform the role of opposition, as this diminished their success in realising group claims. Kirchheimer made a distinction between the 'Weltanschauungs'-party, the totalitarian movement and the modern catch-all party. According to Kirchheimer, the catch-all party was now forced to think more in terms of profit and loss of electoral support and policy. The transition from the ideological orientated mass party to the interest-group oriented catch-all party is one facet in the erosion of classical opposition.

Kirchheimer (1958a) returned to these themes in a discussion of the consequences of the constitutional changes of 1958 in France. Here he argued that the new French constitution affirms the authority of the bureaucratic elite and personalised politics by strengthening the position of the president, thereby dramatically reducing the democratically elected National Assembly's legislative power. Again, legal procedures are used for political ends. This time a reform of the electoral laws misrepresented the popular strength of the Communist Party. The French election system, a single-member district system with a second ballot, produced significant disproportions between the outcome in seats allocated and the votes cast. Kirchheimer thought that, at the elections, no real alternatives were offered and the popular vote was only used to justify decisions that have already been taken. In France Kirchheimer also saw a transformation of political mass parties aimed at representation into a conservative electioneering organisation.

At the end of the 1950s Kirchheimer continually argued that the dominant party type in Western Europe was still the democratic mass party. This type of party "rests on a nucleus of professional political personnel and on a party membership of great variety in size and intensity of loyalty feelings. At the same time it entertains amicable relations with and finds support among a variety of interest groups" (Kirchheimer 1959a, 270). If these parties want to achieve a majority status, they need to "adapt to their new social, economic and intellectual environment and appeal to as many voters as possible by watering down their purely ideological commitments". This transforms democratic mass parties into the "Christian type of catch-all people's parties" (Kirchheimer 1959a, 270). According to Kirchheimer, the cleavage between the new middle class and the older independent middle class diminished and a more rational party structure, less bound by ideology, emerged. Especially on the Western European continent, where no single party can obtain a clear-cut majority, all policy changes are negotiated in detail and power-sharing is agreed to in advance. Here again Kirchheimer stressed the waning of opposition as the major political parties became steadily more identical in ideology and program.

In France as well as in West Germany, Kirchheimer (1957a) remarked that

impressive political stability was facilitated by restrictions on the freedom of political choice. The West German authorities restricted political competition utilising legal means, for example banning of the Communist Party (KPD) in Germany. The early re-instalment of the other parties (CDU, SPD and FDP) by the allied occupation powers, gave these parties the lead in shaping public opinion, which has led to a multi-party system with coalition governments as opposed to the more desirable British two-party system. Kirchheimer examined the history, program and organisation of the SPD in detail and found a gradual fading of its former Marxist orientation. According to Kirchheimer (1957a, 437), the CDU had also transformed into an interdenominational catch-all of Christian politics. The fundamental transformation of both these former *Weltanschauungsparteien* gave evidence of a "progressive predominance of pragmatic over ideological motivations." The CDU is "an interest market ... barely hidden behind the screen of emphatically endorsed ideologies and uncontested leadership groups" (Kirchheimer 1957a, 437). On the social complexion of party elites, Kirchheimer depicted a substitution of nineteenth-century intellectuals with representatives of organised interests. "Reciprocal permeation of parties and interest groups is one of the reasons why the influence of ideological factors is dwindling" (Kirchheimer 1957a, 437). As interest groups became their most important permanent clients, parties changed their attitude toward enrolled members and prospective voters. The average citizen, consequently, participated only indirectly through interest groups affiliation in the increasingly professionalised party machine. "Interest connections provide an organisational and often a financial basis for party operations. But they do not take the place of the parties' contest for voters. To this extent, all German parties are today of necessity "integration parties," i.e., potentially democratic mass organisations" (Kirchheimer 1957a, 440). Kirchheimer argued that, in the absence of any noteworthy opposition of principle, political competition is very orderly ('cartel-dominated') as there exists a broad spectrum of political consensus. This political consensus is a consequence of a "homogeneous middle-class society", the uncritical role of the mass media, centralisation of the administrative power and the establishment of the welfare state. Kirchheimer regarded this development not limited to the German context: "aspects of present-day Germany's political institutions closely resemble those of other highly industrialised countries in the West. The outstanding features are: increasing administrative centralisation to meet the social and organisational needs of mass society; a progressive interpenetration of interest groups and political organisations, accompanied by a high degree of professionalization in politics" (Kirchheimer 1957a, 445).

During the early 1960s Kirchheimer repeatedly referred to the catch-all party concept. In 1961 for example, he asserted that German politics (like many other advanced Western industrial societies) had transformed into only an administrative mechanism. This transformation was visible in the decreasing importance of domestic policy and a reduced intensity of social conflict. This was made possible through society's increasing ability to fulfil the expanding desires of a growing number of its members. As a consequence of this transformation the role of the opposition in parliament has been reduced "- or shall we call it an advance? - from a group having a program resting on intellectual analysis of situations in the light of societal development schemes to an American style "democratic" party pushing the image of an alternative

Kanzler, together with a catch-all election platform ..." (Kirchheimer 1961b, 256). Political awareness is low, argued Kirchheimer, and democratic government is relegated to the few transitory periods when elections are staged. Formulation of social policy had become a precarious process as the socially heterogeneous CDU needed to attract at least a certain percentage of the working-class vote. Differentiations between social and religious groups were blurred as German society had secularised. There existed a higher level of basic consensus in Germany than at any previous time in history, giving impetus to the banning of extremist groups, namely the Communist party (KPD).

Kirchheimer's scepticism about German democracy, the free press and the use of legal means for political ends was very clear (Kirchheimer and Menges 1965a). The political system, he wrote, "... could be characterised as one of sluggish competition between well behaved parties acting primarily in response to the demands and pressures of well organised interest groups. As prosperity increased, the population took only a modicum of interest in the day-to-day activities of these parties, so that politics, as in many other industrial Western countries, increasingly became the affair of the professional politician and his interest-group colleagues.... State authority had been personalised in Chancellor Adenauer.... The domestic political confrontations that occurred at four-year intervals were increasingly devoid of substantive dispute, and their outcome served to confirm the existing political line with some slight variations" (Kirchheimer and Menges 1965a, 88). The most important feature of the post-war West German political system is "...the general decline of parliamentary conflict in the wake of the consensus on the welfare functions of the state and the consequent removal from the political arena of many issues that had formerly been bitterly contested. Moreover, especially in the case of divided Germany, the cold war has "internationalised" many political issues and removed them as subjects of domestic political debate and contention. Concurrently, the major political parties, which before the war primarily concerned themselves with ideology and the promotion of abstract goals, have become far more interested in maintaining stability and in fulfilling the mandates of the assorted interest groups that support them. The entire post-war history of Germany's SPD tells the story of ideology's decline and, especially since 1959, of the adoption of pragmatic programs designed to win the support of diverse social groups" (Kirchheimer and Menges 1965a, 90).

In another article on the West German political scene, Kirchheimer (1966b) maintained that, after the experience of the Nazi-period and the developments in the East, opposition of principle was extremely confined. The successes of the Ehrhard economic policy ruled out any opposition of principle, an opposition already weakened by several election defeats. According to Kirchheimer, the economic, social and foreign policy was no longer challenged in principle by the SPD which additionally adopted a catch-all party platform style (Kirchheimer 1966b, 246). The modern welfare state now provided solutions to the problems of numerous social groups, which weakened traditional controversies and modified political conflict to decisions on priorities. This modification freed political parties "...of the necessity of concentrating their electioneering efforts on specific groups while antagonising others" (Kirchheimer 1966b, 247). Political parties could now compete for electoral support of an expanded gamut of social strata and base their policies on short term strategic requisites as opposed to long term goals (Kirchheimer 1966b, 349). Parties avoid raising the more salient questions of their time, or else deal with them in a

noncontroversial manner, which impeded national party competition. To determine the extent and quality of opposition Kirchheimer suggested to evaluate the correspondence between the dates of elections and the pre-arranged constitutional schedule. The more these coincide, the more political opposition is absent. Competition between parties whose only goal is to participate in the next government makes only marginal criticism possible. According to Kirchheimer, this erosion of goal-orientated opposition is visible throughout most advanced industrial societies. What remains is a watertight political cartel between the major parties, which eliminated political competition by a prefabricated bargaining regime and constitutional limitations on extra-parliamentary opposition.

As a consequence of this cartelisation, individuals of industrialised nations experienced increasing estrangement and relied more often on the state. Kirchheimer (1966c) insisted that the lower classes, especially, participated only *ad hoc* in the actual political decision-making. Trade unions and religious ancillary organisations function merely as intermediaries between the individual citizen and the decision-making institutions. "Most of what can be singled out as relevant behaviour are reactions within the context of mass-consumer institutions. Which candidate of two competing catch-all mass parties the executant votes for, to which brand of gasoline he gives his temporary allegiance, what TV program he switches on, may have important consequences for the purveyor of the respective goods. But for the individual these decisions draw their importance only from the fact that they create the illusion of a margin of initiative ... it does not constitute a meaningful contribution to his problem of how to enlarge his control over reality" (Kirchheimer 1966c, 24).

Despite all these earlier references to catch-allism, however, it is not until the publication of "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems" (Kirchheimer 1966a) that Kirchheimer extensively discusses the changing nature of traditional parties of mass-integration into catch-all parties. In this process, Kirchheimer roughly distinguished three stages in which the consequences for the social basis of parties, their organisation, their program and their quest for political power are outlined. The first stage is that of steady organisational growth which lasts until the beginning of the First World War. In the second period, during the 1920's and 1930's, class mass parties had their first experience with governmental power and encountered the conflict between class-interests and the need for moderation in government. Finally, class parties reached the more advanced stage of catch-allism, with some of the parties still trying to cling to their traditional (working-class) clientele while at the same time attempting to attract a variety of other groups.

Kirchheimer was inspired by the LaPalombara and Weiner load-concept[8] which he

[8] LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) asserted that European parties are often creatures of crisis situations, while sometimes the emergence of a party itself creates a crisis for the system. When the established political elite is either unwilling or unable to integrate oppositional political organizations into the political system a crisis occurs (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966, 3-42). The most salient internal political crises which nations experienced during the period of party formation are crises of legitimacy, integration and participation. Legitimacy is the issue around which the first European parties developed. The internally created parties to which Duverger (1954) referred, appeared to arise when the issue of legitimacy, or constitutional order is much debated. With the establishment of parliaments and the diminishing power of the monarchy this legitimacy crisis was adequately resolved. The integration crisis relates to the unification-process of nations in which territorial or ethnic communities, previously divided, became accommodated. Crises of participation occurred when great social and economic transformations resulted in enormous changes in existing stratification systems and the appearance of new social groups. When these groups demanded their share of control of the state apparatus, the participation and legitimization crisis occurred simultaneously, thereby 'overloading' the problem solving capacity of the ruling political

used to examine the performance of the continental political parties in the 1920's which successfully integrated the working classes into the political system. Kirchheimer also addressed the bourgeois parties' failure to develop into mass-integration parties which would be capable to cooperate successfully with the working-class mass parties.[9] The bourgeois parties saw no need to advance to the stage of integration parties themselves as they had other means of access (educational and class privileges) to the state apparatus. During the first three decades of this century, working-class mass parties were ambivalent with respect to the integration of their members into the existing political community, instead they integrated their constituency into their own organisation which was pitted against the official state apparatus.[10]

This problematic situation is ostensibly resolved after the Second World War when the class lines and denominational structures eroded and for all parties the acceptance of the law of the political market seemed inevitable. Consequently, the political system transformed, as former bourgeois parties of individual representation no longer determined the nature of the party system. Kirchheimer claims that: "(b)y the same token, the mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all "people's" party. Abandoning attempts at the intellectual and moral 'encadrement' of the masses, it is turning more fully to the electoral scene, trying to exchange effectiveness in depth for a wider audience and more immediate electoral success. The narrower political task and the immediate electoral goal differ sharply from the former all-embracing concerns; today the latter are seen as counterproductive since they deter segments of a potential nation-wide clientele" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 184-185).

2.4 The causes and consequences of catch-allism

Kirchheimer identified several factors which determined this transformation and framed the catch-all development in a complex structure of hypotheses, most of which are implicit. It is important to note that in explaining the emergence of catch-all parties, Kirchheimer pointed to a wide range of socio-economic and sociological developments.[11] Chiefly, the catch-all party is a product of increasing economic

parties.

[9] One year earlier Kirchheimer had published the German version of the article under the title "Der Wandel des Westeuropäischen Parteisystems" in the German Politische Vierteljahresschrift (Kirchheimer 1965d). In the subtitle of the German version Kirchheimer calls his analysis of party systems "Eine neue Hypothese über die Ursachen des Erfolgs und Versagens von Parteisystemen" (A new hypothesis on the causes of success and failure of party systems). At a conference in Frascati, Italy on January 6-9, 1964 an earlier English version was presented (Kirchheimer 1964c).

[10] Political integration, in Kirchheimer's view, is the capacity of a political system to make social groups which were previously outside the official politics, full-fledged participants in the political process. While the social integration of the working-class into the industrial society was well underway, the political integration into the existing political system did not occur until after the Second World War.

[11] In Kirchheimer's model of party transformation several independent variables can be distinguished: economic factors, social factors and institutional factors. As economic factors Kirchheimer mentioned (1) the rate of economic development and the spread of mass-consumer goods and (2) the establishment of the welfare state and state-intervention in the economic process. The social factors Kirchheimer enumerated are (1) the erosion of the traditional framework of society (the class lines and denominational structures) and (2) the patterns of social and professional stratification. Kirchheimer also stressed the importance of institutional factors like (1) the political structure (the electoral laws which condition the

prosperity and the emergence of the welfare state. Former class- and denominational mass-integration, and even bourgeois parties, are most likely to adopt a catch-all strategy when prosperity increases and a high level of social security is guaranteed by the welfare state. This type and rate of economic development in Western Europe had reduced the patterns of social and professional stratification and had accommodated conflicting interests. Kirchheimer stressed that parties can only "catch" those voters whose interests do not explicitly conflict. Even though he saw the rate of economic development as the most important determinant his conclusion was, nonetheless, qualified: "if it were so important, France would certainly be ahead of Great Britain and, for that matter also of the United States, still the classical example of an all-pervasive catch-all party system" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185). Kirchheimer further suggested that the (dis)continuity of the political system was also a determinant. However, "...if this were so important Germany and Great Britain would appear at opposite ends of the spectrum rather than showing a similar speed of transformation" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185). Kirchheimer concluded that "we must then be satisfied to make some comments on the general trend and to note special limiting factors" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185).

The first limiting factor in the development catch-all of parties is the traditional framework, i.e. the patterns of social and professional stratification in society. With the reduction of social cleavages parties are able to concentrate more on issues over which broad consensus existed. The second limiting factor is the number and complexity of determinants of economic well-being and individual security (Kirchheimer 1966a, 186). Voters progressively regard political alternatives less in terms of particular claims and more in terms of the alleged political leader's ability to cope with future challenges. A third limiting factor is the party's ideology. At times of de-ideologization, parties with a harsh and limited ideological claim or a limited action program cannot develop a catch-all strategy; neither can a party which claims to represent a specific group or professional category (Kirchheimer 1966a, 187). The size of the party is the fourth limiting factor. Only major parties can become successful catch-all parties. Small, strictly regional parties cannot appeal to large audiences. These smaller parties, with their limited clientele, express no impulse to adopt the catch-all strategy.[12] Furthermore, Kirchheimer insisted that the size of the country is also a limiting factor. The *catch-all* strategy is not "in vogue or even sought among the majority of the larger parties in small democracies" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 188). In smaller democracies fewer factors influence the results of political decision-making, thus enabling parties to stabilise political competition by rigid stipulations. This does not to say that catch-all parties can not develop in small democracies. Kirchheimer remarked that "the Austrian Social-Democratic party forms a partial exception to the rule of less clear-cut transformation tendencies among major class-mass parties in smaller countries. It is becoming an eager and rather successful member of the catch-

accessibility of the political market and thereby the fragmentation of the party system), (2) the continuity of the political system and (3) the political traditions. Furthermore (4) the size of the country is important as well as the size of the party (see also Mintzel 1984).

[12] On the party size factor, Kirchheimer's thesis is contradictory as Kirchheimer presents the size of the party here as an independent variable, whereas party size is regarded a dependent variable where Kirchheimer argues that the electoral fortunes of parties depend on their ability to transform into catch-all parties.

all club" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 188, footnote 13). The type of competition in a party system is also a limiting factor as the perception of the electoral chances in the next election of its competitors determine a parties' proclivity to maintain a dedicated, yet restricted, clientele. Catch-allism, therefore, is a highly competitive phenomenon. When parties are convinced that positive electoral results of the competitor were caused by circumstances that are permanent, they are liable to mimic each other's campaigning style.

Nevertheless, these six factors still do not elucidate which general elements explain the emergence of catch-all parties in different political systems. According to Kirchheimer, it is therefore necessary to evaluate the changing functions of political parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in relation to those of the post-war period. As a result of full democratisation, the expressive function has become ambiguous as a catch-all party has to balance this with the political-action (governing) function. Consequently, the expressive function is subject to a multitude of restrictions and tactical considerations. For electoral reasons the democratic catch-all party has to express widely held popular concerns, in contrast to the more individual opinion and criticism of the representatives of the internally created parliamentary parties. In order for a catch-all party to attain and keep governmental power, moderation and restriction is required.

Kirchheimer argued that parties purported to perform all these functions, but in reality more emphasis was placed on the nominating function. Without the ability to integrate people into the political community, a catch-all party can not force other parties to take their policy preferences seriously. Furthermore, people are only willing to follow a party-leader when they conceive the party's policy preferences to be in accordance with their own belief system. The nomination function combines all this together: "The nominations concretise the party's image with the public at large, on whose confidence the party's effective functioning depends. ... Under present conditions of spreading secular and mass consumer-goods orientation, with shifting and less obtrusive class lines, the former class-mass parties and denominational mass parties are both under pressure to become catch-all peoples' parties" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190).

Kirchheimer (1966a, 190) emphasised five principal indicators of catch-allism: a drastic reduction of the party's ideology; a strengthening of the party's leadership; a reduced role for the individual party member; the recruitment of voters from the population at large and lastly, securing access to a variety of interest groups. Instead of an organisation which combined the defence of a social position with intense commitment to a certain ideology, catch-all parties competed with nearly identical programs to attain the short-range goal of winning the next election. Thus, Kirchheimer argued, due to the fact that the catch-all party's integration function is reduced to attract a maximum number of voters on election day, the catch-all party became analogous to an product of mass consumption.[13] It had to differentiate

[13] "When a party has or seeks an almost nationwide potential constituency, its majority composed of individuals whose relation is both tangential and discontinuous, the factors which may decide the eventual electoral outcome are almost infinite in number and often quite unrelated to the party's performance" .... "The party's transformation from an organization combining the defense of social position, the quality of spiritual shelter, and the vision of things to come into that of a vehicle for short-range and interstitial political choice exposes the party to the hazards of all purveyors of non-durable consumer goods: competition with a more attractively packaged brand of nearly identical merchandise" (Kirchheimer

enough to be recognisable, but could not deviate too much from the other competitors. Kirchheimer claimed that the decreasing membership and voter loyalty demanded that catch-all parties look for methods of procuring more permanent support through interest groups. "Only the interest group, whether ideological or economic in nature or a combination of the two, can provide mass reservoirs of readily accessible voters. It has a more constant line of communication and higher acceptance for its messages than the catch-all party, which is removed from direct contact with the public ..." (Kirchheimer 1966a, 193). However, the catch-all party can not afford to identify itself too closely with interest groups as this might discourage voters who identify themselves with other interests. In turn, interest groups establish connections with a multitude of parties in order to minimise the risk of losing influence on government policy. The interdependency and mutual adaptation of the catch-all party and the interest groups - the former expecting from the latter electoral rewards, the latter expecting rewards in government policy in return - moderates their behaviour. Thus, the catch-all party is reduced to a collector of interest group demands, resulting in the neglect of unorganised interests. According to Kirchheimer, catch-all parties will not advance concrete policy proposals which could be turned into electoral weapons by the competitors (Kirchheimer 1966a, 197). Instead, the catch-all party will do its utmost to establish consensus and thereby avoid party realignment. This moderation in policy proposals enlarged the electoral chances of the catch-all party, yet hampered the party's integration function.

On the positive side, Kirchheimer argued that the contribution of the catch-all party was embedded in its ability to mobilise voters on the basis of their own policy preferences, instead of mobilisation on the basis of a priori selected goals by party leaders (Kirchheimer, 1966a, 198). This expanded the area of manoeuvrability for leaders who were no longer restricted by specific party policy and also gave formerly excluded minorities the opportunity to join the political elite. Moreover, Kirchheimer asserted, that the "...nomination of candidates for popular legitimation as officeholders thus emerges as the most important function of the present-day catch-all party. Concentration on the selection of candidates for office is in line with an increasing role differentiation in industrial society....Compared to his connection with interest organisations and voluntary associations of a non-political nature and to his frequent encounters with the state bureaucracy, the citizen's relations with the political party are becoming more intermittent and of more limited scope" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 198-199). In contrast, the negative consequence of this looseness of the catch-all party support excluded the possibility of radical changes in policy. Kirchheimer concluded that the role of the political party in Western European society became more limited than would appear from its position of formal pre-eminence. In its governmental role the catch-all party could only function as a co-ordinator and arbitrator between different powers. Via its electoral role the catch-all party produced limited popular participation and integration within political institutions. In the words of Kirchheimer: "The instrument, the catch-all party, cannot be more rational than its nominal master, the individual voter. No longer subject to the discipline of the party of integration ... the voters may, by their shifting moods and their apathy, transform the sensitive instrument of the catch-all party into something too blind to serve as a

1966a, 195).

link with the functional powerholders of society. Then we may yet come to regret the passing - even if it was inevitable - of the class-mass party and the denominational party, as we already regret the passing of other features in yesterday's stage of Western civilisation" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 200).

2.5 Continuity in Kirchheimer's political thought

Although some argue that Kirchheimer did not develop a coherent system of thought (see Herz 1966, 2; Herz and Hula 1969, iv; Herz 1989, 17) this chapter illustrates that considerable continuity in subject matter and perspective can be found in Kirchheimer's work. The core of criticism directed towards Kirchheimer, is that his writings were not based on empirical research, but on ad hoc personal observations (see for example Heidenheimer, undated). His writings are an amalgamation of elements from theories on social structures, empirical party-sociology and some principles from Downs' economic theory of politics (Sontheimer 1989, 184). Furthermore, Kirchheimer seemed particularly influenced by "The Lonely Crowd" by Riesman, Glazer and Denny (1950) and "The End of Ideology" written by Daniel Bell in 1960 (see Schmidt 1989, 173). Elements from all these publications were combined with strong normative views on democratic and social developments in Kirchheimer's writings. These views originated mainly from his traumatic experiences during the collapse of the Weimar republic and his fear that American political practices would also become dominant in Western Europe. Other authors were less fixated on his haphazard methodology and opaque lexicon, instead they stressed that the importance of Kirchheimer's work lies in his ability to select from numerous data that which was relevant, to differentiate general tendencies from specific events and to analyse them in an original and creative fashion. Kirchheimer was thus able to depict a new type of party, the catch-all party, and simultaneously describe the consequences of its emergence for modern democracies (Sontheimer 1989, 186-188).[14]

Whether or not Kirchheimer's scientific work can be considered systematic, there is substantial continuity in subject matter throughout his entire oeuvre. The most fundamental problem Kirchheimer grappled with is whether the essence of democracy is pluralism or consensus. Kirchheimer framed consensus not in terms of uniformity of opinion, but in the acceptance of democratic procedures by all participants. Kirchheimer's principle tutor, Carl Schmitt, feared 'factionalisation' in the political sphere as it threatened the unity of the nation. Instead, Kirchheimer feared the drive for unity and consensus would lead to misrepresentation of the class structure of society. To Kirchheimer social and political pluralism is a basic prerequisite for democracy.

Degeneration of pluralism, and thus democracy is the overarching subject matter of Otto Kirchheimer's oeuvre. This democratic degeneration is characterised by three

[14] Taking an opposite position, Stöss (1989) argued that Kirchheimer did develop a systematic party-theory. This theory incorporates party-sociological aspects as well as elementary problems of democracy in a bourgeois society. According to Stöss, Kirchheimer distinguished four party-types: the party of individual representation, the democratic mass-integration party (subdivided in democratic parties of integration based on class and on confessional grounds), parties of opposition of principle (or totalitarian parties) and catch-all parties. Kirchheimer delineated the development of the (German) party system into three stages in connection with the emergence or disappearance of these party types. The period of individual representation (1850-1875), the period of emergence of class mass-integration parties (1875-1945 with the interlude of the totalitarian regime) and the period of the 'catch-all' party (after 1945).

basic antagonisms, which structure Kirchheimer's work. The first is the *use of legal means for political ends*, which he coined 'political justice' and experienced at first hand in the Weimar republic. Abuse of legal provisions eventually leads to deterioration of the tripartition between the legislative, executive and judicial powers. This 'cartelization' of powers as well as the exclusion of political opponents consequently results in *vanishing political choice and opposition*, the second antagonism in the deterioration of democracy. Inevitably, vanishing political choice alienates the citizen from the state, the political centre. The state and its citizens no longer share common ideological goals and the populace is not represented. This *misrepresentation of society at the political level* constitutes the third antagonism of democratic corrosion. Declining sovereignty of the people and the expansion of state activities thrusts citizens from the public sphere into a mere private existence.

Kirchheimer (1964b) himself enumerated these main themes of his work in the introduction to "Politik und Verfassung" (Politics and Constitution). His first central concern, he argued, was to identify the determinants of the swift erosion and alteration of political systems and the synchronous transformation of democratic institutions (constitution, parliament, government, political parties and interest groups). Secondly, Kirchheimer thought it his task to uncover the basic mechanisms of political order and disorder; which involved the analysis of the struggle between different groups in society and the means by which these groups utilised legal means for achieving their political goals. Thirdly, the creation of humane and meaningful conditions for the individual, including the guarantee of individual freedom and full participation in the democratic process, remained a cornerstone of Kirchheimer's treatises.

Long after he refrained from considering himself a Marxist, Kirchheimer upheld that Marxism remained the best method to analyse society (Herz 1989, 17; Herz and Hula 1969, xxxvii). This explains Kirchheimer's assertion that the most decisive antithesis was the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, and not the typical German conflict between liberal-democratic institutions and authoritarian powers. Still, the shock of the sheer brutality of Adolf Hitler's nazi-regime made Kirchheimer very sensitive to manifestations of authoritarianism as well as premonitions of anti-communism and led him to analyse the origin and consequences of national-socialism in depth. Kirchheimer was genuinely disappointed by the post-war developments in Europe and his last writings "clearly show this mixture of sadness, resignation and indignation" (Herz 1989, 15). The article "Private Man and Society" began with a quote from Marx' critique of Hegel's philosophy of the state: "The real human is the private person in the current constitution." Kirchheimer persistently emphasised the limited capacity of most constitutions to represent societal structures. To typify Kirchheimer as a Marxist is, however, too simple. While he continued to use Marxist class theory and continuously stressed the influence of economic determinants on the political superstructure, Kirchheimer also displayed genuine anxiety about the increasing power of state apparatuses. His later work, in particular, emphasised the need for political pluralism.

Burin and Shell (1969, x) suggested that Kirchheimer's life and work can be divided into four periods. First, his German period, in which "Weimar- und was dann?" (Kirchheimer 1930a) was his most important essay. The second period comprises the years spent in exile in France and the first years in the United States, in

which Kirchheimer worked for the "Institut für Sozialforschung". His third, and most 'pragmatic' period was the time spent in US-government employment at the OSS, where Kirchheimer felt he worked for the reinstatement of democracy in Europe. In his fourth period Kirchheimer became a genuine 'political' scientist as his writings showed a broader interest, shifting from problems of the 'state' and 'sovereignty' to overall social and political trends, such as the changing industrial and technological society as well as the transformation of political institutions (political parties, parliaments and trade unions). His years at Columbia University demonstrated a decisively sociological concern with the role and conditions of individuals in modern society.

Throughout these periods, Kirchheimer's approach and subject matter has roughly followed the general trend in political science. Traditionally, political science is a very descriptive scientific discipline, oriented primarily towards political theories and formal political institutions. Traditional institutionalists focused chiefly on the political impact of the legislature, the legal system, the state and other administrative and economic institutions. Formal laws and structures were regarded as explanatory to actual political behaviour. This emphasis on legal and constitutional aspects of politics is clearly dominant in Kirchheimer's early work. Until 1933, Kirchheimer concentrated on the role of the state as a repressive machinery in the hands of the ruling classes. The constitution of such a state echoed the outcome of the class struggle. Kirchheimer indicated that when rulers risk losing their privileged positions, they will abuse legal provisions. Ruling by decree and dissolution of parliament, in order to retain their power positions, are examples of such provisional abuse. Although at this point Kirchheimer's writings were primarily of a more legal nature, his work was never purely legal in content and significance (see for example Kirchheimer 1930d). In his essays on the Weimar Republic a political element is always discernible. These writings critically examine social relations and their manifestation in justice, constitution and politics. Clearly, Kirchheimer was deeply influenced by his tutor at Bonn University, Carl Schmitt. The concepts of legality and legitimacy, crucial for the understanding of Kirchheimer's state theory, also played an important role in Schmitt's work. Further testimony of a political component in his work is the prominence of the concept of 'political justice' in Kirchheimer's critique of the Weimar Republic and post-war Europe, particularly Germany.

In his analysis of the Weimar democracy, characterised by great social and political instability and authoritarian solutions, Kirchheimer displayed a growing awareness for the importance of formal democratic rules, elected parliamentary bodies and political and civil liberties. It appears safe to assume that Kirchheimer's continuing preoccupation with the disturbing effects of the opposition of principle on the democratic process stemmed from his traumatic experience in Weimar Germany. Then, he was still sceptical about the exaggeration by liberals of the importance of constitutions and 'rule of law' (Rechtsstaat) and regarded liberal democracy a 'non-state', an empty legal machine, thus taking a clear Marxist position.

With the dissolution of the Weimar democracy into presidential and subsequently Nazi dictatorship, Kirchheimer came to stress emphatically the importance of democratic rules, political rights of citizens and elected parliamentary representatives. His personal experience with legal procedures and 'justice' being used for political ends in different regimes only reinforced this conviction. Most of Kirchheimer's work after 1933 deals with the problematic nature of majority rule, rule by presidential

decree, parliamentary sovereignty, the nature of political legitimacy and the role of the bureaucracy. In the same period, Kirchheimer also concentrated on legal-sociological subjects, but even this work remained politically relevant. At this point, Kirchheimer (1941a) additionally explores at a more theoretically level the problems of class conflict and its resolution, that is, political compromise by full political participation of all groups in society.

Prior to the 1950s, Kirchheimer maintained a Marxist perception of the state and argued that power relationships within the state are the result of conflicting social, political and economic positions (Kirchheimer 1944). The outcome of social, economic and political struggle was not, as pluralists asserted, an appeasing compromise between these conflicting interests, neither can the state be seen as a 'neutral' power. The role of the state as arbitrator between groups was reduced by interest groups, dominating and controlling the class struggle. As a result, the individual as consumer as well as voter, had lost his 'sovereignty'. It is this position of the individual in the capitalist state which would become the central focus of Kirchheimer's later work.

Kirchheimer's decision to remain in the United States and not return to Germany after 1945 is essential in grasping the ethos of his post-war writings (Kirchheimer 1962a). After the Second World War, Kirchheimer published several articles on the political developments in Germany, namely, the elections of 1949, the composition of the Bundestag and on the government in Eastern Germany. The most important feature in his work during this period was the introduction of the concept 'political justice' (Kirchheimer 1955; 1961). According to Söllner (1988), throughout the 1950s two trends were visible in Kirchheimer's writing. First, his Marxist perspective was steadily replaced as Kirchheimer became influenced by pluralist theorists, most notably by Laski (1938). The second trend was the introduction of historical and sociological aspects in his analysis. This was again in line with a general trend in social science. The static approach to politics of the institutionalists and the need for more comparative concepts provoked the behaviourist revolution in political science. This behaviourist revolution was characterised by a shift of scientific attention to values, individual characteristics, attitudes and behaviour as explanatory variables for political phenomena. In his analysis of modern capitalist societies, Kirchheimer now seemed to combine the Marxist perspective of the state with more liberal notions of concepts such as equality and liberty, although he never abandoned his conviction that the political structure must genuinely represent the social-economic structure of a society for a regime to be legitimate. Attempts by authorities of all regimes, whether democratic or authoritarian, to misrepresent certain groups by institutional and electoral engineering were fiercely criticised by Kirchheimer. At the same time, Kirchheimer seemed to criticise the penetration of the private sphere by state institutions, a very liberal criticism. According to Kirchheimer, there was no justification for an incisive distinction between totalitarian and constitutional democratic political regimes. Both penetrate deeply into the lives of their citizens, not to integrate them into the body politic, but to appease them into the role of an uncritical consumer. This leaves citizens without means to configure the state and society into their own image.

In post-war Europe, Kirchheimer detected a waning of the tripartition of functions between the legislative, executive and judicial powers. He claimed that the representatives of these powers, political parties, governments and the courts, were

increasingly forming a unified cartel. This power block leaves the individual virtually powerless in the scarce attempts to influence his or her environment. After the Second World War, Kirchheimer concentrated profoundly more on the role of political institutions, in particular, the function of political parties within the nation-state. Kirchheimer posited that the interdependency of political parties and the state had increased. According to Kirchheimer, parties were drawing nearer to the state, into a state-party cartel which had resulted in the waning of political opposition.

Kirchheimer's most significant writings concern the analysis of political systems and regimes. Following 1954, Kirchheimer developed a truly comparative approach on the transformation of political structures and institutions in Western Europe. He made good use of all the information collected during his years in government service; data he was not allowed to use in publications during his years in government employment (Herz 1989, 13). Freed from the state censorship, Kirchheimer now produced his most famous articles on political parties and introduced the catch-all concept in 1954. Another prominent topic which gained increasing prominence in his work was the role of interest groups in society and the state. Instead of a fragmentation of Western party systems, as some authors would typify the developments of the sixties, Kirchheimer saw a vanishing of opposition into a party-state cartel. He regarded the British party system as the classical pattern of government and opposition, in which agreement on fundamental features and presentation of meaningful policy alternatives enabled a smooth transformation of the machinery of government from one party to another. He distinguished two different types of deviation from this classical government-opposition model in Europe. Firstly, the vanishing of opposition of principle, which had predominated in Europe until World War II and secondly, the emergence of the catch-all party in the period after 1945.

According to Kirchheimer, the catch-all party did not integrate its followers into its own ranks against the official state, but rather performed its integrative function by amalgamating the mass-population into the existing political community. The weakened antagonisms between the classes in modern industrial societies lead to a new type of opposition which was based on pragmatic rather than on ideological motives. These oppositional forces no longer strove to fundamentally change society, since all parties advanced identical demands. Disagreement was thereby confined to the question of priority, methods and accents in solving practical political problems. Political opposition was reduced to a non-ideological competitive element as parties try to win a maximum of votes among all social strata of the population. Citizens only had a meagre and passive role as the mediation of conflicting interests will be effected through interests-groups rather than through political parties. In countries where the opposition of principle is left mainly to the communist parties, this ultimately poses a threat to the parliamentary system. Kirchheimer (1959a) regarded a democratic regime, confronted with a large opposition of principle, as the least stable type of democratic government. He pointed out that "Weltanschauungsparteien" (parties of socialist and religious denomination) did not integrate their members into the political community as a whole, but rather tended to integrate them into a particular party organisation. This had a negative as well as a positive side. Negatively, it isolated the members' social activities from the political community and thus rendered consensus impossible, but conversely it protected its members against the consequences of atomisation of the modern industrial society by promising a betterment of life in a more just political and social order. Kirchheimer regretted the disappearance of party

systems similar to the Weimar Republic; those with an opposition of principle against the prevailing economic and social structure. According to Kirchheimer, modern parties no longer constructed a blue-print of the community as a whole. The difference between the Weimar period and the post-war period, Kirchheimer asserted, was that the Weimar Republic suffered from a crisis of political elites, while the post-war catch-all period is characterised by a crisis of mass politics. Where the weakness of the parties in the Weimar Republic could be found in their integration-deficiency, the weakness of the catch-all parties lay in its representation-deficit. This was caused by the emergence of the welfare state, which solved the most urgent problems without deteriorating the position of competing social groups. Subsequently, there was no longer serious deprivation of certain social groups.

In his later writings this general process of rationalisation of the modern world and its consequences became Kirchheimer's most important concern. Depoliticisation, privatisation and the incorporation of the working class into the mass-consumption society of the post-war period had not replaced the earlier working class-alienation (Entfremdung). The working class (now called 'executants' to underline their passive role) had come to accept the role of middle-class consumers. They had little interest in politics and casted their vote only to legitimise the political system. Furthermore, political candidates of catch-all parties beguiled only a real initiative or choice. According to Kirchheimer, no party or other intermediary institution provided legitimisation, in that catch-all parties no longer reflected the social structure of society. The effect of this party system change upon the participation of citizens was perhaps Kirchheimer's deepest concern in his later work.

What makes Kirchheimer's oeuvre remarkable and valuable is that while some author's argued that politicians were conducting ancient feuds long forgotten by everyone else, Kirchheimer's concern was the opposite. He conceived the catch-all party to be an instrument which betrayed the interests of the masses. According to Kirchheimer, post-war politics differed from the interbellum in that the catch-all people's party acted as an agent of the personal political ambition of elites, rather than a mass organisation oriented towards the mobilisation of the people. The diminished activity of the ordinary citizen in politics, within as well as outside party organisations, indicated this depoliticisation. The incapacity of social democratic parties in particular to increase intra-party activity and democracy, thus failing to create a working class identity and solidarity, was fiercely targeted by Kirchheimer. Social democratic parties no longer challenged the capitalist state and related mode of production, which resulted in the disappearance of principled opposition against these structures. Kirchheimer stressed that the domination of the catch-all party in contemporary party systems entailed severe implications for the quality of parliamentary democracy. This process severely limited the choice of the electorate, the effectiveness of opposition and the pluriformity of political representation. Subsequently, the functioning and development of individual parties as well as West European party systems as a whole transformed significantly. It is precisely this sophisticated and multifarious cluster of social and political aspects which, according to Kirchheimer, indicated a profound transformation of democratic politics, that now justifies a closer examination of Kirchheimer's catch-all theory. Although Kirchheimer's complex and broad ideas are not easy to operationalise, it is this which I will attempt in the following chapter.

Summary of the main ideas underpinning Otto Kirchheimer's work:

- political justice: constitutions and legal provisions are used for political ends by powerholders.
- political inclusion: for a regime to be legitimate the political structure should represent the social structure. There is substantial penetration of political parties by interest groups, while unorganised interests remain unrepresented.
- political opposition: opposition of 'principle' is vanishing and the electorate is deprived of political alternatives by a state-party cartel.

3 A definition of Kirchheimer's catch-all party

3.1 Introduction

In contrast to the Lipset and Rokkan 'freeze-hypothesis' (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis points to a fundamental restructuring of West European political systems. Kirchheimer feared that the American type of party system would become dominant in Western Europe (Kirchheimer 1966a, 185; 1954a, 250; 1961b, 256). He stressed the competitive element of catch-allism and argued that when one party adopts the catch-all strategy, other parties in the party system are forced to follow its example. Inconsistently, Kirchheimer excluded certain parties from the catch-all development when he suggested that the class and denominational mass parties, in particular, were transforming into catch-all parties.[15] Moreover, he provided inadequate evidence as to why other mass parties, as well as cadre parties and parties of individual representation, would not succumb to the pressures to transform into catch-all parties. Assuming that catch-allism was indeed a contagious phenomenon, logically catch-allism would either be ubiquitous within a party system or hardly discernible at all. Presuming there is convergence of political parties in Western Europe towards catch-allism, parties obviously begin this process of transformation from different (ideological, organisational and electoral) starting points and will not necessarily follow the same course and speed of transformation. Moreover, this transformation into catch-all parties will not happen overnight, but more likely constitute a gradual process. Therefore, the concepts of 'mass parties' and 'catch-all parties' should not be regarded as a dichotomy. Rather, these concepts refer to two different party types with distinctive characteristics, which constitute two extremes on a continuum of 'catch-allism' on which all parties can be placed and few parties will be pure 'mass' or pure catch-all parties.[16]

Furthermore, Kirchheimer's conceptualisation of the catch-all party is ambiguous and not sufficiently lucid, complicated by the fact that the concept was developed over a period which at least spans the years from 1954 until 1966, during which Kirchheimer provided very incoherent indications to what precisely constitutes a catch-all party. The reader becomes confused at times, because the catch-all party is sometimes referred to as the "catch-all people's party" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190), other times as the "catch-all mass party" (Kirchheimer 1954a, 250; 1966a, 191), the "conservative catch-all party" (Kirchheimer 1954a, 250), the "Christian type of catch-all people's parties" (Kirchheimer 1959a, 270) and still another version is the "personal loyalty variant of the catch-all party" (Kirchheimer, 1966a, 187, footnote

[15] "former class-mass parties and denominational mass parties are both under pressure to become catch-all peoples' parties" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190). Kirchheimer first excludes communist mass-parties, but is not consistent: "However, even in France - not to speak of Italy - Communist policies are under pressure to accommodate the new style" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 191).

[16] Botella (1989, 9) draws the same conclusion arguing that we should be "thinking of "catch-all" and "mass" parties not as two different groups of empirically visible realities but in terms of a "continuum" along which we can place actual political parties. The extremes of the "continuum" would be the "pure" definitions (in a Weberian, ideal-type sense) of catch-all and mass parties respectively."

12). Only if one tries to construct an operational definition does it become clear how vague and unkempt the catch-all concept actually is. Moreover, the formulation of the five developments which Kirchheimer (1996a, 190) regarded to be the principal indicators of the transformation from mass- or individual representation parties into catch-all parties are indistinct and difficult to operationalise intelligibly.

Finally, Kirchheimer himself did not empirically and systematically test the catch-all development. Lacking the necessary data and methods for such an empirical cross-national analysis as well as possibly the inclination to carry out such a study, Kirchheimer's 'evidence' for the catch-all development is at best illustrative and inconclusive. Overstating this point somewhat, Mayer (1989, 160) argues that "(i)n relying on such illustrations, Kirchheimer chooses to ignore numerous parties that clearly are not catch-all. He never suggests criteria for disconfirming the claim that a trend does, in fact, exist in the catch-all direction". Obviously, what is needed is a valid and accurate definition and research strategy to evaluate the catch-all thesis.

In order to develop this valid and unambiguous definition of Kirchheimer's catch-all concept, Sartori's method of concept reconstruction and formation will be used (Sartori 1970; 1984; 1991). Sartori's methodology implies that, first, the meaning (connotation) of the catch-all concept must be reconstructed by enumerating all characteristics mentioned in the literature in order to establish what exactly characterises a catch-all party. The aim of this exercise is to find a *common core of characteristics* and organise these constituent abstract elements in a meaningful and valid manner (Sartori 1984, 50). Sartori (1984, 55) argues that the "crux of (re)-conceptualisation consists of separating the defining (core) properties (or necessary characteristics) from the accompanying properties (or contingent and accidental characteristics)." The defining properties delineate the extension of the concept, that is all objects to which the concept applies (Sartori 1984, 24). In this study, a twofold strategy is used to find the defining or core properties of the catch-all concept. To ensure validity of this operationalisation, this inquiry first examines Kirchheimer's original development of the catch-all concept, and second it evaluates the debate on 'catch-allism' which followed its introduction. In order to avoid misconstruing catch-allism, this study attempts to move away from all the different interpretations and to remain as close as possible to the original meaning of the catch-all concept. Therefore, Kirchheimer's original texts, references and personal notes function as a point of departure for the selection of the empirical indicators of catch-allism.

3.2 The original catch-all concept

Kirchheimer (1954a) introduced the catch-all party concept with particular reference to the West-German party system and also explicitly referred to the United States as the classical example of a catch-all party system (see Kirchheimer 1966a, 185; 1961b, 256), without providing a clear definition. Twelve years after its first introduction, Kirchheimer (1966a, 190) had still only formulated a very cursory definition of the transformation into a catch-all party which is now conceived of as involving five related elements: a) drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage. (...) b) Further strengthening of top leadership groups, whose actions and omissions are now judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to the efficiency of the entire social system rather than identification with the goals of their particular organisation. c) Downgrading of the role of the individual party member, a role considered a historical

relic which may obscure the newly built-up catch-all party image. d) De-emphasis of the class-gardée, specific social-class or denominational clientele, in favour of recruiting voters among the population at large. e) Securing access to a variety of interest groups for financial and electoral reasons. These five elements, in turn, can be categorised into an ideological dimension (point a), an organisational dimension (points b, c and e) and an electoral dimension (points d and e). These three dimensions will structure the format of the ensuing analysis.

An earlier version of Kirchheimer's renowned article, "The Transformation of the European Party Systems" (Kirchheimer 1964c), showed that considerable revisions had been made to the original manuscript[17]. The most substantive alterations were made to the section which describes the post-war catch-all party. This suggests that Kirchheimer, between the initial version and the final published version, rethought and re-formulated his views considerably. The most significant revisions to the original manuscript are made to the section in which Kirchheimer elaborates on the factors which influence the catch-all development in different European countries (page 185 to 188 have almost been completely re-written). Also, the section in which the expressive function is discussed (page 189 in the later version) and the part on the aggregative function (on page 194-195 of the 1965-text) have been significantly modified. Finally, Kirchheimer added a substantial portion of text to the conclusion on the attitude of the party's leadership towards the functional powerholders. Most important in the context of this study, however, are the changes that were made to the five characteristics which Kirchheimer listed as the properties of the catch-all development. In the earlier version Kirchheimer stated that the change towards catch-allism involves: "Further development of a party bureaucratic apparatus committed to organisational success without regard to ideological consistency" (Kirchheimer 1964, 16). The element "further strengthening of the top leadership groups" (Kirchheimer 1965, 190) has later been added to the definition.

More clarity on the original meaning of the catch-all concept can also be achieved by scrutinising Kirchheimer's personal notes which he used for his lectures at Columbia University and unpublished papers he wrote.[18] In one undated paper[19] Kirchheimer specified in which domains the major changes in the character and role the parties have to be analysed (Kirchheimer undated I, 5-7). Firstly, Kirchheimer suggests examining the electorate of the party, focusing on the correlation between social class and political activism. Secondly, he asserted that attention must be paid to the party membership and party leadership. Kirchheimer argued that the role of party members had undergone changes and the increased gap between members and leaders of the party should be investigated. Furthermore, to evaluate changes in action

[17] Otto Kirchheimer died suddenly before submitting the final text of the chapter. Joseph LaPalombara included the text "with only minor revisions" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 177). However, the differences between the first draft (Kirchheimer 1964) and the published version are substantial.

[18] Part of Kirchheimer's personal papers can be found in the German Intellectual Emigre Collection, Department of Special Collections and Archives, State University of Albany, New York. During the summer of 1994 I analyzed the material from this archive of which the results are presented here.

[19] This paper (referred to as Kirchheimer undated I) is entitled: "The realities of Political responsibility: Parliament and Party in Western Europe. Outline for a Research Project." It must have been written after 1962 as Kirchheimer refers to his position at Columbia University.

preferences of parties, Kirchheimer stated that the representatives in political office needed to be analysed, as well as the cohesiveness of party organisation and the mechanisms of enforcing party decisions. Another unpublished paper (Kirchheimer 1964d), which dealt with core political problems in advanced industrial societies, provides additional information on the essence of catch-allism, most important of which is de-ideologization of parties. The function of the catch-all party was restricted to the "effective selection of political personnel ... Change to catch-all party allocates to the party mainly electioneering or referenda engineering functions and de-emphasises anything more than symbolic participation of the mass of the people in the political process" (Kirchheimer 1964d, 8). Echoing his earlier concerns, Kirchheimer stressed the invisibility of ordinary citizens in the decisive power structures and especially emphasised the powerlessness of the lower strata.

Although no previous study has ever focused on the direct references and intimations Kirchheimer gave in order to specify the meaning of these various elements, an analysis of such sources can facilitate a more precise understanding of what was involved. For example, in referring to "further strengthening of top leadership groups" and "downgrading of the role of the individual party member", it is imperative to note that Kirchheimer (1966a, 190) points specifically to earlier work by Lohmar (1963) and Pizzorno (1964) to indicate developments at the **organisational level**:

"Ample material to points b) and c) may be found in the interesting study by a practising German politician: Ulrich Lohmar, *Innerparteiliche Demokratie,* Stuttgart, 1963, esp. pp. 35-47 and 117-124. See also, A. Pizzorno, "The Individualistic Mobilization of Europe", in *Daedalus* (Winter 1964), pp.199, 217."

This reference to Lohmar (1963) suggests that Kirchheimer interpreted the downgrading of the role of the individual party member as a multifaceted process. This process first includes a stagnation in the size of membership of parties[20] and secondly, the idea that the social composition of the membership of parties will shift towards a more balanced representation of different social groups.[21] Thirdly, the relevance and status of membership declines for the party's financial revenues in favour of state financing.[22] The diminishing function of party-members as mediators between party-leaders and the populace is the fourth element here.[23] Finally, the process of

[20] "Die Mitgliederschaft ist bei der SPD über Jahrzehnte relativ konstant geblieben .... Das deutet ... auf eine relatieve Stabilität, aber auch auf die Stagnation der Mitgliederbewegung hin" (Lohmar 1963, 35).

[21] "Die berufliche Schichtung der Mitgliederschaft in beiden Parteien erklärt sich u.a. daraus, daß die jeweiligen sozialen Gruppen ihre spezifischen Interessen bei jeweils einer der großen Parteien am besten aufgehoben wähnen" (Lohmar 1963, 36).

[22] "Die Bedeutung der Finanzierung der Arbeit politischer Parteien durch die Beiträge der Mitglieder wird jedoch vermutlich in nächster Zeit zurücktreten, da die Parteien im Bundestag und in den Landtagen dazu übergegangen sind, sich erhebliche Zuwendungen aus öffentlichen Mitteln zu beschaffen. Ob die teilweise Verlagerung der Finanzierung der Parteien auf den Staat zu einer Stärkung des Status der Mitglieder führen kann, darf mann bezweifeln" (Lohmar 1963, 37).

[23] "Die Mitgliedshaft der Parteien ist nur in unzureichenden Grade als Mittler zwischen Führung und Bevölkerung anzusprechen. Sie hat weder in der innenparteilichen Willensbildung noch in der Meinungsbildung nach außen Bedeutung erlangen können" (Lohmar 1963, 43).

transformation towards a catch-all party organisation involves an increasingly negligible role of members in the selection of candidates.[24] The further strengthening of upper echelons of the party organisation must be understood as an unavoidable consequence of representation which leads to indirect (co-opted) (s)election of leaders (Lohmar 1963, 117-124).[25] As a consequence of mass consumption and protection by the welfare state, Kirchheimer feared that the masses would increasingly be excluded from political affairs. The catch-all party abandons the recruitment and encapsulation of members as a principal and permanent activity. "The very catch-all character of the party makes membership loyalty far more difficult to expect and at best never sufficient to swing results" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 193). Kirchheimer clearly distinguished the mass party from the catch-all party at the organisational level: "To the older party of integration the citizen, if he so desired, could be closer. Then it was a less differentiated organisation, part channel of protest, part source of protection, part surveyor of visions of the future. Now, in its linear descendant in a transfigured world, the catch-all party, the citizen finds a relatively remote, at times quasi-official and alien structure. (...) the individual and society may indeed find the catch-all party - non-utopian, non-oppressive, and ever so flexible - an ingenious and useful political instrument" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 199).

Kirchheimer frequently used Duverger's conceptualisations of mass and cadre parties (Kirchheimer 1966a, 178 and Kirchheimer 1954, 246, 259) and commented that the "internal-external creation dichotomy has to be viewed in the light of presence or absence of a supporting framework for religious or class-motivated parallel organisations. The local committee of the internally created bourgeois party and its financial backers can never serve as such a fool-proof prop of electoral success as can the network of parallel organisations typical of external parties" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 178 footnote 1). The function of these affiliated organisations are obvious to Kirchheimer; "Socialist parties around the turn of the century exercised an important socialising function in regard to their members. They subjected a considerable number of people hitherto living only as isolated individuals to voluntarily accepted discipline operating in close connections with expectations of a future total transformation of society" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 182). According to Kirchheimer, the catch-all party is organisationally more differentiated and offers less opportunity to the individual citizen to participate in the internal decision-making processes and therefore, ancillary organisations will gradually be rendered superfluous. Kirchheimer also emphasised that financial resources had become increasingly important in order to communicate with the electorate. As catch-all parties no longer possessed the

[24] Lohmar 1963, 43: "Sowohl bei der innerparteilichen führungsauswahl als auch bei der Nominierung van Kandidaten für die Parlemente erweist sich, daß die große Mehrheit der Mitglieder auf das Geschehen keinen oder nuhr sehr geringen Einfluß hat."

[25] Pizzorno (1964) in turn, emphasised the modifications of power structures in European societies. Political parties no longer espoused a change to the structural elements of society and tended to abandon the pursuit of ideological goals. Selection of (party)leaders therefore ceases to be determined uniquely by class origin or ideological orientation, but instead by their technical and managerial qualities: "The circle where political personnel are recruited has grown numerically, spread socially (...), and risen qualitatively. (...) The chances for attaining political power have improved for individuals belonging to the middle and lower middle classes, and not only for those belonging to the classes which are the traditional reservoir of the ruling groups. (...) ...technical-economic values now constitute effective standards of selection." (Pizzorno 1964, 212-217).

means of communication of a mass-integration party (party-press and ancillary organisations), they needed to communicate through other channels and with other means. When volunteers are unavailable, the organisation then, becomes less labour and more capital intensive. This professionalisation of political parties leads to proportionally larger amounts of money spent on salaries of experts as well as increasing campaign expenditures.

For electoral as well as financial reasons catch-all parties will secure access to a variety of interest groups: "The financial reasons are obvious, but they are not the most important where official financing is available, as in Germany, or where access to the most important media of communication is fairly open, as in England and Germany" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190-191). Kirchheimer suggested two financial sources which gained eminence for catch-all parties, namely financial backing by the state and by interest-groups, whereas the prominence of membership revenues abated. Kirchheimer is incisive about the electoral reason for this approachment to interest organisations: "(t)he chief reason is to secure electoral support via interest-group intercession" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190).

Kirchheimer regarded the **electoral dimension** of crucial importance, which is clear from the fact that this dimension gives the catch-all party its name. The catch-all "people's" party attempts to transgress the (already declining) socio-economic and cultural cleavages among the electorate in order to attract a broader 'audience' (Kirchheimer 1965, 184).

Commenting on inter-party elite co-operation and consensus Kirchheimer (1966a, 188) referred to Torgersen (1962) to illustrate how Scandinavian parties stabilised their political relations.[26] Kirchheimer argued that the Swedish and Norwegian social democrats had no incentive to change their form of recruitment and electoral appeal. The parties reduced political conflict to a minimum by decreasing the differences in their political programs. Political conflict was only exhibited when necessary to emphasise the distinctiveness of the parties to the electorate. Parties adopted a position in the political centre by moving away from extreme policy stances. Moreover, parties de-emphasised 'old' political issues and traditional lines of conflict which were considered antiquated and inappropriate. All political leaders co-operated closely, thus leaving little room for political opposition. This indicated a development from 'ideological politics' to 'pluralistic politics.' Furthermore, political competition was minimised and political participation of citizens declined as a result of this. According to Kirchheimer, such a development can be assessed by examining changes in electoral turnout, reduced involvement in organised party activity and citizens' participation in electoral meetings and rallies.

With reference to the work of Rokkan and Valen (1963), Kirchheimer finds additional evidence for a reduction in political competition. He specifically referred to

[26] In this article Torgersen made a distinction between four problems. First, the decreasing differences between the platforms and programs of parties, which concerns the major political alternatives within a political system. Second, the low quality of the intellectual and academic discussion. Third, the problem of declining mass activity, reducing parties to "pretty empty organizational shells, since what they offer is just the difference between "tweedledee" and "tweedledum" in a society where other and more exiting ways of spending one's leisure time have emerged." The fourth problem relates to the channels of political influence in cases such as Austria, where parties "have established elaborate agreements between themselves in order to share power" (Torgersen 1962, 159-160).

page 29 of the article, in which Rokkan and Valen sketch a trend toward de-ideologisation and de-politicisation: "Urbanisation, industrialisation and the growth of the national economy have created new lines of conflict and have also gradually affected the alignments of leaders and followers in the local communities. Conditions in the peripheral areas have created important barriers, socio-economic as well as geographical, against the spread of partisan politics and have made for persistently low levels of politicisation."

Kirchheimer (1966a, 191) cited a similar argument by Lipset (1964) in support of the assertion that there is a general decline in ideological conflict as well as in political participation. Increasing affluence and consequent upward social mobility within Western industrial democracies resulted in the emergence of new middle strata. According to Lipset, professionalisation of politics minimised the class conflict and generated substantial political consensus and moderation as well as a pragmatic orientation among all major parties after 1945. Parties make a trans-class appeal, with a programme spearheaded by collective bargaining and moderate political and socio-economic changes. Lipset (1964, 268-272) argued that in Western social systems the class conflict between representatives of the left and the right were resolved amicably with social-democratic ideology. Parties of the right have accepted the welfare state and economic planning and the leftist parties had become more moderate in their revision of capitalism. Catholic and socialist mass parties were transforming their electoral appeal, losing their membership and attendance at party meetings as well as the readership of their newspapers.[27] Non-partisan interest groups, on the other hand, gained in membership and power. Voters were far less loyal to the traditional socialist parties as a result of the emergence of a new middle class. Even if citizens remained loyal to a party at elections, their commitment to the party declined. At that point in time, Lipset (1964, 282-290) perceived only moderate parties, with a middle class appeal, competing in the political arena.

In his lecture notes, Kirchheimer clarified what he meant with the wider electoral 'catchment' of parties[28]. In the mid-1960s, according to Kirchheimer, parties in the main countries of Continental Europe and in Britain change significantly and become American style catch-all parties. These parties ceased the recruitment of their voters among a specific clientele and although parties can never appeal to one hundred percent of the voters, " the general appeal is to <u>all</u> social classes. Only those with definite points of view contra are excluded." (Kirchheimer undated II, 27). According to Kirchheimer, a Catholic party, for example, can appeal to all voters with the exception of convinced anti-clericals. To Kirchheimer, this mass appeal is facilitated by the fading of class distinctions and increasing social mobility. Votes are attracted, not on the basis of a consistent pre-set party program, but through the personality of the party leader. The catch-all party thus reduced politics to individual political personalities. Kirchheimer thought that if the 'Weltanschauung' of the party was lost, the electorate would shift its loyalty when the personal image changed.

[27] "The transformation in class attitudes as reflected in political and interest group behavior is most noticeable in northern non-Latin Europe and among the socialist and Roman Catholic political parties." (Lipset 1964, 272). "In Germany and in Italy, the Christian Democratic type parties, with their efforts to retain the support of a large segment of the unionized working classes, have made a trans-class appeal in favor of moderate changes." (Lipset 1964, 276).

[28] Kirchheimer's lecture notes are also available at the German Emigre Archive at Albany. The term 'catchment' was coined by Houska (1985).

In addition to authors mentioned above, Kirchheimer also referred to Anthony Downs (1957) for catch-all characteristics on the **ideological dimension**: "In Anthony Downs's well-known model, action preference simply results from the party's interest in the proximate goal, the winning of the next election. In consequence the party will arrange its policies in such a way that the benefits accruing to the individual members of the community are greater than the losses resulting from its policy" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 195). This Downsian concept of the 'multi-policy party' is in its essence equivalent to Kirchheimer's catch-all concept.[29] Both authors pointed to the fact that parties sacrificed their former ideological position, in order to maximise their electoral appeal. Catch-all parties are competitive; they aim at vote-maximisation and are no longer mere representatives for certain social strata. The catch-all party is described as a mass-consumer good for it mobilises voters on policy-preferences rather than on ideology. Their multi-interpretable ideologies are products for the electoral market, being limited only by the fact that voters will not vote if all parties stress totally identical programs. Parties therefore, compete by means of personalities (candidates), traditional loyalties and other 'irrational' means.[30]

Regarding ideology Kirchheimer refers to Lipset (1964, 290-299) again, who argues that the communist parties seemed reluctant to accept the new social realities, although some (like the PCI) modified their ideology in a social-democratic direction. In deference to Duverger, Kirchheimer specifically excluded the (communist) anti-system parties from the catch-all development, although he argued that the French and Italian communist parties were more inclined to adopt the catch-all style (Kirchheimer 1966a, 191). In the text referred to by Kirchheimer, Duverger (1964) argued that the need for parties to coalesce with others makes them more moderate in their political stance. Whenever parties in coalition cabinets are faced with concrete problems they refrain from fundamentally changing the existing political order. In the words of Duverger (1964, 245): "The reciprocal isolation of governing politicians and ideologues is harmful to both. Denied contact with ideas and ideologies and losing sight of distant goals by concentrating on immediate affairs, governing politicians condemn themselves to immobility and turn to financial deals (...)." Political compromise and centrist positions are now more likely to develop as all parties consist of factions or wings which spread widely across the ideological spectrum. These different factions counterbalance and check one another against any extremist tendency of the party. Due to this ideological convergence, alternation in cabinet composition does no longer lead to different policies.

On the ideology and policy of modern political parties, Kirchheimer remarked in

[29] Mintzel 1984, 66: "Kirchheimer beruft sich in seinem klassischen Artikel über "Den Wandel des westeuropäischen Parteiensystems" lediglich in einer fußnote ausdrücklich auf die "Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie" von Downs. Bei näheren Hinsehen wird aber deutlich, daß die hintergründigen "Anleihen" Kirchheimers so weitgehend ist, daß in bezug auf das Volksparteikonzept von einer geistigen Vaterschafts Downs gesprochen werden muß. Kirchheimers artikel hinterläßt an vielen Stellen geradezu den Eindruck, als habe sein Autor wichtige Teilstücke des Zweiparteien-Konkurrenzmodells van Anthony Downs nur mit historischen Datenmaterial und Beispielen angereichert."

[30] The difference between the analyses of Kirchheimer and Downs is, that Downs explains this behavior with a rational choice model and Kirchheimer ascribed catch-all behavior to the "present conditions of spreading secular and mass consumer-goods orientation, with shifting and less obtrusive class lines" which puts "parties under pressure to become catch-all peoples' parties" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 190).

his lectures: "While parties are mass parties, a party large enough to get a majority has to be so catch-all that it cannot have a unique ideological program" (Kirchheimer 1962c, 1). This shows that Kirchheimer assumed modern parties adopt similar policy positions and emphasised similar issues, though it is still not clear which position is taken or which issues catch-all parties embrace. From another section it emerged that Kirchheimer believed catch-all parties adopt a position in the centre of the political spectrum: "Under proportional representation, one party can ignore the others in establishing its program, and can emphasise the points in which it is unique. However, the CDU and SPD aim for the middle. (In) English and American systems, parties fight for marginal voters. There are certain people who always vote for one party, but in order to get the floating vote one party minimises its differences from the next" (Kirchheimer 1962c, 3). Catch-allism, according to Kirchheimer, is indicated by convergence of political parties to the centre of the political spectrum.

This close examination of the evolution of Kirchheimer's conceptualisation of catch-allism and of the references he made to support his assertions, provides adequate clues to what Kirchheimer considered to indicate catch-allism. In accordance with Sartori's method of concept (re)construction, these findings will be checked against the main arguments in the continuing debate in political science literature over the interpretation and measurement of catch-allism.

3.3 The debate on catch-allism

Ever since Kirchheimer coined and developed the term catch-all party it has been cited in numerous texts which deal with European party systems. The indiscriminate acceptance and use of the term is mainly pre-empted by the obvious, but very sketchy, evidence Kirchheimer provided for in his thesis. Furthermore, the term fell in line with the fashionable end-of-ideology literature.[31] Superficial confirmation of Kirchheimer's analysis was evidenced in November 1959 by the ratification of the Bad Godesberg programme in which the German SPD distanced itself from its former Marxist position and adopted the principle of private ownership. Additionally, the formation of the grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD in 1966 highlighted, for many political observers, the 'waning of opposition' in an extreme form. Why the term catch-allism remained to be in vogue in political science literature, even in the face of evident re-ideologization and increasing polarisation during the 1970s, is not easily explained. Neither is the renewed attention the catch-all concept received during the 1980s.

As it is difficult to evaluate all the references to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, the selection of body of literature for this study is based on the comprehensiveness in which a particular text deals with defining the catch-all party concept and whether the concept is framed in a comparative empirical context. The summary of the debate is structured on the basis of the three dimensions which were differentiated earlier: the ideological, organisational and electoral dimension.

Although authors put different emphases on, and have their own interpretation of

[31] see Marshall 1949, 67 ff.; Aron, 1955, 219 ff.; Bell 1960, 369-375; Shils 1955, 52-58; Lipset 1960, 403-417, 1970, 267-304; Kirchheimer 1957, 127-156.

the reduction of ideology, the characteristics mentioned by the various authors of this **ideological dimension of catch-allism** can be summarised in five categories: catch-all parties adopt an electoral strategy aimed at vote maximisation, they have increasing similarities in issue emphasis, catch-all parties downgrade their traditional ideology, they mediate the different interests and fifth, a catch-all party adopts a centrist position in the party systems. There is, however, some overlap in the interpretation of these ideological elements. The electoral strategy aimed at vote maximisation seems to be the overarching element. Increasing issue similarity is indicated by the search for "themes that can appeal to the electorate as a whole rather than to specific groups or classes" (Wolinetz 1979, 302); emphasis on general and valence issues, as well as on issues that are designed not to deter potential voters (Dittrich 1983) or "emphasis on popular, consensus issues" (Norris 1993, 1). Still, other authors define this element as increasing policy agreement (Schmidt 1989; Katz and Mair 1992). The element of downgrading traditional ideology is emphasised by many authors[32], stating, for example, that it results in "diminishing ideological distance between parties" (Schmidt 1989, 174). Many authors stress that catch-all parties adopt a centre position in the political spectrum.[33] The mediation of interests is highlighted by Tarrow (1969) who argued that catch-all parties adopt moderate electoral strategies which lead to depolarisation (see also Herz 1989, 19 and Norris 1993, 1) and increasing coalition potential (Dittrich 1983; Keman 1988; 1994; Schmidt 1989).

Several authors have argued that the crucial dimension of catch-allism is the **organisational dimension** (see Panebianco 1988). Mair (1989), for example, asserts that, apart from the first characteristic Kirchheimer enumerates (the decline in ideological baggage), all other characteristics have organisational implications, while in addition Dittrich (1983, 266) insists that in order to scrutinise the catch-all thesis "we need to get inside the parties." The organisational features of catch-allism are related to the means of communication between the party and the electorate, the financial structure of the party, the function of the party in a democratic polity, to the size and role of its membership, the professionalisation of the party organisation and to the relative power position of the party leadership.

The decline in membership is an essential indicator of catch-allism (Tarrow 1969, 170; Mintzel 1984). Indeed, Naßmacher (1993) defined the catch-all party solely on the basis of its member-to-voter ratio. Others argued that not only the number of members decreases, but also their internal participation and influence on decision-making up to the point where they are effectively marginalised.[34] The main beneficiaries of this power shift are those who lead the party. As party leaders can no longer rely on the mass-party organisation, they must procure their staff and financial means elsewhere. Professionalisation and differentiation are thus inevitable repercussions.[35] Politics increasingly becomes a profession of experts, while at the same

[32] see Mintzel 1984; Buchaas 1981; Wolinetz 1979, 302; Schmidt 1985; 1989; Mayer 1980a; Dittrich 1983; Smith 1989; Farneti 1985; Müller 1991; 1992b; 1992c; Manning 1992.

[33] Wolinetz 1979, 302-305; Norris 1993, 1; Keman 1988, 174-178; Schmidt 1985, 392; Schmidt 1989, 174.

[34] Mintzel 1984; Mintzel 1990; Panebianco 1988; Dittrich 1983; Müller 1991; 1992; Mair 1989; Katz and Mair 1992; 1994.

[35] Tarrow 1969; Mintzel 1984; Smith 1989; Norris 1991. Panebianco (1988, 221 and 232-235) argues: "If Kirchheimer's theory about the transformation of mass parties into catch-all parties is correct, the

time the capital intensity of the party organisation and its electoral campaigns increases (Panebianco 1988; Katz and Mair 1991). Most notably, generous state party finance makes parties less dependent on membership fees (Müller 1991; 1992c). Parties additionally rely progressively more on external interest groups, rather than on members in order to finance the party organisation (Panebianco 1988). In this process, party organisations have become more uniform and their scope of activities (or functions) has narrowed (Sundberg 1985, 315). Additionally, catch-all parties are primarily involved in the recruitment of popular leaders (Wolinetz 1991). The primary function of the catch-all party is the nomination of candidates for public office.[36] Furthermore, most parties no longer directly control the national media (most importantly television) and have come to depend on non-party channels of communication.[37]

Kirchheimer considered **the electoral dimension of catch-allism** pivotal enough to use this dimension for its label: catch-all party. In describing parties which endeavour to appeal to a multitude of different voter groups, Kirchheimer focused "on the ways in which class or denominational parties adapt to weakened loyalties. Minimally, any test of the catch-all thesis should be couched in terms of changes in bases of support" (Wolinetz 1979, 6). Electorally, three electoral factors surfaced from this debate: the size and composition of the party's electorate, the party's connection with the electorate and its relation with interest-groups.

Most authors which use the catch-all concept refer to the broad-based appeal of modern parties and their wider electoral catchment.[38] Catch-all parties attract a substantial number of voters from all the social strata (Schmidt 1985, 382-384; Schmidt 1989). This leads to a certain degree of resemblance between the party's electorate and the entire electorate or minimally less distinctive electoral profiles (Dittrich 1983; Sundberg 1985). Some authors argued that a catch-all party can not appeal undifferentiatedly to the total electorate. The party must rely on the passive support of its traditional social groups and wield modern techniques of campaigning in order to attract the floating voters.[39] Thus, while there remains a certain social structural

evolution of modern political parties would be essentially... from ...weakly institutionalized, "cadre" parties to ...highly institutionalized, mass parties to ...weakly institutionalized, "catch-all" parties."

[36] Mintzel 1984; Farneti 1985; Schmidt 1985; Müller 1991; 1992.

[37] Katz and Mair 1991; Müller 1991; 1992c; Wolinetz 1991.

[38] McHale and Shaber 1976, 295-296; Mayer 1980a; Mintzel 1984; 1990; Feist et. al. 1978; Houska 1985. The ultimate catch-all character of the parties is achieved when a party is capable of approaching a cross-cutting of the entire population. Müller (1992a, 155) states that we should not apply the most stringent conception of catch-allism, that is that the parties' social structure should mirror the entire population: "Indeed there would be hardly any catch-all party at all since there are few parties with such a balanced social structure." Müller reminds of the fact that Kirchheimer argued that parties cannot attract all electoral groups. For a party to develop towards catch-allism it suffices to extend their electoral appeal outside their traditional group(s) at a faster rate than the transformation of the social structure suggests. Rose and Urwin (1969, 16) related the level of social cohesiveness to Kirhheimer's catch-all thesis: "Kirchheimer (1966, 192) has argued that rising standards of living have so reduced social differences that major European Socialist parties are all becoming catch-all or heterogeneous in their appeals for votes." Heterogeneous parties are parties whose supporters share no major social characteristics. Rose and Urwin found 19 parties which belonged to this 'catch-all'-category: of which the Austrian FPÖ, The British Labour Party, Radical Venstre in Denmark, the CDU in Germany, all major parties in Ireland (Fine Gael, Fianna Fail and Labour), the PSDI in Italy and Venstre in Norway are part of this study.

[39] Smith 1989; Müller 1991; Müller 1992; Panebianco 1988, 262-274; Zuckerman and Lichbach 1977;

emphasis (Buchaas 1985), the catch-all party's connection with the electorate is considerably weakened and more discontinuous. Contact with the electorate is established only indirectly through intermediary interest organisations (Panebianco 1988; Wolinetz 1979; Müller 1991; 1992).

From this evaluation one conclusion is inescapable: there is no consensus on how to define the catch-all concept. Authors apparently take numerous aspects at random from Kirchheimer's text, put different emphases on them and, in addition, give their own interpretation. Moreover, some writers concentrate heavily on the electoral dimension, thereby neglecting the multi-dimensionality of Kirchheimer's catch-all development. This is not surprising when one considers that when these scholars were writing the only cross-national and comparable data that were available, were electoral data. The study of McHale and Shaber (1976) as well as McHale and McLaughlin (1974) are good examples of this electoral bias. In turn, Panebianco (1988) primarily emphasised the organisational elements of modern parties (see also Katz and Mair 1991). Other authors, such as Schmidt (1985; 1989) regarded only the ideological and the electoral dimension important and neglected the fact that Kirchheimer also outlined organisational developments. Wolinetz (1991) argued that Kirchheimer's thesis not only contained an organisational dimension, but also an ideological component, thereby overlooking the electoral dimension. In contrast, Müller (1991; 1992b; 1992c) broke down the catch-all development into five instead of three dimensions: ideology, intra-party distribution of power, composition of the electorate, links with interest groups and the function of the party in the political system. Tarrow (1969) as well as Feist et. al (1978) are examples of the few studies which have taken all three dimensions of the catch-all development into consideration (see also Mair 1989).

In addition to these discrepancies in defining catch-allism, there also exists sparse consensus among scholars regarding its measurement.

3.4 Defining catch-allism

Most authors writing on catch-allism do not clarify which indicators should be utilised to measure the catch-all development. Due to the overemphasis on the electoral dimension, several authors suggest to take electoral volatility as the principal indicator of catch-allism.[40] Keman (1988), for example, related the degree of electoral volatility to the extent to which party distances have diminished. Still, others look at developments in the party system format, or changes in the fragmentation of party systems as indicators of catch-allism. Mayer (1980a), for instance, argued that Kirchheimer's thesis presupposes a lowering of the fractionalisation-index in West European party systems over time.[41] Dittrich (1983), on the contrary, argued that parliamentary fragmentation is not an adequate measure. If all parties developed a catch-all character, then a renewed equilibrium is the outcome, resulting in probably minor

Norris 1993, 1.

[40] Maguire 1983; McHale and McLaughlin 1974; Zuckerman and Lichbach 1977; Shamir 1984; Wolinetz 1979.

[41] Wolinetz 1979; Shamir 1984; Mayer 1980a and Schmidt 1989 all measure the catch-all development with Rae's index of fractionalisation (Rae 1968, 413-418).

changes in vote percentages and numbers of parties. Instead, Dittrich (1983) proposed examining trends in votes for individual parties, as well as patterns of aggregate electoral volatility, in order to test the catch-all thesis. If the connection between voters and the party is loosened, this will necessarily result in a larger proportion of floating voters. Most of these indicators are, however, features of the party system as a whole, not of individual parties to which Kirchheimer clearly referred.

On the ideological level, Dittrich (1983) suggested to assess the degree of depoliticisation through content analysis of party-programs and policy-outputs. In addition, Schmidt (1985; 1989) argued that catch-all parties no longer distinguish themselves ideologically from their competition; instead he suggested measuring disassociation with the political-distance scale developed by Thomas (1975; 1980). Tarrow (1969) selected the voting of party members at congresses as an indicator of polarisation. Müller (1991; 1992b; 1992c) went further, suggesting three methods of measuring de-ideologisation: the development of an ideological consensus, the decline in the practical influence of ideology and a greater separation between the ideological pronouncements and practical policy. In order to measure the development towards a decline of mass-party membership and organisation, Tarrow (1969) employed as indicators of catch-allism the voter-member ratio, membership per section as well as organisational density of sections. Müller (1991; 1992) measured the power shift from the mass membership to the party top by counting the frequency of party conferences.

Regarding the electoral dimension, Zuckerman and Lichbach (1977) tested Kirchheimer's thesis by assessing the increasing number of voters with little or no party loyalty. In turn, Schmidt (1985) suggested measuring a party's ability to catch voters from all the social strata by estimating the weakness or even absence of social cleavages, visible in the social stratification of party support. When the proportions of the different social groups of voters for each political party resemble the percentages of the entire population, it then justifies the designation of catch-allism (Schmidt 1985; 1989, 179-180).

For all the variety, most if not all of the empirical assessments of catch-allism have been at best myopic and at worst uni-dimensional. This study strives to go beyond this uni-dimensional bias of most of these earlier attempts. Instead, it intends to chart the catch-all development and integrate the three dimensions. Sufficient data are now available for a multi-dimensional verification of catch-allism in Western Europe. Admittedly, the data are not complete and they are not standardised, but they are available over a sufficiently long period, to scrutinise Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis.

The main postulate in this study, is that the catch-all concept should not be disassociated from the theoretical framework in which it was developed. Therefore, this study utilises an important part of Kirchheimer’s oeuvre, in which the original configuration of the catch-all concept can be found, as the fundament for the definition of the core (or minimal) elements, which demarcate the catch-all concept. In order to elucidate the empirical indicators of catch-allism, this study also encompasses the debate on catch-allism which followed its inception, in addition to Kirchheimer's references in the article "The Transformation of Western European Party Systems", as well as his private notes and unpublished writings. This leads to the following core definition of the catch-all party:

A catch-all party is characterised by an indistinct ideological profile, a wide electoral appeal aimed at vote maximisation, a loose connection with the electorate, by a power balance in favour of the party top vis-à-vis the party members and by a professional and capital-intensive organisation.

Employing the findings of the analysis presented above, this core definition can now be operationalised in terms of empirically observable and measurable indicators which do justice to Kirchheimer's authentic multi-dimensional conception of catch-allism. The method used here, including both primary and secondary literature, maximises the validity of the operationalisation of catch-allism outlined below.

Let us first look at the **organisational** characteristics of catch-allism as explicitly indicated by Kirchheimer (1966a, 190, footnote 16). Indicating *a declining importance of party membership*, catch-all parties cease to encapsulate large numbers of voters into the party organisation as members, resulting in a stagnation in the size of the membership. Aside from numerical marginalisation, members also cease performing an important role in the internal decision-making procedures of the party. In the development towards a catch-all party there *is a power shift from the members in favour of the party leadership*. The party leadership disavows members of their influence on the decision-making process, particularly in the selection of candidates. Nominating electorally attractive candidates then becomes the paramount function of a catch-all party, whereby ideology is superseded by the charisma of political leaders. Modern methods of campaigning are introduced and more professional staff is employed within the party organisation, leading to *increasing professionalisation of the party organisation*. As a result, the party progressively differentiates between the different functions. This professionalisation also changes the financial structure of parties, since the higher costs can no longer be obtained from membership fees. Thus, catch-all parties are increasingly dependent on state finance and private contributions coming from a wider variety of sources. These various characteristics, as well as their empirical indicators and modes of operationalisation, are summarised in table 3.1.

Table 3.1 The operationalisation of the organisational dimension of catch-allism.

characteristic	indicator	unit of measurement
declining importance of party membership	stagnation or decline in membership size	the number of members in proportion to the total electorate (MERATIO)
	declining importance of the membership for the party's financial revenues	proportional level of membership revenues relative to total income (MEMFIN)
	increasing financial dependence of state finance	proportional level of state funding relative to total income (STATFIN)
increasing professionalisation of the party organisation	increasing capital intensive election campaigns	expenditures for election campaigns relative to annual income (CAMPAIGN)
	increasing capital intensive party structure	number of professionals in the central party organisation and the parliamentary party (STAFMEM and STAFSEAT)
change in the intra-party power balance in favour of the leadership	declining role of party members in selection of candidates and representatives	official procedure in party statutes on candidate and leadership selection and actual practice of candidate and leadership selection (CANDSEL and LEADSEL)
	declining role of members in policy formation and decisions on government participation	frequency of possibilities of policy influence (congresses) and the openness of method of influence (rules of putting motions to the congress) (NOCONGR and MOTIONS)

NB: (CAPITALS) are variables used to define the SPSS data-set, for their operationalisation see appendix 2.

As can be seen from table 3.1, the first organisational catch-all characteristic, the declining importance of party membership, is evidenced by three indicators. Firstly, by a stagnation or decline in the number of party members. To ensure this measure is comparative across countries, membership size is related to the total electorate. Secondly, the importance of the membership for the party is measured in financial terms. Catch-allism, as argued above, is also indicated by a decreasing proportion of the total party income derived from membership fees, as well as by the increase in the proportion of party income from state finance, the latter being the third indicator of the declining importance of membership.

The second organisational characteristic of catch-allism, professionalisation of the

party organisation, is measured by two indicators: the capital intensity of both election campaigning and organisational structure. The capital-intensity of electoral campaigns is measured as the percentage of the total party income spent on election campaigns, whereas capital intensity of the organisation is indicated by the number of professionals employed at the party central office and within its parliamentary bureaucracy. To allow cross-national comparisons, this number of professionals in the central party office is related to the membership level and the number of staff employed at the parliamentary party organisation is related to the number of parliamentary seats of the party.

The third organisational characteristic of a catch-all party is a power-shift from the members to the leadership of the party, which is measured by two indicators: the declining role of party members in internal decision-making processes and, secondly, the procedure by which the party chairman and parliamentary candidates are selected. With regard to the role of members in intra-party decision-making, the frequency by which congresses are held, quantitatively determines the opportunities which members have on the policies of the party and on the decisions to enter a government. Furthermore, the openness of the procedure of putting motions to national conferences, measures the qualitative level of influence members can exert on important decisions made by the party. This openness is manifested in the specific procedure by which motions can be put to the party congress. The second relevant indicator of the power balance between party members and the party leadership to be used here is the level of influence members have in the selection of the national party chairman and the parliamentary candidates for the party. For these indicators this study will analyse the official rules as they are laid down in the party statutes.

Here, as elsewhere when discussing these three broad characteristics, I will begin the analysis by assuming uni-dimensionality. That is, I will assume that each of the indicators within each broad characteristic, tends in the same direction. Only at the end of each discussion and on the basis of the findings to that point, will I put this uni-dimensionality to the test.

Drastic reduction of the party's historical ideological profile and the resulting waning of opposition are central elements of Kirchheimer's thesis. The first **ideological** characteristic of a catch-all party's maturation is *de-ideologisation: a decline in emphasis on traditional issues in the official communications of the party*. Some authors who defined catch-allism framed this development in terms such as de-emphasising or downgrading ideology, vague party programs or disposal of ideological heritage. Ideological catch-allism is also characterised by *a decrease in traditional policy preferences*. Catch-all parties phrase their policy preferences in accordance with the general opinion, emphasising valence issues and seeking compromise and consensus. This de-polarisation is indicated by an increasing propensity of catch-all parties to accept government responsibility even when they are unable to control 'traditional' preferred policy areas through ministerial portfolios. In addition, catch-all parties recognise the political status quo and legitimise the current political order. This waning of opposition leads to greater uniformity in ideological and policy positions of the different parties within one party system. Kirchheimer asserted that catch-all parties converge towards *a centre position in the political spectrum*. Convergence on the left-right dimension decreases the space of party competition. Next to the inclination of government participation regardless of policy and ministerial control, the homogeneity in issue-emphasis as well

as centripetal movement, catch-allism is also indicated by *increasing coalition potential* of parties. The extent as well as the continuity of executive control, is respectively demonstrated in the proportion of ministerial portfolios parties obtain and the accumulated duration of time in office. These characteristics and their operationalisation are summarised in table 3.2.

Table 3.2 The operationalisation of the ideological dimension of catch-allism

characteristic	indicator	unit of measurement
adopting a centrist position within the party system	convergence of parties on a left-right scale towards the centre of the scale as well as overall convergence between parties within one party system	the distance from the centre space by determining the frequency of left and right issues emphasised in party-manifestos (saliency approach) (DISTCNTR and LRMANIF)
a decline in emphasis on traditional issues	a reduction of references to traditional issues in the party platform	the proportion of emphasis on traditional issues in the party platform (TRADEMPH)
a decrease in traditional policy preferences	a decline in control of traditional ministerial portfolio's	proportional control of traditional ministerial portfolios (TRADCONT) and non-traditional or opportunist portfolio control (OPTCONT)
an increase in coalition potential	an increase in quantitative ministerial control (government participation) as well as accumulated time in office	the percentage of ministries held by parties in government (GOVTCONT) and the proportion of time parties hold governmental responsibility (TIMEGOVT)

NB: (CAPITALS) are variables used to define the SPSS data-set, for their operationalisation see appendix 2.

As can be seen from table 3.2, the first catch-all characteristic on the ideological dimension is indicated by the position of parties on the left-right policy dimension, a position determined by the saliency of issues in the party's manifesto. This left-right score for each party is determined by a combination of the Castles and Mair expert-scale and party manifesto data (see Pennings and Keman 1994). On the basis of these party positions, the systemic centre space in all countries is established as well as the distance of all individual parties from this centre. Consequently, the level of centripetal and centrifugal movement as well as the extent of polarisation or convergence within each party system can be assessed over time. Finally, the programmatic trends of parties on the left-right scale will be evaluated as well as their flexibility in policy position. A centripetal movement and increasing policy flexibility indicate catch-allism.

Second, a decline in emphasis on traditional issues is analysed by assessing the consideration parties give in each party manifesto to the five issues which were most emphasised by all parties of the party family in the period 1945-1960. These five

issues are considered to be the 'traditional issues' for all parties of the respective party family. For each party the relative emphasis on these traditional issues is measured across time.

To ascertain party loyalty to their traditional policy preferences, the third indicator of ideological catch-allism will analyse whether or not parties have become increasingly driven by office-seeking motives, and shifted their preferences for ministerial control. For all party families the 'traditional' ministerial portfolios are established (see Budge and Keman 1990) and for parties the score in each period is based upon the level of control of these ministries. This level of traditional portfolio control is consequently related to the total proportion of ministerial control in order to establish the level of opportunistic office-seeking behaviour of political parties.

As the fourth ideological catch-all characteristic, the level of coalition potential (Sartori 1976) of a party is determined on the basis of government participation and the proportion of time parties are in office. Since there are no data available on participation in coalition negotiations or the perception of coalition potential by the party elites, this study measures coalition potential a-posteriori by assuming that parties have coalition potential once they have been incorporated into governments (see Lijphart 1984a, 58-59; 1984b; 1984c). Firstly, the level of ministerial control is measured by the average percentage of all ministerial posts held by the party in each of the nine periods. Secondly, the proportion of time the party has controlled governmental office is calculated over time.

With regard to the **electoral** dimension, the most important element of catch-allism is the *wider electoral appeal* of the catch-all party. Kirchheimer and other authors indicated this decline in clear stratification of the party's electorate with references to 'attracting voters from all strata', 'orientation to a nation-wide electorate', 'broader electoral base', 'mirroring the general population' and 'appealing to new groups of voters', all designating the ability of a catch-all party to increase its potential number of voters. At the same time, catch-all parties loose their *direct and durable connection with their voters*, a development parties attempt to curb by establishing connections with the electorate through the different interest groups and through non-partisan means of communication. The indirect relationship between catch-all parties and voters reduces the number of voters who strongly identify with the party, resulting in higher levels of floating voters. The third electoral characteristic of catch-allism, related to the ideological level, is the *increasing influence of interest groups*. This representation of different social groups becomes evident in the recruitment of representatives outside the traditional pools. Candidates from outside the party are recruited on the basis of their technical and managerial skills, rather than on their political affiliation and adherence to party ideology or program.

Table 3.3 The operationalisation of the electoral dimension of catch-allism.

characteristic	indicator	unit of measurement
a broadening of the electoral appeal of the party	a less class-distinctive composition of the party's electorate	level of social stratification of party support, a decline in class-voting (CLASSDIS)
a disjointed connection with the electorate	a decline in the level of party identification	percentage of voters which strongly identify with the party (IDENTIFY)
	higher levels of electoral turn-over	level of electoral volatility (VOLATIL)
increasing influence of interest groups	less emphasis on the political qualities of the (parliamentary) leadership and increasing emphasis on the technical and managerial qualities	number of ministers recruited from interest groups and from outside the party organisation (EXTRECRUT)

NB: (CAPITALS) are variables used to define the SPSS data-set; for their operationalisation see appendix 2.

As can be seen from table 3.3, the wider appeal of the party will be analysed by ascertaining whether parties are catching voters beyond their traditional bases of support. This study, therefore, will examine changes in the social composition of the electorate between support of the working class, and middle plus upper classes, constituting a measure of class-distinctiveness of party support similar to the Alford-index of class-voting (Alford 1962). Catch-allism is indicated by a declining class-distinctiveness of the party's electorate.

The second indicator of electoral catch-allism, a disjointed connection with the electorate, will be investigated by observing changes in the proportion of voters which claim to have a strong party identification. In addition, electoral volatility is employed as an indicator for the de-alignment of the electorate and increasing electoral turnover.

Finally, the last characteristic of a catch-all party, an increasing influence of interest groups, will be evaluated by examining the number of ministers recruited from these special interest groups and from outside the parliamentary party.

3.5 Measuring catch-allism

In order to test the catch-all thesis empirically, I first measure the transformation towards the catch-all model in separate univariate analyses of all individual variables. For each individual indicator of catch-allism, the cross-national variance, cross-time variations, and the different levels of catch-allism within the party families are summarised in chapters 4 to 6. On each of the indicators this development over time is summarised by way of regression analysis. My analysis will clarify the direction and extent to which parties in Western Europe are transforming towards the catch-all model, as well as provide evidence to whether this transformation constitutes a linear

trend.

Finally, at the end of each of these chapters, the different variables which together constitute one dimension of either organisational, ideological or electoral catch-allism are analysed in relation to one another by utilising multivariate reliability and factor analyses. A reliability test is performed in each chapter to establish whether all indicators tap one single dimension of catch-allism. In theory all items are *different* indicators of the *same* phenomenon, namely catch-allism, so it is obvious that they should correlate reasonably strongly with one another if we are to assume one single underlying dimension. This question is also addressed in the final chapter, where I will assess the validity or otherwise of treating catch-all development *tout court* as one single phenomenon.

The following chapter begins the empirical test of the catch-all thesis by examining the extent of organisational catch-allness of political parties. As with each of these empirical chapters, the bulk of the analysis is focused on political parties within their national contexts, on the one hand, and within their family groupings, on the other. In other words, rather than presenting and discussing the findings at the level of the individual party, the data are aggregated up to the level of national party systems and cross-national party families, with both being also subject to an over-time analysis. These aggregations are necessary because a full presentation and discussion of the eighty or more individual parties through time would simply prove far too unwieldy. Although these individual party data are fully summarised in lengthy tables at the end of each chapter, the analysis within the chapters themselves therefore remains at quite an aggregate level. In effect, therefore, I take the empirical evidence of change at the level of the individual party, which constitutes the core unit of analysis within Kirchheimer's theory, in order to assess the changing degree of catch-allism over time within *national party systems* and within *cross-national party families*. Nonetheless, as indicated above, the original building blocks for these aggregations, that is, the data on the individual parties themselves, are presented in the summary tables at the end of the chapters, where these parties are ranked within the different time-periods according to their degree of catch-allism.

Summary:

- A catch-all party is a party that is characterised by an indistinct ideological profile, a wide electoral appeal aimed at vote maximisation, a loose connection with the electorate, by a power balance in favour of the party top vis-à-vis the party members and by a professional and capital-intensive organisation.
- Catch-allism is a three dimensional phenomenon, consisting of organisational, ideological and electoral components.
- Catch-allism is characterised by 10 characteristics, which can be measured by 15 indicators.
- In this study catch-allism will be measured over the post-war era (divided in nine periods of five years), across 12 West European countries by observing 83 parties which are categorised in party families.

4 The organisational dimension of catch-allism

4.1 Political participation and party organisations

Any viable democracy needs a minimum of political participation by its citizens in order to be responsive and legitimate (Dahl 1971; 1989). Political participation may assume diverse forms and take place outside traditional political institutions, yet organisational membership of political parties is crucial for large-scale popular mobilisation (Verba and Nie 1978; Inglehart 1990). Political parties function as important agents in the political articulation and institutional translation of societal demands (Rueschemeyer et. al, 1992). Moreover, it is through political party organisations that the leadership in representative democracies gains executive power. Therefore, the type of political parties in the party system, either mass-integration parties, cadre parties or elite-clientelistic parties, determine to a large extent when and how citizens participate in the articulation of their interests. As intermediary agents, the organisational structure of political parties effects the opportunities for citizens to participate in the political decision-making process. Conversely, citizens perform a multitude of tasks for political parties when they decide to become active party members (see Scarrow 1994). Kirchheimer recurrently expressed his deep concern with the limited capacity of modern catch-all parties to perform this integrative function in the political system (see chapter 2).

Since the 1950s, an interesting discrepancy has emerged in Western Europe. While the level of cognitive mobilisation (the political skills) and political interest of citizens has increased substantially, partisan loyalty and membership have declined dramatically in most European countries (Ester et. al 1993, 258; Inglehart 1990, 354-358). In addition, the propensity to participate in unconventional political activities has increased substantially over time (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Kriesi et al. 1995). Still, not all change can be ascribed to individual attitudes of citizens. This chapter will show that the elites of political parties in Western Europe have professionalized their organisations extensively, in particular the parliamentary bureaucracy. Additionally, political parties in most countries have gained access to substantial financial resources since the 1960s, especially through state funding, making them less dependent on membership fees and voluntary activism by party members. This marginalization of membership in numerical and financial terms coincides with the continuation of negligible influence of members on leadership selection and policy formation.

In order to determine whether country-specific aspects as well as the genetic origin of parties influence the transformation of parties in Western Europe, the next three chapters explore the development of political parties cross-nationally, over time and by party family. As explained in chapter 3, the format of the discussion is similar throughout the book; each of the indicators of catch-allism is first univariately examined across time, by country and by party family. Secondly, at the end of each chapter multivariate statistical techniques will be used to substantiate possible relations between the different indicators of catch-allism. This particular chapter begins with an analysis of the organisational characteristics of catch-allism: the development in party membership, the changes in the financial structure of parties, the level of professionalisation of the party organisation and the intra-party power balance.

4.2 Size of party membership[42]

At the organisational level, catch-allism is indicated **firstly** by a declining relevance of party membership. In theory, members become less important for the financial revenues of catch-all parties; members are given only a marginal role in the increasingly professional election campaigns and they do not perform an important function in the internal decision-making process. Therefore, catch-all parties will no longer attempt to incorporate a large proportion of their supporters as party members and will require very limited membership participation and involvement in inner-party activities.

For the purpose of this analysis, and particularly for cross-national and cross-time comparison, measuring party membership in absolute terms is clearly inadequate (see also Katz and Mair 1992). A more suitable measure for comparison over time is the ratio of party members to party voters (M/V), which is often used as an indicator of social penetration or encapsulation. Still, as in an equation both numerator and denominator can vary, this measure fails to indicate whether a party managed to encapsulate a higher or lower proportion of its voters, or whether variation is due to electoral gains or losses. Therefore, a measure which relates the size of the total national electorate with the raw number of members (M/E) is best suited for cross-national comparisons. Moreover, the sum of M/E for all parties within a party system denotes the total proportion of party-members in a given electorate. Therefore, this section summarises national trends in party membership in relation to the total electorate.[43] The total member-electorate ratios of West European countries are summarised for each of the nine periods in the table below. Note that the entries are not averages, but the total proportion of the electorate holding a membership card for any of the parties in the national party system.

[42] In the West European context, party membership refers to the act of joining a political party, usually by meeting the requirement of registration and the periodic payment of dues. Frequently parties ask their members to 'remain loyal to the party platform and policies' and prohibit them to 'join any other political party'; a certain age and nationality is also often required. All other obligations have slowly become obsolete in Western Europe (see Janda 1980, 126; Duverger 1954, 61; Riggs and Janda (1968), pp. 45-104 and 159-216). Indirect party membership has become almost extinct in Western Europe; the majority of the parties have only direct membership. The social democratic party in Sweden abolished indirect membership in 1990 and lost a substantial part of its membership because of it. Now, only the British Labour Party, the Austrian ÖVP, the Norwegian DNA and the Finnish communist People's Democratic League still have a considerable number of indirect members and the Finnish and Norwegian conservatives (KOK and Hoyre), the Finnish Agrarians (KESK), the French Radical party and the Irish Labour Party continue this type of link with the electorate, albeit on a modest scale (see Janda 1980 and Katz and Mair 1992).

[43] However, with regard to the catch-all thesis it is also important to analyze the level of encapsulation of the different party families, since Kirchheimer distinguished parties on the basis of their effort to integrate the populace into the body politic. Hence, in the final section of this chapter the member-voter ratio will be included in the multivariate analysis.

Table 4.1 The total **member-electorate ratios in West European countries 1945-1990**

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	23.8	21.2	27.6	29.8	29.7	29.3	28.5	27.3	24.5	**26.9**	**6.3**	**.234**
Bel	-	-	-	7.6	7.8	8.4	8.8	8.8	8.9	**8.4**	**1.3**	**.154**
Den	18.3	20.3	21.5	18.3	16.4	11.8	8.4	7.4	6.8	**14.4**	**2.9**	**.201**
Fin	-	-	-	18.9	17.9	16.5	14.9	14.0	12.9	**15.9**	**2.7**	**.169**
Fra	8.3	4.0	2.1	1.7	1.3	1.7	4.6	3.1	1.0	**3.1**	**0.8**	**.258**
Ger	4.3	2.6	2.7	3.0	3.2	3.8	4.6	4.4	4.2	**3.6**	**0.8**	**.222**
Ire	-	-	-	2.6	8.3	8.8	9.4	10.7	12.8	**11.0**	**3.7**	**.336**
Ita	11.9	13.6	12.2	12.2	20.6	12.5	10.0	9.4	9.7	**12.5**	**2.1**	**.168**
Net	14.2	10.1	11.6	16.3	9.7	6.2	5.3	3.8	2.9	**8.9**	**1.3**	**.146**
Nor	14.0	8.5	16.8	30.4	8.8	12.9	8.8	13.7	12.2	**12.3**	**3.0**	**.243**
Swe	20.2	16.2	22.7	22.3	19.9	20.3	22.7	23.4	21.2	**21.0**	**6.2**	**.295**
UK	2.1	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.5	5.8	1.6	0.8	1.0	**2.3**	**1.1**	**.478**
X	**13.0**	**11.0**	**13.2**	**13.8**	**12.2**	**11.5**	**10.7**	**10.7**	**9.6**	**11.7**	**2.7**	**.233**
S	**3.7**	**4.4**	**4.1**	**4.1**	**3.6**	**3.4**	**3.5**	**3.5**	**3.1**	**3.7**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.284**	**.400**	**.311**	**.297**	**.295**	**.296**	**.327**	**.327**	**.323**	**.316**	**-**	**-**

Entries are percentages of the total electorate which hold a membership of one of the national parties. Sources of the data are Katz and Mair 1992, Beyme 1985 and several other studies (see appendix 2). The first column in the table contains the abbreviation for the countries as explained in appendix 2. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The column '*S*' lists the standard deviations of the countries, while the row '*S*' at the bottom of the table provides the standard deviation for each period. Standard deviations are used to assess cross-national and cross-time variation. Rows and columns labelled '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*) for countries and periods, as this measure is more suitable for comparison of several clusters of data with respect to their relative homogeneity in instances where the groups have very different means (see appendix 3 for methodological considerations). Entries given *in italics* are based on one score only and considered unrepresentative. A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available.

This table shows that there are substantial differences in the average level of party membership across Western Europe and, importantly, in only a few countries significant proportions of the electorate join a political party. In general, Austrian parties have the largest membership party organisations in Western Europe in relative terms, followed shortly by the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Finland, Sweden and Denmark) and Italy. Substantially lower proportions of the electorate joined political parties in north-western Europe (Belgium, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany), while the lowest membership ratios are found in France. In Austria over one quarter of the population eligible to vote held membership cards of political parties and in Sweden over twenty per cent of those qualified to vote signed up with a party. In the rest of Scandinavia (Finland, Denmark and Norway) approximately one sixth of the population is a party member, an average level which is also found in Italy. As stated above, in the other European countries the average proportion

of the electorate which actually joins a political party is significantly lower. In the case of Ireland, around ten percent of the population took the effort of registering as a party member, while in Belgium and the Netherlands around eight per cent of the population qualified to vote were enlisted as party members. In the United Kingdom, France and Germany only a very low share of the electorate enrolled as member of a political party.

In these terms at least, very few political parties can claim the label 'mass-party' and membership can hardly be considered "the very substance of the party" as Duverger (1954, 63) once claimed. With some leniency the 1950s and 1960s could be labelled the decades of 'mass membership', when the average level of partisan affiliation reached its post-war peak at thirteen per cent of the European electorate. As Kirchheimer asserted, aggregate levels of membership have declined in most European party systems, particularly since the late 1960s. In the late 1980s party membership relative to the total electorate has dropped below the ten per cent level. This decline has been most striking in Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Party membership in Denmark dropped from around twenty per cent in the 1960s to approximately six per cent of the electorate in the 1980s. In France, where levels of party membership have traditionally been very low to begin with and only the PSF and PCF have extensive party organisations, the membership-electorate ratio has nevertheless declined further during the late 1980s. Similarly, parties in Norway, Austria, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands lost party membership in proportion to the total electorate.[44] In Austria a clear decline in average membership levels set in during the 1970s, yet this country still has the highest membership level of all countries in this study. Swedish parties have also been able to maintain noticeably high levels of party membership throughout the last five decades.

The consistent trend of membership decline does not affect all European countries. Belgian, German, Irish and to a lesser extent some Norwegian parties have been able to incorporate an increasing proportion of the electorate into their party organisations. In these countries, at least until the 1990s, a generalised catch-all transformation at the membership level did not materialise. In addition, in recent years absolute membership has increased for some of the major parties in Finland, Italy, Norway and Sweden. The highest levels of fluctuation in membership are found in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden, as compared to more homogeneous (trends in) membership levels in Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands and Italy. Germany, France, Norway and Austria are in the middle of the distribution regarding intra-country variation. In line with Kirchheimer's assumption of convergence, the differences in membership level between parties have declined over time as is shown by a lower levels of variance in later periods.

For every country the extent of membership decline over time is summarised by computing the regression coefficient of membership-electorate ratios, taking the year

[44] Selle and Svåsand (1991) differentiate between countries in which the major parties have declined (the Netherlands, Britain and Denmark), countries in which membership in general has been increasing (Belgium, Austria, Ireland, West-Germany and Finland) and those in which some parties have increased in membership while others have declined (Sweden and Norway). The data presented here do not confirm this analysis when the post-war period as a whole is taken into account. As the authors do not specify which parties they included, it was not possible to clarify these differences.

in which the observation was made as the independent variable.[45] A decline in membership relative to the electorate would be indicated by a negative trend parameter. Table 4.2 shows that in most European countries membership did decline over time (the overall β = -.16*). Only Belgium seems to be excluded from this general trend.

Table 4.2 Trends in membership-electorate rates over time in Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK
beta (β)	-.07	.15	-.58*	-.03	-.26	-.15	-.32	-.42*	-.34*	-.24	-.09	-.65*

The column indicated 'beta' (β) provides the regression coefficient between the membership-electorate ratios and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

The steepest decline over time in party membership is found in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Ireland and France, while the downward trend in Finland, Austria and Sweden is more moderate. Belgium has the only party system in which parties have attracted more members over time.

Since Kirchheimer insisted that, in particular, the social democratic and Christian democratic parties are prone to adopt a catch-all style, the differences between party families are important. With regard to this genetic origin, the conventional wisdom that parties of the traditional left (socialist, social democratic and communist parties) are better organised and socially embedded than their right-wing non-socialist competitors is only partly corroborated by the data presented in table 4.3, which provides the average membership-electorate ratios of the European party families.

[45] The variable year in this study is defined as the last year of each period (see appendix 2). The linear regression parameter represents the straight line which mathematically is the 'best fit' to all points in a scattergram of all scores. It constitutes only a summary measure of an overall negative of positive trend, without regard to fluctuations in this trend over time.

Table 4.3 Average member-electorate ratio's of West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
cd	3.3	3.5	3.2	4.3	3.2	2.7	2.4	3.0	2.8	**3.1**	**3.8**	**1.232**
com	1.5	1.9	1.9	1.3	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.4	1.1	**1.3**	**1.7**	**1.341**
con	2.5	1.0	2.7	2.4	3.1	2.7	2.0	2.2	2.2	**2.3**	**1.4**	**.614**
sd	6.2	6.2	6.1	4.6	5.4	4.7	4.8	4.3	3.8	**4.6**	**5.2**	**1.134**
soc	-	-	0.1	-	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	**0.2**	**0.1**	**.502**
lib	2.6	2.2	1.6	1.4	1.6	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	**1.3**	**1.6**	**1.241**
env	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.1	0.1	**0.1**	**0.1**	**1.006**
eth	-	-	-	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.9	**1.0**	**0.5**	**.501**
agr	2.7	-	2.6	8.9	4.9	4.2	4.1	3.8	3.4	**4.3**	**3.6**	**.834**
prt	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	**0.2**	**0.2**	**1.045**
X	**3.1**	**3.0**	**2.6**	**3.1**	**2.5**	**1.8**	**1.5**	**1.6**	**1.4**	**1.7**	**1.8**	**1.143**

Entries are average member-electorate ratios. Sources of the data are Katz and Mair 1992, Beyme 1985 and several other studies (see appendix 2). The abbreviations in the first column refer to the party families, which are explained in appendix II. The last columns, '*S*' and '*CV*' list the standard deviation and the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*) of the party families. Column and row indicated with an *X* lists the average of the period and party family mean. Entries given *in italics* are based on one score only and are not included in the calculations. Data before 1955 are too scarce to report. The - indicates that data were not available.

Although it is important to note that the initially significant differences between parties of different origin are declining, it can be seen that the highest membership levels are still found among social democratic parties. Particularly during the 1950s West European social democratic parties affiliated the largest proportions of the electorate as party members, while in the 1960s a period of membership decline sets in for the social democratic party family. Nevertheless, with the possible exception of the Austrian and Swedish social democrats, few ('mass') parties of social democratic origin encapsulated high proportions of the electorate. Parties of communist origin can neither be counted as political mass membership organisations, for these parties have relatively low ratios of membership. Moreover, most European communist parties have now either vanished as political membership organisations or merged with other leftist groups to form new and broader political movements. Socialist parties even had significantly lower levels of membership than their social democratic and communist brethren. In contrast, agrarian parties encapsulated more supporters and reached a relatively high level of membership organisation compared to other party families, although agrarian membership levels are also dwindling since the 1970s. This process of membership decline has, on average, less impact on conservative parties in Western Europe, which were able to maintain a relatively stable fraction of the electorate as party members. Still, conservative parties have also been losing some of their appeal as membership organisations since the mid-1970s. Despite the fact that Christian democratic parties were also able to sustain a relatively stable level of organisational encapsulation throughout the last five decades, these parties do demonstrate decreasing membership levels during the late 1980s. More pronounced and consistent are the losses in membership discernible within almost all European

liberal parties. Only some well-organised Scandinavian liberal parties have been able to prevent this overall membership decline in relation to the total electorate. The nascent environmental party organisations have not (yet) been able to encapsulate a large proportion of their voters.

As far as the various party families are concerned, the highest variance in membership, relative to the total electorates are found within the communist, social democratic, Christian democratic and liberal party families, while the lower coefficients of variance of the conservative, ethnic and agrarian parties are indicative of relatively more homogeneity in membership levels among members of this party family.

To summarise the trends in membership over time, table 4.4 provides the regression coefficients of the membership-electorate ratios of party families with the year of observation as independent variable.

Table 4.4 Trends in membership over time of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	soc	lib	env	eth	agr	prt
beta (β)	-.09	-.13	-.08	-.14	.19	-.34*	.32	-.08	-.07	.65

Entries are regression coefficients between the membership-electorate ratios and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Cross-time analysis of membership-electorate ratios demonstrates that all the major traditional party families lost membership in relation to the total electorate, in particular the liberal, social democratic and communist parties. It materialises, for example that, despite their sometimes unrealistic membership claims, communist parties of 'total integration' experienced a steep decline in membership since the 1970s from very low levels of membership to begin with. Only more contemporary parties of socialist origin, as well as the new protest and environmental parties are excluded from the general decline in membership. Overall, an era of distinct decline in membership seems to have set in during the late 1960s and 1970s and parties have not been able (or willing) to reverse this process.

In conclusion, one finds that with the exception of some Belgian, German and Irish parties, as well as most of the 'green' parties, relatively few political parties in Western Europe escape a decline in membership. From this finding it seems that sizeable membership can hardly be regarded as a necessary condition for the survival of political parties. Even the oldest European parties, the British Conservatives, the Danish and Italian liberals and the German SPD, never encapsulated high proportions of the electorate as members in their organisation and only in very few cases can membership levels of West European parties justify the label of 'mass parties'. These findings therefore appear to sustain Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis at least at the national level and as far as many of the individual party families are concerned.

4.3 Party political finance

Party finance is perhaps the least transparent aspect of the study of political parties.[46] Recently, the Augusta and Dassault-affairs in Belgium, the acceptance of 'cash-for questions' by British MP's and illegal donations of Asil Nadir to the British Conservative Party, as well as the *mani pulite*-inquiry into illicit party funding in Italy, suggest that parties have access to enormous, sometimes illegal, financial resources (Fisher 1994). Nonetheless, central authorities attempt to control party political finance by formal regulation. In most countries parties are legally compelled to disclose their financial reports and submit these accounts to an official audit. Furthermore, ceilings on expenditures and contribution limits have been introduced and in some countries it is prohibited to receive contributions from certain sources. On the other hand, most central authorities subsidise political parties from public funds.

Under most national legislation there are no limits set on the income of parties, so parties can raise the amount of money they regard necessary to perform their activities. Encompassing not only membership fees and state funding, political money can also derive from a wide variety of other sources (Ware 1996, 298-302). As a result, almost all party organisations in Western Europe have become more capital intensive.[47]

4.3.1 Membership fees

According to the catch-all thesis, the declining importance of members for political parties should be visible in several organisational aspects. In the operationalisation of organisational catch-allism above, the **second** indicator that was specified is the declining importance of members for the party's financial revenues. This aspect is measured here in proportions of membership fees relative to the total party income. A cross-national and cross-time comparison of the extent to which European parties relied on financial resources from membership dues is summarised in table 4.5. The entries refer to the proportion to which membership fees (MF) account for the total income (TI) of parties (the MF/TI-ratio).[48]

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[46] See for classifications of party finance Weber 1925, 169; Von Beyme 1985, 196-197; Heidenheimer 1970; Paltiel 1981. Nassmacher (1993) defined political finance as 'money spent by candidates and parties for campaign as well as non-campaign purposes.'

[47] The largest increases in income of party central offices are found in Germany, Austria and Ireland. Parties in Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland and Norway have also witnessed a substantial growth rate of their annual income. Only parties in Sweden and Italy are showing a decline in the "official" income figures. The annual growth rates are less impressive when the annual inflation rates are taken into account. Only in Austria and Norway does the average growth rate in party income exceed the average inflation growth rate. Inflation figures are taken from table 4.7. "Inflation: average growth rates 1960-1985" in Lane and McKay 1991, 54.

[48] Janda (1980, 91) regards the sources of funds as a main indicator of organizational autonomy: "The most autonomous party would be one that relied entirely on its internal operations for financing, which it might do through a combination of party dues and party enterprises, such as income from businesses, investments or sales of publications. The least dependent would be one which depended on contributions from some specific institutional sector of society, for example labour unions, business, military, church, and education/scientific. Between these two extremes would be parties which were guaranteed government funds through legislation to finance party activities."

Table 4.5 Percentage of total party income from membership fees in Western Europe 1950-1990

	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	84.8	87.2	87.1	86.7	58.7	30.4	31.8	20.6	**63.3**	**31.5**	**.492**
Den	-	60.5	65.3	52.4	46.2	47.9	52.7	36.0	**51.6**	**30.1**	**.583**
Fin	-	2.3	2.2	1.7	2.7	2.7	3.1	3.0	**2.6**	**1.3**	**.504**
Ger	-	63.4	21.7	26.7	33.1	32.7	35.9	31.1	**34.9**	**15.5**	**.441**
Ire	-	44.6	18.3	42.8	47.3	41.7	45.4	32.6	**39.0**	**28.7**	**.730**
Ita	42.0	43.3	47.4	13.2	12.6	14.4	16.9	16.8	**28.5**	**15.3**	**.541**
Net	-	84.2	81.4	74.3	68.9	77.2	71.8	75.0	**76.1**	**12.4**	**.164**
Nor	-	54.7	61.5	46.5	29.4	25.8	29.3	33.8	**40.1**	**19.5**	**.492**
Swe	-	25.4	19.3	10.0	7.1	6.0	8.8	7.2	**11.9**	**10.7**	**.901**
UK	-	13.4	14.2	16.1	12.3	30.3	37.7	35.5	**22.8**	**19.6**	**.864**
X	**63.4**	**47.9**	**41.8**	**37.0**	**31.8**	**30.1**	**33.3**	**29.2**	**37.2**	**18.5**	**.502**
S	**30.3**	**32.4**	**33.4**	**30.9**	**27.5**	**27.3**	**25.5**	**24.7**	**27.5**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.478**	**.676**	**.799**	**.835**	**.864**	**.906**	**.765**	**.845**	**.739**	**-**	**-**

Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992, Tables E1). The row marked by an *X* lists the average of the period and the column *X* provides the country mean score. The column and row *S* provide the standard deviations, while the column and row labelled *CV* provide the coefficients of variance (*S*/*X*). The - indicates that data were not available. No data for Belgium and France are available, while data for the first period are too scarce to report. For Germany there are no separate data on members/branches and party taxes.

Across Western Europe a distinctive and secular decline in the proportion of income from membership fees is discernible (see also table 4.6 and 4.10). From an average of approximately fifty per cent of the total party income in the 1960s, European parties' resources originating from membership dues constituted less than thirty per cent in the 1980s. Nevertheless, significant differences between countries can be observed. In the Netherlands, for example, parties are still largely financially dependent on membership contributions, while the proportion of membership fees for the total party income in Finland is almost negligible. On average, Austrian parties depend for more than sixty per cent of their income on contributions from members and Danish parties derive over fifty per cent of their income from their members. Norwegian parties utilise their membership fees to finance forty per cent of their activities, while in Germany and Ireland around one-third of the total income of parties derives from membership fees. For Italian, British and particularly Swedish parties, members are least important in terms of total financial revenues.

With the exception of the United Kingdom and Finland, all over Western Europe the importance of membership in financial terms declined. Primarily the introduction of state finance (see next section) contributed to this development.[49] After the introduction of state finance in 1975 in Austria, for example, the average percentage of membership fees dropped thirty per cent points and declined even further in the

[49] The correlation coefficient between the membership level and revenues from membership fees is rather low (r^2 .14), while the correlation between membership and state finance is a much stronger r^2 -.65* (significant at the .001 level).

last decade. An equally drastic decline can be found in Germany after the introduction of state finance in 1959. To a lesser extent this development also occurred in Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Italy when provisions were introduced for state finance of political parties in these countries. The inevitable conclusion is that in financial terms, members became less important for parties as the losses in membership revenues were progressively substituted by other sources of income. Additionally, the declining standard deviation marks a convergence of parties over time with respect to the proportion of income obtained from membership fees. Table 4.6 recapitulates the magnitude of membership fees for the total income of the different party families included in this study.

Table 4.6 Percentage of total party income from membership dues by party families 1955-1990

	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*β*
cd	84.5	67.4	49.8	45.8	42.6	36.8	34.8	**51.7**	**28.1**	**.542**	**-.44***
com	31.5	32.6	23.6	14.9	15.5	24.0	11.8	**27.3**	**16.6**	**.613**	**-.58***
con	7.4	7.2	14.7	15.6	17.6	21.8	21.8	**15.2**	**14.8**	**.972**	**.34***
sd	58.6	55.0	55.4	40.8	38.4	41.0	37.6	**53.7**	**31.1**	**.581**	**-.28***
soc	27.2	69.1	61.8	43.0	56.4	40.4	35.9	**47.5**	**28.7**	**.604**	**-.17**
lib	39.5	29.0	23.7	22.3	29.3	36.6	30.7	**30.2**	**24.7**	**.822**	**.05**
env	-	-	-	-	4.5	28.6	22.3	**25.5**	**23.3**	**.911**	**.21**
agr	47.4	41.7	9.2	3.1	7.8	9.7	8.8	**7.7**	**15.8**	**2.112**	**-.54***
prt	-	-	-	-	6.7	8.5	5.8	**7.1**	**2.4**	**.344**	**-.26**
X	**47.9**	**41.8**	**37.0**	**31.8**	**30.1**	**33.3**	**29.2**	**37.2**	**18.5**	**.502**	**-.21***

Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992, Tables E1). Column and row indicated with an *X* lists the average of the period and party family mean. The column '*S*' provides the standard deviation of the party family scores in each period and the column '*CV*' gives the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). The - indicates that data were not available. The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the proportion of membership fees of the total party income and the year of measurement. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). Note that the data for Belgium and France are not included. The communist score is based on only two parties (PCI and VpK).

On average, both social democratic, socialist as well as Christian democratic parties procure more than fifty per cent of their income from membership contributions, setting these parties apart from the other West European party families. Until the 1960s these three party families banked on membership fees for the larger part of their financial resources, yet the proportion of their income accumulated from membership fees declined to less than forty per cent in the 1980s. While 'green' as well as communist parties derived approximately one quarter of their financial resources from membership fees, members were much less important to agrarian and protest parties in financial terms.

Over time, the steepest decline in income from membership fees have occurred in the agrarian, communist and Christian democratic party families, concurrent with significant transformation of the income structure of socialist and social democratic parties. Evidently, liberal, agrarian and conservative parties have access to other

substantial sources of income as they obtained only a relatively moderate proportion of their total income from membership fees throughout the post-war period. Liberal parties boosted their income from membership fees during the seventies and early eighties, making it the only traditional party family in which the decline in income from membership is not manifest. The largest variance can be found among agrarian and conservative parties, while the most homogeneous party families are the social democratic, Christian democratic, socialist and liberal parties.

In sum, the development over the last forty-five years shows that West European parties have restructured their party income significantly.[50] Clearly membership fees became less important to political parties than was the case before the introduction and extension of state finance. This finding corroborates Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis. Additional evidence of a catch-all development at the level of party finance can be found in that the vast differences in financial structure between the party families which existed forty years ago are disappearing. Whether this convergence is solely attributable to increasing similarity in dependence of state finance will be assessed in the next section, where the **third** indicator of organisational catch-allism, an increasing dependence of parties on state finance, is discussed.

4.3.2 State finance

Two opposite normative positions emerge in the debate on the consequences of state funding to political parties.[51] The first view emphasises that state subventions[52], especially those based on seats in parliament, increase the significance of elections in financial terms. Parties procure a clear incentive to win votes rather than members and will therefore direct their efforts less towards the mass membership organisation and more towards election campaigns. Furthermore, state funding leads to

[50] Of the different party families, the conservative parties increased their income at the rate of +7.8 per cent annually. The recent emergence of environmental parties may account for their higher annual growth of +11.5 per cent. The Christian democratic and communist parties are close to the average annual growth-rate (+6.6 per cent and +6.7 per cent respectively). The social democratic (+5.6 per cent) and socialist parties (+8.3 per cent) are also becoming more capital intensive. The liberal parties have the lowest annual increase in income (+3.5%) which may be the result of their high capital intensity from the outset.

[51] The justifications for the introduction of state finance have been the rising costs of party activities, especially campaigning, and the decline in traditional sources of income. The political debate over the benefits and drawbacks of public finance all started from the viewpoint that parties perform important functions in the democratic system. According to the supporters of public finance, the quality of the political process depends largely on the quality of political parties. To create equal opportunities and fairness in political competition and to avoid corruption, financial facilitation by the state has been introduced in most political systems. The opposition towards state finance of political parties argued that public funding will decrease the possibilities of public assessment of the parties and their accountability to the sovereign people. Finally, parties become more dependent on the state and as parties themselves control the state, they are able to secure their own future and hamper the entrance of new parties.

[52] State subsidies consist of direct public party funding where the recipient is the party central organization or the parliamentary group of the party. These direct financial subventions can consist of inter-election maintenance grants as well as campaign subsidies. Direct subsidies also include funds given to the youth and women organizations or party educational and research foundations, such as exist in the Netherlands and Ireland. State subventions can also be facilitative and indirect: free broadcasting, mailing, telecommunications and billposting, free press access and the use of meeting halls. Additionally, indirect party funding is any form of indirect assistance (financial or otherwise) that benefits the parties. This includes tax credits and tax reduction facilities. The data in this section are primarily from Von Beyme (1982, 241-261); Paltiel (1970; 1981); Nassmacher (1987); Katz and Mair (1992; 1994); Müller (1992); Deschouwer (1992); Bille (1992, 267-271).

centralisation of the party hierarchy and reduces the influence of the rank-and-file activists as it opens possibilities for the party leadership to campaign with more professional mass communication and public relations experts. Finally, state finance by and large discriminates against new parties which can results in a 'cosy cartel' of the traditionally dominant parties in the system (Kirchheimer 1966b; Paltiel 1981). A contradictory position is adopted by Mendilow (1992, 93) who argues that public party finance can "actually enhance the appearance and survival of new parties, and moreover, enable ideological factions within established parties to threaten their parties with secession. These factors may create an effective barrier against the full formation of catch-all parties...."

Clearly, state funding is a party system function rather than a voluntaristic choice of a specific party and according to Gunlicks (1993), diversity between countries in party political finance is therefore best explained by the centralisation of the national state, the electoral and political system. In general, Gunlicks argues, a centralised state leads to stronger national party organisations, also in financial terms. A more decentralised, federal system will strengthen parties at the federal level at which they compete for public office. The electoral system also affects the financial structure of parties as majoritarian plurality systems allows candidates to be financially more independent, while proportional representation generates candidates which are financially dependent on the national party organisation. Stronger national party organisations in a parliamentary democracy make the national party office financially more dominant, while presidentialism and weak partism, like in France, will lead to more financial independence of the individual candidates (from the central party that is, not from other contributors).

In Western Europe numerous provisions for financial assistance from the state are made available to political parties (see table 4.7). Direct public finance of political parties was first introduced in 1959 in Germany, soon followed by similar provisions in Finland (1967) and Sweden (1966). In Austria subventions for the parliamentary party were introduced in 1963 and in Britain in 1975, be it only for the opposition party. In the late 1960s a wide scale introduction of direct funding of parliamentary fractions as well as of central party organisations was discernible in most countries. In the late 1970s, when parties were confronted with financial difficulties, another wave of state subventions could be observed. In France, Denmark and Belgium direct public finance to the parties' central office was adopted in the late 1980s. This left the Netherlands and Ireland as the only West European countries which do not subsidise central party offices directly.[53] The subsidies to the central offices are usually based on the number of parliamentary seats parties obtained at the general elections or, as is the case in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany and Norway, on the basis of the number of voters at the last election. Additionally, funds are made available to ancillary organisations for youth activities, the emancipation of women, for specific educational or research activities as well as for organisational costs of travelling and mailing. In some countries, Norway, Sweden and Austria for example, the state also provides funds for newspapers which are controlled by political parties. More indirectly, parties are assisted by the allotment of free (or inexpensive) access to national broadcasting facilities or other means of communication such as billboards (Smith 1981, 173 ff.). Finally, parties usually have access to local, regional and national bureaucracies,

[53] Irish parties do, however, receive substantial funds through the 'Oireachtas Grant' (Farrell 1994, 235).

providing them with the use of public halls, telephones and other institutional facilities. In some countries, most notably Austria and Belgium, patronage positions within local and national bureaucracies as well as in nationalised industries are used by parties to staff with their own personnel. Since parties in government have proportionately more access to these facilities, British and Irish rules of state finance make a distinction between opposition parties and governmental parties, allowing direct subsidies only for opposition parties. The evidence shows that in most countries political parties are facilitated in a substantial manner through direct financial as well as indirect material contributions at the local and national level of government. In this analysis I will only use the direct state subsidies to central party offices.

In order to summarise and distinguish all the different provisions in European countries table 4.7 provides information on the first year of introduction of direct and indirect public party finance for each country as well as the recipient, the interval with which the subsidy is provided, the basis on which the subsidy is calculated, the type of indirect subsidies and finally the specific grants and services that parties benefit from.

Table 4.7 Public finance of political parties in Western democracies.

country	introduction direct funding	recipient	interval	basis	type of (in)direct subsidies	indirect fund-ing
Austria	1963 1975	parliamentary group party	annual	per vote and per seat	billposting, broadcasting, press access, youth, research and educational organisations and patronage positions	1975
Belgium	1971 1989	parliamentary group party	annual	per seat	broadcasting and educational organisations and patro-nage positions	1985
Denmark	1965 1987	parliamentary group party	annual	per vote	broadcasting, press access, women and youth organisations	-
Finland	1967 1967	parliamentary group party	annual	per seat	billposting, broadcasting, press access, women and youth organisations	-
France	1988	party (presidential and parliamentary)	annual election	per seat, per vote and per candidate	billposting, broadcasting, press access	1988
Germany	1959 1959	parliamentary group party	annual election	per vote and per seat	billposting, broadcasting, youth, foreign aid and educa-tional organisations	1983
Ireland	1960 1974	opposition parties all parties	annual	per seat	travel costs, postage, broadcasting and youth organisations	-
Italy	1974-1993	parliamentary group	annual election	per vote	broadcasting, press access, women and youth organisations	-
Netherlands	1964	parliamentary group	annual	per seat	billposting, broadcasting, women and youth, educational and research organisations	1951
Norway	1966 1970	parliamentary group party	annual	per vote and per seat	travel costs and youth organisations	-
Sweden	1966 1966	parliamentary group party	annual	per seat	broadcasting, press access, women and youth organisations	-
United Kingdom	1975	opposition parliamentary group	annual	per seat	broadcasting, mailing and use of public halls	1975

Source of data: Von Beyme (1982; 1985); Gunlicks (1993); Katz and Mair (1992; 1994); Mendilow (1992); Nassmacher (1987) and Paltiel (1970; 1981). See Appendix 2 for additional sources.

Given the fact that the earliest (direct) state subvention emanated in Germany in 1959, it follows that it is only after this pivotal point that political parties progressively turned to the resources of the state for financial support. To assess the extent of this development, table 4.8 summarises the level of state funding as a percentage of the total income of political parties in Western European countries since 1960.

Table 4.8 Direct state funding as a percentage of the total income of political parties in Western Europe 1960-1990

	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	-	-	26.3	37.0	36.5	42.8	**35.7**	**13.5**	**.378**
Den	-	-	-	-	-	33.9	**33.9**	**22.9**	**.676**
Fin	-	86.9	55.2	44.9	47.8	46.1	**56.2**	**20.0**	**.356**
Fra	-	-	-	-	-	59.2	**59.2**	**13.9**	**.235**
Ger	47.5	32.9	21.7	15.8	19.7	19.1	**26.1**	**14.2**	**.544**
Ire	35.4	29.4	20.4	19.1	18.9	15.4	**23.1**	**10.8**	**.468**
Ita	-	91.6	67.8	67.2	66.0	53.7	**69.3**	**24.9**	**.359**
Net	1.9	1.3	1.7	1.2	0.8	1.8	**1.5**	**1.4**	**.933**
Nor	3.2	57.0	63.4	54.1	58.1	55.6	**48.6**	**20.0**	**.411**
Swe	49.0	51.6	63.5	68.8	60.4	54.6	**58.0**	**15.3**	**.264**
UK	-	-	13.8	10.8	9.4	10.5	**11.1**	**5.6**	**.505**
X	**27.4**	**50.1**	**37.1**	**34.4**	**35.3**	**35.7**	**38.4**	**14.8**	**.385**
S	**25.0**	**34.2**	**28.9**	**28.9**	**26.9**	**24.2**	**28.0**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.912**	**.682**	**.778**	**.840**	**.762**	**.677**	**.729**	**-**	**-**

Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992), with the exception of the data for France (see appendix 2). The first column contains the abbreviation for the countries as explained in appendix II. Before 1960 no state subventions existed, whereas for Belgium there are no data at all. Other missing data are indicated by a minus sign (-). The row marked by an *X* lists the average of the period and the column '*X*' provides the country mean score. The column and row '*S*' provide the standard deviations, while the column and row labelled *CV* provide the coefficients of variance (*S*/*X*).

Despite the vast differences between countries, most West European parties depend heavily on direct public funding. Italian parties, in particular, derived a large proportion of their officially declared income from state finance; yet, the Italian average fell to a level of about half of the parties' total income as a result of income from other private and corporate donations and simply because of high inflation (see Bardi and Morlino 1994, 258-259). With the introduction of public party finance, Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish parties also became largely dependent on state subsidies. In Norway, for example, parties in the early 1960s derived only three per cent of their total income from public resources, whereas, after the introduction of state finance in 1970, this level rose to over sixty per cent (Svåsand 1994, 324). Denmark has only recently begun state financing of political parties and exhibited the steepest rise in public funding. According to Bille (1994, 146), Danish parties increased their income from public resources significantly over the last few years. Austrian parties banked on circa thirty-five per cent of their income on financial support from the state, though the bulk of public funds is provided at the level of the

Länder (Müller 1994, 55). In Germany the dependency of parties on public finance has decreased since the late 1960s, although Poguntke (1994, 193) calculated that "(b)y the end of the 1980s ... the proportion of state subventions had reached between 60 and 80 per cent of total central office income." Here too the provisions at the sub-national level constitute a substantial part of the total income of parties. In Britain, where only the opposition parties are entitled to direct financial support from the state, the proportion of state funding to the total party income hovered around ten per cent. Surprisingly, parties in Ireland are dependent on state funding for almost a quarter of their total income despite the relatively limited financial provisions for political parties. The absence of direct state funding to parties makes for the lowest proportions of state dependence in the Netherlands, though indirect subsidies through several party foundations are substantial (see Koole 1992a; 1996). Large variation among parties within the same party system are found in Denmark and the Netherlands, while there is high homogeneity among Swedish and French parties.

Nonetheless, particularly with relevance to what might be anticipated by Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, it is important to underline that there has been no general and substantial increase in the proportion of state subsidies since the 1970s. In Finland, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands financial support from the state even declined in relative importance for the total income of parties. In contrast, Austrian, Norwegian and Swedish parties relied increasingly on state funding. In addition, over time the differences between parties have declined and across Europe parties are showing more homogeneity in financial structure, indicating convergence on this indicator. Although national legislation determines the level of state funding, the main differences in dependency on state finance between party families are summarised in table 4.9.

Table 4.9 State funding as a percentage of total party income by party family 1960-1990

	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*β*
cd	5.9	14.3	31.6	26.8	31.6	28.8	**23.2**	**20.9**	**.900**	**.32***
com	31.9	80.1	51.3	48.9	49.7	48.7	**51.8**	**31.4**	**.606**	**-.11**
con	31.6	62.6	37.8	33.9	42.7	43.5	**42.0**	**23.3**	**.554**	**-.07**
sd	39.9	40.2	36.1	33.9	33.8	31.3	**35.9**	**24.8**	**.691**	**-.11**
soc	-	-	62.1	51.4	65.2	41.9	**55.2**	**21.1**	**.382**	**-.36**
lib	36.8	49.0	41.9	43.1	40.3	35.6	**41.1**	**31.2**	**.759**	**-.09**
env	-	-	-	47.1	42.8	38.8	**42.9**	**33.7**	**.786**	**-.10**
agr	60.8	76.5	71.4	53.2	50.2	48.2	**58.9**	**19.4**	**.329**	**-.46***
prt	-	-	-	-	81.5	73.2	**73.2**	**9.3**	**.127**	**-.50**
X	**27.4**	**50.1**	**37.1**	**34.4**	**35.3**	**35.7**	**38.4**	**14.8**	**.385**	**.01**

Data are from Katz and Mair (1992). The first column contains the abbreviation for the party families as explained in appendix II. Column and row indicated with an *X* lists the average of the period and party family mean. The column '*S*' provides the standard deviation of the party family scores in each period and the column '*CV*' gives the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the proportion of state funding and year of measurement. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). The - indicates that data were not available. The data for Belgium and France are not available.

Due to the fact that all agrarian parties (Centre parties) in this study are Scandinavian, where state finance is at a relatively high level, the average proportion of public funds of their total income is almost sixty per cent. Social democratic parties as well as parties of Christian democratic denomination are, on average, less dependent on state funding and relied for more than half of their income on membership fees. The opposite is found for the socialist and communist parties, which, despite their doctrine of mass mobilisation, relied heavily on state funding. Probably as a result of their ability to generate funds from corporate interests besides membership fees, conservative and liberal parties depended on state funding for only approximately forty per cent of their total income. Environmental parties, with their low organisational capacity, derived a similar percentage of their income from state subventions. For all party families the 1960s and early 1970s were the heydays of state support. Thereafter, in contradiction to what Kirchheimer anticipated, the mean proportion of state funding of the total party income declined. The highest fluctuations in reliance on state finance are found within the Christian democratic, social democratic, communist and liberal party families, whereas the socialist and agrarian parties have a much more stable and homogeneous income pattern. Similar to income derived from membership, the initial distinctions between parties of different origin are disappearing over time, primarily due to the introduction of direct state finance for parties in most countries.

To draw some overall conclusions, it is useful to summarise the findings on the transformation of the financial income structure of political parties in the different countries. Table 4.10 provides the regression coefficients of the proportion of membership fees and state finance relative to total party income with the year of observation as independent variable.

Table 4.10 Trends in income over time of political parties in Western Europe 1960-1990

beta (β)	Aut	Den	Fin	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK
membership fees	-.75*	-.22	.25	-.06	.15	-.39*	-.25	-.42*	-.49*	.48*
state finance	.43	-	-.58*	-.49*	-.55*	-.30	-.10	.14	.17	-.20

The table provides the regression coefficients (β) between the proportion of membership fees for the total party income and the proportion of state finance with the year of observation as independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). Data for France and Belgium are not available.

This pattern of regression coefficients generates four types of transformation which can be distinguished on the basis of the two sources of party income; from membership and from state subventions. In table 4.11 countries are assigned to the four cells on the basis of transformation of their income pattern.

Table 4.11 Types of financial transformation 1960-1990

	increasing proportion of state funding	**decreasing proportion of state funding**
increasing membership revenues		Finland United Kingdom Ireland
decreasing membership revenues	Austria Denmark Norway Sweden (France) (Belgium)	Germany Italy the Netherlands

Note that the data for Belgium and France are very scarce so their categorisation should be treated with caution.

The United Kingdom, Ireland and Finland differ from all the other countries in that the financial importance of the membership actually increased in these countries, thereby refuting Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis at this point. The other rift between countries is constituted by the importance of direct state subvention. Regarding the development of state finance, the German and Italian cases also contradict the catch-all thesis as financial support from the state actually decreased proportionally in these countries, whereas in the Netherlands direct state finance is practically non-existent. This makes the Netherlands an outlier in terms of the financial structure of political parties in the West European context since party activities here are largely financed by membership fees (Koole 1996, 179). Parties in Sweden and Denmark, on the other hand, hardly generate any income from their members and are primarily dependent on state funding. Parties in the United Kingdom also deviate from the general picture in that the relevance of membership fees increased considerably. The cell which represents a transformation according to the catch-all thesis is found on the bottom left, indicating decreasing importance of membership and increasing importance of state finance. In this cell Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden are situated. Thus, only four out of the twelve countries in this sample evidence a generalised development over time towards catch-allism on this indicator. Following the recent introduction in Belgium and France of state subventions to political parties, these two countries can be added to the left bottom cell, still constituting only half the cases in this study that show a development along the lines of Kirchheimer's assertions. Danish, Austrian, Swedish and Norwegian parties have experienced a financial transformation which most resembles the catch-all model. However, although there is no constantly increasing level of catch-allism on this indicator, the introduction of state finance itself in most countries since the 1960s makes West European political parties certainly more catch-all in the 1980s than in the 1950s. Kirchheimer was correct in his assertion that state finance would gain in importance, yet he erroneously assumed that this process would continue.

One further significant conclusion extracted from this study is, that while membership fees are becoming less important for most parties, this loss of income has not been progressively compensated with state finance in all countries. Obviously, many parties in Western Europe have tapped other financial means for organisational continuity and expansion. Evidence suggests that these resources originate primarily from corporate and individual donations (Fischer 1994; Mendilow 1992; Paltiel 1981).

In most countries these donations are not subject to legal restrictions and in some countries these private contributions are even tax-deductible, making them indirect state finance. Furthermore, the disclosure of party income is usually only at the aggregate level, so that individual contributors remain anonymous. Frequently, financial donations are also made to organisations which are not directly related to a political party, yet which channel these donations into the party organisation. These various sources of income for political parties have resulted in numerous political scandals over illegal funding and created an atmosphere of political corruption. In combination with weak party-attachments of the electorate, this 'sleaze factor' has already cost some parties in Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom dearly at election time.

4.3.3 Campaign expenditures

After examining the income structures of West European parties, this section surveys the other side of the coin, namely party expenditures.[54] Here the focus is only on campaign expenditures; in that *an increasing capital intensive effort and style of political campaigning* is considered the **fourth** indicator of organisational catch-allism[55]. This indicator is measured by the proportion of the total annual party income spent on election campaigns, which is taken here to be an approximation of the level of professionalization of West European parties.

Political parties (or individual candidates) have two main resources that can be used in election campaigns: money and labour (Ware 1996, 296). Additionally, as was shown in the last section, parties have access to considerable facilitative resources, encompassing free access to the media, patronage positions and the use of state bureaucracies, all of which are utilised during electoral campaigns, yet will not appear in official campaign budgets. Since it is impossible to include these indirect means in the analysis, this section will only discuss the financial resources parties deplete to attract voters. Section 4.4 of this chapter examines the development in the size of the human resources, that is the size of the professional staff, of political parties in Western Europe.

In absolute terms campaign expenditures have sky-rocketed almost all over Western Europe during the post-war period (see Katz and Mair 1992, tables E.6). Several factors contribute to the increasing capital intensity of democratic political campaigning. The traditional lines of communication through a variety of intermediary organisations are abandoned by many parties and more direct means of political communication with the electorate are adopted. Many political parties in Western Europe disposed of their party newspapers and other forms of monopolised media and now progressively rely on the commercialised press. This encumbers their effort to get their message across as parties have to compete not only with the other parties in the national party system, but with other news-items as well. Many parties have tried to tackle this problem by hiring professionals from marketing or commercial agencies to advice them on the form and substance of their political information. As a

[54] Two types of party spending can be distinguished: the routine, inter-election expenses necessary for the maintenance of the party organization and the campaign expenditures during the election campaign, of which only the latter is analyzed here.

[55] Pedersen, for example, suggests that parties increasingly campaign in a "catch-all style, i.e. to use more broadly based appeals, marketing techniques, etc." (Pedersen 1983, 58).

result, the content of the slogans at election time have also changed. Under the influence of image-consultants, less emphasis is put on the ideological content of the party platform while increasing emphasis is laid on the positive characteristics of personalities. Party leaders and parliamentarians now often receive media training by professionals, especially concerning their appearances on television. Contrary to Kirchheimer's assertion, political opponents attack each other more directly, usually with the help of commercial advertising companies. One of the most famous examples was perhaps the Saatchi & Saatchi campaign for the British Conservative Party with their slogan "Labour Doesn't Work." This text was displayed underneath a long line of people queuing in front of an employment office.

All these factors make Kirchheimer's assumption of increasing campaign expenditures a logical hypothesis. Furthermore, in several countries such as Norway and Sweden, expenditures on elections campaigns are not confined by a legal maximum, neither are parties restricted in their expenses by legislation in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium (in the latter a maximum expenditure was set for both parties and candidates in 1989). This also suggests that parties can employ whatever financial resources they deem necessary to win the next election. Nevertheless, in some West European countries legal regulations on campaign expenditures do exist. In Austria, for example, parties set their own maximum expenditures limits, which are reported and inspected by an all-party committee after the election. Since 1974 Italian parties are also compelled by law to supply a detailed account of elections expenses, although no maximum limit is set. In Ireland regulations concerning campaign expenditures existed since 1923, but were removed in 1963. Strict party regulations on finance exist in Germany, though they are hardly ever enforced. Legislation in the United Kingdom sets a maximum expenditure on campaigns, although these restrictions are applicable only to individual candidates in local constituencies, not to parties at the national level (Fisher 1994, 62). Moreover, the maximum expenditure has been raised five times since 1960. One could say that there are very limited barriers for parties to increase the amount of money spent on campaigning.

In this section the (sometimes estimated) campaign expenditures of parties in national elections are examined.[56] To make the data comparable across the different countries in this study, the amounts spend on political campaigning are given as the percentage of the total annual income of the party Head Office. Table 4.12 below summarises these data for each of the countries in this study.

[56] For Germany there are no longitudinal data available for national election. Therefore, the Land election in Baden-Württemberg was compared for two consecutive elections, as well as one local election in Nord Rhine-Westphalia and the European elections of 1984 and 1989.

Table 4.12 Campaign expenditures as proportion of the total annual party income in Western Europe 1960-1990

	1961-1965	1966-1970	1971-1975	1976-1980	1981-1985	1986-1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*beta (β)*
Aut	201.3	173.9	151.9	56.9	75.4	82.0	**108.0**	**71.8**	**.665**	**-.56***
Bel	-	-	-	471.3	272.6	257.8	**333.9**	**138.2**	**.413**	**-.62***
Den	98.4	33.2	26.4	31.7	25.1	45.2	**46.3**	**30.4**	**.656**	**-.21**
Fin	100.0	13.5	16.0	8.7	8.8	9.4	**26.1**	**20.7**	**.793**	**-.53***
Ger	-	-	-	165.5	30.7	35.4	**77.2**	**11.9**	**.154**	**.22**
Ire	19.1	-	-	124.1	135.9	81.6	**90.2**	**57.7**	**.639**	**.37**
Ita	-	-	25.8	28.9	25.1	29.4	**27.3**	**17.6**	**.645**	**.03**
Net	24.2	29.1	37.0	30.0	25.4	23.8	**29.1**	**15.6**	**.536**	**-.15**
Nor	99.7	28.7	38.4	21.2	38.0	24.3	**41.6**	**53.5**	**1.28**	**-.59***
Swe	48.9	39.1	35.4	53.6	86.5	53.0	**52.8**	**54.1**	**1.02**	**.19**
UK	88.1	42.7	47.8	90.4	45.1	71.3	**64.2**	**29.1**	**.453**	**-.03**
X	**83.8**	**51.5**	**47.3**	**61.1**	**49.6**	**45.5**	**56.3**	**36.3**	**.645**	**-.00**
S	**55.5**	**47.6**	**52.0**	**139.9**	**87.9**	**73.5**	**78.9**	**-**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.662**	**.924**	**1.09**	**2.29**	**1.77**	**1.16**	**1.40**	**-**	**-**	**-**

Entries are average percentages of an annual income spent on election campaigns. Data on campaign expenditures are taken from Katz and Mair (1992, Tables E.6). Data before 1960 are not available for most countries and for France too scarce to be included. For Belgium the campaign expenditures in proportion to the total amount of state subventions are used, as total party income data are unavailable. A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available. The first column contains the abbreviation for the countries as explained in appendix II. Column and row indicated with an *X* lists the average of the period and party family mean. The column '*S*' provides the standard deviation of the party family scores in each period and the column '*CV*' gives the coefficient of variance (*S*/ *X*). For every country a linear regression was computed with the campaign expenditures as the dependent variable and the period of observation as the independent variable. The column 'β' provides these regression coefficients. A decline in campaign expenditures as a proportion of the total party income would be indicated by a negative trend parameter. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Legal restrictions on campaign expenditures have indeed not checked a considerable growth in election campaign expenditures. In absolute terms, almost every single West European party increased its campaign expenses between 1960 and 1990. Nevertheless, as can be seen from table 4.12, these increases were relatively moderate compared to the total party income growth; resulting in lower proportions of campaign expenditures over time in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The effect of income growth is exemplary in the Finnish case: before the introduction of state finance, Finnish parties spent almost one total annual income on their election campaigns. This proportion dropped to one-tenth of one annual income after the introduction of state subventions in 1967. Parties in Sweden, Germany, Ireland and Italy spent an increasing proportion of their annual income on elections. Relative to their total income, Austrian, Irish and German parties have spent most on election campaigns. The lowest proportions of the annual income spent on election campaigns are found in the Netherlands, Italy and Finland. Overall, less than half of the parties' national income is spent on election campaigns and over time, contrary to Kirchheimer's assertion, this proportion has

even decreased in most countries. The differences between parties within and across countries in expenditure levels on electoral campaigning remain substantial, witnessed by high coefficients of variance. To reiterate, the absolute amount of money parties spent on election campaigns grew significantly, yet this increase has been more than compensated by an even steeper rise in the total annual income of political parties.

An interesting pattern also emerges when the data are broken down for the different party families, as is summarised in table 4.13.

Table 4.13 Campaign expenditures as proportion of the total annual income of party families 1960-1990

	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*beta (β)*
cd	23.9	42.0	71.2	153.4	71.9	74.4	**72.8**	**125.3**	**1.722**	**.05**
com	-	-	31.9	31.5	15.8	13.4	**23.2**	**13.9**	**.599**	**-.60**
con	76.8	24.8	29.6	69.9	58.2	54.2	**52.3**	**49.2**	**.941**	**.08**
sd	97.7	64.5	52.9	62.5	53.5	54.0	**79.1**	**66.5**	**.840**	**-.31***
soc	-	2.1	15.7	27.3	21.7	27.1	**25.4**	**13.3**	**.524**	**-.16**
lib	46.6	44.0	28.6	97.4	81.5	80.7	**63.1**	**105.4**	**1.673**	**.15**
env	-	-	-	21.3	145.8	74.4	**110.1**	**104.0**	**.945**	**-.04**
eth	-	-	27.6	204.7	162.9	265.2	**167.9**	**174.1**	**1.044**	**.34**
agr	30.0	21.6	23.4	30.3	22.8	37.5	**27.1**	**24.4**	**.900**	**.08**
X	**83.8**	**51.5**	**47.3**	**61.1**	**49.6**	**45.5**	**56.3**	**36.3**	**.645**	**-.00**

Entries are percentages of an annual income spent on election campaigns. Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992). The first column contains the abbreviation for the party families as explained in appendix II. Column and row indicated with an *X* lists the average of the period and party family mean. The column '*S*' provides the standard deviation of the party family scores in each period and the column '*CV*' gives the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the proportion of campaign expenditures relative to the total party income and the period of observation. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). The minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available and data for France are too scarce to be included.

In interpreting this table, the reader should bear in mind that the proportions are determined by both changes in the level of expenditures as well as by changes in the income of parties, which in turn are subject to specific national provisions and regulations. Keeping this in mind, the data show that on average, the social democratic and the Christian democratic parties spent more than seventy per cent of their income on election campaigns, whereas the liberal parties in Western Europe also depleted a fair proportion of their annual income on electoral purposes, namely, over sixty per cent on average. The party families which spent the lowest proportions of their income on attracting the popular vote, are the agrarian, socialist and communist parties (excluding the fascist, environmental, ethnic and protest party families from the comparison). The differences between party families are too small to ascribe them to different ideologies concerning the level of mass organisation of the parties. Two conclusions can be drawn from this table. First, the general trend of decreasing proportions in expenditure on election campaigns is only found among parties traditionally positioned on the left of the political spectrum, namely communist, socialist, social democratic and environmental parties. This downward

trend in campaign expenditure is not found among the Christian democratic, agrarian and liberal parties. Communist, socialist and social democratic parties also have the lowest variation in campaign expenditures. Some of this variability, however, is also caused by the inclusion of a different number of parties from the various countries with their typical national legislation on electoral campaigns and the availability and type of public finance. A second important conclusion from all this is that Kirchheimer's assumption that parties in Western Europe would primarily concentrate their (financial) efforts on winning the next election is not corroborated by these data.

In summary, Kirchheimer was correct in assuming that larger amounts of money would be spent on election campaign by political parties. However, despite an increase in the absolute amount spent on election campaigns, most parties increased their income at a proportionately higher rate, resulting in lower expenditures relative to their total income. Apparently, parties spent their burgeoning riches on other activities, one of which is discussed in the next section: the professionalization of the party organisation.

4.4 Professionalization: the size and structure of the party staff

With the decline of mass membership, the importance of voluntary labour has also declined for most political parties (Bartolini 1983; Heidar 1994). A possible shift from labour-intensive to capital intensive political activity can also be assessed by examining the level of bureaucratic professionalization of party organisations. To measure the level of professionalization, the **fifth** indicator of organisational catch-allism, I will look at the number of professional salaried experts and bureaucrats employed at the party organisation.[57] Firstly, the focus is on the professionalization of the party central office and secondly, in section 4.4.2, on the professionalization of the parliamentary party.

4.4.1 Staff in central office

For reasons of comparison, the number of professionals in the central party organisation is related to the number of party members.[58] The entries in the table below refer to the number of professionals employed at the party central office for each 10.000 members. For most parties the absolute size of professional staff at party headquarters in Western Europe increased substantially during the post-war period.[59] Only nine parties are exempted from this general pattern of professionalization (Katz and Mair 1992, tables C.1). The variation in professionalization between the different countries is summarised in table 4.14 below.

[57] The total size of the party bureaucracy can be much larger as some people outside central party offices can also devote themselves to full-time party work (Panebianco 1988, 223-231; Katz and Mair 1993b, 16).

[58] The level of professionalization is the ratio between bureaucrats dedicated to and responsible for the maintenance of the national central party organization and the total membership (M).

[59] Katz and Mair 1992, tables C.1; Müller 1994, 73-74; Deschouwer 1994, 104; Sundberg 1994, 173-175; Farrell 1994, 223; Von Beyme 1985, 238; Koole 1994, 290-291; Krouwel 1996, 183-184; Pierre and Widfeldt 1992, 789-791; Webb 1994, 124-125.

Table 4.14 Ratio between staff in party central office and total membership in Western Europe 1955-1990

	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*beta (β)*
Aut	1.93	1.31	2.03	2.52	2.55	2.75	2.85	**2.28**	**0.01**	**.001**	**.36**
Den	2.96	1.95	2.53	2.22	5.82	6.17	6.00	**3.95**	**0.04**	**.001**	**.36***
Fin	3.58	3.36	3.86	4.30	4.69	5.35	5.56	**4.39**	**0.03**	**.001**	**.31***
Ger	-	7.08	3.74	6.22	2.23	3.63	4.45	**4.56**	**0.02**	**.001**	**-.37**
Ire	1.01	0.87	0.36	0.30	3.51	18.42	8.34	**4.69**	**0.11**	**.002**	**.36**
Ita	1.59	1.95	1.77	2.99	7.18	18.95	17.87	**7.47**	**0.18**	**.002**	**.35***
Net	2.45	3.68	5.92	10.20	3.60	4.57	4.89	**5.04**	**0.06**	**.001**	**.05**
Nor	-	1.62	1.54	6.25	3.78	3.55	3.99	**3.41**	**0.04**	**.001**	**.12**
Swe	1.07	2.50	3.32	3.85	4.71	6.89	6.32	**4.09**	**0.04**	**.001**	**.45***
UK	0.49	0.68	0.67	0.67	0.67	2.13	2.75	**1.15**	**0.01**	**.001**	**.79***
X	**1.89**	**2.50**	**2.57**	**3.95**	**3.87**	**7.24**	**6.30**	**4.05**	**0.05**	**.001**	**.24***
S	**0.02**	**0.02**	**0.03**	**0.06**	**0.04**	**0.12**	**0.11**	**0.06**	**-**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.001**	**.001**	**.001**	**.002**	**.001**	**.002**	**.002**	**.001**	**-**	**-**	**-**

Entries denote the number of professionals per 10.000 members. Data on staff of party central offices and membership are taken from Katz and Mair (1992). Data for France and Belgium are unavailable. The first column contains the abbreviation for the countries as explained in appendix II. The column indicated by *CV* lists the standard deviation of the country scores. The row '*X*' lists the average of the period and the row labelled *CV* provides the coefficient of variance (*CV*/*X*). The column indicated *'beta (β)'* provides the regression coefficient between the number of professionals employed at the party central office for each 10.000 members with the year of observation as independent variable. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). Data prior to 1955 are not available.

Table 4.14 clearly vindicates the catch-all assertion that West European parties professionalized their central party organisation. Relative to membership, the number of professionals has more than tripled in the last three decades. Parties in Italy employed the highest proportion of professional staff in relation to membership size. Also, parties in the Netherlands have a relatively high proportion of professional staff working in their central office, despite the fact that Dutch parties employ relatively few professionals at their central offices in absolute terms. Obviously, the low level of membership in the Netherlands accounts for this relatively high ratio. Parties in Austria and in the United Kingdom, on the other hand, have much lower proportions of professional staff relative to their membership despite the fact that they employ two or three times the number of professionals found at Dutch party central offices. Still, in all countries, with the sole exception of Germany, the level of professionalism of parties increased as regression analysis shows. The steepest increases in professionalisation are found in the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy and Ireland, while Norwegian and Dutch parties professionalized more slowly. The relative decline in professional staff in Germany is more than anything the result of very early professionalization. German parties employ by far the largest number of professionals in absolute terms. Albeit, most of these proportional increases are also the result of declining membership figures; in response to this development parties have not opted to decrease their staff accordingly. On the contrary, parties seem to assign many of

the tasks previously given to the rank-and-file voluntary activists to professionally trained personnel. This indicates that modern political parties can do without large memberships, but are reluctant to do away with the expertise of the professionals. Over time, nevertheless, the heterogeneity between parties has increased somewhat as becomes evident from the two measures of dispersion (the standard deviation and coefficient of variance).

The trend towards professionalization is also visible when the data are broken down into party families as is done in table 4.15 below. Again, the entries in the table below refer to the number of professionals employed at the party central office for each 10.000 members.

Table 4.15 makes clear that, over time, with the exception of environmental and protest parties, all party families enlarged their professional staff at their Head Office relative to their membership-size. The lowest proportions of professionals are found among the agrarian, social democratic and Christian democratic parties. These three party families also have the largest pools of membership, which may go a long way in explaining these low scores on the number of professionals per ten thousand members. The largest variation between parties of the same germane origin are found among the socialist and environmental parties, while Christian democratic, social democratic, agrarian and conservative parties show more cross-national homogeneity. Agrarian, socialist, communist and social democratic parties have professionalized their central extra-parliamentary organisation most rapidly, while Christian democratic, liberal and particularly conservative parties have transformed more slowly.

Table 4.15 Ratio between central office staff and total membership by party family 1955-1990

	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*β*
cd	1.67	3.10	2.29	3.09	3.03	3.16	4.30	**2.95**	**0.02**	**.001**	**.23**
com	6.25	4.81	7.23	11.13	9.01	8.99	11.60	**8.42**	**0.05**	**.001**	**.39**
con	1.34	4.70	6.89	4.14	5.09	4.90	4.22	**4.47**	**0.03**	**.001**	**.09**
sd	1.63	1.94	2.10	2.44	2.97	3.17	3.37	**2.52**	**0.02**	**.001**	**.35***
soc	9.00	4.62	5.83	5.20	8.75	23.33	26.27	**19.45**	**0.17**	**.001**	**.45**
lib	2.12	2.17	3.54	6.67	4.95	4.87	6.26	**4.37**	**0.05**	**.001**	**.27***
env	-	-	-	-	-	30.29	22.76	**26.53**	**0.25**	**.001**	**-.16**
agr	0.87	0.86	1.06	1.26	1.53	1.37	1.73	**1.24**	**0.01**	**.001**	**.55***
prt				19.61	20.04	9.56	4.79	**7.18**	**0.08**	**.001**	**-.81***
X	**1.89**	**2.50**	**2.57**	**3.95**	**3.87**	**7.24**	**6.30**	**4.05**	**0.05**	**.001**	**.24***

Entries are the average number of professionals per 10.000 members. Data on staff of party central offices and membership are taken from Katz and Mair (1992). Data for Belgium and France are not included. The minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available. Column and row indicated with an *X* lists the average of the period and party family mean. The column '*CV*' lists the standard deviation of the country scores. The column indicated 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the number of professionals employed at the party central office for each 10.000 members with the year of observation as independent variable. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

In sum, throughout Western Europe a significant increase in professionalization of central party offices is evident. Kirchheimer correctly asserted that political parties have diverted their resources towards building more professional organisations instead of investing in voluntary membership organisations. Despite the lack of cross-national data on membership activity, the evidence available from country studies strongly suggests that the role of members for the daily functioning of political parties has declined substantially throughout Western Europe (Von Beyme 1985, 186-188; Heidar 1994, 82; Seyd and Whitely 1992, 89; Zielonka-Goei 1992, 102).

4.4.2 Staff of the parliamentary party

Subsequent to professionalization of parties' central offices, catch-all parties will also professionalise their parliamentary party organisations according to the catch-all theory outlined in chapters 2 and 3. To measure the level of expertise at the parliamentary parties, the ratio between the number of parliamentary staff and the number of parliamentary representatives (seats in parliament) is utilised. A score of 100 means that the number of experts employed at the parliamentary party is equal in number to the seats in parliament. The results of these calculations for the different countries in this study are given in table 4.16.

Table 4.16 Ratio parliamentary staff and number of parliamentary seats in Western Europe 1960-1990

	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*β*
Aut	28.5	57.1	55.5	54.1	51.3	55.6	**38.2**	**39.8**	**1.04**	**.33**
Den	26.1	16.3	28.0	62.0	68.2	90.3	**46.1**	**41.2**	**.893**	**.57***
Fin	3.5	5.0	7.5	11.0	15.9	15.4	**8.6**	**5.4**	**.628**	**.89***
Ger	423.1	103.3	126.9	130.2	208.7	358.4	**206.1**	**176.9**	**.858**	**.25**
Ire	-	-	7.6	19.9	80.0	95.5	**50.8**	**41.7**	**.820**	**.89***
Ita	-	15.1	15.5	57.0	40.2	54.3	**36.4**	**23.7**	**.651**	**.47**
Net	7.7	28.5	109.3	171.6	174.5	172.2	**110.6**	**70.8**	**.640**	**.70***
Nor	16.3	19.6	39.8	70.4	67.0	53.2	**44.4**	**43.8**	**.986**	**.38***
Swe	4.8	14.0	20.3	24.7	32.5	36.6	**20.8**	**12.5**	**.601**	**.78***
UK	22.2	20.0	28.6	-	35.7	40.6	**33.4**	**28.7**	**.859**	**.28**
X	**66.5**	**31.0**	**43.9**	**66.8**	**77.4**	**97.2**	**59.5**	**48.5**	**.815**	**.19***
S	**92.5**	**31.1**	**43.8**	**68.0**	**67.8**	**105.7**	**73.6**	**-**	**-**	**-**
CV	**1.39**	**1.00**	**.997**	**1.02**	**.876**	**1.09**	**1.24**	**-**	**-**	**-**

Entries are ratios between the number of parliamentary staff and number of parliamentary representatives. Data on staff of parliamentary party are taken from Katz and Mair (1992) and number of seats are taken from Mackie and Rose 1989 (updates from European Journal of Political Research). A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available. Column, '*S*' lists the standard deviation of the country scores. Row '*X*' lists the average of the period and the row labelled '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). The column indicated 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the number of professionals employed at the parliamentary party in relation to the number of seats with the year of observation as independent variable. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

As can be seen from table 4.16, in all West European countries parties professionalized their parliamentary organisation. Although this secular trend towards professionalization of the parliamentary parties in Western Europe is unmistakable, the ratio between the number of professionals employed by the parliamentary parties and the number of parliamentary seats reveals large dissimilarities between countries. Despite the fact that these cross-national differences in the level of parliamentary professionalization declined since the late-1950s, substantial disparities remain. The German Bundestag and the Dutch Tweede Kamer have professionalized most thoroughly over the last three decades. In Germany parliamentarians have, on average, more than two assistants and Dutch MP's have more than one professional at their disposal. While in Germany the rapid growth of parliamentary party staff became evident even before the early introduction of state funding, professionalization in the Netherlands occurred mainly after the introduction of state subsidies in 1968 for the assistance of individual MPs and parliamentary parties. The most 'understaffed' parliamentary representatives are found in Sweden and particularly Finland, yet parties in these countries are professionalising rapidly in the last decade of this study. A similar high beta-coefficient was found for Ireland; Irish parliamentarians did not have any staff at their disposal until 1975, when state finance provided secretarial assistance. Initially, one secretarial assistant was made available for each 10 MP's (TDs), while in 1982 this proportion increased to almost one assistant for every

MP. In Denmark the increasing professionalization resulted from the introduction in 1986 of a state subsidy enabling each MP to hire professional assistance. Austria, Italy and the United Kingdom are in the middle of the distribution concerning the ratio of professional staff and MP's as well as the speed of professionalization.

Despite the fact that provisions for parliamentary staff are largely the function of national regulations and financial provisions, there is some variance between the different party families concerning the speed of transformation. Table 4.17 gives the regression coefficients of the parliamentary staff in relation to parliamentary seats of party families with the year of observation as independent variable.

Table 4.17 Trends in professionalization of the parliamentary party of West European party families 1960-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	soc	lib	env	eth	agr	prt
beta (β)	.48*	.18	.53*	-.18	.26	.41*	.34	.97	.73*	.80*

The column indicated 'beta' (β) provides the regression coefficient between the parliamentary staff in relation to parliamentary seats and the year of observation. Coefficients marked by an asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

With the exception of the social democratic parties, all party families show a propensity towards more professionalization over time. This finding clearly contradicts Kirchheimer's assertion that social democratic parties would be most eager to adopt catch-all practices. More in line with the general trend, however, social democratic parties did professionalise their parliamentary organisation most rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s. Liberal, conservative and Christian democratic parties also employed higher numbers of staff over the last decades, while communist an socialist parties were a little more reluctant to take on larger numbers of professional parliamentary staff. It emerges that, of the larger party families, agrarian and conservative parties have professionalized most rapidly over time. Kirchheimer correctly asserted that parties in Western Europe are rapidly professionalising their parliamentary organisation. Only the social democratic parties seem to hold on to somewhat more traditional organisational practices.

To summarise, political parties is Western Europe have thoroughly professionalized both their central office organisation as well as their parliamentary party. In most countries the increase in parliamentary party staff has steadily exceeded the speed of professionalization of the central offices. The only exceptions to this pattern are Italy and the United Kingdom, where party central offices were professionalized more rapidly than the parliamentary party. The increasing predominance of the parliamentary party over the central office has been most insistent in Ireland and Denmark; exhibiting an increase in staff was ten times higher for the parliamentary party than for the central office. In Austria, Finland, Germany, Norway and Sweden, the professionalization of the parliamentary party has surpassed that of the party's central office by three to four times (see Katz and Mair 1994). The tendency in Western Europe to bestow state finance to the parliamentary party has transcended the proclivity to grant financial support to the parties' central offices, which in turn resulted in a power shift from the extra-parliamentary party organisation to the parliamentary party. Further evidence of this alteration in intra-party power structure is elaborated in the next section where the internal democracy of West

European parties is assessed.

4.5 Internal democracy and power distribution

This section concentrates on the distribution of power within political parties between the leadership and the rank-and-file membership.[60] As was shown in chapter 2, one of Kirchheimer's central concerns was the limited opportunity for political participation by citizens in modern party systems dominated by catch-all parties. Catch-all parties discourage members from having any control in the selection of the national party chairman and parliamentary candidates, so enhancing the party leadership's increasing influence over these internal decision-making processes. Furthermore, it is expected that the institutions for the internal process of will-formation shall also become less democratic in the development towards catch-allism.

In chapter 3 it was argued that both the nominating process or selection of party leaders and parliamentary candidates are the most crucial functions of political parties and therefore, good indicators for the distribution of power within the party organisation (see also Schattschneider 1942, 64). Moreover, the selection of the leadership and the formulation of policy are interrelated since candidates, who are elected into public office or in the party central office are, for example, in a position to influence the political agenda and prepare the documents used in the debate. One could also reverse this argument: decisions about persons are often preliminary policy decisions and thus, choices on candidates are structured by policy preferences (see Niedermayer 1989; Ranney 1981, 103). Therefore, the manner in which the leadership of political parties is selected is related to intra-party conflict and party cohesion (Gallagher 1988). As some of the earliest studies of political parties also emphasised, an 'open' or democratic selection of leadership is also crucial for the legitimacy of political leaders (Michels 1911, 120-128; Duverger 1954, 135). Indeed, the recruitment and nomination of candidates for public office is such a vital function that it is widely regarded as the discriminating criterion of the definition of a political party (Sartori 1976; Eldersveld 1982).

In this study I use the number and status of people who participate in the leadership and candidate selection and policy formation process to determine the 'openness' of the procedures. In general terms, the higher the number of people that have the opportunity to participate in these procedures, the more 'open' the procedure. If the rank-and-file membership is excluded from the candidate selection and policy formation, the procedure is considered centralised. Usually candidate selection is an intra-party affair, where only a limited number of party members are eligible to vote and thereby, become part of the 'selectorate'.[61] Two opposing

[60] See also Beer 1956, 9-57;Von Beyme 1985, 232-240; Katz and Mair 1993b; Niedermayer 1989.

[61] Ranney (1981, 83 ff) distinguishes three dimensions of candidate selection: centralization, inclusiveness and direct or indirect participation. Centralization refers to the pattern of power distribution in the candidate selection process over the different levels of the party organization (national, regional and local). Inclusiveness refers to the restrictiveness of the qualifications for participation in the selection process. The inclusiveness is determined by the extent to which the party elite allows the lower party echelons to participate in the election process. A direct intra-party selection procedure would thus entail an open primary, poll or referendum among all party members. An indirect method is the selection by committees or conventions where delegates decide on who is to be the candidate for public office. Another important aspect is the extent of competitiveness of the inter-party competition: the number of candidates which run for the same office. Parties will try to limit too open a competition between candidates for the party leadership, as a display of disunity will damage the party's electoral credibility and attractiveness. As politicians become more professional, and more ambitious for office and less policy oriented, they will

selection procedures, democratic direct membership polls or indirect nomination by the incumbent national leader(s) can be seen as two poles on the scale of centralisation in the selection of candidates. As it is necessary (and sometimes compulsory by law) for parties in a democratic polity to retain a democratic structure, parties will rarely opt for an official procedure of total co-optation. However, as will be shown below, even when direct membership polls are held, candidate selection within parties is largely outside democratic popular control and the larger majority of citizens are not involved in inner party politics (see von Beyme 1985, 239). Many inner-party elections are indirect, namely, through committees or bureau's, nomination by the leadership itself, selection by the elected representatives, party congresses or conferences, all allowing for extensive manipulation of the outcome by the party leadership. The relevance of the selection of the party chairperson, as opposed to policy decisions, lies in the fact that the latter are usually very temporal and vague, whereas the appointment of party leaders have more durable consequences (Müller and Meth-Cohn 1991, 40). The importance of these decisions on individuals transcend party affairs themselves, since top officials of political parties are often consulted in decisions made by governments and ministers. Conversely, ministers depend on the party leadership for re-election and political support. Moreover, negotiators in coalition formations often consult party leaders (if these leaders do not conduct the negotiations themselves) to ensure that the party will lend support the newly formed government.

On the basis of research on candidate selection by Janda (1980, 110-111) and Gallagher (1988a), a scale of centralisation of candidate and leadership selection is constructed. Unlike practices in the United States such as 'primaries', the selection procedure in Western Europe is purely an intra-party process. Voters in Europe can only participate in leadership and candidate selection when they join a political party organisation. Party voters are therefore not included in this scale.

sooner put the party's unity at risk. This will have consequences for the style of (democratic) leadership, the internal cohesion of the party and its electoral fortune (Marsh 1993; see also Dahl 1971, 7).

Figure 4.1 Openness (inclusiveness) of the leadership and candidate selection procedures: locus of major influence

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
incumbent national leader	party central office or national executive	interest or other external groups	parliamentary delegates	national convention or congress	select group of (local) party members	open party referendum for members

← centralised (exclusive) selection — de-centralised (inclusive) selection

This scale is used to quantify centralisation in both the selection of party leaders and parliamentary candidates of European parties. The determining factor for each score is the major locus of influence in the selection process. The right end of the scale, box 7, indicates the most open and democratic selection procedure, in which all members formally have the right and opportunity to participate in the selection procedure. This would mean open primaries, referenda or polls among party members. Box 6 indicates a procedure in which party active members have to attend (local) meetings or congresses to be admitted in the selection procedure. Usually, this procedure entails the appointment of special election committees. A procedure in which the official congress representatives or local party leaders participate in the selection procedure and members can only ratify the candidate selection afterwards is indicated by box 5. A party is placed in box 4 when the parliamentary party mainly influences the selection of the party leader. This procedure may include ratification by party members after the selection. When the locus of most influence rests outside the official party organs with affiliated interest groups (such as trade unions), yet the selection requires ratification by the party central body, score 3 is assigned. Box 2 is indicative of a procedure which gives the party central office or executive body vital influence in the selection procedure. When there is complete co-option by the incumbent party leader, the most centralised score of 1 is given to the respective party. If a party moves toward the centralistic end of the scale, because the party top increases its influence over the selection of the party leader, the party is transforming toward catch-allism. By using the same scale for both processes, chairman and candidate selection, a comparison between the two processes across parties and countries over time is rendered possible.

One important distinction which has to be made, is between the official rules for the selection procedure as they are laid down in the party rules and the 'real world' selection process. This 'actual' selection process denotes a very complex mechanism of interaction involving multiple actors (some of which may even be outside the formal party organisation), in which all actors have a variegated degree of influence. Seldom will one single actor exert complete control over the selection process. The measurement of centralisation in this study concentrates on the formal, official written party rules of leadership and candidate selection.

Changes in the intra-party balance of power between the party members and the party leadership is assessed by two measures. First, the selection of the national party chairperson (or party president), which is the highest official in the party central office, is analysed. An increasingly centralised (exclusive) selection procedure of the party chairperson indicates organisational catch-allism. In section 4.5.2 the selection of parliamentary candidates is analysed. Both measures together constitute the **sixth** indicator of organisational catch-allism.

4.5.1 Selection of the party chairperson

In Western Europe, the eminence and role of the party 'leader' differs from party to party. He or she may have the sole task of managing the party organisation or, conversely, play an important role in the policy formulation and decision-making. In some parties the party chairperson or president is the most important position, while in other parties the parliamentary leader (or governmental leader) is more influential.[62] In some cases, the parliamentary leader automatically becomes the party leader or is able to appoint confidants to the party chair. Furthermore, it is important whether the function of party leader is given to a single person or is a shared responsibility by several individuals. In Austria, Belgium and Italy the national party executive commonly select their leader from their midst. This extra-parliamentary leader yields significant power in the appointment of ministers, governmental policy making and coalition formation. In Ireland, France, Finland and Denmark the party chairperson and the parliamentary leader is usually the same person, who combines both functions. In contrast, in Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom, the parliamentary leadership tends to dominate the extra-parliamentary organisation. The next table summarises the most dominating bodies in the selection of the party chairperson in each country.

Table 4.18 Major locus of party leader selection in West European countries 1945-1990

country	Most important party body in selection	Other important actors
Austria	national executive	parliamentary party
Belgium	national executive	national convention
Denmark	parliamentary party	national executive
Finland	national congress	local conventions
France	national executive	
Germany	national executive	national congress
Ireland	parliamentary party	national congress
Italy	national executive	
Netherlands	national executive	national congress
Norway	parliamentary party	national executive and congress
Sweden	parliamentary party	
United Kingdom	parliamentary party	

Adapted from Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, 254. Data from Katz and Mair 1992.

This table clearly shows that leadership selection within West European parties is often an oligarchic intra-elite selection procedure, in which members are, at most, allowed to 'rubber-stamp' decisions at the national party congress after they have been taken by the party national leadership. In most West European countries national party executives and parliamentary representatives maintain firm control over the

[62] Dewachter 1987, 320-322; Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, 252-253; Müller 1994; Deschouwer 1994; De Winter 1993, 245; Mair 1994; Bille 1994; Sundberg and Gylling 1992, 277; Thiebault 1993, 283-290; Raymond 1990; Poguntke with Boll, 1992: 352; Marsh 1993, 299; Krouwel 1996; Koole 1994; Svåsand 1994, 306; Strom 1993, 332; Webb 1994, 121-122.

leadership selection procedure. Despite the presence of factionalism in almost all political parties, candidates which stand for the national party leadership will seldom be openly contested (von Beyme 1985, 226-232; Massari 1989; Cole 1989). Overt challenges to incumbent leaders are rare, allowing for the conclusion that party leadership elections in Western Europe are seldom open or competitive. Table 4.18 only gives a very static picture of the general pattern in each of the countries, thereby neglecting the variation between parties within countries and transformation of individual parties over time. In the next table a more dynamic approach is adopted; the entries given are the average 'scores of inclusiveness' in the selection of the party chairperson, based on the 7-point scale explained above (see figure 4.1).

Table 4.19 The openness of the selection of party leaders in Western Europe 1945-1990

	1945 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*beta (β)*
Aut	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.1	**3.7**	**1.1**	**.297**	**.23**
Bel	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.7	3.9	**3.3**	**1.4**	**.424**	**.19**
Den	4.3	4.4	4.4	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	**4.0**	**0.9**	**.225**	**-.28***
Fin	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.9	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	**4.5**	**1.1**	**.244**	**.26***
Fra	2.2	2.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	**2.7**	**0.9**	**.333**	**.15**
Ger	2.8	2.8	3.5	3.5	3.5	4.1	4.1	4.1	**3.5**	**1.0**	**.286**	**.52***
Ire	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.9	**4.4**	**0.6**	**.136**	**.16**
Ita	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.4	2.4	2.8	3.2	3.3	**2.5**	**1.0**	**.400**	**.46***
Net	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.8	4.1	3.8	4.5	4.5	**3.8**	**1.7**	**.447**	**.26***
Nor	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.7	**4.8**	**0.3**	**.063**	**-.10**
Swe	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.9	4.9	**4.6**	**0.8**	**.174**	**.24**
UK	3.3	3.3	3.3	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.8	4.8	**3.9**	**1.0**	**.256**	**.62***
X	**3.5**	**3.5**	**3.6**	**3.8**	**3.9**	**3.9**	**4.1**	**4.2**	**3.8**	**1.0**	**.263**	**.20***
S	**1.4**	**1.4**	**1.3**	**1.2**	**1.2**	**1.2**	**1.2**	**1.2**	**1.3**	**-**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.400**	**.400**	**.361**	**.316**	**.307**	**.307**	**.293**	**.285**	**.342**	**-**	**-**	**-**

Note that the scores of the period 1945-1955 are aggregated in one column for reasons of space (scores did not differ). Entries are average 'openness-scores'. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data on the selection procedure are taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.2. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The column and row marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the countries. Rows and columns indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). The row 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the inclusiveness of the selection procedure and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Overall, the openness of leadership selection in Western Europe is low, with few parties allowing party members to voice who they want to be party leader. Still, a moderate trend towards more inclusive and open procedures of party leadership selection is discernible, particularly since the 1960s (β = .20). An increasing number of parties have been willing to grant party members some influence over the selection of party leaders, although usually only in the ratification of choices made earlier by the

party elite. In all countries, with the exception of Denmark and Norway, this moderate trend towards democratisation of internal decision-making is noticeable. The most democratic party organisations can be found in Norway, Sweden and Finland, in contrast to the French and Italian parties which remained relatively undemocratic and centralised with regard to their leadership selection procedure. French parties did adopt more open procedures during the 1960s and 1970s, yet regressed to more centralised procedures again in the 1980s. The coefficients of variance show the moderate trend towards convergence among West European parties. While, for example, the initially very undemocratic German, Italian and British parties democratised their leadership selection procedures, the originally very democratic Danish parties have moved towards more centralised procedures. Notwithstanding a moderate general trend towards more openness, prior to 1990 only a very small minority of political parties in Western Europe granted members any substantial influence beyond casting their vote in leadership elections at the national conference, and then only after these leaders had been pre-selected by the party elite. This is also evidenced in the next table, where the average level of openness in leadership selection is given for the different party families.

Table 4.20 The openness of party leadership elections of Western European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*beta (β)*
cd	2.7	2.8	3.3	3.3	3.5	3.6	3.8	3.8	**3.3**	**1.0**	**.303**	**.39***
com	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	**3.1**	**1.4**	**.452**	**.30***
con	3.8	3.8	3.9	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.2	**4.1**	**1.0**	**.244**	**.20**
sd	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	4.2	4.4	**3.9**	**1.2**	**.308**	**.12**
soc	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	**4.7**	**0.7**	**.149**	**-.41***
lib	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.1	**3.9**	**1.3**	**.333**	**.07**
env	-	-	-	5.0	5.0	5.8	5.6	5.8	**5.4**	**0.8**	**.148**	**.29**
eth	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	**3.4**	**2.0**	**.588**	**-.06**
agr	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	1.1	.255	.19
X	**3.5**	**3.5**	**3.6**	**3.8**	**3.9**	**3.9**	**4.1**	**4.2**	**3.8**	**1.0**	**.263**	**.20***

Note that the first two periods are taken together. Entries are average 'openness-scores'. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data on the selection procedure are taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.2. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and party family means. The column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation the party families, while the column indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the inclusiveness of the selection procedure and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

As can be seen from table 4.20, since the 1960s individual parties within most party families have adopted more open and democratic leadership selection procedures. Christian democratic, social democratic, communist, conservative, liberal and agrarian parties have all contributed to the general trend towards a more open procedure of designating the party leadership. The most democratic procedures in selecting the party chairperson are found within the environmental party organisations. Other party

families which, on average, allow fairly open elections are the socialist and agrarian parties, although the former have closed their procedure to some extent. Ethnic parties have centralised their leadership selection procedure only moderately.

One obvious conclusion is that few parties were willing to change their formal rules on leadership election into a more centralised direction; the French UDF and the Italian MSI being notable exceptions. Moreover, the firm grip of party executives over the nomination of the official leadership has been a characteristic feature of West European politics ever since the earliest phase in the process of democratisation. Thus, Kirchheimer incorrectly assumed a trend towards the exclusion of the membership-party from the leadership selection process. Contrary to Kirchheimer's assumption, some Western European parties cherish their democratic image and even increased the formal level of membership influence in the selection of the party leader. Despite this trend, in the large majority of cases members are not allowed to partake directly in the election of the party chairman. Although some parties experimented with membership primaries over the years, only 9 parties (the Belgian PRL and PSC, the German Grünen, the Irish Labour Party and Greens, the Dutch D66, and the Swedish MP, Liberals and SDP) allowed members a direct vote in the selection of the party leader at the end of the 1980s. In most parties members only confirm the candidate that has been selected by a preliminary internal party procedure where a select number of individuals exert influence. In still other parties members have no say at all in the matter. This justifies the conclusion Müller and Meth-Cohn (1991, 56) draw: "... party leadership selection is about 'horizontal power games' rather than 'vertical power games'. The party conference, formally the highest party organ, does little more than rubber-stamp."

4.5.2 Selection of parliamentary candidates

No analysis of politics can afford to neglect the manner in which individuals gain political power at the national level (Valen 1966; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). The method through which parliamentary candidates are selected has important consequences for the quality of the democratic political process. The calibre and actions of selected candidates, their educational and professional background, their age and gender all influence the quality and representativeness of parliament. These qualities of parliamentary representatives subsequently determine the quality of government as an increasing number of ministers start their national political career in parliament (see section 6.3 below). Also, the parliamentary voting behaviour of deputies and the manner in which they are selected are interrelated as politicians will show most loyalty to the locus that has greatest influence on their (re-)election. If the procedure is centralised and deputies depend for their re-election on the central party organisation, they will avoid deviant roll-call behaviour. When the selection is more decentralised, deviant roll call behaviour can occur if this benefits the regional selectorate which decides on the re-election of the deputy. The cohesion of the (parliamentary) party is thus closely related with the locus of selection (Gallagher 1988, 12-16). This is important as party cohesion is generally seen as the most vital prerequisite for programmatically effective and democratically responsive parties (Ranney 1968).

In some countries the selection process[63] is regulated by legal provisions, whereas

[63] In this study 'candidate nomination' and 'candidate selection' are considered two distinct processes.

in all countries the process is influenced by historical tradition, the political culture, by the size of the constituencies as well as the electoral system. Legal provisions which regulate the inner-party process of candidate selection exist only in Finland, Germany and Norway.[64] In all the other countries candidate selection is not formally governed by law. In these countries electoral laws, such as the size of the constituencies, the number of candidates per district and the ballot system, primarily determine the internal party rules and democratic participation. Duverger (1954, 356-359), for example, pointed out that a smaller constituency as well as proportional representation increases the influence of parties over the candidates, in that the rank-and-file membership can exercise more influence on the choice of the candidate. In addition, other authors have put forward a similar argument by stating that the larger the constituency, the more difficult it is for members to influence the selection, unless primaries or polls are held (Epstein 1967, 203). Furthermore, the degree of financial facilitation from the state and the accessibility to the media and other means of communication exert their influence on internal decision-making within political parties. In addition to these factors the governmental structure of a country (federal or unitary state), the political culture (people's attitudes towards political phenomena) and the nature or type of the party influence the method of candidate selection (Gallagher 1988, 8-11; Eldersveld 1964, 80). Although no European constitution outlaws candidates to run for public office outside the 'official' parties, the main route to public office is through the established political parties. Thus, in practice, nomination for public office is not equally accessible to all individuals. Legal stipulations, such as a number of required signatures or the deposit of a certain amount of money, all result in the domination of 'official' parties in the nomination of candidates for public office.

As stated above, a progressively centralised (exclusive) selection procedure of parliamentary candidates also measures the **sixth** indicator of organisational catch-allism, namely the declining role of party members in the selection of the (parliamentary) party leadership. Table 4.21 below is based on the official party statutes which regulate parliamentary candidate selection (Katz and Mair 1992, Tables

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Nomination "is the predominantly *legal* process by which election authorities certify a person as a qualified candidate for an elective public office and print his or her name on the election ballot for that office. Candidate selection, on the other hand, is the predominantly *extralegal* process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective public office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or lists of candidates" (Ranney 1981, 75; see also Eldersveld 1982, 196-197; Epstein 1967, 202; Duverger 1954, 354; Obler 1973; Rush 1969; Scarrow 1964; Valen 1966).

[64] Finland has strict legal provisions stipulated in the 1978 Party Law, under which party primaries are compulsory. In Germany Article 21 of the Basic Law (which stipulates that the internal organization of the parties must be democratic) and Article 2 of the Party Law (stipulating selection of parliamentary candidates as the defining function of political parties) and Article 17 of the Party Law (candidates must be selected by secret ballot) all regulate the candidate selection in German parties (Poguntke 1987, 611). Norway has the oldest legal regulation on candidate selection: the 1921 Norwegian Act of Nominations forbids the national party leadership to intervene directly in the nomination procedure and stipulates that voters are allowed to cross out the names of unwanted candidates. In Denmark and Sweden voters are given large influence in the final nomination of candidates. In Denmark a principle of candidate nomination was introduced in the electoral law in 1970 which made preferential voting more effective (Pedersen 1987, 32), while in Sweden voters have the opportunity to strike the names of unwanted candidates and thereby change the order of the candidates, yet the internal party selection is not legally regulated in both countries.

D.5) as well as secondary literature[65] and summarises the most dominant bodies in the selection of the parliamentary candidates in Western European countries.

Table 4.21 Major locus of parliamentary candidate selection in West European countries 1945-1990

country	Most important party body in selection	Other important actors
Austria	local conventions	national executive
Belgium	local conventions	national executive
Denmark	local conventions	
Finland	local members	
France	national executives	local conventions
Germany	local conventions	
Ireland	local conventions	national executives
Italy	national executives	local conventions
Netherlands	local conventions	national executives
Norway	local conventions	
Sweden	local conventions	
United Kingdom	local conventions	

Adapted from Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, 254, additional information from Gallagher and Marsh 1988.

As can be seen from table 4.21, parliamentary candidate selection in Western Europe is mainly a prerogative of active local party members and the national executives of the parties. Most parties shy away from giving members, let alone voters, a direct and substantive voice in the selection of parliamentary candidates. With the exception of some of the Belgian parties during the 1960s, Labour in Britain, D66 in the Netherlands and the environmental parties, practically none of the parties in this study allowed the electorate to influence the selection procedures through open primaries. Admittedly, voters are given some influence over the rank-order of candidates in Denmark and Finland through the use of preference votes, by way of the alternative vote in Ireland. Finland is the only country where party members (not all voters) have been granted the legal right of direct influence in the selection of parliamentary candidates through primaries.

The most common procedure adopted in Western Europe is the selection of parliamentary candidates by a local (regional or national) committee, followed by the subsequent ratification by the local convention of active members; the final approval or veto concerning (the rank-order of) candidates usually remains with the national executive (see also Gallagher et. al. 1995, 255). Central control therefore, is substantial and only a select group of local party activists are involved in the process (see Gallagher 1988, 245). The decision to determine which candidate's name will appear on the party's ballot paper is usually left to the party elite at the constituent level.

[65] Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Gallagher, Laver and Mair 1995, 253-259; Katz and Mair 1994; Müller 1992, 116; 1992a, 100-104; Gerlich 1987, 83; De Winter, 1988, 36; Deschouwer 1994; Pedersen 1987, 34; Sundberg and Gylling 1992, 277; Thiébault 1988, 78-80; Gallagher 1985; 1988, 131; Mair 1987; Wertman 1988, 153; Koole 1994; Valen 1988, 228; Epstein, 1967, 220-228; Pierre 1992, 38; Denver 1988, 59-60.

Although a very small number of parties do hold a referendum among their members, in most West European parties members have to attend local meetings to participate in the selection. From the 'official story' it is unfortunately difficult to determine to what extent these selections are actually controlled by the higher echelons of the parties. From the analysis above it seems that national party bodies do try, and often succeed, in controlling the candidate selection to a large extent and usually have some kind of veto power as well. Still, in none of the parties in this sample are parliamentary candidates selected solely by the incumbent party leader. In some, such as the French right-wing parties, party leaders do wield substantial influence. There are, nevertheless, considerable deviations from the general pattern between countries and across time. This is summarised in the following table, for which the centralisation scale developed above (see figure 4.1) was used again.

Table 4.22 The openness of the selection of parliamentary candidates of Western European parties 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	3.3	3.3	2.7	2.7	3.3	**3.5**	**0.9**	**.26**
Bel	5.8	5.3	5.1	4.9	4.2	3.3	2.0	2.7	2.7	**4.0**	**2.0**	**.50**
Den	5.0	5.0	4.9	4.9	5.6	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	**5.2**	**0.9**	**.17**
Fin	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	5.4	5.4	5.4	5.4	**5.0**	**1.1**	**.22**
Fra	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	2.5	2.5	1.8	**4.1**	**1.6**	**.39**
Ger	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.3	5.3	**5.1**	**0.4**	**.08**
Ire	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.5	5.3	**4.8**	**1.4**	**.29**
Ita	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.0	3.0	2.2	2.2	2.2	**3.0**	**1.4**	**.47**
Net	4.0	4.0	3.8	4.0	3.9	3.5	3.5	4.7	3.7	**3.9**	**1.9**	**.49**
Nor	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.4	**5.8**	**0.6**	**.10**
Swe	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.5	**6.6**	**0.5**	**.08**
UK	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.3	0.5	.12
X	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.7**	**4.6**	**4.2**	**4.4**	**4.1**	**4.6**	**1.1**	**.24**
S	**1.5**	**1.5**	**1.5**	**1.4**	**1.6**	**1.5**	**1.8**	**1.8**	**1.8**	**1.6**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.313**	**.313**	**.313**	**.292**	**.340**	**.326**	**.428**	**.409**	**.439**	**.348**	**-**	**-**

Entries are average 'openness-scores'. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data on candidate selection procedures are taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.5. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The column and row marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the countries. Rows and columns indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*).

The most open and democratic candidate selection procedures are practised in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland), while the most centralised and exclusive procedures can be found in Italy, France, Austria and the Netherlands. In contrast to leadership selection, the dominant trend in the selection of parliamentary candidates in Western Europe is one of increasing exclusion of the rank and file membership from the selection procedure (β = -.12*). Table 4.23 provides the results of a linear regression analysis of openness of candidate selection with the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 4.23 Trends in the openness of candidate selection over time in Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK
(β)	-.44*	-.60*	.22	.26*	-.68*	.31*	.24	-.44*	-.01	-.31*	-.07	.12

Entries are regression coefficient between the inclusiveness score and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

In Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden the selection procedure is progressively centralised. Most notably, this exclusion of members occurred in France and Belgium. The major parties of Belgium gave their members substantial influence in the selection of representatives until the 1960s. At the end of the sixties, however, in most parties (except for the PS) the member polls were

replaced by more oligarchic selection procedures (De Winter 1988, 42-43). Contrary to Kirchheimer's assertion, however, ordinary party members within some parties in Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom were given a greater voice in candidate selection since the 1960s. In some instances, such as the German and Irish case, the higher score results from the emergence of new parties with more open and inclusive selection procedures. This underlines the fact that in contrast to the convergence hypothesis, the differences between parties have increased over time. The pattern for the different party families is summarised in table 4.24.

Table 4.24 The openness of elections of parliamentary candidates of West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
cd	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.1	3.6	4.2	4.2	**4.2**	**1.4**	**.33**
com	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.3	3.3	4.1	3.4	3.4	3.4	**3.5**	**2.0**	**.57**
con	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.5	5.5	5.1	5.1	5.1	**5.3**	**1.3**	**.25**
sd	5.1	5.1	5.1	5.0	4.6	4.4	3.9	4.1	3.6	**4.5**	**1.4**	**.31**
soc	2.0	2.0	3.3	4.2	4.3	5.0	4.3	4.3	3.8	**3.7**	**1.6**	**.43**
lib	5.2	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.1	4.6	4.6	4.7	**5.0**	**1.6**	**.32**
env	-	-	-	-	4.0	4.0	4.3	5.1	4.9	**4.5**	**1.8**	**.40**
eth	6.3	6.3	6.3	6.3	5.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	**5.3**	**1.9**	**.36**
agr	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	**6.0**	**0.8**	**.13**
prt	-	-	-	-	-	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	**6.0**	**0.0**	**.00**
X	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.8**	**4.7**	**4.6**	**4.2**	**4.4**	**4.1**	**4.6**	**1.1**	**.24**

Entries are average 'openness-scores'. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data on candidate selection procedures are taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.5. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and party family means. The column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation the party families, while the column indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*).

On average, the most open and decentralised procedures for the selection of parliamentary candidates are found within the agrarian, conservative, liberal and protest parties, while the most exclusive procedures are more common within the communist and socialist party families. Christian democratic and social democratic parties opted for procedures which place them in between these two groups. As a summary measure of overall trends the next table provides the results of a linear regression analysis of the inclusiveness of candidate selection of the different party families with the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 4.25 Trends in the openness of candidate selection over time of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	soc	lib	env	eth	agr
beta (β)	-.15	-.02	-.03	-.37*	.24	-.13	.20	-.47*	.00

Entries are regression coefficients between the inclusiveness score and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Most party families, with the exception of socialist and environmental parties, centralised their candidate selection procedures, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. This process of exclusion of the party membership is most distinct within social democratic parties in Western Europe, precisely as Kirchheimer predicted. Although some socialist parties democratised their selection procedures for parliamentary candidates during the 1960s and 1970s, this process was reversed again in the 1980s. Similarly, some Christian democratic parties decentralised their candidate selection in the late 1970s. In particular, special interest groups outside the party gained influence over the selection of candidates in the CVP, ÖVP and DC, yet overall the procedures of Christian democratic party organisations were progressively centralised up until the 1980s.

In summary, parliamentary candidate selection in Western Europe can hardly be regarded open and democratic. The hesitant experiments with primaries and member-polls during the sixties and seventies were soon reversed as parties went back to their former practice of central control over candidate selection. Regional or local elites usually nominate the candidates while party members are at best asked for their approval of these pre-selected candidates. Moreover, the proportion of members which actively participate in the selection of parliamentary candidates is very low to begin with (Gallagher 1988c, 246). Additionally, if candidate selection takes place at the local level, national executives of most parties maintain substantial supervision and control over this selection of parliamentary candidates. If members are given a voice in the selection procedure, veto power usually remains with the national executive as a final safeguard. In other cases, such as in most of the major Dutch, Italian and French parties, the national leadership does not take any risk and preselect all the candidates themselves and members are consequently only asked to ratify this selection. Still, this high level of centralised control is more a stable characteristic of European parliamentary democracy, rather than a bearing which parties embarked upon at the time Kirchheimer advanced his catch-all thesis.

4.5.3 Power distribution in the formulation of policy

Kirchheimer's assertion that within catch-all parties members have very limited opportunities to participate in the internal decision-making procedures is subjected to another empirical assessment here. Earlier, the interconnectedness between personnel recruitment and policy formation was pointed out, when I stated that the selection of party leaders and parliamentary candidates are, in fact, indirect policy choices. The leadership of a catch-all party will, therefore, also restrict extensive participation of the membership in policy decisions as this would seriously limit their room to manoeuvre and their flexibility in policy stances (see also Niedermayer 1989). Moreover, open conflict over policy and the party program causes a party to look divided and weak,

which can have serious electoral and governmental repercussions. One method to curb the influence of the membership on the formulation of party policy can be found in Austria, where the term of office for the party leadership was lengthened and the duration of the party congresses has been slimmed down. In general, the nature of national party conventions has also changed significantly. Modern party conventions are predominately used to generate free publicity. Conventions have transformed into carefully prepared media events where dissension from the lower echelons of the party is downplayed in order to plug an image of a united governable party (Müller 1994, 69). In other countries party conferences also mainly serve ideological and electoral purposes (Deschouwer 1994, 87). Moreover, the leadership controls the agenda of the discussions ensuring that congresses remain "little more than a forum for the expression of approval" (Von Beyme 1985, 235).

The extent to which the level of participation and the role of party members declined in the policy formulation, is firstly, measured by the *frequency of party congresses* (the number of times members have the formal opportunity to influence policy formation) and secondly, by the *rules to put motions to the national congress*. These indicators both measure the **seventh** indicator of organisational catch-allism. Frequency of party congresses, indicating the level of centralisation of a party, can be used to analyse the relative power balance between the party leadership and the active members (Rohrschneider 1994, 225; Kitschelt 1994, 223-224)[66]. The 'openness' of rules to put motions to the national congress also indicate this relative power balance, as these rules determine the extent to which (active) members have the opportunity to influence party policy. Again, the official regulations as stipulated in the party rules are used here to measure both indicators. First, the general pattern and the variations in the number of congresses scheduled by parties in the different countries are reviewed in table 4.26.

[66] "Conferences can be one important arena in which to contrain the strategic choices open to party elites. For this reason, autonomous elites will want (1) to schedule conferences infrequently, (2) to time them, if unavoidable, close to elections because this may cut down on the delegates' willingness to criticize the leadership, and (3) to control the agenda and the motions by a powerful conference committee framing the delegates' choices in detail." (Kitschelt 1994, 223-224).

Table 4.26 The average number of congresses scheduled by political parties in West European countries 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	4.2	3.6	3.4	2.5	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.7	**2.7**	**1.3**	**.481**
Bel	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.1	**4.5**	**1.1**	**.243**
Den	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.3	3.5	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.2	**3.7**	**1.6**	**.434**
Fin	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.9	**2.7**	**1.1**	**.409**
Fra	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.9	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	**2.8**	**1.1**	**.394**
Ger	3.1	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.9	3.3	**2.9**	**1.3**	**.451**
Ire	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.6	**5.0**	**0.4**	**.084**
Ita	3.1	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.4	2.5	**2.7**	**1.0**	**.372**
Net	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	4.1	4.1	3.9	3.5	3.5	**3.5**	**2.1**	**.601**
Nor	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.6	**3.3**	**1.1**	**.333**
Swe	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.8	2.8	3.1	3.0	**2.7**	**1.4**	**.521**
UK	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	6.3	**5.1**	**0.9**	**.184**
X	**3.5**	**3.4**	**3.4**	**3.3**	**3.2**	**3.6**	**3.5**	**3.5**	**3.1**	**3.5**	**1.2**	**.342**
S	**1.5**	**1.4**	**1.4**	**1.4**	**1.6**	**1.6**	**1.6**	**1.4**	**1.6**	**1.5**	**-**	**-**
CV	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.4**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**0.5**	**0.4**	**0.5**	**0.4**	**-**	**-**

Entries are the average number of congresses scheduled by parties. Data on frequency of congresses are taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.4b and Janda 1980. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The column and row marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the countries. Rows and columns indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*).

Only thirteen of the 83 parties in this study reduced the frequency of their congresses[67] and limited the opportunity to influence the policy of the party as Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis predicts. From 1945 until 1970 there is little change in the number of party congresses scheduled in West European countries, while during the 1970s there is a limited increase in the number of national congresses. Since the mid-1980s, however, the frequency of party congresses declined again, culminating in the lowest average number of congresses in the late 1980s. In all, there is a modest trend towards a higher frequency in national party conferences (b = .06). That this finding of more frequently scheduled conferences must be qualified in some countries is witnessed in the Dutch case where according to the statutes the Catholic People's Party was presumed to hold bi-annual national conferences. However, from 1966 until 1980 not one conference was held.

To provide a summary measure of national trends the results of a linear regression analysis of number of congresses with the year of observation as the independent variable are summarised in the next table.

[67] The Austrian FPÖ, ÖVP and SPÖ, the Belgian PCB and VU, the German CDU, the Irish ILP, the Italian DP, PSI, PRI and PCI and the Swedish Fp and MSP.

Table 4.27 Trends in number of congresses in Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK
beta (β)	-.43*	-.08	.26*	.04	.36*	.09	-.23	-.17	.12	.18	.13	.27

Entries are regression coefficient between the number of congresses and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level ($t = < .05$).

Over time, Danish, Finnish, French, German, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish and British parties gave members more frequent opportunities to meet with the party executive over policy issues. The highest number of party congresses were held in Britain and Ireland, where annual conferences are firmly embedded in the political culture, even if membership influence on the decision-making processes is very low (Kelly 1989; Webb 1992b). In these two countries the variation across parties and across time is very low. Belgian parties usually hold an annual conference as well, while in other countries party executives are traditionally less keen to consult the party membership annually on policy decisions. Nevertheless, in only four out of the twelve countries in this analysis have party elites decreased the number of congresses. Most drastically the frequency of national party conventions is reduced in Austria. There are considerable intra-country differences in some party systems where a number of parties have decreased the frequency of congresses, while other parties in the same system have increased the number of congresses. Such large variation among parties within one party system can be found in the Netherlands, as well as among parties in Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Austria. Overall variation between parties has remained stable over time, suggesting that change on this indicator is more of a qualitative nature than a quantitative development. Earlier I concluded that national congresses have transformed from very closed intra-party events, where outsiders were not welcome, into open media-oriented manifestations. Similar observations of relative little change can be made when the data are sorted by party families as summarised in table 4.28.

Table 4.28 The average number of congresses scheduled by West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
cd	3.6	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.2	3.2	**3.2**	**1.4**	**.433**
com	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8	2.0	**1.9**	**0.4**	**.211**
con	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	**3.8**	**1.2**	**.324**
sd	3.2	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.9	2.8	3.0	2.8	**2.9**	**1.3**	**.452**
soc	5.0	5.0	3.8	3.3	3.5	4.2	3.6	3.6	3.8	**3.7**	**1.3**	**.354**
lib	4.2	4.1	4.1	3.9	4.3	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.4	**4.2**	**1.6**	**.381**
env	-	-	-	-	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	**5.0**	**0.0**	**.000**
eth	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	**4.9**	**0.5**	**.101**
agr	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	3.3	**3.3**	**1.2**	**.362**
prt	-	-	-	-	-	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	**5.0**	**0.0**	**.000**
X	**3.5**	**3.4**	**3.4**	**3.3**	**3.2**	**3.6**	**3.5**	**3.5**	**3.1**	**3.5**	**1.2**	**.342**

Entries are the average number of congresses scheduled by parties. Data on frequency of congresses are taken from Katz and Mair 1992, tables D.4b and Janda 1980. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and party family means. The column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation the party families, while the column indicated by '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*).

As can be seen from table 4.28, annual conferences are a consistent trait of environmental and ethnic party organisations. Of the major party families, liberal and conservative parties organise the highest number of congresses on average. In contrast, parties of the traditional left, in particular communist and social democratic parties, created much fewer opportunities for their members to participate in the policy formulation. Between the social democratic and Christian democratic parties in different countries there is substantial variation, indicating the high propensity of these parties to adapt to the parameters of the national political culture. As a summary measure of overall trends within the different party families the results of a linear regression analysis of the number of congresses with the year of observation as the independent variable are given.

Table 4.29 Trends in number of congresses held by West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	soc	lib	env	eth	agr
beta (β)	-.01	.00	.06	-.06	-.13	.07	.00	-.38	.00

Entries are regression coefficients between the number of congresses and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Over time the frequency of national conventions does not vary significantly; the number of congresses remains relatively stable within the agrarian, environmental and communist party families. Contrary to the general trend, ethnic, social democratic, socialist and Christian democratic parties reduced the frequency of national party conferences. Instead, liberal and conservative parties, with a relatively large number of

congresses to begin with, increased the frequency of their congresses.

On this indicator Kirchheimer's assertions are not corroborated; most parties have not opted to organise party conferences less often and some parties have even increased the frequency by which national conferences are scheduled. Rather than the frequency, political parties have changed the character of these national conferences which have become primarily media-oriented manifestations of unity and governability instead of intra-party meetings at which crucial policy decisions are taken.

Next to the frequency of occasions at which the lower echelons of the party can exert their influence on policy-formation, the quality of these opportunities is important. This qualitative aspect reveals the extent to which delegates can influence policy decisions of the party when congresses are held. Therefore, the second measure of influence which (active) party members can exert on policy formation is the 'openness' of the procedure by which motions can be put to the party's national congress. Figure 4.2 represents a scale of procedures by which motions can be put to the party congress.

Figure 4.2 Procedure by which motions can be put to the national party congress.

1	2	3	4	5	6
party leader decides on the agenda for the national congress	interest or other external groups decide which motions will be put to the congress	parliamentary leader or representatives decide which motions will be put to the congress	national committee or board decides which motions will be put to the congress	select group of (local) party members decide which motions will be proposed to the congress	all members can propose motions directly to the national congress

← very exclusive procedure — very inclusive procedure

The left end of the scale, box 1 indicates a procedure which gives the party leader the most influential position deciding which motions are to be discussed at the national congress. A party is assigned a score of 2 when the procedure by which motions are put to the congress is largely dominated by elites formally outside the official party organs. Box 3 means that the parliamentary leader or group is allowed to determine the motions to be discussed at the congress. Indicated in box 4 is a procedure in which a national committee or board is the gatekeeper and agenda-setter for the congress. The following category, box 5, indicates a procedure in which party members have to attend (local) meetings or congresses to have their motion accepted by this lower party body before the motion is send to the national congress. This category also includes a procedure by which only a local board or policy committee is permitted to send motions to the national congress. Finally, box 6 indicates the most open and democratic procedure to put motions to the national congress. In this procedure all members, formally, have the right and opportunity to participate in the policy formation. They can suggest or vote on policy proposals. When a party moves toward the left end of the scale, the party top increases its influence in the motion-procedure; which means that the party is transforming towards the more exclusive catch-allist type of organisation. Parties which had no official rules concerning the proposal of motions but have later introduced them are also considered to have

become more exclusive over time. The procedure additionally becomes more closed when fewer party bodies have the right to propose motions or the rules to introduce motions become more complicated. Finally, stipulations about the maximum number of motions which can be put before the national conference also reduce the possibilities to influence policy. The results of this quantification are recapitulated by country in table 4.30.

Table 4.30 The locus of decision-making at the national congress in West European countries 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	4.3	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.6	**4.3**	**0.8**	**.186**
Bel	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.8	3.8	3.7	3.6	**3.6**	**1.4**	**.388**
Den	5.1	5.1	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.3	5.1	4.8	4.8	**5.0**	**0.6**	**.120**
Fin	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	**4.5**	**0.3**	**.066**
Fra	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	**4.0**	**0.0**	**.000**
Ger	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	**4.8**	**0.3**	**.063**
Ire	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.7	4.9	**4.5**	**0.5**	**.111**
Ita	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	**4.5**	**0.5**	**.111**
Net	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.6	4.6	**4.3**	**0.4**	**.093**
Nor	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.5	**4.4**	**0.2**	**.045**
Swe	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	4.9	**4.9**	**0.2**	**.040**
UK	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.1	4.1	3.8	**4.0**	**0.7**	**.175**
X	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.5**	**4.5**	**4.5**	**4.5**	**4.4**	**0.5**	**.111**
S	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.7**	**0.8**	**0.7**	**-**	**-**
CV	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**0.2**	**-**	**-**

Entries denote the average 'openness' of decision-making measured by the locus of decision-making. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992; 1994), Janda (1980) and Jacobs 1989. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The column and row marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the countries. Rows and columns indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*).

Table 4.30 shows there is little variation between countries in the average openness of decision-making procedures as parties all over Western Europe have been unwilling to open up their national congress to more membership-influence. On the other hand, only seven parties adopted regulations with a higher exclusiveness of their procedure: the Austrian SPÖ, the Danish KrF and Venstre, the German CDU, the Irish WP and FG and the Italian PLI. The most common procedure within the larger majority of parties is the one of providing local party members with the opportunity to propose policies (motions) at local conventions. These proposals are only discussed at the national congress after a committee has functioned as a 'gate-keeper', which ensures that the leadership does not lose control over internal policy-making. Thus, within most European parties the national executive exercises firm control over the agenda of the national conventions. As a result, open dissent and conflict are not often seen at national conferences. Belgian, French and British parties are more exclusive than

their European counterparts, while within Danish, Swedish and German parties the procedure to put motions before the national conference is more open and democratic. Within Belgium there are substantial differences between parties and across time. Table 4.30 clearly shows that Kirchheimer's assertion that party members would be progressively excluded from internal decision-making procedures is not corroborated. Over time the overall trend is one of solid central control over policy in most countries (β = .06). If any change over the post-war period can be observed it is in the opposite direction as Kirchheimer suggested, namely towards more open procedures.

Table 4.31 provides the results of linear regression analyses of openness of the procedure to put motions to the national conference with the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 4.31 Trends in openness of procedure to put motions to national conferences in Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK
beta (β)	.07	.05	-.16	.05	.00	.29	.18	-.11	.47*	.20	.03	-.03

Entries are regression coefficient between the openness of motion procedure and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

As can be seen from table 4.31, parties in most countries have not substantially modified their procedures regarding policy discussions at national party conferences. In the majority of countries there is a moderate trend towards more openness. In the Netherlands some of the major parties opened up their procedures to allow for member-influence which was traditionally at a very low level, accounting for the most significant trend towards more internal democracy. The positive parameters in other countries are primarily the result of the emergence of new parties with more democratic, open procedures for debates at national conferences, such as the 'new left' parties in the 1970s and the 'green' parties in the 1980s. Only in Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom have procedures to put motions before the national conference become more restricted over time.

To evaluate the variation among parties of different genetic origin, table 4.32 summarises the openness of procedures to put motions before national conferences grouped by different party families.

Table 4.32 The locus of decision-making at congresses of West European parties by party family 1945-1990

	1945 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*beta (β)*
cd	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.1	**4.2**	**0.5**	**.119**	**.02**
com	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.9	3.9	4.0	**3.7**	**1.4**	**.378**	**.10**
con	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	4.3	**4.3**	**0.5**	**.116**	**.00**
sd	4.4	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	**4.5**	**0.5**	**.111**	**.10**
soc	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.3	4.8	4.9	4.4	**4.6**	**0.5**	**.108**	**.10**
lib	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.7	4.7	**4.8**	**0.6**	**.125**	**-.02**
env	-	-	-	-	4.0	4.0	5.0	5.8	**5.4**	**0.9**	**.166**	**.75***
eth	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	4.8	**4.7**	**0.4**	**.085**	**.27**
agr	4.7	4.7	4.7	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.5	**4.6**	**0.2**	**.043**	**-.40***
prt	-	-	-	-	4.5	4.3	4.3	4.3	**4.3**	**0.3**	**.069**	**-.24**
X	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.4**	**4.5**	**4.5**	**4.5**	**4.5**	**0.5**	**.111**	**.06**

Entries denote the average 'openness' of decision-making measured by the locus of decision-making. A score of 1 indicates the most exclusive selection procedure, while a higher score indicates a more open procedure. Data are taken from Katz and Mair (1992; 1994), Janda (1980); Jacobs (1989). The first two periods are taken together as data did not vary. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and party family means. The column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation the party families, while the column indicated by '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/ *X*). The column 'β' gives the regression coefficients between the openness of the procedure to put motions before the national congress and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (t) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

This cross-time and cross-national analysis shows that there are only minor differences between the party families and little variance over time in the openness of the decision-making procedures at national party conferences. Environmental and liberal parties practice the most inclusive procedures for policy formulation. On the other end of the scale are the communist parties; their theory and practice of democratic centralism makes for relatively exclusive procedures in policy decisions. The reader should bear in mind that these data on policy-making at the national congresses of parties only tell the 'official' story, the stipulated rules on the possibilities of exercising influence, they do not tap the materialisation of membership influence on intra-party decisions. Nevertheless, a corroboration of these findings are found in an expert study conducted by Laver and Hunt (1992, 84) assessing the intra-party distribution of influence on policy formation based on expert judgements. They also showed that, in 56 out of the 83 parties included in this study, the party leadership exercises the largest influence on policy (see also May 1973). Again, what was found is that, contrary to the catch-all thesis, West European political parties have not progressively excluded party members from the internal decision-making processes. Nevertheless, although this study found a moderate trend towards more membership influence in intra-party decision-making, this trend was primarily the result of the entry of new, more 'participatory' parties with more democratic structures. In most parties the influence of members on policy decisions was very moderate to begin with and this central control by the party leadership over policy has remained a stable feature of West European party politics.

4.6 Conclusion: organisational catch-allism of West European parties

Some of the findings in this chapter are consistent with Kirchheimer's catch-all theory, while other aspects of the catch-all thesis were not corroborated by this empirical analysis.

Conforming to Kirchheimer's thesis, party members in Western Europe were marginalised in both numerical sense as well as in financial terms, while at the same time party leaders highly professionalized central party offices and particularly their parliamentary party organisation. Across Western Europe a progressively larger majority of citizens shun party membership. Relative to the total electorate, party membership declined in an almost secular trend, with the partial exception of some German, Belgium and Irish parties as well the environmentalist party organisations. Mass parties, if they ever existed, are clearly not a dominant feature of modern West European party systems. Directing their organisational activities away from civil society, parties increasingly sought financial facilitation from the state or other sources, rather than enlarging their membership revenues.

Despite their flourishing wealth, parties have not used these growing financial means to build extensive membership organisations. Instead, Western European parties primarily expanded their professional staff and spent a considerable, but declining, proportion of their annual income on election campaigns. Still, it has not been the central extra-parliamentary party organisation which has professionalized most speedily and extensively; in most countries the parliamentary parties employed larger numbers of professionals and experts than party central offices. Parties in Western Europe have undergone a process of extensive professionalization and capital accumulation, particularly at the level of the parliamentary party. This accumulation of human and financial resources by the parliamentary party has resulted in the dominance of the parliamentary party over the total party organisation. Those who decide on the level of and conditions for public funding of political parties thought it wise to allocate most of the resources to the section of the party which they themselves could control best, namely their own parliamentary organisation.

Kirchheimer correctly asserted that party organisations are increasingly instrumental to the electoral ambitions of elites. Indeed, political parties in Western Europe are no (longer) grass-roots movements where information and authority is generated bottom-up from members and voters. Even though few parties have been willing to totally shed their democratic image, the rank-and-file membership only plays a very moderate role in the selection of the party leadership, the parliamentary candidates and in the formation of policy. Contrary to Kirchheimer's assumptions, however, this analysis found that members are not progressively excluded from the selection of the party leadership and no secular trend towards centralisation of power was found either. Indeed, a moderate tendency towards the opposite, namely democratic inclusion, is discernible. The consequences of this development should not be exaggerated. Concurrent with the selection of the party leader becoming more democratic came an ebbing of influence by members over the selection of parliamentary representatives. It was found that while members gained marginal influence on the selection of the party leaders, the selection of parliamentary candidates and the formation of policy remained firmly under central control throughout the post-war period. Decisions on power positions within the party organisation as well as in public

office are largely controlled by or under veto of the national executive. When internal selection and decision-making procedures are opened up, parties have given more influence to ordinary party members rather than to party activists, being as that the former are more likely to rubber-stamp decisions taken by the national executive. The conclusion can only be that the higher echelons of the party hierarchy have allowed members more influence over the extra-parliamentary party which itself has rapidly declined in importance. Rather than empowering the better informed and more ideologically motivated party activists, party leaders have allowed individual members more influence only over the domain of the party organisation which is least influential in the decision-making process.

In contrast to Kirchheimer's assertions the number of opportunities for members to influence policies of political parties has not been reduced. Nevertheless, the agenda at national conventions is still firmly controlled by the national executives. Open dissent and conflict is rarely seen as this would seriously damage the public image and electoral appeal of political parties.

To examine Kirchheimer's assertion that primarily the major traditional parties are susceptible to the catch-all inception, table 4.33 reports the correlations between the various indices of organisational catch-allism and indicators of ancientry (the age of party), of electoral strength and organisational continuity of political parties.

Table 4.33 Correlation matrix of organisational indicators with party age, electoral size and organisational discontinuity

	PARTY AGE	ELECTORAL SIZE	ORGANIZATIONAL DISCONTINUITY
MERATIO	.17-*	.61**	-.00
MEMFIM	-.00	.19*	-.02
STATFIN	-.07	-.24**	-.06
CAMPAIGN	.18**	.15	.01
STAFMEM	-.33**	-.29**	-.06
STAFSEAT	-.02	-.15	-.08
LEADSEL	-.01	-.05	-.11*
CANDSEL	-.04	-.05	-.07
NOCONGR	.07	-.07	-.01
MOTIONS	-.00	-.08	.04

The table reports Pearson's correlations. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 level (*) or at the 0.001 level (**). The definition and measurement of the variables are explained in Appendix 2.

Insofar as the evidence is concerned, there are only weak relationships between electoral strength and the indicators of organisational catch-allism; correlation coefficients are, generally, low. One case of interaction which should be pointed out is the substantial correlation between party membership relative to the electorate and popular support at election time, indicating that parties with relatively large membership levels are also dominant in electoral terms. Another notable finding is that professionalization relative to membership and financial support from the state are both negatively correlated with electoral strength, suggesting that parties with a substantial popular appeal rely less on state finance and professionals in the 'party on

the ground' than their electorally less successful competitors. The life span of the party has little or no effect on the organisational indices, although there is a weak negative relationship between professionalization of the membership party and party age. This latter finding suggests that the older parties have been relatively more dependent on voluntary party work for their daily activities and have been relatively less predisposed to hire professionals. Organisational discontinuity, that is the number of splits and mergers, is practically unrelated to any organisational characteristic.

To analyse the overall trend of catch-allism at the organisational level over *time*, all scores have been standardised by means of z-scores[68]. Subsequently, the variables are recalculated so that for each variable a high standard score means more catch-allism and a low score means that parties have transgressed less towards the catch-all organisational model. The scores are summarised in table 4.34.

Table 4.34 Cross-time developments of organisational catch-allism (in z-scores) in Western Europe 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	n
meratio	-.22	-.33	-.17	-.20	-.07	.08	.15	.13	.21	441
memfin	-.96	-.99	-.47	-.33	-.11	.13	.12	.07	.21	284
statfin	-	-	-	-.43	.18	.08	-.04	.07	-.47	228
campaign	-	-	.59	.11	-.24	-.24	.20	.03	-.35	218
stafmem	-	-	-.37	-.32	-.25	-.06	-.06	.36	.27	274
stafseat	-.08	.83	.01	-.30	-.45	-.27	.07	.13	.39	222
candsel	-.17	-.14	-.13	-.11	-.03	-.04	.23	.10	.17	564
leadsel	.26	.26	.22	.12	-.02	-.06	-.09	-.22	-.31	577
nocongr	.00	.08	.10	.13	.04	-.08	-.05	-.05	-.12	586
motions	.07	.07	.08	.06	.00	-.03	-.04	-.06	-.09	505

The variable names are explained in Appendix 2. Entries are average z-scores measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high (positive) score means have a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties.

Table 4.34 shows that some indicators do not confirm a trend towards increasing organisational catch-allism. Moreover, the selection of the party leader, the procedure to put motions to the national congress and the number of congresses, even show a development in the opposite direction. Two opposite trends are visible; more catch-allism over time in terms of professionalization of the party organisation, yet less catch-allism in terms of the formal possibilities of membership participation in the internal decision-making processes. The development towards the catch-all model is most advanced and consistent with regard to the membership size and the level of professionalisation of the party central offices and the parliamentary party bureaucracy. During the 1960s and 1970s there was a slow yet constant increase in the

[68] A z-score is calculated by finding the deviation of the individual score from the arithmetic mean of the distribution and dividing this result by the standard deviation of the distribution. Thus, all scores have a mean of .00 and a standard deviation of 1.0 (see Blalock 1979, 96-100; Spence et al. 1983, 72).

level of organisational catch-allism in terms of membership and the financial structure. Expenditures on political campaigning, however, do not show a linear development in the direction Kirchheimer suggested. In the internal power structure catch-allism is only discernible in the increasing centralisation of parliamentary candidate selection. Contrary to the catch-all thesis, political parties have not decreased the influence of members in the leadership selection or in the policy discussions at the national party conventions. However, as was shown earlier, members had little influence over policy to begin with and party elites in Western Europe maintain firm control over the agenda of the national party convention.

To qualify Kirchheimer's theory, in this empirical research a linear trend towards organisational catch-allism is not validated. The main conclusion from all this is that only few parties ventured towards the organisational catch-all model on all indicators and even when parties did it was not to the same extent. Admittedly, there is little variation between countries or over time in the formal rules on internal decision-making. Thus, at the formal level, organisational stasis dominates. Nonetheless, other indicators of catch-allism at the organisational level show substantial cross-national and cross-time variation. This signifies that Kirchheimer's assumption of a linear and uni-dimensional transformation towards organisational catch-allism is inaccurate.

To test Kirchheimer's assumption of uni-dimensionality of organisational catch-allism, a reliability analysis of the organisational variables was performed (see appendix 3). The main conclusion from this test can only be that the indicators Kirchheimer regarded to indicate catch-allism do not tap one single underlying organisational dimension. This finding of multi-dimensionality is corroborated by factor analysis performed on this set of organisational indicators which suggests that three factors underpin organisational transformation of West European parties (see appendix 3). To test Kirchheimer's assumptions on the geographical distribution of catch-allism as well as his assertions of divergence between parties of different origin, these three factors will be used in the remainder of this chapter to evaluate the relative level of catch-allism of West European political parties.

In combining the factor analysis with the standard scores, it is possible to assess the relative extent to which parties have transformed towards or moved away from the catch-all model on these three organisational factors.[69] By way of simple summation of variables with high factor loadings, the z-scores of the items on the three extracted factors are averaged into one score (Kim and Mueller 1978b, 70).

The openness of the leadership and parliamentary candidate selection (CANDSEL and LEADSEL) as well as the number of congresses held by the party (NOCONGR) are all positively correlated with a factor which will be coined ***'centralisation of internal decision-making.'*** Scores on this factor consists of the standard scores of these three variables.

Staff at the central office relative to members (STAFMEM) is negatively correlated with the second factor, while the number of members relative to the electorate (MERATIO) is positively correlated with this factor. Therefore this factor denotes the relative level of 'non-professional mass partism.' Standard scores of the

[69] This study does not use the factor scores to determine the level of catch-allism of political parties, instead the relative level of catch-allism is determined on the basis of the Z-scores of the raw variables.

membership-electorate ratio and staff relative to members are added into one after all scores have been recoded into the expected catch-all direction. Now a higher score means that parties have moved away from the non professional mass-party model, this factor designates the ***professionalization of the membership party*** at the central office.

The level of professional staff in relation to the number of parliamentary seats (STAFSEAT) is positively associated with the third extracted factor. More difficult to interpret is that income derived from membership fees (MEMFIN) is also positively correlated, while state finance (STATFIN) is negatively correlated to this factor. The structure of party income from membership fees and state subsidies is related to the level of professionalization in a different fashion than the catch-all thesis foretold. This does not need to detain us here since all z-scores on these items are re-coded so that they all point in the expected 'catch-all direction'. Therefore this third factor is interpreted as the ***'professionalization of the leadership party'***.

Since all the standard scores are re-coded in the 'catch-all direction', higher scores in the table below denote a relative high level of 'catch-allism', while a lower or negative scores indicate lower levels of 'catch-allism' on the respective factors. For example, a high score on the centralisation-factor means a high level of internal centralisation. Higher scores on the factor of professionalization of the central office of the membership party indicates that the party has moved towards the catch-all party model as all scores are recalculated into the direction hypothesised in the catch-all thesis. Nevertheless, these average standard scores should be interpreted with caution as the data-base has a considerable number of missing values on some indicators which influences the relative position of the cases. Bearing this in mind, the relative levels of organisational catch-allism expressed in average standard scores (z-scores) of the party families in three periods, are summarised in table 4.35. For each period the party families are rank-ordered by the level of catch-allism.

Table 4.35 Relative organisational catch-allism (in z-scores) of West European party families 1945-1990

CENTRALISATION OF INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING			PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE MEMBERSHIP PARTY			PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE LEADERSHIP PARTY		
1945 1960	1961 1975	1975 1990	1945 1960	1961 1975	1976 1990	1945 1960	1961 1975	1976 1990
com .91	com .83	com .80	com .23	com .41	env 1.41	con .44	lib .12	com .41
cd .38	cd .21	cd .20	lib .05	lib .20	com .44	sd -.27	com .10	agr .31
sd -.03	sd .10	sd .19	con -.06	con -.06	lib .32	com -.29	con .05	lib .23
con -.21	lib -.36	con -.34	agr -.18	cd -.21	con .06	lib -.35	agr -.02	env .19
lib -.30	con -.36	lib -.36	cd -.23	sd -.47	cd -.07	agr -.48	sd -.36	con .09
agr -.33	agr -.41	agr -.46	sd -.87	agr -.72	sd -.31	cd -1.46	cd -.66	cd -.15
		env -.94			agr -.39			sd -.21

Entries are average z-scores measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of 'catch-allism', while a low or negative score indicates a low level of 'catch-allism' in comparison to the other parties. The first column provides the relative level of centralisation of the internal decision-making processes, the second column gives the relative level of professionalization of the extra-parliamentary party central office and the third column

provides the relative standing of party families with respect to the professionalization of the parliamentary party.

Table 4.35 shows that, concerning 'the centralisation of the internal democracy', the relative highest level of catch-allism is found among communist parties, whose tradition of democratic centralism makes for very little influence on the internal decisions by their membership. Kirchheimer was correct in assuming that parties of social democratic and Christian democratic origin are very susceptible to the catch-all development concerning the centralisation of power. Of the major party families, the Christian democratic and social democratic parties are consistently closer to the catch-all model than their conservative, liberal and agrarian counterparts with respect to this internal decision-making. At the lower end of the distribution of relative catch-allism are the very democratic and open environmental party organisations. This rank-ordering of party families on the level of internal democracy is very stable over time, confirming the earlier conclusion that centralisation of power is a constant and static feature of West European party systems.

Regarding the 'professionalization of the membership party' and the 'organisation in support of the party leadership', a different pattern emerges. Over time some party families moved towards more professionalized (catch-all) practices and away from the mass-party model. Particularly liberal and conservative parties have changed their organisation towards the professional catch-all model. The traditionally extensive membership organisations of social democratic and Christian democratic parties resulted in relatively low levels of professionalization for these parties and preserved more compliance with the mass-party model. Analogous to this, the former mass parties of agrarian descent also lagged behind in their professionalization of the membership party, yet professionalized the party organisation according to the catch-all model at the leadership level. In the last period, spanning 1976 to 1990, the Christian democratic and social democratic parties clearly differ from all other party families with respect to their relatively low level of professionalization both at the parliamentary party as well as in their central offices.

A development towards catch-allism on all three factors is not found in equal proportion within each party family. In the next table, the cross-country differences are summarised. Again I use the three extracted factors (see appendix 3). The entries in the table are the average standard scores of all items which load significant on the three extracted factors. Countries are rank-ordered in ascending order based on their relative level of catch-allism.

Table 4.36 Relative organisational catch-allism (in z-scores) in West European countries 1945-1990

CENTRALISATION OF INTERNAL DECISION-MAKING						PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE MEMBERSHIP PARTY						PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE LEADERSHIP PARTY					
1945 1960		1961 1975		1975 1990		1945 1960		1961 1975		1976 1990		1945 1960		1961 1975		1976 1990	
Ita	.76	Ita	.83	Ita	.87	Bel	.54	Fra	.52	Ita	.71	Ger	.94	Ita	.64	Fra	.68
Fra	.56	Aut	.62	Aut	.63	Fra	.43	Ger	.46	Ire	.58	UK	.72	UK	.39	Ita	.54
Ger	.43	Ger	.24	Fra	.45	Ger	.38	Bel	.28	Fra	.53	Fin	.49	Swe	.39	Swe	.47
Net	.29	Fra	.08	Bel	.27	Net	.06	Net	.21	Ger	.36	Swe	.07	Ger	.18	Nor	.24
Aut	.23	Net	.07	Net	-.03	Fin	-.08	Den	-.10	Den	.29	Ire	-.38	Fin	.05	Fin	.16
Fin	.06	Bel	.04	Ger	-.07	UK	-.17	Nor	-.12	Net	.27	Ita	-.39	Nor	-.24	Ger	.05

Den	-.10	Fin	-.11	Den	-.24	Nor	-.19	Ita	-.15	Bel	.19	Den	-.65	Aut	-.41	Aut	.04
UK	-.18	Den	-.12	Fin	-.27	Ita	-.23	Fin	-.16	UK	.08	Nor	-.74	Den	-.58	Den	-.09
Bel	-.22	UK	-.29	Nor	-.49	Ire	-.53	UK	-.23	Fin	-.03	Aut	-.92	Ire	-.51	UK	-.37
Swe	-.39	Swe	-.46	Swe	-.56	Den	-.62	Swe	-.34	Nor	-.03	Net	-1.78	Ne	t-1.18	Net	-.38
Ire	-.48	Nor	-.48	Ire	-.65	Swe	-.68	Ire	-.84	Swe	-.13					Ire	-.43
Nor	-.48	Ire	-.49	UK	-.67	Aut	-1.84	Aut	-.86	Aut	-.85						

Entries are average z-scores measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. The first column provides the relative level of centralisation of the internal decision-making processes, the second column gives the relative level of professionalization of the party central office and the third column shows the relative level of professionalization of the parliamentary party.

As can be seen from table 4.36 there are substantial differences between countries on aal three extracted dimensions. The dominant message of the table is that highest levels of catch-allism on the three organisational factors are found within the larger Western European democracies, namely France, Germany and Italy. Parties in these countries of continental Western Europe have transformed most rapidly and extensively towards the catch-all model and adopted, or rather maintained, relatively undemocratic internal structures. Also, parties in France, Germany and Italy score relatively high on the professionalization of the parliamentary organisation and move away from the mass-party model on this factor. Belgian and Dutch parties also have relatively high catch-all scores on the internal democracy factor and ended up with a relatively high level of professionalization of the membership party, yet the Low Countries are lagging behind in this transformation on the professionalization of the leadership organisation. In both countries this results from the absence of substantial direct state funding to extra-parliamentary party organisations. On the internal democracy factor, the Scandinavian countries, Ireland and the United Kingdom clearly differ from the continental mainland. Norwegian, Swedish, Irish and British parties allow members to have more influence on the proceedings of the party than in the rest of Europe. This pattern is only partly duplicated at the other two extracted factors. Austrian parties, for example, have a very high catch-all score on the centralisation of the internal democracy factor, yet remained very close to the mass-party organisation with respect to the level of professionalization. This picture may be distorted by the significant level of 'patronage' (Müller 1994, 73). However, Danish, Norwegian and Finnish parties are most often found in the middle of the distribution with regard to professionalization. Swedish parties have relatively low standardised catch-all scores on the centralisation of decision-making factor and on professionalization of the membership party, meaning that they have build and maintained relatively democratic parties with a large membership in comparative perspective. At the same time, however, Swedish parties have also professionalized their leadership organisation to a relatively high extent. Parties in Ireland and the United Kingdom proved comparatively immune to the catch-all virus at the organisational level.

To specify these findings, the three tables below provide similar standardised scores on the three extracted factors of all individual parties in three aggregated periods (1945-1960, 1961-1975 and 1976-1990). Again, parties are rank-ordered in descending order, meaning that parties with the highest catch all scores are at the top

of the league table. The first column indicates the relative position concerning the centralisation of internal democratic procedures. A high (catch-all) standard score on the 'centralisation' factor indicates a low level of internal democracy and membership influence on policy-making, while a low (negative) score indicates a very democratic party organisation. The second and third column give the rank-ordering of parties with regard to the relative level of professionalization of the central party organisation and the parliamentary party organisation.

Overall, three main conclusions can be drawn after examining cross-national differences as well as variety among party families in the type of party organisation in Western Europe over time. First, there is insufficient evidence to assert that there is an unvarying and consistent trend towards catch-allism at the organisational level. Parties are clearly experiencing the influence of their genetic origin, the impact of the national political institutions and culture, as well as the constraints of national party competition. A second important inference materialising from the data presented here is the sizeable cross-national variation and substantial differences in party organisation between party families. Evidently, when the genetic origin of a party can be equated with the Duvergerian extra-parliamentary mass-party model, as is the case with most social democratic, Christian democratic and agrarian parties, the organisational development towards catch-allism is thwarted by this historic genetic inheritance. Similarly, the ideological and consequent organisational legacy of democratic centralism explains why communist parties are over-represented at the undemocratic end of the scale regarding centralisation in decision-making procedures. A third feature of organisational transformation of West European parties found in this analysis is a distinct geographical distribution in terms of catch-allism. Geographically a picture emerges, where parties from the larger European democracies, particularly Italy, Germany and France, rank among the those parties which have adopted relatively many catch-all characteristics. In contrast, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish and Irish are primarily found at bottom of the table in each of the periods due to their relatively democratic internal organisation. Although Kirchheimer had incorrectly assumed that the trend towards catch-allism would be universal, he did correctly assert that the larger parties (in particular of social democratic and Christian democratic origin) in Western Europe as well as parties in the larger West European party systems in general would be more prone to adopt a catch-all style.

Summary of the main findings:

- Party membership has declined substantially in most West European countries and is now below 10 per cent of the total electorate.
- Membership fees have become less relevant and now accounts for less than one-third of the financial revenues of political parties.
- Revenues from state finance increased in importance and political parties now depend on financial support from the state for one -third of their income.
- Campaign expenditures increased substantially in absolute terms over the post-war period, but the income of parties has been steeper resulting in a much lower proportion of annual incomes spend on election campaigns (less than fifty percent of one annual income).
- Parties have professionalized their organisations thoroughly and employed larger numbers of experts at the Head Office and in the parliamentary party organisation.
- Parties have professionalized their parliamentary party organisation more extensively than their extra-parliamentary party.
- Party members have gained some influence on the selection of the party leadership, but their influence on the selection of parliamentary candidates has declined.
- Party members have not been progressively excluded from all internal decision-making, yet there is no clear trend towards democratisation of political parties either.
- Central control over internal decision-making is solid and durable.
- In Western Europe three types of party organisation can be distinguished on the basis of the internal decision-making procedures, the professionalization of the extra-parliamentary as well as the parliamentary party, namely traditional mass parties, democratic cadre parties and traditional cadre parties.
- Christian democratic and social democratic parties have moved relatively little into the catch-all direction at the organisational level. Liberal and conservative parties have moved closer to the organisational catch-all model.
- As a geographical pattern the highest levels of organisational catch-allism are found in the larger European democracies (France, Italy and Germany), while the lowest levels of catch-allism are found in most of the Scandinavian countries, the United Kingdom and Ireland.

Centralisation and professionalisation 1945-1990

Table 4.37 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of centralization and professionalization 1945-1960

Country	Family	Party	Centralise	Country	Family	Party	Profco	Country	Family	Party	Proflead
Fin	com	SKDL	1.37	Ger	sd	SPD	1.43	Ger	cd	CSU	0.68
Ita	com	PCI	1.37	Fin	con	KOK	1.16	Fra	rad	RAD	0.66
Bel	com	KPB	1.19	Fin	eth	SFP	1.06	Nor	com	NKP	0.61
Ita	fas	MSI	1.19	UK	sd	LAB	0.93	Fra	cd	MRP	0.61
Ita	lib	PLI	1.19	UK	con	CON	0.69	Den	soc	SF	0.58
Ger	com	DKP	1.12	UK	lib	LIB	0.53	Ita	lib	PLI	0.56
Den	com	DKP	1.12	Swe	com	VPK	0.50	Den	com	DKP	0.56
Aut	com	KPO	1.12	Den	soc	SF	0.23	Aut	com	KPO	0.55
Net	cd	ARP	1.06	Swe	lib	FP	0.17	Bel	com	KPB	0.54
Fra	cd	MRP	0.88	Swe	sd	SAP	0.08	Ger	com	DKP	0.52
Ita	cd	DC	0.83	Den	lib	RV	-0.18	Net	com	CPN	0.51
Net	cd	KVP	0.78	Aut	lib	FPO	-0.19	Fra	sd	PSF	0.51
Fra	sd	PSF	0.76	Ire	sd	ILP	-0.38	Swe	com	VPK	0.51
Ger	cd	CDU	0.69	Ita	com	PCI	-0.40	Ger	cd	CDU	0.46
Net	cd	CHU	0.64	Swe	agr	C	-0.48	Net	lib	VVD	0.46
Ita	sd	PSI	0.60	Ger	cd	CSU	-0.52	Ita	lib	PRI	0.41
Fin	agr	KESK	0.58	Ger	cd	CDU	-0.52	Nor	lib	V	0.38
Ger	cd	CSU	0.57	Den	con	KF	-0.52	Nor	cd	KRFP	0.36
Fra	com	PCF	0.55	Nor	sd	DNA	-0.59	Fin	com	SKDL	0.32
Swe	com	VPK	0.55	Fin	com	SKDL	-0.74	Fra	con	GAUL	0.32
Fra	con	GAUL	0.41	Nor	lib	V	-0.88	Ger	sd	SPD	0.17
Ita	sd	PSDI	0.37	Aut	sd	SPO	-1.17	Net	sd	PVDA	0.14
Fra	lib	UDF	0.37	Net	lib	VVD	-1.54	Den	lib	RV	0.14
Aut	cd	OVP	0.30	Net	cd	KVP	-1.56	Fra	com	PCF	0.12
Den	sd	SD	0.27	Net	cd	ARP	-1.76	Aut	lib	FPO	0.10
Fra	rad	RAD	0.26	Net	sd	PVDA	-1.99	Fin	sd	SSP	0.09
UK	con	CON	0.23	Net	cd	CHU	-2.04	Net	cd	CHU	0.04
Aut	sd	SPO	0.23	Den	sd	SD	-2.11	Nor	agr	SP	0.01
Ger	sd	SPD	0.19					Swe	con	MSP	0.01
Fin	sd	SSP	0.08					Ita	sd	PSI	0.00
Net	lib	VVD	0.05					UK	sd	LAB	-0.02
Den	con	KF	0.02					Net	cd	ARP	-0.04
Bel	eth	VU	-0.05					Nor	con	HOYR	-0.11
Den	soc	SF	-0.10					Swe	lib	FP	-0.11

Swe	sd	SAP	-0.13			Swe	agr	C	-0.18
Ire	soc	WP	-0.14			Ita	cd	DC	-0.31
Net	com	CPN	-0.18			Fin	eth	SFP	-0.31
Ita	lib	PRI	-0.18			Den	con	KF	-0.34
Fin	lib	LKP	-0.20			Fin	con	KOK	-0.36
Fin	con	KOK	-0.20			Net	cd	KVP	-0.43
Fin	cd	SKL	-0.20			Ire	sd	ILP	-0.53
Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.27			Fin	agr	KESK	-0.57
Ire	sd	ILP	-0.29			UK	con	CON	-0.61
UK	sd	LAB	-0.29			Net	cd	CDA	-0.62
Ger	lib	FDP	-0.36			Ita	com	PCI	-1.06
Bel	cd	CVP	-0.38			Den	lib	VEN	-1.16
Nor	sd	DNA	-0.40			Nor	sd	DNA	-1.53
Nor	agr	SP	-0.40			Den	sd	SD	-1.88
UK	lib	LIB	-0.49			Aut	cd	OVP	-2.27
Nor	con	HOYR	-0.51			Aut	sd	SPO	-2.85
Aut	lib	FPO	-0.55			Swe	sd	SAP	-2.86
Swe	lib	FP	-0.61						
Net	sd	PVDA	-0.61						
Swe	con	MSP	-0.61						
Ire	cd	FG	-0.70						
Bel	lib	PVV	-0.70						
Nor	lib	V	-0.83						
Ire	con	FF	-0.83						
Den	lib	RV	-0.95						
Den	lib	VEN	-0.96						
Bel	sd	BSP	-1.16						
Swe	agr	C	-1.16						
Fin	eth	SFP	-1.19						

Table 4.38 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of centralization and professionalization 1961-1975

Country	Family	Party	Centralize	Country	Family	Party	Profco	Country	Family	Party	Proflead
Ita	com	PCI	1.37	Ita	lib	PLI	1.39	Net	lib	D66	1.43
Ita	fas	MSI	1.19	Ita	fas	MSI	1.26	Nor	prt	FRP	1.25
Ita	lib	PLI	1.19	Ita	sd	PSDI	0.99	Net	com	CPN	0.91
Bel	com	KPB	1.19	UK	sd	LAB	0.92	Den	lib	CD	0.70
Net	cd	ARP	1.16	Ita	lib	PRI	0.86	Ger	com	DKP	0.69
Ger	com	DKP	1.12	Den	lib	CD	0.76	Nor	com	NKP	0.68
Den	com	DKP	1.12	Ita	cd	DC	0.64	Ger	lib	FDP	0.66
Aut	com	KPO	1.12	Swe	sd	SAP	0.55	Den	com	DKP	0.66
Ita	sd	PSI	1.06	Ita	sd	PSI	0.53	Ger	cd	CSU	0.65
Ita	cd	DC	0.83	Swe	lib	FP	0.43	Bel	com	KPB	0.65
Net	cd	KVP	0.78	Nor	soc	SV	0.43	Fra	con	GAUL	0.64
Aut	sd	SPO	0.72	Swe	agr	C	0.40	Fra	sd	PSF	0.63
Ita	sd	PSDI	0.65	Ger	lib	FDP	0.38	Bel	eth	VU	0.59
Net	cd	CHU	0.64	Fin	con	KOK	0.34	Fin	lib	LKP	0.58
Aut	cd	OVP	0.62	Aut	lib	FPO	0.33	Aut	com	KPO	0.52
Fra	sd	PSF	0.58	Swe	com	VPK	0.32	Fra	com	PCF	0.39
Fra	com	PCF	0.55	Ger	sd	SPD	0.28	Ger	cd	CDU	0.37
Fin	com	SKDL	0.54	UK	con	CON	0.27	Bel	lib	PVV	0.36
Den	sd	SD	0.53	Swe	con	MSP	0.27	Ita	sd	PSDI	0.35
Ita	lib	PRI	0.46	Fin	eth	SFP	0.26	Swe	con	MSP	0.33
Net	com	CPN	0.42	Net	com	CPN	0.25	Nor	lib	V	0.32
Fra	lib	UDF	0.37	Fin	com	SKDL	0.24	Den	soc	SF	0.21
Bel	eth	VU	0.36	Ger	cd	CSU	0.20	Swe	com	VPK	0.19
Fin	agr	KESK	0.32	Fin	agr	KESK	0.12	Net	lib	VVD	0.18
Ger	cd	CDU	0.25	Den	lib	RV	0.06	Aut	lib	FPO	0.12
Ger	sd	SPD	0.19	Nor	con	HOYR	0.01	Fin	com	SKDL	0.10
Fin	sd	SSP	0.08	Nor	lib	V	-0.03	Net	sd	PVDA	0.09
Swe	com	VPK	0.03	UK	lib	LIB	-0.03	Ita	lib	PLI	0.09
Fra	con	GAUL	0.03	Ire	sd	ILP	-0.07	Ita	fas	MSI	0.08
Aut	lib	FPO	0.01	Ire	cd	FG	-0.11	Den	cd	KRF	0.07
Ger	cd	CSU	-0.01	Nor	prt	FRP	-0.12	Ita	lib	PRI	0.05
Fra	cd	MRP	-0.02	Den	prt	FRP	-0.18	Net	cd	CHU	0.05
Bel	cd	CVP	-0.04	Ger	cd	CDU	-0.28	Den	lib	RV	0.05
UK	con	CON	-0.12	Ita	com	PCI	-0.29	Fin	sd	SSP	0.04
Den	soc	SF	-0.13	Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.37	Net	cd	ARP	0.04
Net	lib	VVD	-0.16	Den	con	KF	-0.37	Fin	eth	SFP	0.04
Swe	sd	SAP	-0.16	Aut	cd	OVP	-0.43	Bel	cd	CVP	0.02
Swe	cd	KDS	-0.18	Nor	sd	DNA	-0.48	Swe	lib	FP	-0.00

Fin	cd	SKL	-0.20	Den	lib	VEN	-0.53	Ger	sd	SPD	-0.00
Fin	con	KOK	-0.20	Nor	agr	SP	-0.59	Fin	con	KOK	-0.06
Fin	lib	LKP	-0.20	Fin	sd	SSP	-0.70	Net	cd	KVP	-0.15
Nor	sd	DNA	-0.27	Den	soc	SF	-0.72	Swe	agr	C	-0.18
Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.27	Net	lib	D66	-0.73	UK	lib	LIB	-0.19
Ire	soc	WP	-0.27	Net	lib	VVD	-0.74	UK	sd	LAB	-0.20
UK	sd	LAB	-0.29	Ire	con	FF	-0.75	Ita	sd	PSI	-0.21
Ire	sd	ILP	-0.29	Aut	sd	SPO	-1.14	Nor	con	HOYR	-0.23
Ger	lib	FDP	-0.36	Den	cd	KRF	-1.23	Bel	sd	BSP	-0.24
Den	cd	KRF	-0.36	Net	cd	CHU	-1.40	Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.30
Bel	lib	PVV	-0.36	Net	cd	KVP	-1.48	Den	con	KF	-0.40
Nor	agr	SP	-0.40	Net	cd	ARP	-1.49	UK	con	CON	-0.43
Nor	soc	SV	-0.40	Ire	soc	WP	-1.63	Net	cd	CDA	-0.46
Den	con	KF	-0.44	Den	sd	SD	-1.67	Ita	com	PCI	-0.49
UK	lib	LIB	-0.49	Net	sd	PVDA	-1.69	Nor	sd	DNA	-0.55
Nor	con	HOYR	-0.53					Den	lib	VEN	-0.59
Net	sd	PVDA	-0.54					Ita	cd	DC	-0.61
Ita	env	PR	-0.55					Den	sd	SD	-0.65
Swe	con	MSP	-0.55					Nor	agr	SP	-0.80
Den	prt	FRP	-0.57					Ire	sd	ILP	-0.84
Fra	lib	RAD	-0.62					Fin	agr	KESK	-1.19
Den	lib	CD	-0.65					Aut	cd	OVP	-1.85
Den	lib	RV	-0.67					Swe	sd	SAP	-2.04
Ire	cd	FG	-0.70					Aut	sd	SPO	-2.24
Ire	con	FF	-0.70								
Swe	lib	FP	-0.72								
Den	lib	VEN	-0.73								
Nor	lib	V	-0.83								
Nor	prt	FRP	-0.96								
Bel	sd	BSP	-0.96								
Fra	lib	MRG	-1.07								
Fin	eth	SFP	-1.14								
Swe	agr	C	-1.16								
Net	lib	D66	-2.78								

Table 4.39 Parties rank-ordered according to the level of centralization and professionalization 1976-1990

Country	Family	Party	Centralize	Country	Family	Party	Profco	Country	Family	Party	Froflead
Ita	com	PCI	1.40	Net	com	CPN	2.79	Ire	soc	WP	3.74
Fra	com	PCF	1.37	Fra	com	PCF	1.40	Ita	env	PR	2.92
Bel	com	KPB	1.32	Ger	lib	FDP	1.33	Ita	soc	DP	2.33
Fra	lib	UDF	1.19	Ita	fas	MSI	1.27	Ire	env	GRE	2.31
Ita	fas	MSI	1.19	Nor	prt	FRP	1.01	Den	prt	FRP	0.90
Ita	lib	PLI	1.19	Ita	sd	PSDI	0.95	Swe	env	MP	0.81
Fra	cd	MRP	1.15	Ita	soc	DP	0.80	Ita	lib	PLI	0.73
Den	com	DKP	1.12	Ita	lib	PRI	0.74	Bel	env	ECO	0.70
Aut	com	KPO	1.12	Ita	lib	PLI	0.72	Aut	env	GA	0.70
Ger	com	DKP	1.12	Ita	env	PR	0.71	Fra	lib	UDF	0.68
Ita	sd	PSI	1.11	Swe	agr	C	0.66	Ger	com	DKP	0.68
Aut	cd	OVP	1.00	Swe	com	VPK	0.65	Net	com	CPN	0.68
Ita	lib	PRI	0.96	Aut	env	GA	0.63	Ger	lib	FDP	0.66
Net	cd	ARP	0.95	Fra	con	GAUL	0.60	Fra	lib	RAD	0.66
Bel	eth	VU	0.92	Aut	lib	FPO	0.59	Swe	com	VPK	0.65
Ita	soc	DP	0.88	Swe	lib	FP	0.53	Fra	lib	MRG	0.64
Aut	sd	SPO	0.86	Den	prt	FRP	0.50	Den	com	DKP	0.63
Ita	sd	PSDI	0.80	Fra	sd	PSF	0.50	Ire	lib	PD	0.61
Net	cd	KVP	0.78	Nor	soc	SV	0.45	Ger	cd	CSU	0.60
Fra	sd	PSF	0.78	Swe	env	MP	0.42	Den	soc	SF	0.58
Fra	con	GAUL	0.74	Den	lib	CD	0.35	Fra	sd	PSF	0.56
Net	cd	CDA	0.69	Swe	con	MSP	0.34	Nor	soc	SV	0.51
Den	sd	SD	0.66	Nor	sd	DNA	0.33	Bel	eth	VU	0.51
Net	cd	CHU	0.64	Nor	cd	KRFP	0.32	UK	sd	SDP	0.48
Net	com	CPN	0.42	UK	con	CON	0.32	Net	lib	D66	0.47
Ita	cd	DC	0.42	Ita	cd	DC	0.31	Fra	con	GAUL	0.47
Ger	sd	SPD	0.19	Fin	agr	KESK	0.30	Den	lib	CD	0.45
Ger	cd	CDU	0.19	Ire	lib	PD	0.29	Ger	env	GRU	0.44
Fin	agr	KESK	0.19	Ger	env	GRU	0.28	Den	lib	RV	0.38
Bel	lib	PVV	0.16	Fin	eth	SFP	0.25	Fin	com	SKDL	0.34
Net	lib	VVD	0.11	Fra	cd	MRP	0.24	Ire	cd	FG	0.34
Fin	sd	SSP	0.08	Fin	con	KOK	0.24	Swe	con	MSP	0.33
Bel	cd	CVP	0.06	Swe	sd	SAP	0.18	Fin	con	KOK	0.31
Aut	lib	FPO	0.01	Fin	sd	SSP	0.13	Den	cd	KRF	0.27
Nor	sd	DNA	0.01	Nor	lib	V	0.03	Bel	lib	PVV	0.25
Ger	cd	CSU	-0.01	Den	lib	VEN	0.03	Nor	lib	V	0.24

Net	sd	PVDA	-0.13	Den	cd	KRF	0.03	Swe	lib	FP	0.24
Ita	env	PR	-0.14	Ire	cd	FG	0.01	Net	sd	PVDA	0.23
Bel	sd	BSP	-0.14	Den	con	KF	0.00	Ita	sd	PSDI	0.23
Swe	cd	KDS	-0.18	Den	lib	RV	0.00	Net	cd	KVP	0.22
Fin	cd	SKL	-0.20	Nor	agr	S	-0.04	Fra	com	PCF	0.19
Fin	con	KOK	-0.20	Ger	cd	CSU	-0.05	Fin	eth	SFP	0.18
Fin	lib	LKP	-0.20	Ita	sd	PSI	-0.08	Aut	lib	FPO	0.17
Swe	sd	SAP	-0.23	Ire	sd	ILP	-0.12	Net	cd	ARP	0.16
Swe	com	VPK	-0.23	Fin	com	SKDL	-0.12	UK	sd	LAB	0.14
Nor	soc	SV	-0.27	Aut	cd	OVP	-0.13	Ita	lib	PRI	0.14
Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.27	Nor	con	HOYR	-0.15	Ita	fas	MSI	0.14
UK	con	CON	-0.29	UK	sd	LAB	-0.31	Ita	com	PCI	0.12
UK	sd	LAB	-0.34	Net	sd	PVDA	-0.39	Net	cd	CHU	0.06
Den	cd	KRF	-0.36	Net	cd	CDA	-0.39	Net	lib	VVD	0.05
Den	soc	SF	-0.36	Ita	com	PCI	-0.40	Den	con	KF	0.04
Ger	lib	FDP	-0.36	Ire	con	FF	-0.41	Ita	sd	PSI	0.04
Nor	agr	S	-0.40	Ger	cd	CDU	-0.45	Net	cd	CDA	0.02
Swe	con	MSP	-0.43	Net	lib	VVD	-0.50	Ger	cd	CDU	0.00
Fin	com	SKDL	-0.48	Net	lib	D66	-0.51	Ger	sd	SPD	-0.01
Ire	sd	ILP	-0.51	Aut	sd	SPO	-0.53	Bel	cd	CVP	-0.01
Ire	soc	WP	-0.55	Den	soc	SF	-0.56	Fin	sd	SSP	-0.03
Den	prt	FRP	-0.57	UK	lib	LIB	-0.60	Nor	prt	FRP	-0.07
Den	lib	CD	-0.65	Ger	sd	SPD	-0.85	Nor	agr	S	-0.09
Den	lib	VEN	-0.67	UK	sd	SDP	-0.87	UK	lib	LIB	-0.10
Den	lib	RV	-0.67	Ire	soc	WP	-0.98	Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.11
Den	con	KF	-0.67	Den	sd	SD	-1.14	Swe	agr	C	-0.14
Ire	cd	FG	-0.70	Ire	env	GRE	-1.16	Den	sd	SD	-0.18
Ire	lib	PD	-0.70	Net	cd	KVP	-1.58	Nor	sd	DNA	-0.18
Ire	con	FF	-0.70	Net	cd	CHU	-1.60	Ita	cd	DC	-0.22
Aut	env	GA	-0.75					Den	lib	VEN	-0.23
Nor	lib	V	-0.83					Ire	con	FF	-0.28
Nor	con	HOYR	-0.83					Bel	sd	BSP	-0.33
Swe	lib	FP	-0.87					UK	con	CON	-0.51
Nor	prt	FRP	-0.87					Nor	con	HOYR	-0.55
UK	sd	SDP	-0.88					Fin	agr	KESK	-0.95
Swe	env	MP	-0.96					Ire	sd	ILP	-1.10
Fin	eth	SFP	-1.06					Aut	sd	SPO	-1.53

Ire	env	GRE	-1.06		Aut	cd	OVP	-1.70
Fra	lib	RAD	-1.07		Swe	sd	SAP	-2.39
Fra	lib	MRG	-1.07					
Swe	agr	C	-1.16					
Bel	env	ECO	-1.21					
UK	lib	LIB	-1.25					
Ger	env	GRU	-1.57					
Net	lib	D66	-2.05					

5 The ideological dimension of catch-allism

5.1 Policy and party competition

In representative democracies political parties compete with their political opponents for popular support. The previous chapter showed that political parties attempt to increase their financial and human resources in order to boost their competitiveness. Still, these resources are not the only prerequisite for political competition. In principle, democratic party competition takes place on the basis of policy proposals. In more functional terminology, political parties select, aggregate and articulate societal demands and subsequently communicate these policies to the electorate through election programs, political speeches, via modern mass-media and voting behaviour in parliament (Almond and Powell 1966; 1995). Ideally, voters are offered a choice between the proposed alternatives at regularly held elections. In short, democratic theory assumes ideological and policy differences between the different competitors (Klingemann et al. 1994, 7-8).

As chapter 2 has demonstrated, one of Kirchheimer's main concerns was that in political systems dominated by catch-all parties, the electorate is no longer offered these clear policy alternatives. According to Kirchheimer (1966b), political opposition was 'vanishing' from West European politics as catch-all parties dispose themselves of their ideological heritage. The catch-all theory outlined above holds that ideological catch-allism is indicated by a drastic reduction of ideological baggage since catch-all parties exchange policy-seeking for office-seeking behaviour. This chapter concentrates on the transfiguration of the space for interaction between political parties in West European party systems. To evaluate whether a development towards catch-allism has evolved on the ideological level, the next section will first analyse the direction of party competition. Kirchheimer asserted that, in the catch-all era, parties adopt a 'centrist position' in their party system, which leads to a more confined space of party competition and thus a decline in the degree of polarisation. Furthermore, catch-all parties no longer compete in traditional terms on ideology, instead they de-emphasise their 'traditional' issues. Next to an assessment of the centripetal movement of parties and the emphasis on traditional issues, this chapter also analyses the conversion into catch-all behaviour by party elites in terms of pay-offs in office control. According to Kirchheimer, elites of catch-all parties are more co-operative in their behaviour and show an increasing propensity to accept governmental responsibility even they are unable to control 'traditionally preferred' ministerial portfolios.

5.1.1 The centre in West European party systems

In order to establish how many and which parties move towards the 'centre-space' of their party system, this 'centre-space' has to be defined.[70] Traditionally, different policy

[70] For discussions and conceptualizations of the 'centre' in party systems see Downs 1957, 115-116; Duverger 1963, 215; Sjoblom 1968, 177; Sartori 1976, 134 and 202; Farneti 1983; Daalder 1984, 79 and 100-105; Ieraci 1992; Hazan 1997, 23-28. Other authors have also developed measures for the centre position; see for example Castles and Mair 1987; Rozendaal 1990, 331; Van Deemen 1990, 187-190; Keman 1994, 2.

positions of political parties are represented in one-dimensional left-right spaces of party competition. The assumption of these left-right or 'spatial models' of party competition (Downs 1957; Stokes 1963) is that political parties adopt positions on the same set of issues. Although many citizens evaluate political parties in terms of left and right and voters have little difficulty in defining themselves in these terms (see Inglehart 1990), this study utilises a modified form of this approach, usually referred to as the 'saliency theory of party competition' (Robertson 1976; Budge and Farlie 1977; 1983; Klingemann et al. 1994). In the saliency model the position of parties is based on the saliency they put on different issues. The assumption is that parties do not directly compete with each other by taking opposite positions on the same issues, instead they selectively emphasise different issues. To an extent, parties even 'own' certain issue-domains.[71] Since this study evaluates the left-right positions of political parties over time, the saliency model has a distinct advantage over more static left-right scales, and I will apply this model by drawing from the policy emphases as revealed in party election manifestos[72], for which the most comprehensive source is the content analysis of party programs conducted by the ECPR Manifesto Research Group, which include data on most of the election manifestos of the major political parties in this study.[73]

To move from this relative salience of the different issues to a spatial representation of party positions on a dynamic left-right scale, this study follows a procedure developed by Pennings and Keman (1994).[74] Pennings and Keman do not

[71] Butler and Stokes 1974; Sjöblom 1968; Budge and Farlie 1977; 1983a; Sani and Sartori 1983; Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Budge 1992; Laver 1993; Laver and Shepsle 1994. An alternative approach is the directional theory of issue voting (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989; MacDonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz 1991) which, in most simple terms, assumes that parties are only evaluated by voters when they adopt extreme positions (in intensity) on issues that are at the core of their platform.

[72] Laver and Schofield (1990, 245) argue that four methods can be distinguished to locate parties on a left-right scale: the scaling can be done on the basis of expert-judgements (Taylor and Laver 1973; de Swaan 1973; Dodd 1976; Castles and Mair 1984; Laver and Hunt 1992), on the basis of the analysis of parliamentary roll-call behaviour of party representatives, on the basis of the analysis of mass survey-data (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976) and on the basis of policy-documents of parties (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Laver and Budge 1992). This study utilizes the last method. Expert and mass surveys are too static, and in this study the left-right movement of parties over time is needed. Manifesto analysis allows for this dynamic modelling of party positions on policy dimensions over time.

[73] The Manifesto Research Group developed a common coding scheme for the analysis of issue dimensions of postwar election manifestos. The coding procedure consists of assigning each sentence in party manifestos into one unique category. Fifty-four different categories are distinguished in party platforms within seven broad issue domains. The proportion of sentences of the total manifesto devoted to each of these categories provides an interval measure of the saliency of the different issues for parties over time. For a description of this data-set and its format see Volkens 1992.

[74] The Pennings and Keman-scale is constructed by first, determining which parties are considered to belong to the left, centre or right of their party system on the basis of the Castles and Mair (1987) expert-scale. The authors thus obtain a categorization of parties independent from their party programmes. Secondly, the average scores of all parties on 54 variables in the party Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; see also Klingemann et al. 1994), are correlated with the scores on the Castles and Mair left-right scale. Issues with correlations higher than 0.40 are considered 'typically left' or 'typically right.' The final step is the calculation of the position of parties by subtracting the sum of emphasis of the 'left-wing-issues' from the sum of the emphasis on the 'right-wing' issues. The poles of the scale are +100 (when the

assume a fixed centre, instead they project the political centre as relative to the position of all parties within a particular party system. This method facilitates a dynamic analysis of the total range of party competition and makes movement of the relative centre possible. The total range of party competition is the 'distance' between the party on the most extreme left and the party on the extreme right position, which Sartori (1976) has referred to as the "space elasticity" of the party system. To calculate the centre-space Pennings and Keman divide this total range of party competition into three equal parts; the left space is the maximum left position minus the range divided by three, the right space is the maximum right position plus the range divided by three (as the right positions are negative values) and the centre space is confined by the inner boundaries of the left and right space. The centre-range is thus dependent on the distance between the positions of the two most extreme parties (see also Keman 1997; Pennings 1997). The exact mid-point between the two most extreme party positions can be regarded as the exact centre of the party system.

The implications of a variable centre space are substantial. First, this definition of the centre space means that the centre space expands when parties proliferate their positions and the centre range shrinks when parties converge, which implies that growing catch-allism will be associated with a reduced width of the centre. In addition, the entrance of new parties, the dissolution, mergers or splits of existing parties can all alter the range of party competition and thereby, change the size and directional movement of the centre. This, in turn, can modify the number of parties that populate the centre space. As a consequence, the composition of the centre-space can vary between different party systems as well as within one national party system over time. The *range* and *boundaries* of the centre space in West European party systems, measured as outlined above, are presented in table 5.1.

entire manifesto consists of emphasis on left-wing issues) and -100 (when the entire manifesto consists of emphasis on right-wing issues only).

Table 5.1 Width of centre range and boundaries of the centre in West European party systems 1945-1990

	width of centre range					boundaries of the centre space			
	1945 1960	1961 1975	1976 1990	*X*	*MAX*	1945 1960	1961 1975	1976 1990	*beta (β)*
Aut	16.5	21.6	15.9	18.0	31.3	-12.5 to 3.9	- 2.7 to 18.8	- 8.2 to 7.7	-.62*
Bel	22.7	16.5	17.6	18.9	32.4	-17.0 to 5.6	- 1.0 to 15.4	-15.2 to 2.4	-.27
Den	27.7	30.2	32.4	30.1	40.0	-11.3 to16.3	-19.4 to 10.7	-23.7 to 8.7	-.69*
Fin	-	-	20.7	20.7	20.7	-	-	1.9 to 18.8	-
Fra	21.0	29.4	19.3	23.2	32.3	2.4 to18.6	8.2 to 21.2	-11.1 to 8.1	.42*
Ger	18.2	7.6	18.5	14.8	25.3	- 6.9 to11.4	- 6.4 to 1.1	0.1 to18.4	.45*
Ire	21.2	13.6	16.2	17.0	29.4	-19.8 to 1.3	-10.5 to 3.2	- 6.5 to 9.6	.25
Ita	22.3	17.3	22.8	20.8	33.9	-17.7 to 4.6	- 9.6 to 7.8	-26.1 to -3.3	-.73*
Net	11.8	22.9	20.4	18.4	28.0	-11.2 to 0.5	-11.6 to 11.4	-16.6 to 3.7	-.15
Nor	16.4	32.5	21.2	23.3	51.5	- 4.6 to 11.7	-39.8 to -7.3	-19.4 to 1.7	-.67*
Swe	35.1	29.1	27.7	30.6	35.1	-31.7 to 3.4	-31.3 to-2.3	-24.4 to 3.2	.20
UK	11.0	13.1	16.8	13.5	26.0	- 5.4 to 5.7	- 2.8 to 10.3	-15.7 to 0.6	-.75*
X	19.8	19.7	20.3	19.9	21.9	-12.3 to 7.5	-11.5 to 8.2	-13.7 to 6.6	-.23*

Data are kindly provided by the Manifesto Research Group. Theoretically, party scores can range from +100 (extreme left position) and -100 (extreme right-wing position), allowing the total range of competition a maximum width of 200. This theoretical situation allows for a maximum width of the centre space of 66.7. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average centre range by period and country means. 'Range' refers to the width of the centre space, which is the total space of party competition divided by three. Columns under 'boundaries' provide the two perimeters of the centre space within each 15 year period. The column indicated 'MAX' presents the maximum distance between the two most extreme boundaries of the centre space of party competition over all post-war periods. A minus sign (-) means that data are not available. The column beta (β) provides regression coefficients between the exact centre point in the party system and the year of observation, summarising the direction of party competition. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Table 5.1 shows considerable cross-national variation in expansion and compression of the centre space of party competition in Western Europe. The centre range is widest in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) and Italy, while it is most cramped in the United Kingdom and Germany. Particularly during the 1960s the German centre space became very narrow which may well have sparked Kirchheimer's assertion that this was a European-wide phenomenon. Nevertheless, in Norway, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Denmark the centre range of competition has actually expanded; a development contrary to Kirchheimer's waning of opposition thesis. The growth of inter-party distances was most extensive in the Netherlands, where the centre range practically doubled after 1960. Closer examination shows that the expansion of the centre range of competition in the 1960s and 1970s in Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands was primarily caused by the emergence of new parties at a time when traditional parties actually adopted more moderate stances. It should be noted that many of the parties with the most extreme position included in this study are very small in electoral terms and negligible to government formation and national policy formulation. In some other countries such 'extremist' parties are not included in the study, which may explain some of the

variation. In Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland and Italy new political competitors entered the political scene in the 1960s and 1970s during which time the range of competition actually narrowed. Sweden, the country with the widest centre space, is the only case with a linear development towards compression of the space of party competition. Conversely, the inter-party distances expanded in Austria and France during the 1960s and 1970s, yet the centre space of competition dwindled in the last two decades. As noted earlier, the most cramped centre space of party competition is found in Germany since the late 1950s until the mid-1970s. This decline in inter-party distances started to unfold at in the country Kirchheimer observed most closely, triggering him to fully develop the catch-all thesis.

Overall, there is no consistent trend towards a declining centre space of party competition. In the majority of countries the centre space actually expanded during the last decades, indicating more extreme positions of some parties in their party system and a larger 'room to manoeuvre' for political parties. Only in Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland and Sweden did the width of the centre space of party competition decline over time. In sum, no firm evidence of an overall reduction in inter-party distances was found in West European party systems and hence we cannot confirm Kirchheimer's hypothesis that a process of ideological convergence and 'waning of opposition' characterised West European party systems after the Second World War.

Also, the shift in *direction* of the centre space shows several different trends across Western Europe. Over time the nucleus of party competition shift to the left in France, Germany, Ireland and Sweden, whereas in the other countries the mid-point of the space of party competition shifts to the right (see column 'beta β' in table 5.1). More precisely, in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and the Netherlands the centre shifts to the left in the 1960s and early 1970s, yet moves back to the right again in the period 1976-1990. In Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden the movement of the centre is in the opposite direction during the 1960s, namely to the right. In Denmark and Norway the centre space of party competition moves almost continuously to the right during the post-war period, yet shifts to the left again in the last period.

Thus, within and across West European party systems the centre space of party competition shows considerable variation over time both in width and direction, making Kirchheimer's assertion of the waning or even vanishing of political opposition seem untenable. There is no linear and uniform trend of movement towards the centre; rather, parties seem to take advantage of the considerable room to manoeuvre inside as well as outside the centre of their party system in order to strategically position themselves for electoral and governmental competition. That said, it must also be emphasised that the range and direction of the centre space tells us nothing about the parties which actually occupy the centre in West European politics, for which changes in the range and direction of the centre space has obvious consequences.

In Western Europe a considerable proportion of political parties, including over one third of the total number in this study, is located in the centre range of party competition. The numbers of parties occupying the centre augmented particularly during the late 1950s and again in the 1970s. Yet, there is no secular trend of an

increasing number of centre parties in West European party systems. In fact, the proportion of parties in the centre has actually declined since the late 1970s (see also Keman 1997, 96). Occupancy of the centre space also demonstrates substantial cross-national variation and over time the dissimilarities between West European party systems have even increased. Partly due to its fragmented party system, Italy for example, has the most crowded centre space in Western Europe over the total post-war period. Party competition within the centre range of the party system is also very common in Austria, the United Kingdom and Denmark. In contrast, the French political and constitutional changes that brought about the Fifth Republic resulted in few parties positioning themselves in the political centre space. Perhaps it was this development that led Duverger (1963, 215) to assert that the French centre space is always empty. Clearly, an empty centre is exceptional in Europe, as next to France, this situation only occured in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Germany for limited periods of time. Parties in France also exhibit the highest volatility in centre occupation, while the most stable proportion of centre parties can be found in the Netherlands; although even this coefficient of variance still shows substantial centre-migration.

Occupancy of the centre space of competition is, however, dependent on the relative position of other parties and is therefore inadequate in itself to provide substantiation or rejection of the catch-all thesis. Two modes of interaction between party positions and the centre-range are feasible. First, parties may have (relatively) stationary positions while the centre-range changes to such an extent that parties move in and out of the centre. A second possibility is that the centre is relatively stable and parties change their policy position. To test whether West European parties demonstrate a centripetal or centrifugal movement it is therefore necessary to calculate the distance of all parties from the exact centre position (which itself is variable) in each period. As this study concentrates only on the absolute distance of parties from the centre, the positive and negative signs of the scores are ignored. For each of the nine periods, table 5.2 provides the average distance of all parties in West European countries from the exact centre position of their party system.

Table 5.2 The (average) distance from the centre in West European party systems 1945-1990.

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1955 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	6.7	8.8	12.9	16.4	7.2	10.4	1.1	14.7	7.2	**9.5**	**6.1**	**.642**
Bel	14.0	22.4	7.0	12.2	9.3	8.1	6.2	10.4	6.5	**10.3**	**7.2**	**.699**
Den	11.3	10.8	26.8	15.5	17.7	21.1	20.3	26.2	23.5	**20.2**	**12.7**	**.629**
Fin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14.8	6.2	**10.5**	**8.1**	**.771**
Fra	13.5	18.3	10.2	13.3	8.7	13.4	14.3	2.9	18.9	**12.3**	**6.2**	**.504**
Ger	5.5	6.9	17.6	1.9	4.8	6.7	4.8	15.8	12.2	**8.9**	**7.9**	**.888**
Ire	13.7	16.8	8.2	9.3	12.4	6.0	2.6	11.3	16.1	**11.1**	**7.3**	**.658**
Ita	12.7	6.6	10.5	5.9	11.5	8.3	6.2	11.6	16.1	**10.1**	**7.6**	**.752**
Net	6.9	12.2	7.2	9.5	14.6	12.0	14.7	13.7	7.3	**10.9**	**6.6**	**.606**
Nor	7.7	13.5	11.8	8.9	8.3	36.4	15.0	20.4	18.3	**16.1**	**11.9**	**.739**
Swe	16.3	22.8	19.8	29.3	14.7	12.2	10.9	17.6	14.6	**17.5**	**12.7**	**.726**
UK	8.3	6.8	5.5	9.7	7.3	9.2	23.4	16.7	16.3	**11.5**	**7.0**	**.609**
X	**10.8**	**13.2**	**13.1**	**12.2**	**11.3**	**15.1**	**11.8**	**15.7**	**14.6**	**13.2**	**9.9**	**.750**
S	**7.4**	**9.4**	**10.3**	**9.6**	**7.9**	**11.7**	**9.9**	**11.5**	**10.0**	**-**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.685**	**.712**	**.786**	**.787**	**.699**	**.775**	**.839**	**.732**	**.684**	**-**	**-**	**-**

Entries are average distances of all parliamentary parties from the exact centre (mid-point between the most extreme left-wing and most extreme right-wing party). For Finland no data were available until 1980. Belgian and Dutch parties which split or merge are counted as one over the entire period. See appendix 2 for sources of the data. Above the first column contains the abbreviation for the countries as explained in appendix II. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The column '*S*' lists the standard deviations of the countries, while the row '*S*' at the bottom of the table provides the standard deviation for each period. Standard deviations are used to assess cross-national and cross-time variation. Rows and columns labelled '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*) for countries and periods, as this measure is more suitable for comparison of several clusters of data with respect to their relative homogeneity in instances where the groups have very different means. A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available.

These figures clearly show that across West European party systems no uniform trend towards the centre is discernible, but rather a pattern of substantial variation in centripetal and centrifugal party movements can be seen. Nevertheless, as far as the 1960s are concerned, these data do corroborate Kirchheimer's belief that parties were then moving towards the centre space. Overall, the average distance from the centre declines during the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, most West European party systems manifest a centrifugal tendency indicating programmatic polarisation. Polarisation between political parties is most profound in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden), while parties in Germany and Austria position themselves relatively much closer to the centre position. In order to summarise the overall centrifugal and centripetal trends within countries, table 5.3 provides the results of a linear regression analysis of the distance from the centre of political parties with the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 5.3 Trends in party distances from the centre over time in Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK

beta (β)	-.07	-.41*	.28*	-.55	-.16	.22	-.04	.13	.17	.37*	-.20	.61*

Entries are regression coefficient between the distance from the centre and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Clearly, there is no secular centripetal trend among parties in West European political systems. The positive parameters show that, over time, the distance of political parties from the centre space actually increased in Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom. Only in half the countries included in this study, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland and Sweden, are parties demonstrating a moderate centripetal movement over time. Following this evaluation of cross-national variation, table 5.4 reviews differences in distance from the centre of the parties belonging to each party family.

Table 5.4 The distance of parties from the centre in West European systems by party family 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
cd	9.1	8.7	8.0	8.1	7.6	10.8	4.1	11.6	7.7	**8.5**	**6.5**	**.765**
com	20.8	22.4	22.1	22.0	22.2	12.7	16.8	23.7	21.7	**20.7**	**10.7**	**.516**
con	14.3	17.3	17.8	19.2	17.2	17.2	16.6	19.6	15.9	**17.3**	**11.5**	**.665**
sd	11.9	10.2	12.8	9.8	9.5	14.3	9.4	14.3	13.4	**11.8**	**7.6**	**.644**
soc	-	-	39.7	21.1	21.1	33.1	23.6	26.5	25.5	**26.1**	**11.6**	**.444**
lib	7.9	13.8	10.2	12.6	9.6	13.8	11.9	10.9	14.5	**11.7**	**8.4**	**.718**
env	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.3	10.7	**16.2**	**9.9**	**.611**
eth	-	-	-	8.1	7.9	0.3	2.0	14.4	4.7	**7.1**	**6.5**	**.915**
agr	3.0	14.9	8.9	2.3	8.0	19.9	6.6	8.2	5.0	**8.4**	**7.5**	**.893**
prt	-	-	-	-	-	41.6	27.3	31.0	31.1	**32.7**	**6.7**	**.205**

The abbreviations in the first column refer to the party families, summarised in appendix 2. Entries are percentages of all parties included in this study. A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available or parties did not exist at that particular point in time. The column '*X*' provides the average score of the party family. The column '*S*' gives the standard deviations by party family, while the column '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/ *X*).

With regard to genetic origin, agrarian, liberal, Christian democratic and social democratic parties are most often found in, or close to the centre of West European party systems (see also Keman 1997, 107). In particular, the data in table 5.4 confirm the centrist tendency of Christian democratic and agrarian parties. For the Christian democratic parties this centrist position is relatively stable over time. Apparently, agrarian parties have not labelled themselves 'centre-parties' without reason; since these parties have the lowest average distance from the centre position and can often be found in the centre of the political spectrum. In contrast, conservative, communist and socialist parties are consistently most distant from the exact centre in their party system. Liberal and social democratic parties usually do not move far away from the centre point in their party systems. As Kirchheimer suggested, in several countries the social-democratic parties adopted a more centrist position during the 1960s, yet a centrifugal movement of social democratic parties is visible in the 1980s. As a

summary measure of overall trends in 'centrism', the next table presents the results of a linear regression analysis of the distance of parties of the different party families from the centre with the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 5.5 Trends in movement towards the centre over time of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	soc	lib	env	eth	agr
beta (β)	-.01	-.04	.03	.09	-.06	.12	-.96	.09	-.23

Entries are regression coefficients between the distance from the centre and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

The stable centrist position of the Christian democratic parties is evidenced by a very low negative trend over time in their distance from the centre. While Christian democratic, agrarian, communist and socialist parties show a moderate centripetal tendency, conservative, social democratic and liberal parties reveal a modest centrifugal trend over time. Overall, this analysis also shows that party families in general basically maintain a similar distance from the centre over time, evidenced by very low coefficients, with the exception of the polarizing environmentalist family. As the exact centre point varies considerably across countries and within party systems there can be no other conclusion than that parties strategically re-position themselves at relatively comparable distances from the centre.

A more specific analysis indicates that two major patterns of centre occupation dominate West European party systems. First, there is the dominant centrism of Christian democratic parties, a situation found in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy (see also Keman 1994). Christian democratic parties in these countries generally maintained their centrist position, while conservative parties in other countries were moving away from the centre space. Only in Ireland, Norway and France have Christian democratic parties left the centre space and become embedded at the right-wing of the political spectrum. A second dominant pattern in Western Europe is centre space occupation by social democratic parties in their respective party systems. The Danish, German, Irish and Swedish social democratic parties already resided in the political centre immediately after World War II, as opposed to the Austrian, Belgian, Italian, British and Dutch social democratic parties which came to inhabit the centre space at a later stage. In other countries the picture is less transparent. In Norway, for example, the population of the centre is in continuous flux. New parties which emerged in the mid-1970s in Norway pulled the centre to the right, making it possible for the conservatives to monopolise the centre space. Another deviant case is the Swedish party system, where the conservative party appears to be the stable factor in the political centre. In both of these Scandinavian countries the former agrarian, now self-labelled Senterpartiet, situates itself in the centre space as well. Even more abundant fluctuation in centre space occupancy is found in the United Kingdom, where first, the Conservative Party resides in the centre, only to be driven out by Labour's move to the right in the 1960s and finally by the entry of the Liberal Party and its successor (SDP) as residents of the centre space in the 1980s.

Over time no linear trend towards increasing centre space occupation nor an

overall centripetal movement of political parties is discernible in Western Europe. The evidence actually indicates the opposite trend to what Kirchheimer claimed, as for example, the number of conservative and liberal parties which inhibit the centre space declined since the late 1970s. Moreover, although Christian democratic and social democratic parties show relatively stable levels of centre space occupation, the propensity of parties to move in and out of the centre range actually increased between the 1950s and the 1980s. Still, it is too early to dismiss Kirchheimer's thesis altogether. Kirchheimer argued that modern catch-all parties are disposing themselves of their ideological inheritance, which would then be visible in more flexible policy stances and in the adoption of strategically more advantageous positions in the Downsian sense. With this in mind, I will now turn in section 5.1.2 to look at the extent to which political parties have converged towards each other or, instead, have proliferated in their policy positions.

5.1.2 Convergence and polarisation of political parties

Convergence of political parties indicates increasing consensus between party elites within party systems and behaviour oriented towards co-operation. This 'waning' or even 'vanishing of opposition' is a prominent aspect of Kirchheimer's political thinking, and I will measure it here by taking the standard deviation of all party positions within one party system.[75] These calculations are summarised in table 5.6 in which the entries are the average standard deviations of all party positions, indicating the average distance parties have adopted. The higher the mean standard deviation, the more parties proliferate on average; the lower the standard deviation-score, the more parties converge towards each other by adopting similar policy positions.

Table 5.6 Average party distances (in standard deviations) in Western Europe 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*
Aut	8.2	10.5	16.7	23.1	8.4	14.2	1.6	17.7	8.6	**14.2**
Bel	18.3	30.1	10.3	13.5	10.9	10.5	8.5	13.9	8.9	**14.0**
Den	14.6	13.4	33.1	17.6	22.0	24.0	23.9	32.2	27.7	**23.8**
Fin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.0	7.4	**13.2**
Fra	11.9	21.4	12.3	14.1	11.3	15.1	16.7	2.9	22.0	**14.1**
Ger	7.2	8.8	25.1	2.3	6.5	9.4	6.5	22.6	14.2	**13.1**
Ire	19.1	23.9	10.2	11.8	15.3	6.9	1.0	14.8	18.5	**15.1**
Ita	13.1	9.8	12.0	7.0	17.4	11.8	6.1	11.7	19.8	**14.3**

[75] "A general interest is in the general convergence or divergence of parties over the postwar period, particularly in view of theses of the "end of ideology" (Bell 1962) or of the emergence of the totally pragmatic "catch-all" party (Kirchheimer 1966). In part, of course, judgements of convergence and divergence rest on arbitrary decisions about which years to compare. Inspection of individual graphs of party movement on the main dimension shows that in most countries there is no steady movement to convergence or divergence; parties come together and move apart presumably in response to imperatives of party competition, not to secular trends towards de-ideologisation" (Budge 1992, 24; see also Thomas 1975; 1979; 1980; Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987; Laver and Hunt 1992, 65-67; Katz and Mair 1993a).

Net	8.6	15.0	10.0	11.8	16.5	13.1	20.3	15.7	10.4	**13.2**
Nor	11.1	17.3	14.6	12.7	12.8	31.7	18.7	21.1	19.1	**18.0**
Swe	20.5	27.9	26.5	33.3	18.3	13.2	16.5	26.9	18.2	**22.0**
UK	10.2	8.0	7.6	11.8	10.7	11.8	27.4	23.3	19.0	**14.3**
X	**13.4**	**17.4**	**18.3**	**16.3**	**15.2**	**17.6**	**16.1**	**20.9**	**18.2**	**-**

Entries are standard deviations of party positions between all parties within one party system in each period. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average standard score by period and country means. A minus sign means that data were not available or statistic could not be calculated.

Countries show significant variance in timing and extent of political polarisation and convergence of political parties. As noted earlier, Denmark and Sweden emerge as the most polarised party systems in Western Europe. Particularly during the 1950s and early 1960s, as well as in the 1980s, Swedish and Danish political parties differ substantially in policy position. Overall, considerable polarisation between parties is also found in the United Kingdom, France and Norway. Relatively low levels of polarisation characterise political competition in Germany, Austria and Italy. In Germany two short periods, the late 1950s and the early 1980s, stand out as times of considerable polarisation between the different political competitors. On the whole, however, party distances in the German political system rank among the lowest in Western Europe, a fact which was noted by Kirchheimer as well. Several interesting findings emerge from this analysis, such as the evidence that the Italian party system is far less polarised as could be expected from its relatively fragmented format. Apparently the numerous Italian parties cluster to a significant extent around similar policy positions. Only the late 1960s and 1980s are times of increasing ideological polarisation in the Italian polity. Although parties converged towards one another in Belgium, Austria, Denmark and Sweden over time, there is no evidence here either of a secular trend of convergence as suggested by Kirchheimer. In sum, this analysis does not corroborate Kirchheimer's assertion of vanishing opposition in Western Europe. There is no linear development towards convergence of political parties, instead polarisation and convergence alternate over time in all European party systems.

Utilising the same data on policy positions of parties on the dynamic left-right scale, which runs from an extreme left-wing position (+100) to an extreme right-wing position (-100), we can also chart the programmatic movement of West European political party families over time and the results of this analysis are summarised in table 5.7

Table 5.7 Average left-right policy positions of West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	**1951 1955**	**1956 1960**	**1961 1965**	**1966 1970**	**1971 1975**	**1976 1980**	**1981 1985**	**1986 1990**	***X***	***S***	***direction***
cd	- 2.4	- 6.6	- 8.7	- 4.1	- 3.9	- 1.6	- 3.7	- 6.0	- 6.6	**- 4.8**	**8.9**	**- 4.2**
com	18.4	28.2	23.6	20.5	28.4	15.9	20.3	27.4	14.9	**14.8**	**10.3**	**- 3.5**
con	-14.7	-12.7	-14.0	-19.7	-14.3	- 8.9	-17.9	-20.0	-22.4	**-12.1**	**16.9**	**- 7.7**
sd	12.2	13.8	13.4	7.4	11.6	14.5	6.9	6.2	5.9	**10.2**	**9.4**	**- 6.3**
soc	-	-	44.0	20.2	25.4	22.1	22.7	20.8	19.0	**24.9**	**9.0**	**- 25.0**

lib	- 4.4	- 6.7	- 6.5	1.5	- 0.7	- 2.1	- 2.4	- 9.6	-13.4	**- 4.9**	**14.1**	**- 9.0**
env	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36.6	9.7	**23.2**	**19.1**	**n.a**
eth	-	-	-	- 0.8	5.3	9.1	- 0.9	-13.7	- 1.3	**- 0.4**	**8.7**	**- 0.5**
agr	- 8.6	-11.7	-15.5	- 9.5	- 2.1	6.4	1.1	- 1.1	- 3.5	**- 4.9**	**8.4**	**+ 5.1**
prt	-	-	-	-	-	-52.6	-29.2	-43.4	-41.2	**-41.6**	**14.5**	**+ 11.4**
X	**0.3**	**1.6**	**3.4**	**1.8**	**5.5**	**- 0.3**	**- 0.7**	**- 1.2**	**- 7.1**	**- 0.1**	**17.3**	**- 6.8**

Entries are average positions of the left-right scale of all parties of the same genetic origin (see section 4.1.1 and Appendix 1). A score of +100 signifies an extreme left-wing position, while a score of -100 indicates an extreme right-wing position. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and party family means. The column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation the party families. The last column indicated by '*direction*' provides the difference between the first available average position-score and the score in the period 1986-1990. A minus sign (-) indicates that data were not available or parties did not exist at that particular point in time.

In general, and as can be seen from table 5.7, West European parties show substantial movement along the left-right scale and have, over time, shifted their policy preferences to the right end of the political spectrum. With the exception of the agrarian and protest parties which already had distinctive right-wing policy profiles, all party families adopted increasingly right-wing policy positions, particularly during the late 1950s and early 1960s as well as in the 1980s. This rightward drift can be detected within most party families and appears to counter Kirchheimer's predictions regarding the emergence of centripetal competition in West European party systems. Moreover, the 1970s proved to be a period of left-wing radicalisation for the social democrats, while the 1980s mark a shift to the right once more. Similar trends of 'moderation' and 'radicalisation' over time are found with socialist and communist parties and, to a lesser extent, environmentalist parties. Liberal parties, having positioned themselves on the right in the 1950s, shifted towards the left in the 1960s. During the 1970s and 1980s, however, liberal parties follow the general shift to the right. Parties of conservative origin have, on average, a solid right-wing policy stance, although this stance radicalised during the late 1970s and early 1980s. What this erratic pattern might suggests is that parties shift their policy stance and converge or pull together when they consider this beneficial to their chance of government participation or electoral gains. That said however, and with the exception of the period spanning from 1960 to 1975, there is an unmistakable programmatic movement of West European parties to the right of the political spectrum, which suggests that centrist positions are not automatically seen as electorally beneficial by many parties. Indeed, a movement to the right can also have a considerable pay-off in electoral terms as is shown by the electoral victories of Margaret Thatcher in Britain, the enduring electoral success of Helmut Kohl in Germany and the advent of right-wing governments in Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark during the 1980s (Gunn 1989). In the end, however, few of these movements, including the programmatic and ideological radicalisation to the left in the 1970s and to the right in the 1980s, appear to substantiate Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis.

Kirchheimer also suggested that catch-all parties would adopt progressively flexible policy positions and increasing willingness to exchange ideological rigidity for strategic office-seeking behaviour, and this flexibility is also something which we can assess with these policy data. Accordingly, table 5.8 reports the standard deviations of left-right scores of the different party families over time.

Table 5.8 The flexibility in policy position (standard deviations) of Western European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*CV*
cd	11.3	10.9	10.7	6.9	6.9	9.0	6.2	10.5	7.7	**8.9**	**1.8**
com	5.0	6.7	6.5	9.5	3.0	13.0	15.1	10.1	15.1	**10.3**	**0.5**
con	15.9	12.8	24.9	22.3	11.3	15.5	10.8	26.9	7.7	**16.9**	**1.0**
sd	4.4	5.3	8.5	8.4	8.6	8.9	11.2	10.4	12.6	**10.2**	**0.9**
lib	8.8	17.1	10.7	16.5	14.4	12.1	13.8	15.3	14.6	**14.1**	**0.3**
agr	9.5	2.4	11.3	13.1	6.1	0.7	0.6	7.5	2.7	**8.7**	**1.8**
X	**9.2**	**9.2**	**12.1**	**12.8**	**8.4**	**9.9**	**9.6**	**13.5**	**10.1**	**11.5**	**1.1**

Entries are average standard deviations in policy position. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average standard deviation over all post-war policy positions of the particular party family and of the nine periods respectively. The row marked by *'CV'* provides the coefficient of variance of the party families over the post-war period.

The differences in this case are striking, particularly insofar as they associate differential degrees of flexibility with parties of different lineage. When this genetic origin is taken into account, for example, it is found that liberal and particularly conservative parties are far more flexible in their policy stance than Christian democratic, agrarian and social democratic parties. The finding, that parties generally found on the right hand of the political spectrum adopt more flexible positions while parties predominately situated in the centre and on the left are more rigid in their commitment to principle, was also noted by Klingemann et al. (1994, 247-248). During the late 1950s and early 1960s, however, there appears to have been a more generalised ideological flexibility which corroborates Kirchheimer's own emphasis on the downgrading of traditional ideology. In contrast, however, the late 1960s and 1970s marked a period of more rigidity in policy positions, a process which was reversed again in the 1980s. In other words, there is no evidence of a linear trend towards more flexibility in left-right programmatic movement; rather parties appear to use the 'room for manoeuvre' when this is possible, and seem to regress to more ideological rigidity when they deem this necessary for electoral reasons or as a coalitional strategy.

In sum, we can detect neither a general trend towards ideological moderation, nor evidence of a continual centripetal trend or programmatic convergence. Rather than a centripetal movement of parties, the centre of gravity of party competition in Western Europe has shifted to the right, and in contrast to Kirchheimer's theory, the proportion of parties which occupy the centre space has even declined since the late 1970s. What can be witnessed across Europe is a cyclical movement of parties in and out of the centre for strategic purposes and a pattern of flexibility in policy position which both suggests that parties adapt their policy stance to the prerequisites and parameters of national party competition and electoral calculations.

5.2 Emphasis on traditional issues

Political issues (politically salient problems) are central to democratic party competition. Political elites frame existing dimensions of conflict, as well as new

problems and challenges which modern democracies face, in terms of political issues. In addition, the power to do the opposite, and to keep issues from surfacing on the political agenda has also important consequences for the agenda-setting in modern democracies (Bachrach and Baratz 1962). However, this rise and fall of issue saliency is not totally unstructured, and shifts in salient issues as well as changes in the relative dominance of issue dimensions may indicate fundamental changes in the social structure (Inglehart 1990). Equally important, the origin of parties can be traced to specific social cleavages and conflicts and as long as these political conflicts persist or maintain relevant to certain groups, the political parties will keep the related issues on the political agenda. Communist and socialist parties, for example, continue to emphasise class-based issues and state ownership of means of production, while social democratic parties will more likely emphasise redistributive and state interventionist issues. In turn, agrarian parties, along with Christian democratic parties usually emphasise traditional morality-issues in conjunction with religious issues. Traditionally, liberal parties primarily emphasise the importance of law and order as well as individual and economic freedoms, whereas conservative parties are usually oriented towards nationalist and military issues, as well as the preservation of traditional morals. Indeed, some go as far as to claim that certain issues 'belong' to certain party families and that political parties can basically be regarded as single-issue movements. Budge and Farlie (1983a), for example, argued that social democratic parties have always been single-issue parties and that they do not expand their concerns; instead they simply reduce emphasis on unpopular issues.[76]

If Kirchheimer was correct in asserting that parties, in their transformation towards catch-allism, abandon their specific clientele and aim for wider electoral support, they no longer need to hold on so tightly to their specific emphasis.[77]

[76] Budge and Farlie (1983a, 304-305) argue that, "the assertion made originally by Kirchheimer that parties - especially socialist parties - are expanding their appeal so as to encompass all issues that might attract votes, and thus are becoming indistinguishable 'catch-all' parties. In point of historical fact, Kirchheimer's criticism was sparked off by the repudiation of certain traditional but unpopular elements in the socialist platform (e.g., state ownership, control) rather than by its expansion. (...) Our analysis of competition reveals an asymmetry in the competitive position of socialist and bourgeois parties, which put the latter in a 'catch-all' position from the earliest emergence of the former as a popular force. Socialist parties 'own' only the issue of socio-economic redistribution: since this would always produce immediate benefits for the majority of the population, it is a frequently occurring issue with a considerable impact on floating voters (to say nothing of its permanent effects on the socialist basic vote). Socialist parties are to a large extent single-issue parties: the logic of effective competition indicates that, far from becoming 'catch-all' parties, they should get rid of vote-losing elements in their policy (such as nationalization) to bring their winning issue into effective focus. During the 1960's this was in effect what was done by the German and Austrian social democrats. How can bourgeois parties compete with the redistributive appeal? Historical evidence indicates that, as heirs to all the older party appeals, they became catch-all parties from the beginning of the socialist threat, searching their wide range of proprietary issues for the one(s) most likely in the current election to direct attention away from redistribution. These contrasting emphases, together with direct confrontations of records and candidates and sometimes foreign policies, constitute the familiar pattern for an election under left-right competition."

[77] Budge and Farlie (1983a, 280) argue that parties compete by "adding other appeals to the traditional partisan emphasis in close elections, all parties act as 'catch-all' parties under given circumstances. At other times when they feel bound to win or loose regardless, parties will stress their ideological purity. This broadening and contracting of appeals is not therefore a once-and-for-all process as argued, for example by Kirchheimer (...), but one closely related to the ebb and flow of election fortunes. ... Where party competition is conceived of as emphasizing different issues, 'convergence' towards a 'centre' simply means that they start talking about the same issues, not that they necessarily agree on them."

Instead, catch-all parties strategically use political issues for electoral purposes. However, only at the risk of very high electoral costs can parties totally do away with their ideological heritage. As Klingemann et al. (1994, 24) point out; "parties sustain an identity that is anchored in the cleavages and issues that gave rise to their birth... Parties are historical beings." This does not mean, nevertheless, that parties can not selectively emphasise or de-emphasise issues at times when this seems electorally advantageous to them. Furthermore, new issues which can not be neglected are bound to crop up in every party system and parties will include them in their policy statements.

Accordingly, the **second** feature of ideological catch-allism is likely to be indicated by a declining emphasis on issues which are *traditionally* highlighted by parties in their party program. Again, the data from the party manifestos of the ECPR Manifesto Research Group can be employed in order to determine which issues are typical and traditionally emphasised by different party families. All party manifestos of one party family in the period from 1945 until 1960 are aggregated and the average proportion of emphasis on the different issues is calculated. The five issues most emphasised by each party family are then considered to be the 'traditional' issues for all parties belonging to that particular party family. This relatively 'rough-and-ready' index may be regarded as indicative of the relative saliency of issues which are considered to be traditional for that party family. An important difference between this measure and the left-right scale used in section 5.1 is that the traditional issues differ for each party family and these are reported in appendix 2. Table 5.9 below summarises the average percentages of the party manifestos devoted to these traditional issues by the different party families over time.

Table 5.9 The mean proportion of emphasis on traditional issues by Western European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
cd	31.5	27.7	27.6	24.0	18.3	20.4	23.7	19.0	21.0	**23.9**	**9.5**	**.397**
com	28.1	29.8	31.7	19.9	21.6	19.0	22.8	28.0	21.5	**24.7**	**8.9**	**.360**
con	33.2	21.2	35.4	34.7	21.4	27.4	22.4	23.4	29.2	**27.6**	**14.3**	**.518**
sd	28.8	23.7	27.3	26.2	20.5	23.7	26.3	23.2	24.4	**24.9**	**8.3**	**.333**
soc	-	-	40.0	23.6	24.3	25.3	27.0	30.7	25.4	**27.4**	**7.8**	**.284**
lib	20.2	22.3	20.3	17.2	17.4	17.2	18.3	18.7	17.5	**18.8**	**8.2**	**.436**
env	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.0	32.3	41.8	**30.5**	**17.0**	**.557**
eth	-	-	-	2.1	5.3	8.7	9.5	7.1	17.5	**9.6**	**7.1**	**.739**
agr	28.3	25.3	26.8	17.1	12.4	10.5	11.6	13.4	8.8	**17.1**	**9.5**	**.555**
prt	-	-	-	-	-	40.8	29.6	33.8	37.2	**35.4**	**15.5**	**.438**
X	**26.8**	**24.2**	**26.7**	**22.6**	**18.5**	**21.2**	**21.6**	**22.2**	**23.6**	**22.3**	**10.6**	**.475**
S	**10.5**	**10.3**	**13.0**	**10.2**	**7.8**	**12.0**	**10.0**	**9.2**	**10.2**	**10.6**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.391**	**.426**	**.487**	**.451**	**.422**	**.566**	**.462**	**.414**	**.432**	**.475**	**-**	**-**

Entries are average percentages of the party manifesto devoted to traditional issues (see appendix 1). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and party family means. The column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation the party families, while the column indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/ *X*).

Although traditional issues still constitute an important segment of the party platforms in Western Europe, the data in table 5.9 clearly indicate that the late 1960s and the 1970s mark a period where non-traditional political issues began to gain prominence. Kirchheimer correctly noted this development, yet he appears to have overestimated the extent to which this process would continue. What can be seen is that this trend of de-emphasis on traditional issues was reversed in the early 1970s as parties awarded more saliency to their traditional concerns in their public declarations of principles; a process which persisted during the 1980s. These findings clearly contradict Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis.

Among the party families there is substantial variation in timing and extent in the downgrading of traditional salient issues. Christian democratic and agrarian parties emphasised policy preferences which are typical to their ideology more during the late 1970s and early 1980s; thereafter, a smaller section of their party platform was reserved for their traditional concerns. A similar cyclical pattern is discerneable within the conservative party family: a progressively larger part of their manifesto was devoted to policies and issues outside their conventional concern during the late 1950s and early 1960s as well as during the late 1970s and 1980s. While some social democratic parties retain their historic emphases, particularly in Germany, Ireland and Norway, over time the saliency of traditional issues declines for this party family. Liberal parties too have downgraded their traditional issues in the 1960s, while from that point on the level has remained relatively stable. Most parties within the communist party family have shed their original emphasis considerably, while the environmentalist parties increasingly emphasise their 'traditional' policy preferences. In the 1980s a moderate return to traditionally salient issues can be found within the social democratic, Christian democratic and conservative party families. Finally, by examining the measures of dispersion (standard deviations and coefficients of variance), it can be assessed that the highest flexibility in traditional issue emphasis is found among conservative, Christian democratic, environmental and protest parties. The most stable emphasis on traditionally salient issues can be detected within the party families of the traditional left (communist, socialist and social democrats), a pattern which was pointed out earlier. The direction and extent of these trends can be summarised by a regression analysis of emphasis on traditional issues with the year of observation as the independent variable as reported in table 5.10.

Table 5.10 Trends in traditional issue emphasis over time of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	soc	lib	env	agr
beta (β)	-.38*	-.25	-.11	-.13	-.04	-.13	.96*	-.70*

Entries are regression coefficients between the proportional emphasis on traditional issues and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

It is evident that none of the traditional party families escaped the need to address new issues in their party manifesto and thus devote less space to their traditional concerns. Particularly agrarian and Christian democratic parties have felt the need to include non-traditional issues in their party manifestos at the expense of their conventionally addressed subject matter. Communist parties have also modernised

their party platforms substantially over time. Only the novel environmentalist parties have increased their emphasis on their 'traditional' core issues.

This variation in traditional issue-emphasis across party families also helps to account for variation between countries, as can be seen from the summary figures in table 5.11. In this case the contrasts are quite marked. Parties in Ireland, for example, attribute far more attention to traditional issues than do parties in Italy and the United Kingdom. In the so-called consociational democracies in this sample (Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands), all major parties have de-emphasised their traditional issues. In contrast, most parties in Denmark and France by and large remained loyal to their traditional policy pledges. All these cases may offer support for the 'contagion-hypothesis' of catch-allism, by which Kirchheimer suggested that when one party adopts the catch-all strategy other parties in the system will follow. However, there are countries which do not corroborate this assertion. Italy, for example, shows a very mixed picture with the DC, PSDI and PCI playing down their traditional stance, while the liberal parties, the PSI and MSI remain loyal to their long-established emphases. Further analysis of dispersion and homogeneity in issue emphasis within countries shows that particularly Irish, Swedish and Danish parties vary substantially in their emphasis on traditional issues. Party competition on the basis of constant emphasis on traditional issues is more characteristic for the French and German party systems.

Table 5.11 The mean proportion of emphasis on traditional issues in Western European countries 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	32.0	22.6	23.6	20.9	12.2	25.8	23.4	19.9	24.9	**22.9**	**7.9**	**.345**
Bel	30.6	27.8	32.3	17.2	12.8	20.8	18.7	14.5	16.7	**20.5**	**10.6**	**.517**
Den	17.3	15.8	27.7	21.1	16.4	18.2	25.3	26.6	39.4	**22.2**	**11.9**	**.536**
Fin	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.1	27.7	**26.0**	**11.1**	**.426**
Fra	19.8	15.2	18.5	19.6	19.2	16.7	22.2	24.6	26.1	**29.7**	**6.9**	**.232**
Ger	28.0	26.4	21.6	18.5	19.1	19.6	21.8	21.1	29.7	**23.2**	**6.9**	**.297**
Ire	40.2	34.0	58.7	31.8	25.1	61.9	20.3	32.9	30.4	**35.9**	**14.1**	**.393**
Ita	20.3	15.1	15.4	18.9	12.9	18.2	14.9	16.6	17.6	**16.7**	**9.5**	**.568**
Net	27.9	30.1	26.2	26.5	21.5	19.2	24.9	19.5	14.4	**23.5**	**6.3**	**.268**
Nor	27.7	26.4	31.3	26.4	23.7	28.6	23.1	23.0	23.4	**25.8**	**9.1**	**.353**
Swe	39.7	36.7	36.4	28.3	23.6	19.8	25.0	27.4	23.4	**28.9**	**12.1**	**.419**
UK	20.5	15.5	14.1	20.0	15.1	16.6	18.3	17.3	21.1	**17.6**	**4.5**	**.256**
X	**27.6**	**24.1**	**26.5**	**22.6**	**18.3**	**24.1**	**20.1**	**21.9**	**24.6**	**23.3**	**9.2**	**.395**

Entries are average percentages of the party manifesto devoted to traditional issues (see appendix 1). Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the nine periods. The column indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Across West European countries, a substantial number of political parties de-emphasised traditional issues during the 1960s. This is in line with Kirchheimer's

interpretation of this period. Over time, however, the data do not indicate a secular trend towards de-emphasis on traditional issues and at the national level the 1970s and 1980s even mark a return to more traditional issue-emphasis. Parties in Denmark, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom emphasise more traditional issues in the late 1980s than they did in the 1950s. In contrast, within the Dutch, Italian and Belgian party system a propensity of constant depreciation of traditional issues can be detected. French parties manifested a relatively low level of saliency for traditional issues until the 1970s, and thereafter the proportion of the manifesto devoted to conventional issues increased again. This substantial variation across and within countries show that there is little evidence of a universal and constant de-emphasis on traditional issues.

To summarise the overall trends in traditional issue emphasis within European countries, table 5.12 gives the results of a linear regression analysis of traditional issue emphasis with the year of observation as the independent variable (the overall β is -.12*).

Table 5.12 Trends in traditional issue emphasis over time in Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK
beta (β)	-.15	-.45*	.26*	.35	.26	-.04	-.31	-.04	-.65*	-.20	-.45*	.12

Entries are regression coefficients between the proportion traditional issue emphasis and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

This table shows that particularly Dutch, Belgian and Swedish parties have adapted their party manifestos to modern times and discarded traditional issues from their platforms. Parties in Germany and Italy have largely perpetuated traditional issue emphasis at a similar level. As noted above, parties in Denmark, France, Finland and the United Kingdom have even increased emphasis on traditional policy preferences in their manifestos over time, thereby appearing to refute Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis.

In the end, however, the most striking conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the period set apart by Kirchheimer in his thesis appears to be exceptional. Only during the 1960s a general decline in traditional emphasis can be found. During the 1970s and 1980s parties showed renewed interest in traditional issues. Over time there is no singular *direction* of change in issue emphasis apparent throughout West European party systems. Indeed, since the 1970s trends in issue-emphases have diverged even further.

This finding is substantiated by the study of Blinn and Carkoglu (1994, 10-11) who found a clear decline in issue volatility (changes in policy positions) along the traditional cleavages over the last decades. Notwithstanding the continuing salience of the traditional issues in political competition, their analysis shows that the ideological positions of parties on the left-right cleavage stabilises, with the partial exception of parties in Norway, Denmark, France and the United Kingdom. In contrast, parties show increasing ideological volatility in issue salience on the 'new politics' dimension, except for Belgian and Norwegian parties. This suggests that parties maintain a firm

commitment to traditional issues, yet are willing to include new issues in their party platform when this is beneficial in electoral terms. However, parties delete these new issues with more ease then they discard the traditional issues from their manifestos.

Budge (1992, 27) has suggested that, rather than a decline in ideological conflict, this increasing saliency of new 'post-material' and environmental issues may well lead to new ideological conflict and a restructuring of politically important dimensions. Questions, for example, connected with traditional morality (family, abortion and divorce) are much less emphasised in party manifestos than in earlier days, indicating deconfessionalization and individualism. Proportions of manifestos devoted to military issues and international issues are declining, primarily as a consequence of decreasing international political tensions. Additionally, emphasis on economic issues declined during the 1980s and particularly the 1990s. Issues that have replaced disappearing issues are those to do with 'technology' and new political issues, such as democracy, decentralisation, social justice and environment (see also Laver 1996, 9). Empirical analysis suggests that this (dis)appearance of political issues is a function of economic, social and international political change - general tendencies that are largely outside the control of individual politicians or parties. Issues become independently salient in elections and politicians have only a limited ability to (de)emphasise certain issues and can therefore only partially influence the political agenda by their campaigning strategies (Budge 1992). Hence, developments in Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s caused parties to downgrade the relative salience of traditional issues and stress similar issues. Still, as we have seen here this process was reversed in the 1980s and to some extent traditional issues were resuscitated by political parties, which clearly contradicts the catch-all hypothesis and shows that political parties are unwilling to completely abandon their historic identity as Kirchheimer seemed to suggest.

5.3 Government participation and ministerial control

The **third** indicator of ideological catch-allism, which quantifies the extent to which political opposition in Western Europe dwindles and parties seek compromise and consensus, is analysed through government participation. The assumption is that the inclusion of a growing number of parties in government[78] indicates declining political opposition.[79] This study measures governmental inclusiveness by determining the

[78] In this study parties are considered to be in government only when they provide cabinet ministers (Lijphart 1984, 53; Pridham 1986, 16-17). For a broader definition, see Sartori 1976, 123: "...parties that have in fact entered, at some point in time, coalition governments and/or have given the governments the support they needed for taking office or staying in office."

[79] Katz and Mair (1993a; see also Mair 1995) labelled this the *"dimension of incorporation"* and distinguish three elements of the process of incorporation. First, a tendency towards the inclusion of an increasing number of parties in national governments. Second, a decline in the share of the electorate unrepresented in government over time, caused by the electoral losses of non-included parties and the incorporation of parties into government. Third, the cyclical nature of the process of incorporation. This cyclical nature refers to the process that the non-incorporated parties gain an increasing percentage of the popular vote, whereafter they are either included in a government or experience a decline in popular support. Katz and Mair explain this cyclical nature with the argument that, if a party gains a substantial portion of the popular vote and is enduring, the party is eventually likely to gain office. The inclusion of parties, in its turn, "may allow for an opening of the electoral market to new parties which seek to challenge the prevailing consensus or to break the mould created by the established (in this sense, incorporated) parties, or to those few parties which remain permanently excluded, with the result that a decline in the vote of non-incorporated parties

proportion of ministries controlled by parties in regard to the total number of ministerial portfolios available. Secondly, the continuity of executive power is analysed by measuring the time over which political parties maintain government control. Finally, this section will assess the extent to which parties are indifferent towards specific ministerial portfolios they can control when accepting government responsibility. The next section analyses these three quantitative and qualitative elements of ministerial control.

5.3.1 Ministerial control

Traditional governmental parties in Western Europe have been reluctant in admitting new participants into the inner sanctum of executive power. Over the post-war period the average number of parties in West European governments has increased only marginally as few new parties have been admitted to participate in government, although a number of non-traditional coalition parties did gain executive office during the 1960s and 1970s.[80]

To determine the variation in government control of the different party families, the proportion of the total number of ministerial portfolios controlled by parties is used (see appendix 2). Table 5.13 gives the average percentages of all ministerial portfolios held by the representatives of the party families.

Table 5.13 Mean percentages of ministerial control of West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	X	S	CV
cd	33.9	39.6	38.5	31.2	34.7	15.8	10.9	20.7	23.1	26.8	29.2	1.089
com	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.8	0.4	1.4	1.6	0.0	1.1	3.5	3.181
con	0.0	26.2	22.6	36.7	29.2	19.4	28.5	28.5	43.4	26.1	34.8	1.333
sd	43.5	31.6	28.9	25.8	28.4	45.8	37.0	35.2	26.4	33.6	33.6	1.000
lib	10.0	11.7	7.7	6.7	5.5	8.0	10.2	7.1	8.4	8.4	11.0	1.309
eth	2.7	7.0	1.7	3.8	4.2	4.0	6.4	5.9	7.6	4.8	4.8	1.000
agr	6.2	22.8	16.3	14.0	16.4	11.3	20.8	22.9	9.1	15.5	14.7	.948

is then succeeded by an increase, although the beneficiaries will have changed in this new cycle. Later again, the process of incorporation may begin anew, and so on" (Katz and Mair 1993a, 12-13). The consequence of this method of measurement is that when a party is incorporated into the status of a governing party once, it remains 'included' even if the party never enters a government again.

[80] In Finland the communists joined the Paasio-cabinet in 1966 and in Germany the SDP joined its first postwar coalition in 1966. Shortly before, in 1963, the Norwegian Hoyre, Senterpartiet, KrF and Venstre had formed the first postwar (and shortlived) non-labour coalition in Norway. Three left-wing parties in the Netherlands (DS70, D66 and PPR) gained government control in the early 1970's and in Belgium the ethnic parties (Rassemblement Walloon, Volksunie, FDF and PRLW) were included in broad coalitions in the late 1970s. During the late 1970s the Swedish liberals and conservatives established the first bourgeois coalition. In addition, the British Liberal Party provided the parliamentary majority for a minority Labour government in the mid-1970's, although the Liberals were not formally part of a Lib-Lab coalition. By the end of the 1980s, also the Austrian FPÖ, the Danish Centre Democrats and Christian People's Party, as well as the Finnish Rural Party (SMP) gained office for the first time. Finally, the PD joined a governmental coalition with Fianna Fail in Ireland in 1989 (data from Woldendorp et al, 1993).

X	17.9	19.9	17.4	16.9	16.8	15.3	14.3	14.6	14.2	16.2	-	-
S	25.5	27.8	28.0	28.0	28.3	24.6	25.8	22.9	24.2	25.9	-	-
CV	1.42	1.40	1.61	1.66	1.68	1.61	1.80	1.57	1.70	1.60	-	-

Higher scores indicate larger proportions of ministries held by members of one party family in that particular period. Socialist, environmental, fascist and protest parties were not included in coalitions as these parties never obtained ministerial control. The column and row indicated by an *X* provide the average score of the period and the mean score of the party family. The row and column marked by '*S*' provide the standard deviation for the party families and nine periods respectively. The columns indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/ *X*). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Conservative, Christian democratic and particularly social democratic parties have been most successful in securing ministerial control. On average, every third minister in Western Europe was of social democratic origin. In the first years after World War II the social democrats even held over forty-three per cent of all ministerial portfolios. Still, the heydays of social democracy were the 1970s and early 1980s. In the course of the 1980s, however, social democratic parties lost electoral and governmental ground again (see also Kitschelt 1994). Overall, Christian democratic ministers controlled over one quarter of all ministerial portfolios. Particularly during the 1950s Christian democrats held a large share of ministries in Western Europe. Christian democratic parties are often considered 'pivotal' in term of coalition formation (Keman 1994; 1997) This high level of Christian democratic government control is primarily the result of the dominance of the Italian, Dutch, Belgian and Austrian Christian democratic parties (Kersbergen 1995). In Italy and the Netherlands the Catholic parties were pivotal in every single post-war coalition and usually provided the prime-minister. Belgian Christian democratic parties participated in most post-war governments and more often than not the prime minister was recruited from their ranks. In the French Fourth Republic the MRP participated in most coalitions, yet the constitutional changes of 1958 resulted in a marginal position of Christian democracy within the UDF party-framework. In Scandinavia, Christian democracy is in a much weaker position (see Fogarty 1957; Irving 1979; Hanley 1994). Government control by communist parties immediately after the Second World War resulted from the important role communists had played in the resistance against Nazism. Communists entered governments in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and Italy. However, developments in Eastern Europe and pressure from the United States resulted in the exclusion of communist parties from most European cabinets. Only the Finnish SKDL maintained government control as a result of Soviet pressure and in the 1980s the PCF gained government responsibility again in France. Conservative parties in Europe lost some executive command in the 1970s, though regained government control in the course of the 1980s. Especially in Denmark, Norway and Britain conservative parties increasingly gained ministerial control. Additionally, French conservatives assembled by Chirac and the Finnish KOK have given conservative parties more governmental power. Needless to say, the long-lasting dominance of Fianna Fail in Irish politics contributes significantly to the average level of conservative ministerial control. Liberal parties have been less successful in the coalition game. Nevertheless, the German FDP has participated in most post-war coalitions and also the Belgian, Italian and Dutch liberals were frequently invited to join coalitions. In Scandinavia, however, organised liberalism is weak. Ethnic parties have succeeded in controlling some ministerial portfolios in Finland, where the SFP

coalesced with the social democrats as well as with conservative parties and thus established a pivotal position. The Belgian Volksunie also entered governmental coalitions in the late 1970s and again in the late 1980s. Over time agrarian parties increased their control of ministerial portfolios; the agrarian parties of Finland, Norway and Sweden, which adopted the name of 'Centerparties', have entered coalitions. Moreover, Kesk usually plays a pivotal role in Finnish coalition formation. Socialist, fascist, protest and environmental parties possess the least coalition potential of the West European party families. That this may well change in the future is witnessed by the entry of the successor of the MSI in a right-wing coalition in Italy in the 1990s. Furthermore, environmental parties have in some countries been able to enter in coalitions at the local level of government, which may well stage a development towards future participation in government at the national level. In France and Germany this already materialised when the first 'green' ministers were invited to join the governments led by Jospin and Schröder.

The fairly complicated pattern of executive control of the different party families can simply be summarised by the regression coefficients between control of ministerial portfolios and the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 5.14 Trends in ministerial control over time of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	lib	eth	agr
beta (β)	-.26*	-.17	.22*	-.03	-.05	.23	.05

Entries are regression coefficients between the ministerial control and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

The regression analysis clearly shows that the executive power is slowly slipping through the hands of Christian democratic parties in Western Europe, which have lost a considerable share of ministerial control over time. Some erosion of government control is also discernible for social democratic and liberal parties. Conservative, agrarian and ethnic parties, in contrast, have strengthened their grip on the wheels of state and show a positive trend in control over public affairs through ministerial authority.

Over time the average proportion of ministerial control declined for the initially dominant Christian democratic and social democratic parties. Significant differences between party families in government control decreased since the 1970s, as Christian democrats and social democrats more often shared executive power or alternate in government with other party families. However, despite the erosion of social democratic and Christian democratic dominance, the traditional political party families persist in dominating the executive branch of government. Christian democratic and social democratic ministers have usually been replaced by conservative, ethnic and agrarian colleagues. The next section analyses whether this continuing oligarchisation of political power is the result of a growing inclination of political elites to maximise their control of the executive branch by adopting less rigid portfolio preferences.

5.3.2 Traditional ministerial control

Transformation towards the catch-all model manifests itself in the propensity of

political elites to exchange qualitative government participation (policy-seeking motives) for quantitative government control; catch-all parties are primarily office-seeking and will maximise their control over ministries regardless of the policy field it covers. They will also augment their control over the period in which office is held, no matter the composition of the coalition and without regard for the allocation of ministerial portfolios. This digresses from the traditional model, where parties formerly combined policy and office-seeking motives. Government participation and the corresponding control of ministerial portfolios entrusted parties with influence over specific policy-fields which were of crucial importance to a particular party-family (Budge and Keman 1990a; Laver and Shepsle 1994; 1995).

In this traditional model parties have, resulting from their historical origin, traditional support and ideology, clear policy preferences and a rank-order in the policy goals. Related to this rank-order in policy goals, parties also have a rank-order in preferred cabinet portfolios.[81] Based on the study by Budge and Keman (1990a; 1990b) I have classified the ministerial preferences for each party family. Party families traditionally prefer certain clusters of portfolios: conservative parties, for example, typically have a first preference for ministries the area of *law and order* (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence) and secondly in the cluster of *economic management* departments (Finance, Economic Affairs, Labour, Agriculture, Industry and Public Works). Social democratic, socialist and communist parties, in contrast, prefer most of all control over the *social welfare* portfolios (Education, Health, Housing, Social Affairs and Environment). Christian-democratic parties also have a first preference for control over social welfare ministries. As Christian-democratic parties usually aim to defend the existing order and values, their second preference is with the law and order cluster. Social-democratic parties prefer (some of the) economic management portfolios over law and order departments. Conservative parties are more interested in the economic management portfolios than in social welfare departments. The social welfare portfolios are also most a-typical for liberal parties. On the basis of the preferences reported by Budge and Keman (1990a), table 5.15 rank-orders the ten most preferred traditional ministerial portfolios by party families. As it is difficult to establish the precise rank-order in ministerial portfolios I have opted to consider the *ten* most preferred portfolios as the 'traditional' ministries of the main party families and the actual control of ministerial portfolios will be checked against these preferences.

[81] "(...) possession of vital ministries will be sine qua non of joining government, even if not all relevant ones can be obtained possibly because of overlapping interests on the part of policy-pursuing partners" (Budge and Keman 1990a, 90).

Table 5.15 Traditional ministerial portfolios preferences of party families.

communist socialist and social democrats	Christian democrats	conservatives protest and fascists	liberals	agrarians and centre	ethnic	environmental
Social Welfare	Religious Affairs	Interior	Economics	Agriculture	Education	Environment
Labour	Education	Foreign Affairs	Finance	Interior	Interior	Agriculture
Public Works	Agriculture	Defence	Justice	Foreign Affairs	Housing	Industry
Economics	Social Welfare	Justice	Interior	Economics	Social Affairs	Economics
Education	Health	Agriculture	Industry	Finance	Justice	Interior
Industry	Labour	Economics	Foreign Affairs	Defence	Health	Public Works
Health	Economics	Finance	Defence	Industry	Environment	Labour
Housing	Finance	Industry	Public Works	Justice	Foreign Affairs	Finance
Finance	Industry	Public Works	Labour	Public Works	Defence	Justice
Environment	Environment	Labour	Agriculture	Labour		Foreign Affairs

Adapted from Budge and Keman (1990a, 97, table 4.2) who summarise the ranking of standard ministries for the different party families. The portfolios which belong to the same cluster (see above) have been added to the top ten of preferred portfolios.

Following from this, we can therefore hypothesise that ideological catch-allism will be, **thirdly**, indicated by a declining level of control of traditionally preferred ministerial portfolios.[82] The rank-ordered portfolios are not weighted, as there is no reliable and comparative information available on the relative weight party elites assign to the different ministerial portfolios. Table 5.16 provides the results of two analysis: the first three columns show the average control of the major party families over the three basic clusters of ministries explained above (social welfare, economic management and law and order) as well as over the traditionally preferred portfolios (the top ten enumerated in table 5.15). Note that in the first three clusters the specific ministries in the clusters are equal for all party families, while the portfolio composition of the 'traditional ministerial control-cluster' differs between party families. The results in the basic cluster most preferred by the various party families are given in **bold**.

Table 5.16 Mean control of basic and traditional portfolio clusters of West European party families 1945-1990

[82] In these calculations the total number of ministers, not the number of ministries, are counted. This is justified by the rationale that, in case of disagreement within the cabinet where a vote is necessary, the number of votes will determine the party's policy control. Budge and Keman (1990a, 128) also opt for this strategy and argue that it is better to evaluate the ".... parties' shares of ministers in the Cabinet as opposed to their share of ministries (since what is at stake is a vote in Cabinet and one man casts only one vote, so the proportion of ministers might be more significant than the proportion of ministries) ...." The extent to which a party is capable to obtain ministerial portfolios during the coalition negotiations is called 'party-control' (Keman 1988, 193). Government control can only be determined of parties which have actually participated in government. Also, when a party opts for a single party government and thus obtains all ministerial portfolios, it is impossible to determine their preferred portfolios.

	social welfare portfolios			economic management portfolios			law & order portfolios			traditional portfolios		
	1945 1960	1961 1975	1976 1990	1945 1960	1961 1975	1976 1990	1945 1960	1961 1975	1976 1990	1945 1960	1961 1975	1976 1990
cd	**26.4**	**30.5**	**18.3**	37.2	26.9	17.1	34.3	23.8	15.4	31.8	28.7	17.7
con	17.0	25.0	30.5	16.1	28.1	35.2	**16.9**	**29.3**	**32.7**	18.8	31.9	36.3
sd	**37.8**	**33.5**	**35.1**	35.0	31.3	31.3	33.6	33.7	29.6	36.4	32.4	33.2
lib	6.2	5.7	6.7	**8.0**	**9.5**	**9.9**	10.4	8.2	11.1	9.2	8.9	10.5
eth	**2.4**	**0.9**	**5.3**	2.1	4.3	2.9	5.6	3.7	12.3	4.0	2.3	8.8
agr	16.4	7.8	19.1	19.2	16.2	16.4	**10.7**	**12.8**	**20.7**	15.0	14.5	18.6

Data from Woldendorp et. al. (1993). Entries are percentages of clusters of ministerial portfolios controlled by the respective party families during three post-war periods. The basic clusters are: social welfare = social welfare portfolios (Education, Health, Housing, Social Affairs and Environment). Economic management = economic management ministries (Finance, Economic Affairs, Labour, Agriculture, Industry and Public Works). Law & order = law and order portfolios (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence). The final columns (traditional portfolios) provide the traditionally preferred ministries as enumerated in table 5.15. Socialist, fascist, environmental and protest parties have not participated in government during the period studied here and are therefore not included.

Christian democratic parties have lost considerable ministerial control, namely, over social welfare ministries which they traditionally value highly. By and large, most other party families have maintained control over portfolios which are traditionally important to them. Social democratic parties in Western Europe, for example, control the largest proportion of ministries in the social welfare cluster in every period. Conservative parties even increased control over those ministries which they prefer: portfolios which are concerned with national and international law and order. When invited into government, liberal parties also progressively expanded their control over those ministries which traditionally have been their preference, namely, portfolios in the cluster of economic management. With regard to control over the traditionally most preferred ministries it emerges very conclusively that Christian democratic parties have not been able to claim these crucial portfolios. Social democratic parties have maintained relative stable level of control over the traditionally preferred portfolios, while all the other party families have increased control over the ten most preferred ministries. The exceptional position of Christian democratic parties with respect to traditional portfolio control can be summarised a regression analysis of portfolio control within the three clusters and traditional ministries (see table 5.15) with the year of observation.

Table 5.17 Trends in ministerial control over time of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	lib	eth	agr
Economic Management	-.25*	.06	.24*	-.04	.04	.06	-.09
Social Welfare	-.09	-.12	.18	-.04	.01	.28	.05
Law and Order	-.25*	-.21*	.20	-.05	.03	.27	.19
Traditional portfolios	-.19*	-.09	.21	-.04	.04	.29	.06

Entries are regression coefficients between ministerial control and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). Traditional portfolios for each party family are given in table 5.15. Social welfare departments are the ministries of Education, Health, Housing, Social Affairs and Environment. Economic Management are the ministries of Finance, Economic Affairs, Labour, Agriculture, Industry and Public Works. Law and order portfolios are Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence.

These regression analyses show unequivocally that Christian democratic parties have lost control over ministerial portfolios which are ideologically and historically important to them. Despite this overall loss of ministerial control, Christian democratic parties were selective in which portfolios they tried to hold on to, as is shown by the lower loss of social welfare ministries. Social democratic parties lost control over a small proportion of ministerial portfolios, without any clear difference between the clusters. With the exception of the communists, the other party families, in particular conservative, agrarian and ethnic parties, are all increasingly successful in claiming ministries which have their preference. These differences in control of government are, however, not the simple function of preferences. Overall government control is closely related to electoral strength (r^2 = .74). Traditional portfolio preferences, however, only seem to play a minor role in the decision for parties to enter government. The correlation between electoral strength and control of traditional ministries (r^2 = .71) is only marginally stronger than correlation-coefficients between popular support and control over the social welfare ministries (r^2 = .70), portfolios of economic management (r^2 = .69) and ministries in the cluster of law and order (r^2 = .69).[83]

To evaluate these trends in portfolio control further and assess the extent to which parties have remained loyal their traditional portfolio preferences this section relates the control of traditional ministries to the total overall control of portfolios. According to the theory outlined in this study, catch-all parties will have an increasing propensity to accept government responsibility even when they are unable to control 'traditionally' preferred ministerial portfolios. In order to determine whether parties have become increasingly 'office-seeking', I will relate the percentage of traditional portfolio control to the overall portfolio control. The assumption is that a catch-all development is indicated by a higher ratio in the following formula:

$$\frac{\text{total proportion of ministerial portfolios controlled}}{\text{proportion of traditional portfolios}} = \%\ \text{opportunist ministerial control}$$

[83] All correlation coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.001 level.

When parties control more traditional portfolios the denominator of this equation increases, resulting in a lower score. Less control over traditional portfolios makes for a lower denominator of the equation, resulting in a higher score. Therefore this ratio is labelled 'opportunist government control', indicating that higher scores on this measure denote that the behaviour of parties is being guided by what seems possible, or by circumstances, rather than by ideology or principle. This indicator should be interpreted with caution as, for example, one of its shortcomings is that it is highly susceptible to the dominant type of government building; the number of parties which actually enter into government influences the equation. Single party governments, for example, where one party secures control over all ministerial portfolios, inevitably raises the level of control over traditional ministerial portfolios (the denominator) to the same level as the total control, resulting in a score of 1.00. In contrast, coalitions amalgamated out of parties with overlapping preferences will suppress the level of traditional portfolio control which results in a higher ratio. I have chosen to exclude single-party governments as in these cases it is impossible to determine what portfolios parties prefer to control. Table 5.18 shows the ratios of 'opportunist' ministerial control of portfolios within the different countries of this study.

Table 5.18 Ratios of opportunistic ministerial portfolio control in Western Europe 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	.57	1.04	1.04	1.07	#	#	#	.73	.82	**.85**	**.36**	**.423**
Bel	.68	.67	1.04	1.14	.87	.95	1.07	.86	.72	**.87**	**.19**	**.218**
Den	1.07	1.00	1.00	1.18	1.19	1.00	.74	.51	2.01	**1.13**	**.98**	**.867**
Fin	.61	.76	1.02	.96	.93	1.02	.94	.80	.91	**.89**	**.51**	**.573**
Fra	1.65	1.64	1.68	.75	1.00	.94	1.00	1.07	1.43	**1.25**	**.72**	**.576**
Ger	1.50	1.43	1.68	.91	.73	.76	.75	.79	.74	**1.00**	**.51**	**.510**
Ire	1.25	#	.94	#	#	1.02	#	1.02	1.11	**1.05**	**.27**	**.257**
Ita	1.03	1.13	.90	.78	1.00	1.40	1.04	1.71	1.43	**1.18**	**.78**	**.661**
Net	.61	.72	1.09	1.03	.83	.85	.80	.84	.88	**.85**	**.30**	**.353**
Nor	#	#	#	1.13	.76	1.04	#	1.40	1.05	**1.08**	**.38**	**.351**
Swe	.89	.91	.85	.96	#	#	1.03	1.06	#	**.97**	**.14**	**.144**
X	**.97**	**1.02**	**1.15**	**.97**	**.92**	**1.01**	**.92**	**.98**	**1.14**	**1.01**	**.59**	**.584**
S	**.60**	**.53**	**.56**	**.30**	**.67**	**.45**	**.38**	**.58**	**.97**	**.59**	-	-

Data from Woldendorp et. al. (1993). Entries are ratios of the proportion of total ministerial control divided by the proportion of traditional portfolio control. An '#' means that no score was calculated in order to exclude single party governments. A higher score of opportunistic government control indicates that parties have enlarged their non-traditional government responsibility. The column and row indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The row and column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the nine periods and countries. The column indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Contrary to the assumptions of Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, the data show that

there is a relatively stable level of opportunistic government control throughout the post-war period (β = .01). Across Western Europe there is no trend towards an increasing propensity of party elites to share government responsibility when they can not control the ministerial portfolios of their highest preference. There are, however, significant variations between West European countries. Times of fierce party competition, such as in the French Fourth Republic and Italy, force parties to be more pragmatic in their claims for ministerial portfolios. Thus, parties in France, Italy and Denmark are among the most opportunistic in Western Europe, while Irish and German parties are also relatively Machiavellian in their control over ministerial portfolios. Highest levels of traditional, and consequently lower levels of opportunistic ministerial control are found in the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland.

A cross-time analysis of the post-war period with respect to opportunistic ministerial control does not confirm Kirchheimer's thesis. The period spanning the 1950s and 1960s, correctly deemed by Kirchheimer to be characterised by increasing catch-all behaviour on the part of political elites, indeed manifests high levels of opportunistic portfolio control. Still, the late 1960s and 1970s mark a return to more orthodox ministerial control. Nevertheless, the late 1980, are the heydays of 'Realpolitik' as opportunism in ministerial control increases to the highest post-war level. That this development is confined to only a few countries is shown by the overall cross-time trends, summarised in table 5.19 with the results of linear regression analyses of opportunistic ministerial control with the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 5.19 Trends in opportunistic ministerial control over time of Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe
beta (β)	-.10	-.04	.09	-.02	-.41*	-.26	-.01	.10	.05	.20	.53

Entries are regression coefficients between opportunistic ministerial control and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Countries differ substantially with respect to opportunistic ministerial control; parties in some of the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) as well as Italy and the Netherlands demonstrate an increasing opportunistic attitude towards ministerial control. In other countries, particularly in France and Germany, parties became more uncompromising in their portfolio claims over time. In these countries, however, parties were very pragmatic in portfolio control throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In Austria, Belgium, Ireland and Finland have parties revitalised their interest in traditional instead of showing an eagerness to control non-traditional portfolios. It can be concluded, however, that despite the relatively high level of opportunism in ministerial control in France, Italy and Ireland, no overall and continuous trend towards more opportunistic government participation is discernible. Table 5.20 summarises the findings when this measure of proportional opportunistic ministerial control is applied to the different party families.

Table 5.20 Ratios of opportunistic portfolio control of West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
cd	1.07	.86	1.09	1.01	.87	1.07	.90	1.00	.87	**.98**	**.40**	**.425**
com	.56	-	-	.73	.67	.92	1.10	.96	-	**.74**	**.40**	**.540**
con	-	.88	.79	.88	.85	.80	.77	.90	1.01	**.87**	**.25**	**.287**
sd	1.12	1.05	1.07	1.07	1.46	1.04	1.17	1.05	1.31	**1.13**	**.55**	**.486**
lib	1.06	1.27	1.52	.78	.67	1.03	.79	.86	1.39	**1.03**	**.83**	**.805**
eth	-	.67	1.09	1.42	.00	.93	1.07	.59	.59	**.67**	**.50**	**.746**
agr	.79	.96	1.06	1.27	.97	1.06	.92	1.36	1.07	**1.08**	**.33**	**.306**

Data from Woldendorp et. al. (1993). Socialist, fascist, environmental and protest parties have not participated in government during the period studied here and are therefore excluded. Entries are ratios of the proportion of total ministerial control divided by the proportion of traditional portfolio control. A higher score indicates that parties have gained in non-traditional government responsibility. The column indicated by an *X* provide the average score of the party family. The column marked by '*S*' provide the standard deviation for the party families. The column indicated by '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Table 5.20 reveals that the most opportunistic actors in the West European coalition game are social democratic parties, which accept (perhaps forced to do so after electoral losses) more unconventional ministerial portfolios when in government. Liberal and Christian democratic parties are also relatively pragmatic in their portfolio claims. However, while Christian democratic parties became more traditional in their control over ministerial portfolios over the last decades, liberal parties have become very opportunistic in ministerial control. Conservative and agrarian parties have in recent years also been more inclined to accept government responsibility without obtaining control over their traditionally preferred portfolios. These cross-time trends are summarised in the next table by a linear regression analysis of the level of opportunistic ministerial control and the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 5.21 Trends in opportunistic ministerial control over time of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	lib	eth	agr
beta (β)	-.16*	-.04	.26*	.01	.02	.15	.27

Entries are regression coefficients between the opportunistic ministerial control and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Clearly, Christian democratic and communist parties stand out again as the only party family which has become less opportunistic in ministerial portfolio control over time. Social democratic, liberal ethnic and communist parties have maintained a relatively stable level of opportunism during their participation in government. The only party family which can be said to have become more anxious to enter government, even when the traditionally preferred portfolios could not be obtained is the conservative party family.

In conclusion, parties in Western Europe have shown a consistent willingness to accept non-traditional, less preferred ministerial portfolios over being excluded from executive power. However, there is no increasing propensity to more promiscuous

office-seeking behaviour on behalf of the parties which would support Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis. Rather, pragmatic office-seeking behaviour is a perpetual feature of West European politics. Having said that, this analysis also shows that parties maintain solid portfolio preferences and actual control over traditional portfolios. The differences across countries and over time indicate that political parties are very willing to adapt their portfolio claims to the parameters of political competition and electoral outcomes. Although there is a considerable effect of electoral strength on bargaining position in the coalition game, even after losing an election parties still seem to prefer participation in government over forming the parliamentary opposition, sometimes with little regard of the portfolio allocation. Yet, the analysis above has shown that, given the opportunity, parties restore control over traditionally preferred ministries and related policy areas. It was also shown that the traditional governmental parties adopt flexible policy stances and became less rigid in their portfolio preferences. This litheness enables them to participate in governments, even when coalition partners disallow them their preferred ministerial portfolios. Accordingly, traditional political parties can be considered more competitive than ever and able to adapt more easily to changes in their political, economic and social environment. This increasing flexibility, and consequent loss of ideological rigidity is a feature of Kirchheimer's assumptions of catch-allism, visible in increasing control over the executive power in terms of the total accumulated time in executive office, that is addressed in the next section.

5.3.3 Continuity in government control

In the last section it was established that the 'traditional coalition parties' by and large dominate the executive branch of government and have a stable office-seeking inclination. This section seeks to evaluate to which extent parties have held on to their governmental power or have alternated in government. Accumulated time of government control indicates consensus or dissensus between parties. If Kirchheimer was correct in his assertion that there is a general waning of opposition in Western Europe, then this should lead to more agreement over policy and to smoother co-operation between parties, so dissolution of governments should occur less often.[84] This section moves beyond the size of ministerial control and measures the *duration of government control* by the percentage of the total time individual parties participate in government in each period (see Lijphart 1968, 24). This measure is not similar to government durability and rate of survival.[85] Parties can remain in power, while governments dissolve. The most frequently cited case is the now defunct Italian Democrazia Cristiana. This party participated in more than fifty post-war governments and was never out of executive office until 1994. Cabinets in Italy and elsewhere frequently resign, only to return with the same party composition and sometimes even to a large extent with the same individuals in ministerial responsibility.

[84] Overall, the duration of governments have not significantly increased over time in Western Europe. Woldendorp at al. (1993, 107-108) found that in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden and to a lesser extent in Ireland and Italy, the average duration of governments even went down. Only in Austria, Germany, Finland and France has the time that parties were able to remain in office increased.

[85] see Sanders and Herman 1977; Lijphart 1974; 1984b.

Differences in duration of incumbency of the different party families are given in table 5.22. Entries are proportions of the total time parties held at least one ministerial portfolio. A score of 100 means that all parties which belong to this party family have been in government the entire period of five years. A score of 0 means that none of the parties belonging to one party family gained executive power.

Table 5.22 Mean percentage of time in government of West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	X	S	CV
cd	74.6	81.1	66.2	65.3	66.5	42.1	31.8	43.0	57.3	**58.7**	**44.3**	**.754**
com	21.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	5.4	6.3	9.9	0.0	**5.1**	**16.6**	**3.254**
con	0.0	31.3	33.9	48.2	45.8	43.4	31.0	45.2	50.0	**37.2**	**38.7**	**1.040**
sd	76.8	52.0	56.6	41.9	50.1	60.5	58.7	53.9	51.2	**55.7**	**38.9**	**.698**
lib	32.0	36.7	30.9	37.3	30.4	39.2	33.3	35.2	44.2	**35.6**	**36.7**	**1.031**
eth	71.5	45.4	17.1	19.9	31.8	39.8	54.3	50.0	64.8	**42.2**	**38.4**	**.909**
agr	23.8	58.5	45.5	33.8	61.5	44.4	48.3	61.7	27.1	**45.0**	**41.1**	**.913**
X	**44.1**	**41.6**	**36.5**	**35.7**	**36.9**	**35.3**	**30.8**	**32.4**	**34.3**	**39.5**	**36.4**	**.921**
S	**42.6**	**42.5**	**42.8**	**43.9**	**39.7**	**38.2**	**38.5**	**36.7**	**41.5**	**40.7**	-	-
CV	**.965**	**1.022**	**1.173**	**1.230**	**1.076**	**1.082**	**1.250**	**1.133**	**1.210**	**1.030**	-	-

Data based on Woldendorp et al. 1993. A score of 100 means that all parties of the party family participated in government for the entire period. The column and row indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and the mean party family score. The row and column marked by '*S*' provide the standard deviation for the party families and nine periods respectively. The row and column indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Initially, Christian and social democratic parties dominated the executive branch of government in Western Europe in terms of tenure. More than half of the post-war period these party families managed the public affairs of West European democracies. During the late 1950s and 1960s, however, the ability of social democratic and Christian democratic parties to prolong their incumbency weakened. Social democratic party elites regained a firm hold on ministerial office during the 1970s, whereas the 1980s marked a decade of decline in social democratic tenure of office. The relatively low coefficient of variance for the social democrats shows that among members of this party family the differences in tenure are modest. Comparable cross-national consistency in tenure in office is also found among Christian democrats. Nevertheless, until the early 1980s the Christian democratic parties in Western Europe saw their time in office decline continuously. Between the late 1950s and the early 1980s the average tenure in office of Christian democratic parties declined from around eighty per cent to less than one third of the period 1976 until 1980. This trend of declining incumbency by Christian democratic parties was reversed again in the late 1980s when Christian democratic ministers remained in office for longer stretches of time. Conservative parties, in contrast, increased their tenure in office over the last few decades. During the 1950s conservative parties held government responsibility for one third of the time, whereas in the years spanning 1986 to 1990 conservative parties have been in executive power half of this period. However, the relatively high

coefficient of variance shows there are substantial differences in tenure of office among the parties belonging to the conservative family. On average, liberals have a very stable average level of incumbency with an average hovering around thirty per cent of the time in each period, despite relatively large variation among liberal parties in the different countries. Agrarian parties, although they have a relatively high tenure in office on average, have a very whimsical record of incumbency, with peaks in the late 1960s and early 1980s when agrarian ministers participated in government for over 60 per cent of the period. During the 1970s the variation in incumbency between parties declined gradually, indicating less dominance by only a few (Christian democratic and social democratic) parties as more, and sometimes new parties entered West European governments. However, the heterogeneity among the different parties in tenure in office increased again in the 1980s indicating predominance by a smaller number of parties.

These trends in tenure in office of the party families are summarised in the next table by way of regression analysis between time in government and the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 5.23 Trends in tenure in office of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	lib	eth	env	agr
beta (β)	-.27*	-.09	.24*	-.08	.06	.18	-	.04

Entries are regression coefficients between time in office and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

As can be seen in table 5.23, the regression analysis confirms the general picture of substantial decline in government control over time for Christian democratic parties and moderate decline in tenure for social democratic parties. All other parties, with the exception of the communists, have increased their duration of government control over time. In particular conservative parties participated more often and longer in West European cabinets. These variations among party families show that control of government has become more competitive; a larger number of parties compete for office and the post of minister in national governments has become less secure, particularly for those who represent social democratic and Christian democratic parties. Still, Christian democratic and social democratic parties have not lost their dominance of government control to new competitors, but to the traditional liberal and conservative contenders.

This indicator of duration of incumbency shows that social democratic and Christian democratic parties have lost some of their predominance over the executive in Western Europe. In particular conservative and liberal parties now compete more fiercefully with the Christian democrats and social democrats for office. Moreover, an increasing number of other parties are clamouring at the door of the executive powers of West European democracies as well. It looks as though those who are already seated at the government table have a less secure position then they used to have. However, the traditional governmental parties of Christian democratic, conservative, social democratic and liberal origin have been very reluctant to let the new contenders in. This makes Kirchheimer's assertions problematic. On the one hand, he was correct in asserting that many parties adopt flexible policy positions in or near the centre of the political spectrum. Furthermore, parties are willing to accept government

responsibility even if their preferred portfolios are not open to them. On the other hand, there is no 'cosy consensus' in which all opposition is stifled. The major parties in Western Europe maintain clear policy positions and still aim to control traditionally preferred portfolios. In addition, traditional parties still compete for control over the executive branch of government and their tenure in office has rather shortened on aggregate than increased. In sum, Kirchheimer correctly asserted that opposition *of principle* has dwindled, yet not all party competition evaporated along with it; competition for control over office is still 'the name of the game' in West European politics.

5.4 Conclusion: ideological catch-allism of West European parties

At the ideological level no linear trend towards catch-allism is discernible. Although a substantial number of parties occupy the centre space of Western European party systems, this study found no uniform centripetal trend as Kirchheimer asserted. Evidence presented actually indicates an opposite, namely centrifugal tendency over time; particularly conservative, liberal and social democratic parties moved away from the centre since the 1970s. Parties did move towards the centre during most of the 1950s and 1960s, yet distanced themselves more from the centre of political competition in the early 1970s an 1980s. Nevertheless, Kirchheimer correctly claimed that Christian democratic and some social democratic parties possess a relatively high propensity to move closer to the centre of their party system. However, over the entire post-war period Christian democratic, agrarian, communist and socialist parties show a moderate centripetal tendency, while conservative, social democratic and liberal parties reveal a modest centrifugal trend over time. Overall, the direction of competition shows a clear development towards the left in the 1960s and 1970s, while a trend towards the right is visible in the 1980s. Most notably, social democratic parties moved into the centre of their national party system during this rightward drift. Christian democratic parties generally preserved a position in the centre space of West European party systems, indicating that while the width and position of the centre may be in flux, Christian democratic parties often move with the dominant current to maintain a centrist position. In terms of policy position a pattern is observable, where parties of all genetic origin move towards and away from the centre of the political spectrum dependent on the strategic behaviour of the major competitors in the party system.

A second outcome of this study which contradicts to Kirchheimer's assumption of convergence of political parties, is the finding that there is no secular trend towards a contracting range of party competition. Instead, in most countries the range of competition and the centre space expanded during the last decades, indicating a larger 'room to manoeuvre' for political parties. The width of the centre space of party competition declined only in Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland and Sweden. This means that there is little evidence of an overall reduction in inter-party distances, although there is not sufficient evidence of polarisation per se either. Kirchheimer was correct in his observation of decreasing polarisation during the 1960s; however, party systems in Western Europe underwent increasing polarisation during much of the 1970s and 1980s. In some countries the 1970s are marked by an interesting incongruity, as austere rhetoric polarisation coincided with a convergence in policy positions. Parties, given half the opportunity, will take full advantage of the room to

manoeuvre towards or away from the centre of the party system in order to locate themselves in the optimal position for electoral competition and governmental participation. Clear policy differences between a fixed set of traditional parties persist in most West European party systems and new competitors face a hard time breaking down this bulwark of traditional political power.

Kirchheimer's assertion that over the post-war period political parties in Western Europe will become more flexible in their political stances could only partly be corroborated by this analysis. During the late 1950s and early 1960s there was indeed a period of generally increasing ideological flexibility on behalf of the parties. Nevertheless, no secular trend towards more flexibility in policy stances can be detected over time as is clearly shown by increasing ideological rigidity between the mid-1960s and early 1980s. Concerning this ideological flexibility of parties, it was found that liberal and conservative parties, which usually position themselves on the right wing of the left-right conflict dimension, adopt more flexible positions than Christian democratic, agrarian and social democratic parties of the centre-left. There are strong indications that when parties adopt a more extreme position they also possess more willingness to move back again to a position closer to the centre space or their competitors.

With regard to the second indicator of ideological catch-allism, it was found that parties throughout Western Europe indeed de-emphasised traditional political issues, particularly up until the early 1970s. However, in contrast with the catch-all thesis, parties in several countries devoted a larger part of their manifestos to traditional issues again since the late 1970s, while in other countries the saliency of traditional issues remained stable. Here also there is little evidence of a linear trend towards electoral catch-allism.

More in line with the catch-all thesis, political parties show an inclination to accept ministerial portfolios outside their traditional preferences and parties have strong office-seeking orientations, although this is rather a consistent tendency than a modern trend. Still, particularly in the 1960s and 1980s parties became more pragmatic in their portfolio control, while it was also found that, when the opportunity arises, parties seek to re-establish control over their traditionally preferred ministerial portfolios. Both these findings contradict the assumptions of the catch-all thesis with regard to participation in government. Moreover, in most countries, with the partial exception of Italian and Scandinavian parties, political elites have been reluctant to enter governments when they were unable to claim a substantial proportion of their traditionally preferred ministerial portfolios. Additionally, it was established that, although control over the executive was broadened somewhat during the 1970s, the traditional governmental parties of conservative, Christian democratic and social democratic origin have by and large maintained firm control over the executive branch of government. Particularly parties with a central position in West European politics have a strong record of incumbency (see also Keman 1997; van Deemen 1990; Roozendaal 1990).[86] In the course of time these 'traditional' parties have adopted more flexible policy positions and portfolio preferences when they thought it was necessary to increase their coalition potential, yet they have not

[86] The correlation between control of government and centre occupation is (r^2 = .10), yet the correlation between a centrist position and time of in office is r^2 = .17, significant at the 0.001 level.

eradicated their traditional inclinations for specific policies. This flexibility in policy stance has made control of executive office less secure and it intensified competition between parties, resulting in decreasing tenure of office particularly for Christian democratic and, to a lesser extent, for social democratic parties. Christian democratic parties, which Kirchheimer anticipated to be very prone to catch-all behaviour, have instead become less flexible and opportunistic with regard to their policies which clearly undermined their ability to control governmental power. Although the posture of most West European political parties has become less uncompromising and more flexible, their behaviour with respect to governmental power is not totally identical with Kirchheimer's catch-all model.

The next table shows that electorally dominant parties, particularly those with a policy position close to the centre of the left-right dimension or highly flexible policy positions, controlled the bulk of post-war ministerial positions.

Table 5.24 Correlation matrix of ideological indicators with party age, electoral size and organisational discontinuity

	PARTY AGE	ELECTORAL SIZE	ORGANIZATIONAL DISCONTINUITY
CENTRE	.11*	.02	-.05
LRMANIF	-.15*	.00	.09
TRADEMPH	-.14*	.05	-.07
OPTCONT	.18**	.30**	.06
TRADCONT	.28**	.71**	-.03
GOVTCONT	.25**	.74**	-.03
TIMEGOVT	.28**	.49**	.04

The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. The asterisk indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 level (*) or at the 0.001 level (**). Definitions and measurement of the variables is explained in Appendix 2.

As can be seen from table 5.24 there is a strong correlation between the electoral strength and the percentage of ministerial portfolios held. In addition, there is a clear association between the electoral strength of parties in Western Europe and their ability to claim their traditionally preferred ministerial portfolios as well as with their competence to maintain government control. Table 5.24 also reveals that the older parties have been most successful in obtaining government responsibility over a longer period of time and in claiming traditionally preferred portfolios. In sum, the electorally stronger and more senior parties, which occupy a centrist position, are 'pivotal' in control over the executive within their party system. The logic assumption that electorally weaker parties would adopt a more opportunistic approach to government participation is not corroborated, instead what was found is that Kirchheimer correctly assumed that electorally larger parties are also more pragmatic in their portfolio claims. Finally, it is interesting to note that none of the ideological variables can be significantly associated with the number of splits and mergers of party organisations.

The finding in this chapter of only limited ideological catch-allism in Western Europe is confirmed by an analysis of the standard scores of the individual indicators. Again, all scores have been standardised into z-scores in such a manner that a high standard score indicates more catch-allism and a low standard score means less ideological catch-allism.[87]

[87] The variable opportunistic control (OPTCONT) is not included in this table as this variable was constructed out of a ratio of two original variables in this study (GOVTCONT and TRADCONT).

Table 5.25 Cross-time development in the level of ideological catch-allism in Western Europe 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	n
centrdis	.24	.00	.01	.10	.19	-.19	.14	-.25	-.14	474
trademph	-.36	-.11	-.35	.04	.42	.17	.13	.08	-.06	454
tradcont	-.04	-.08	-.01	-.02	-.03	-.02	.05	.04	.07	630
optcont	.06	.07	.09	-.02	-.07	-.03	-.14	.01	.05	630
govtcont	.07	.14	.05	.03	.02	-.03	-.08	-.06	-.08	630
timegovt	.20	.13	.01	-.01	.02	-.02	-.13	-.09	-.04	617

The variable names are explained in appendix II. Entries are average z-scores measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high score means a relatively high level of catch-allism, while a low score indicates a relatively low level of catch-allism.

Table 5.25 shows that political parties moved closer to the centre of their political system during the 1950s and 1960, inflating the standard catch-all score on this variable. Thereafter, particularly in the early 1970s and 1980s, the standard catch-all score on this variable decreases as a result of centrifugal tendencies of parties. During the 1960s and 1970s parties became less opportunistic, more traditional in their portfolio claims and consequently have lower standard catch-all scores in this period. In the 1980s parties became more flexible in their portfolio preferences when they entered into government, resulting in higher catch-all standard scores on traditional and opportunistic portfolio control. In the period spanning the early 1960s up until the early 1980s parties indeed de-emphasised traditional issues and thereby downgraded the saliency of their traditional ideological heritage which makes for higher standard scores of catch-allism in this period. However, in the mid-1980s parties returned to more traditional issue emphasis and have lower standard catch-all scores as a result. The other indicators of ideological catch-allism, however, demonstrate less transformation towards the catch-all model. The two indicators of increasing coalition potential, namely control of ministerial portfolios and time in government, both show decreasing standard scores over time, which manifests a trend away from ideological catch-allism at the level of office-control.

Similar to the previous chapter, this section seeks to establish, by means of scale analysis, to which extent the indicators of ideological catch-allism tap into one single phenomenon or measure different theoretical constructs (see appendix 3). The conclusion from this test can be no other than that the items at the ideological level do not tap one single phenomenon. In order to detect which latent factors underpin these ideological variables of catch-allism, factor analysis was performed on these items, by which two factors were extracted that basically represent the antithesis between office-seeking and policy-seeking motives.

The first 'office-seeking' factor correlates almost perfectly positive with all four of its items. On the second factor both items, traditional emphasis (TRADEMPH) and the distance of parties from the centre (DISTCNTR), load positively. This means that traditional emphasis does not render a policy position close to the centre impossible. Political parties can do both; they can emphasise traditional issues and concerns in their party platform without distancing themselves too far from the centre of party

competition. Apparently, traditional issue emphasis is not diametrically opposed to adopting a strategic position close the centre space of competition. On the other hand, there are parties which remain loyal to their traditional ideology and program, whatever the consequences for participation in government. The association between the two factors is negative, pointing to the fact that the more parties are geared towards office control, the less their ideological position matters to them. Evidently, there is a clear distinction between 'what parties do', which is seeking control over executive power, and 'what parties say', which is evidenced by their policy positions. Political parties oscillate between the need to attract voters with clear policy positions and their compulsion to command the executive branch of government, yet most political parties have a strong and consistent propensity to distance themselves not too far from the centre of their party system for one reason and one reason alone, namely to obtain governmental power.

In order to summarise more precise the extent to which political parties in Western Europe have moved towards the catch-all model, the method of simple summation of variables with high factor loadings is applied here again. By aggregating the standardised z-scores of all items with substantial loadings on one factor, a factor based score of relative catch-allism is constructed (see Kim and Mueller 1978b, 70). ***Office-seeking behaviour***, then, consists of the average standard scores of the items GOVTCONT, TRADCONT, OPTCONT and TIMEGOVT. ***Policy-seeking behaviour*** contains the average of the z-scores of CENTRE and TRADEMPH.

This enables us to determine the relative level of ideological catch-allism in the different countries and of the different party families as well as of each individual party. All item scores have been recalculated in the same direction so that higher scores indicate a higher level of catch-allism. In table 5.26 first the relative catch-all scores of the all parties from the different countries are presented. These scores are rank-ordered in descending order that a higher position indicates a relatively higher level of catch-allism.

Table 5.26 Cross-time development in ideological catch-allism (in z-scores) in West European countries 1945-1990

OFFICE SEEKING						POLICY SEEKING					
1945 1960		1961 1975		1975 1990		1945 1960		1961 1975		1976 1990	
Ger	.41	Net	.16	Ita	.38	UK	.93	Ger	1.06	Bel	.85
Fra	.23	Ger	.15	Fin	.10	Ita	.59	Ita	.76	Aut	.64
Net	.19	Fin	.08	Net	.06	Ger	.27	UK	.72	Ita	.45
Aut	.17	Bel	.05	Ger	.05	Net	.26	Bel	.62	Net	.30
Bel	.13	Fra	.03	Fra	.01	Fra	.24	Aut	.34	Fin	.13
Fin	.04	Aut	-.01	Bel	.03	Aut	.23	Fra	.35	Ger	.11
Ire	.02	Nor	-.07	Aut	-.05	Nor	-.03	Net	.14	Fra	-.05
Den	-.07	Den	-.07	UK	-.07	Den	-.27	Ire	-.17	Swe	-.27
Swe	-.08	Ire	-.09	Swe	-.09	Bel	-.46	Den	-.32	Ire	-.30
UK	-.08	UK	-.10	Ire	-.15	Ire	-.96	Swe	-.59	Nor	-.48
Nor	-.15	Swe	-.16	Den	-.15	Swe	-1.33	Nor	-.72	UK	-.67
Ita	-.38	Ita	-.48	Nor	-.16					Den	-1.18

Entries are average z-scores, measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. OFFICE SEEKING= the degree of office-seeking behaviour and POLICY SEEKING = the degree of policy-seeking behaviour.

Table 5.26 reveals that ideological catch-allism in terms of office-seeking behaviour on behalf of political parties is higher in the larger continental democracies (Germany and France) as well as in the Netherlands, Belgium and Finland than elsewhere in Western Europe. Comparatively low levels of office-seeking behaviour are found in the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) as well as in Ireland and the United Kingdom. This finding is remarkable since these are the countries where single party government is most frequent. This rank-order is relatively stable over time, with the exception of the Italian case. At the policy-seeking dimension a more volatile picture emerges, except for German, Italian and Austrian parties which have a high catch-all score on the policy dimension over the entire post-war period compared with the other countries. Relatively low levels of ideological catch-allism concerning policy-seeking behaviour are found in Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Ireland. In comparative perspective, Belgian parties have transformed most rapidly towards the catch-all model on the policy dimension. Similar to the findings in chapter 4 it emerges that parties in the larger continental West European democracies, particularly the German, French and Italian parties, have transformed more into the catch-all direction than their counterparts in other countries. Conversely, parties in the Scandinavian party systems are primarily found at the lower end of the distribution. In this respect, Kirchheimer's assertion that parties in the larger democracies will be more 'catch-alllist' in their behaviour is again confirmed here. Whether Kirchheimer was also correct in his differentiation between the different party families is examined below. Average standard z-scores of the party families on the two ideological dimensions are provided in table 5.27. The party families are rank-ordered in descending order of relative catch-allism.

Table 5.27 Cross-time development in ideological catch-allism (in z-scores) of West European party families 1945-1990

OFFICE SEEKING						POLICY SEEKING					
1945 1960		1961 1975		1975 1990		1945 1960		1961 1975		1976 1990	
cd	.48	cd	.19	sd	.16	lib	.39	agr	.80	agr	1.14
sd	.20	sd	.15	cd	.08	agr	.25	cd	.55	cd	.55
agr	.06	agr	.08	agr	.07	cd	.19	lib	.39	lib	.27
lib	-.01	con	.05	con	03	sd	-.01	sd	.16	sd	-.02
con	-.13	lib	-.03	lib	-.03	con	-.65	com	-.45	con	-.63
com	-.23	com	-.28	com	-.24	com	-.1.14	con	-.69	com	-.65

Entries are average z-scores, measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. OFFICE SEEKING = the degree of office-seeking behaviour and POLICY SEEKING = the degree of policy-seeking behaviour.

This table shows that Kirchheimer correctly alleged that parties of social democratic and Christian democratic origin have relatively higher levels of ideological catch-allism in terms of office-seeking than parties of other genetic origin. Notwithstanding, in contrast to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis parties from the social democratic family have been very reluctant to dispose of their ideological heritage which assigns them to the lower end of the catch-all scale in terms of policy. With respect to policy, Kirchheimer's conclusions seem to have been too harsh. In relative terms, liberal parties have shown the least propensity to adopt the catch-all strategy in terms of office-seeking, though have very high average catch-all scores at the policy level. Conservative parties moved towards higher levels of ideological catch-allism on both factors over time, indicating both an inclination to discard their ideological heritage, traditional preferences and an eagerness to adopt flexible policy positions if this results in a pay-off in terms of office.

As was the case at the organisational level, there is no uniform cross-national and cross-time development towards ideological catch-allism. At the ideological level substantial variation between party families and between countries remain visible. These inter-country differences and variation among parties of different genetic origin remain relatively stable over time. In general, ideological catch-allism is found but only for specific party families and countries. Ideologically, parties of Christian democratic and social democratic descent, as well as the former agrarian parties have comparatively adopted more catch-all characteristics than their competitors. Concerning office-seeking behaviour, it seems that the doctrinal legacy of these party families allowed them to espouse catch-all properties. This investigation showed that Christian democratic parties in particular, have showed an almost 'natural' propensity for catch-all tactics; their traditional centrism in terms of policy, their attempt to bridge class divisions in electoral terms as well as their 'pivotal' position with respect to government control has facilitated this process. Conservative and communist parties, on the contrary, experienced the constraints of an ideological embarkment from a position more distant from the political centre. Members from both party families can continuously be found at the bottom end of the catch-all league tables.

Also, a similarly distinct geographical distribution of ideological catch-allism emerges similar to what was found in at the organisational level. In particular parties in the larger West European democracies, namely Germany, France and Italy, have articulate catch-all features. This pattern is largely duplicated in the league table of all the individual parties in three periods below. In addition, parties in the Dutch, Finnish, Austrian and Belgian political system have also been prone to catch-all tactics. Corresponding to the findings at the organisational dimension, parties from Norway, Sweden and Denmark are generally found at the bottom end of the league tables, indicating that parties in these party systems have had little incentive to adapt to the catch-all model, precisely as Kirchheimer (1966a, 187-188) stated.

Summary of the main findings:

- Parties in Western Europe show no linear trend towards increasing centripetal competition and there is neither evidence of increasing centre space occupation. Rather the opposite trend, namely a decline in centre space occupancy, is discernible.
- There is no general trend towards ideological moderation, instead a general shift towards the right of the political spectrum was found.
- This study found no secular trend towards more flexibility in policy positions of political parties.
- Parties decreased their emphasis on traditional issues during the 1960s, but the 1970s and 1980s marked a period of more traditional issue emphasis in party manifestos.
- The traditional 'parties of government' (social democratic, Christian democratic and conservative parties) have largely maintained their dominance over the executive branch of government. Only members of the Christian democratic party family have lost some government control.
- Christian democratic parties have also lost control over ministerial portfolios they traditionally prefer. Other party families have largely maintained control over portfolios they ideologically and historically value most.
- There is no uniform tendency towards more opportunistic and pragmatic ministerial control by political parties in Western Europe.
- The level of incumbency declined for Christian democratic parties and social democratic parties, while over time particularly conservative parties strengthened their hold over executive power.
- Two dominant dimensions of party behaviour can be distinguished at the ideological level, office seeking-behaviour and policy seeking behaviour.
- The geographical pattern in relative levels of ideological catch-allism is that in particular parties from the larger continental West European democracies (Germany, France and Italy) have transformed more into the catch-all direction on the electoral dimension than parties in the Scandinavian party systems, Ireland and (to a lesser extent) the United Kingdom.
- Parties of social democratic and Christian democratic origin have relatively higher levels of ideological catch-allism in terms of office-seeking.
- In terms of policy-seeking behaviour social democratic parties have a relatively low level of ideological catch-allism, whereas the Christian democratic and liberal parties rank higher at the level of ideological catch-allism with regard to policy position

Office and policy seeking behaviour 1945-1990

Table 5.28 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of office and policy seeking behaviour 1945-1960

Country	Family	Party	Office	Country	Family	Party	Policy
Ger	cd	CSU	1.57	Den	lib	VEN	0.84
Ger	cd	CDU	0.70	Ita	lib	PRI	0.82
Net	cd	KVP	0.69	Fra	con	GAUL	0.79
Bel	cd	CVP	0.63	Fra	lib	UDF	0.79
Aut	sd	SPO	0.61	Ita	fas	MSI	0.71
Nor	sd	DNA	0.57	Ita	sd	PSI	0.58
Ita	cd	DC	0.54	UK	sd	LAB	0.58
Fra	cd	MRP	0.53	Ita	com	PCI	0.49
Net	cd	CHU	0.51	Net	sd	PVDA	0.42
Fin	agr	KESK	0.46	Ita	sd	PDSI	0.38
Swe	sd	SAP	0.46	Fra	sd	PSF	0.35
Fra	lib	RAD	0.43	Nor	agr	SP	0.30
Aut	cd	OVP	0.40	Den	com	DKP	0.26
Ger	lib	FDP	0.37	Ita	cd	DC	0.23
Fra	lib	UDF	0.35	Net	cd	ARP	0.22
Fra	sd	PSF	0.33	Aut	sd	SPO	0.21
Den	sd	SD	0.30	UK	con	CON	0.19
Fin	sd	SSP	0.30	Fra	lib	RAD	0.17
Fin	eth	SFP	0.24	Fra	com	PCF	0.04
Bel	sd	BSP	0.20	Net	lib	VVD	0.01
Ire	con	FF	0.16	Nor	com	NKP	-0.05
Net	sd	PVDA	0.15	Nor	con	HOYR	-0.06
Net	cd	ARP	0.14	Ger	cd	CDU	-0.17
Ire	sd	ILP	0.12	Den	lib	RV	-0.18
Bel	lib	PVV	0.11	UK	lib	LIB	-0.19
Ita	lib	PRI	0.11	Ger	sd	SPD	-0.20
Ire	cd	FG	0.09	Swe	com	VPK	-0.22
Ita	sd	PDSI	0.09	Den	con	KF	-0.24
UK	sd	LAB	0.08	Den	sd	SD	-0.24
Ita	lib	PLI	0.07	Nor	lib	V	-0.26
Den	lib	VEN	0.02	Aut	lib	FPO	-0.28
Swe	agr	C	0.01	Bel	sd	BSP	-0.31
Ire	soc	WP	-0.00	Bel	cd	CVP	-0.33
Ita	soc	DP	-0.00	Aut	cd	OVP	-0.34

Fra	con	GAUL	-0.02	Den	soc	SF	-0.34
UK	con	CON	-0.02	Ita	lib	PLI	-0.39
Aut	com	KPO	-0.05	Nor	sd	DNA	-0.50
Net	lib	VVD	-0.06	Swe	con	MSP	-0.50
Bel	com	KPB	-0.12	Fra	cd	MRP	-0.55
Fin	com	SKDL	-0.13	Bel	lib	PVV	-0.69
Den	con	KF	-0.14	Swe	sd	SAP	-0.74
Den	lib	RV	-0.16	Ger	lib	FDP	-0.74
Bel	eth	VU	-0.20	Ire	sd	ILP	-0.75
Fin	lib	LKP	-0.22	Ire	cd	FG	-0.75
Fra	com	PCF	-0.23	Net	cd	KVP	-0.86
Ita	com	PCI	-0.24	Ita	prt	PR	-0.89
Ita	sd	PSI	-0.27	Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.91
Fin	con	KOK	-0.29	Swe	lib	FP	-0.95
Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.30	Net	cd	CHU	-1.07
Nor	agr	SP	-0.30	Swe	agr	C	-1.08
Den	com	DKP	-0.30	Ire	con	FF	-1.47
Swe	lib	FP	-0.30	Ger	com	DKP	-1.58
Net	com	CPN	-0.30	Ger	cd	CSU	
Swe	com	VPK	-0.30	Fin	agr	KESK	
Nor	com	NKP	-0.30	Ire	soc	WP	
Ita	fas	MSI	-0.30	Fin	com	SKDL	
Nor	lib	V	-0.30	Fin	cd	SKL	
Swe	con	MSP	-0.30	Aut	com	KPO	
Ger	sd	SPD	-0.30	Fin	con	KOK	
Ire	com	CPI	-0.30	Net	com	CPN	
Den	soc	SF	-0.30	Fin	lib	LKP	
Ger	com	DKP	-0.30	Fin	eth	SFP	
Nor	con	HOYR	-0.30	Ire	com	CPI	
Fin	cd	SKL	-0.30	Fin	sd	SSP	
UK	lib	LIB	-0.30	Ita	soc	DP	
Aut	lib	FPO	-0.30	Bel	eth	VU	
Ita	prt	PR	-0.89	Bel	com	KPB	

Table 5.29 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of office and policy-seeking behaviour 1961-1975

Country	Family	Party	Office	Country	Family	Party	Policy
Fra	con	GAUL	0.63	Den	prt	FRP	0.80
Ita	cd	DC	0.56	Ger	lib	FDP	0.76
Ger	cd	CSU	0.56	Ger	cd	CDU	0.75
Swe	sd	SAP	0.55	Swe	com	VPK	0.74
Bel	cd	CVP	0.53	Net	lib	D66	0.69
Net	cd	ARP	0.49	Ire	sd	ILP	0.66
Ire	con	FF	0.46	Den	com	DKP	0.63
Net	cd	KVP	0.46	Nor	lib	V	0.63
Fin	agr	KESK	0.45	Bel	eth	VU	0.62
Net	cd	CHU	0.37	Ita	lib	PRI	0.61
Den	sd	SD	0.37	Ire	cd	FG	0.59
Bel	sd	BSP	0.33	Den	soc	SF	0.54
Aut	sd	SPO	0.32	Net	sd	PVDA	0.53
Fin	eth	SFP	0.25	Nor	sd	DNA	0.47
Fin	sd	SSP	0.24	Swe	agr	C	0.45
Net	lib	VVD	0.23	UK	con	CON	0.44
Aut	cd	OVP	0.22	Swe	lib	FP	0.41
Fra	lib	UDF	0.21	Net	lib	VVD	0.41
Den	lib	RV	0.19	Nor	agr	S	0.37
Nor	sd	DNA	0.19	Ita	com	PCI	0.35
Ger	sd	SPD	0.18	Den	con	KF	0.32
Ger	cd	CDU	0.17	Fra	com	PCF	0.30
Ita	sd	PSDI	0.16	Den	lib	VEN	0.29
Fin	lib	LKP	0.16	Fra	con	GAUL	0.25
Ger	lib	FDP	0.13	Nor	soc	SV	0.25
Ita	lib	PRI	0.11	Bel	lib	PVV	0.23
Ita	sd	PSI	0.11	Ita	fas	MSI	0.22
Nor	agr	S	0.10	Fra	cd	MRP	0.20
UK	sd	LAB	0.08	Fra	lib	UDF	0.17
Fra	cd	MRP	0.03	Den	lib	CD	0.17
Fra	lib	RAD	0.02	Fra	lib	RAD	0.15
Nor	lib	V	0.00	Nor	cd	KRFP	0.11
Den	lib	VEN	-0.03	Ita	sd	PSI	0.09
Bel	lib	PVV	-0.04	Den	lib	RV	0.09
Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.05	Fra	sd	PSF	0.08
Nor	con	HOYR	-0.05	Aut	cd	OVP	0.01
Fin	com	SKDL	-0.06	Swe	sd	SAP	-0.01

Net	lib	D66	-0.09	Aut	lib	FPO	-0.02
UK	con	CON	-0.09	UK	sd	LAB	-0.03
Den	con	KF	-0.12	Bel	cd	CVP	-0.06
Net	sd	PVDA	-0.12	Den	sd	SD	-0.07
Ire	cd	FG	-0.18	Ita	lib	PLI	-0.10
Ire	soc	WP	-0.20	Bel	sd	BSP	-0.16
Fin	con	KOK	-0.20	UK	lib	LIB	-0.23
Ire	sd	ILP	-0.21	Ita	cd	DC	-0.25
Ita	lib	PLI	-0.22	Aut	sd	SPO	-0.49
Net	com	CPN	-0.30	Net	cd	KVP	-0.49
Den	prt	FRP	-0.30	Net	cd	CHU	-0.53
Swe	con	MSP	-0.30	Net	cd	ARP	-0.58
Ire	com	CPI	-0.30	Ger	sd	SPD	-0.59
UK	lib	LIB	-0.30	Nor	con	HOYR	-0.74
Den	com	DKP	-0.30	Swe	con	MSP	-0.86
Aut	lib	FPO	-0.30	Ita	sd	PSDI	-0.97
Nor	com	NKP	-0.30	Ire	con	FF	-1.04
Ita	fas	MSI	-0.30	Den	cd	KRF	-1.34
Fra	lib	MRG	-0.30	Nor	prt	FRP	-1.56
Ita	com	PCI	-0.30				
Fra	com	PCF	-0.30				
Den	lib	CD	-0.30				
Fin	cd	SKL	-0.30				
Den	soc	SF	-0.30				
Den	cd	KRF	-0.30				
Bel	com	KPB	-0.30				
Ger	com	DKP	-0.30				
Nor	soc	SV	-0.30				
Swe	lib	FP	-0.30				
Bel	eth	VU	-0.30				
Aut	com	KPO	-0.30				
Nor	prt	FRP	-0.30				
Swe	agr	C	-0.30				
Swe	com	VPK	-0.30				
Fra	sd	PSF	-0.30				
Swe	cd	KDS	-0.30				
Ita	env	PR	-0.50				

Table 5.30 Parties rank-ordered according to their level of office and policy seeking behaviour 1976-1990

Country	Family	Party	Office	Country	Family	Party	Policy
Aut	sd	SPO	0.56	Ita	env	PR	1.60
Bel	cd	CVP	0.54	Den	lib	CD	1.22
Ita	cd	DC	0.50	Fra	lib	UDF	0.91
Net	cd	CDA	0.48	Ita	soc	DP	0.67
Fin	sd	SSP	0.48	Nor	lib	V	0.66
Fin	eth	SFP	0.38	UK	sd	SDP	0.65
Fin	agr	KESK	0.33	Den	lib	RV	0.61
Net	lib	VVD	0.31	Ger	cd	CDU	0.58
Ita	sd	PSDI	0.31	Bel	sd	BSP	0.56
Nor	sd	DNA	0.30	UK	con	CON	0.55
Ger	cd	CSU	0.30	Net	lib	VVD	0.54
Fra	lib	UDF	0.28	Fra	sd	PSF	0.54
Ita	lib	PRI	0.27	Nor	sd	DNA	0.47
Ita	sd	PSI	0.25	Bel	eth	VU	0.44
Ire	con	FF	0.24	Ita	lib	PRI	0.33
Ger	lib	FDP	0.22	Ire	lib	PD	0.32
Swe	sd	SAP	0.22	Aut	cd	OVP	0.32
Ita	lib	PLI	0.20	Fra	com	PCF	0.30
Ire	cd	FG	0.18	UK	sd	LAB	0.28
Bel	lib	PVV	0.17	Nor	soc	SV	0.25
Ger	sd	SPD	0.14	Fin	com	SKDL	0.21
Ger	cd	CDU	0.12	Den	soc	SF	0.20
UK	con	CON	0.11	Ire	cd	FG	0.19
Fra	sd	PSF	0.10	Den	com	DKP	0.19
Fra	con	GAUL	0.10	Swe	com	VPK	0.19
Den	sd	SD	0.08	Ita	com	PCI	0.18
Den	con	KF	0.07	Fin	con	KOK	0.18
Den	lib	VEN	0.06	Aut	lib	FPO	0.17
Swe	lib	FP	0.04	Ire	con	FF	0.16
Ire	sd	ILP	0.04	Bel	lib	PVV	0.16
Fin	com	SKDL	0.03	Fin	eth	SFP	0.15
Bel	sd	BSP	0.03	Nor	prt	FRP	0.10
Net	cd	KVP	0.01	Swe	agr	C	0.06
Swe	agr	C	0.01	Net	lib	D66	0.04
Fra	lib	RAD	0.00	Net	sd	PVDA	0.04
Fra	cd	MRP	-0.00	Ita	cd	DC	0.00
Net	cd	CHU	-0.00	Fra	con	GAUL	-0.00
UK	sd	LAB	-0.05	Ire	sd	ILP	-0.04

Fin	lib	LKP	-0.06	Nor	agr	S	-0.05
Net	sd	PVDA	-0.08	Ita	fas	MSI	-0.06
Swe	con	MSP	-0.09	Ita	lib	PLI	-0.06
Net	cd	ARP	-0.09	Ger	lib	FDP	-0.08
Bel	eth	VU	-0.10	Den	con	KF	-0.08
UK	lib	LIB	-0.10	Fin	agr	KESK	-0.09
Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.11	Den	lib	VEN	-0.12
Nor	agr	S	-0.11	Ire	soc	WP	-0.13
Net	lib	D66	-0.12	Bel	cd	CVP	-0.15
Nor	con	HOYR	-0.12	Net	cd	CDA	-0.17
Aut	cd	OVP	-0.13	Den	prt	FRP	-0.18
Fin	con	KOK	-0.13	Swe	con	MSP	-0.19
Fra	com	PCF	-0.13	Aut	sd	SPO	-0.20
Den	lib	RV	-0.19	Ger	sd	SPD	-0.24
Aut	lib	FPO	-0.19	Ger	env	GRU	-0.26
Bel	env	ECO	-0.20	Fin	sd	SSP	-0.39
Net	com	CPN	-0.20	UK	lib	LIB	-0.47
Ger	env	GRU	-0.20	Ita	sd	PSDI	-0.48
Den	lib	CD	-0.24	Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.48
Den	cd	KRF	-0.28	Nor	con	HOYR	-0.49
Fra	lib	MRG	-0.29	Den	sd	SD	-0.54
Ita	env	PR	-0.30	Ita	sd	PSI	-0.56
Nor	prt	FRP	-0.30	Swe	sd	SAP	-0.63
Swe	cd	KDS	-0.30	Swe	lib	FP	-0.69
Aut	com	KPO	-0.30	Swe	env	MP	-1.10
Ire	soc	WP	-0.30	Fin	cd	SKL	-1.10
Ita	com	PCI	-0.30	Den	cd	KRF	-1.18
Swe	com	VPK	-0.30	Aut	env	GA	-1.54
Bel	com	KPB	-0.30	Bel	com	KPB	
Aut	env	GA	-0.30	Ger	com	DKP	
Ita	fas	MSI	-0.30	Ire	com	CPI	
Den	prt	FRP	-0.30	Net	cd	KVP	
Nor	soc	SV	-0.30	Fra	lib	MRG	
Den	com	DKP	-0.30	Aut	com	KPO	
Den	soc	SF	-0.30	Fra	cd	MRP	
Swe	env	MP	-0.30	Net	cd	ARP	
Nor	com	NKP	-0.30	Net	com	CPN	
Fin	cd	SKL	-0.30	Net	cd	CHU	
Ita	soc	DP	-0.30	Nor	com	NKP	
Ger	com	DKP	-0.30	Bel	env	ECO	
UK	sd	SDP	-0.30	Swe	cd	KDS	

Ire	env	GRE	-0.30	Fra	lib	RAD
Nor	lib	V	-0.30	Fin	lib	LKP
Ire	com	CPI	-0.30	Ger	cd	CSU
Ire	lib	PD	-0.66	Ire	env	GRE

6 The electoral dimension of catch-allism

6.1 Electoral support and democracy

Elections constitute one of the most fundamental democratic process whereby citizens elect their political representatives and provide legitimacy to power-holders. In West European democracies individual candidates and political parties need this electoral support to obtain or consolidate political power and influence. Kirchheimer specifically linked the quality of a democratic regime to the level of political representation and the inclusion of all social groups. The importance Kirchheimer attributed to the electoral dimension of politics is further evidenced by his decision to use this aspect in typifying the catch-all concept. Literally, a catch-all party denotes a party able to catch voters from all social groups. Kirchheimer was well aware of the fact that distinctive social cleavages such as class, religion and ethnicity historically structured European electorates into faithful voter groups, which closely aligned themselves with specific political parties representing their particular interests. By asserting that catch-all parties attempt to ignore, or at least cross-cut, these social divisions, class in particular, Kirchheimer depicted the emergence of catch-all parties and subsequent electoral realignment as the dawning of a new political era.

To corroborate the extent to which party support spreads across the social spectrum, this chapter first analyses cross-time and cross-national variations in the social basis of party support. Kirchheimer claimed furthermore, that the catch-all party only permits a disjointed connection with the electorate. In order to assess whether this process of electoral de-alignment of European electorates is fundamental, this chapter also reviews the level of passive support for political parties (party identification) as well as actual electoral shifts at election time. Changes in (active) electoral support for political parties is examined with the measure of electoral volatility. Finally, to scrutinise Kirchheimer's contention that catch-all parties communicate primarily through intermediary interest groups, the recruitment pattern of party elites from these organised interests is evaluated. As an indicator of burgeoning interest group influence, the social and political background of cabinet ministers is examined as well as the inclination of parties to recruit ministers from outside the parliamentary party.

6.1.1 The social structure of electoral support

Analyses of the social structure of party support are at the heart of the field of political sociology. Political sociologists usually depart from the assumption that political behaviour, voting in particular, is associated with individual characteristics such as occupation, income, ethnicity, religion, and/or social status. In life voters develop lasting partisan preferences and affiliations as a result of these social characteristics. These partisan attachments and identities, in turn, provide simple and meaningful cues which structure individual voting behaviour (Dalton 1988; Andeweg 1982).

In Western Europe the most important social cleavages are the class cleavage and the religious cleavage, followed by ethnicity and region (Rose 1974; Lijphart 1981;

1984). These cleavages largely determined the development and structure of the Western European party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; LaPalombara and Weiner 1966; Dalton et al. 1984; Klingemann et al. 1994). This study limits itself to an analysis of the class-structure of electorates; class being the most dominant cleavage.[88] Although this will result in only a partial picture, a full discussion of all possible social divisions is clearly beyond the scope of this particular study. Chapter 3 has shown that, by definition, catch-all parties extend their appeal to voters from social strata which did not belong to the traditional supporters of the party. Therefore, catch-allism of political parties at the electoral level is indicated, **firstly**, by a decline in the class-distinctiveness of the social basis (or stratification) of electoral support of political parties.

Studies on the stratification of party support concerning class cleavage often use Alford's Index of Class-Voting[89]. Cross-national surveys on the relation between class and voting behaviour in West European countries found, with few exceptions, a substantial decline in the class structuring of voting behaviour.[90] Studies which used other measures than Alford's Index of relative class voting or more elaborate class schemes yielded similar results (see Nieuwbeerta 1995). In this study a very rudimentary class scheme is used: the electorate is divided into only two classes, namely, the manual or blue-collar working class and the non-manual, white-collar middle and upper class. White-collar employees are regarded as the equivalent to the 'middle-classes' and also included in the non-manual category are higher-educated upper-classes, which usually figurate in surveys under headings such as 'professionals', 'business' or 'self employed'. Some surveys use more elaborate class distinctions within intermediate categories, such as unskilled workers, semi-skilled workers and skilled workers, resulting in more refined forms of class analysis.[91] This dichotomous class concept - working class versus non-working class - is a simple and straightfor-

[88] According to Lipset, different parties represent the interests of different classes and he arrived at the conclusion "that parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes. ... More than anything else the party struggle is a conflict among classes, and the most impressive single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right" (Lipset 1960, 223-224; Lipset 1966, 413-414; Lipset 1981, 230). Some authors voiced objections against this 'naive theory' and argued that the size of the working-class is not a powerful predictor of support for parties on the left (Kitschelt 1994, 41). In contrast, Rose and Urwin (1969, 12) argued that "religious divisions, not class, are the main social bases of parties in the Western World today."

[89] Alford's Index of Class-Voting is obtained by calculating the difference between the percentage of the working class (manual workers) voting for the left and the percentage of middle class (non-manual workers) who vote for the left (Alford 1962; 1963). Higher values on this index indicate a more solid and cohesive class voting. Although, this measure is heavily criticised for its serious statistical deficiencies and its Anglo-Saxon bias (Goldthorpe 1980; 1990; Heath, Jowell, Curtice et al. 1991) the measure is widely used in empirical analysis.

[90] Traditionally, the working class by and large supported parties of the left in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain, France and West Germany. During the 1960's and in the 1980's class based voting declined considerably; only the 1970's marked a period of moderate increases in class-voting in some of these countries. See Alford 1962; 1963; Lijphart 1971b; Butler and Stokes 1974; Budge and Farlie 1977; Crewe 1968; Andeweg 1982; Korpi 1983; Lipset 1983; Franklin 1985; Rose 1986; Inglehart in Dalton et al. 1984; Dalton 1988; Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Inglehart 1990, 260; Franklin et al. 1992; Lane and Ersson 1994; Nieuwbeerta 1995; 1996.

[91] This analysis relies on the scarce cross-national comparative data-bases on the electoral profiles of parties, as well as on individual country studies. As a consequence, this study has to be lenient towards the different categorisations in order to make them fit this simple dichotomous scheme. Surveys, even within one country, differ substantially on the wording of the questions, in sample-size and class categories.

ward method which suffices for the overall research aim: to determine significant shifts in electoral behaviour and composition of the electorate of parties across class lines. By subtracting the proportion of white-collar middle/upper-class vote from the percentage of manual working-class vote, an index similar to the Alford-Index of class voting is constructed. All party scores then range between +100, a situation when all voters for the party are manual working-class, and -100, when all voters have a non-manual middle or upper-class background. Since for this study it is most important to note to which extent the electorates of political parties in Western Europe remain class-distinctive, the positive and negative signs are ignored and the entries are thus rated to range between 0 (indicating a complete absence of class distinctiveness) and 100 (indicating totally distinctive homogeneous class support). Catch-allism, visible in less marked and cohesive class voting, will be indicated by lower values on this index. So, the first electoral indicator of progressing catch-allism can be seen in less class-distinctiveness of the electorate of parties. Table 6.1 summarises this level of class distinctiveness of the electorates of parties in West European countries.

Table 6.1 The mean level of class distinctiveness of parties in Western Europe 1950-1990

	1951 1960	1961 1970	1971 1980	1981 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*	*beta (β)*
Aut	28.5	49.5	37.9	24.4	**35.1**	**9.7**	**.276**	**-.31**
Bel	-	40.7	25.9	28.1	**31.6**	**6.5**	**.206**	**-.32**
Den	58.2	48.6	35.2	39.9	**45.5**	**8.8**	**.193**	**-.37***
Fin	63.3	52.7	32.3	49.8	**49.5**	**11.1**	**.224**	**-.25**
Fra	34.3	31.0	32.4	35.3	**33.3**	**1.7**	**.051**	**.01**
Ger	30.7	33.7	37.3	43.8	**36.4**	**4.9**	**.135**	**.20**
Ire	-	40.0	36.1	33.3	**36.5**	**2.7**	**.074**	**-.22**
Ita	24.8	24.1	21.1	37.9	**27.0**	**6.5**	**.241**	**-.02**
Net	41.0	57.9	32.2	48.2	**44.8**	**9.4**	**.210**	**.01**
Nor	55.2	47.9	47.6	38.0	**47.2**	**6.1**	**.129**	**-.20**
Swe	56.0	45.9	47.7	38.0	**46.9**	**6.4**	**.136**	**-.01**
UK	36.2	34.7	21.6	34.4	**31.7**	**5.9**	**.168**	**-.14**
X	**42.8**	**42.2**	**33.9**	**37.6**	**38.8**	**6.6**	**.170**	**-.08**
S	**13.3**	**9.5**	**8.2**	**7.1**	**7.2**	**2.7**	**-**	**-**

Entries are index-scores of support from working class minus non working-class voters. For sources of data see appendix 4. Scores range between 0, which indicates a complete absence of class distinctiveness and 100, indicating totally homogeneous class support. The level of class voting is taken from the sources enumerated in Appendix IV. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and country means. The column and row marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the countries. The column indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/ *X*). The row '*b*' provides the regression coefficient between the level of class-distinctiveness and the year of the observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

As can be seen from table 6.1, over time the class distinctiveness of political parties declined in most countries. In Scandinavian party systems the class cleavage is the most important political divide, resulting in the highest mean levels of class

distinctiveness of party support. Finland, in particular, was unequalled in Western Europe with regard to class distinctiveness of voting behaviour. Oversimplified; the Finnish party system reflects the left-right dimension by its division in two major left-wing parties (SKDL and SDP) as the typical working class representatives and the right-wing non-socialist block of parties. The centre-right flank of the political spectrum is inhabited by the Agrarian Union (Kesk, later Senterpartiet) representing farmers, while the conservative party (KOK) and the liberal party (LKP) represent the interests of the middle and upper classes. This highly class-structured voting pattern decreased considerably since the late 1960s. Similarly, in Sweden high proportions of the working class loyally supported the two left parties (VpK and SAP), while non-manual middle and upper class voters mainly supported the three bourgeois parties (SP, MUP and Fp). Since the 1960s the Swedish party system also showed a decline in class distinctive voting. Although traditionally the social basis of Norwegian and Danish parties has been durable and distinct, there was, nevertheless, a substantial decline in the class distinctiveness in these Scandinavian countries as well, particularly since the 1970s.

In the German, Belgium, Austrian and Dutch party systems the class cleavage is cross-cut by a religious cleavage, resulting in a dominant role for the Christian democratic parties in these countries. In the post-war period these Christian democratic parties attracted a substantial proportion of working class voters. Therefore, the decline in class-distinctiveness is very moderate in these countries and almost absent in Germany and the Netherlands. Despite the fact that German parties lost some of their class distinctiveness, there is still a moderate trend towards increasing class distinctiveness of the major political parties. The Dutch electorate was almost completely structured by the class (as well as the religious) cleavage (Irwin 1980, 180; Lijphart 1974, 243). This clear structuration dwindled, particularly since the early 1980s. Nevertheless, over time there is a relatively high level of class distinctive voting again in the Netherlands during the 1980s. Although the Belgian party system cannot be understood without reference to the linguistic division between Walloon and Flemish groups, the major political parties in Belgium also reflect the class and religious cleavage. Overall, Belgian parties have increasingly adopted a cross-class electoral appeal and the class distinctiveness of the electorate of the political parties declined rapidly. Notwithstanding similarities between the Austrian, German, Belgian and Dutch party systems, parties in Austria have lost much more of their class distinctiveness compared to the other consociational democracies, indicating a rapid decline in the relevance of class for structuring the popular vote and a substantial movement towards the catch-all model.

In France and Italy party competition is characterised by the presence of an electorally strong and distinctly working-class communist party. Particularly in France a relatively stable pattern of class distinctiveness of political parties is witnessed. Although the French party system is characterised by four major 'tendencies' rather than cohesive parties, the left in France is dominated by two large and relatively durable working-class party organisations: the socialist SFIO (later PSF) and the communist PCF. In contrast, the right end of the political spectrum, which comprises a Gaullist tendency and a liberal tendency, is characterised by more transient party organisations. Nevertheless, all the different political constellations which took root at the centre-right in France have attracted most of the middle and upper-class vote. Similar sharp class divisions in Italian society and politics warranted this country the

label of 'extreme pluralism' (Sartori 1966; 1976). The main antagonisms in Italian politics are the left-right and religious cleavage, together with a North-South divide; more recently politicised by the Lega Nord and Lega Lombarda. The result of this cleavage structure is political fragmentation at the organisational level; yet the most prominent ideological division is found between the catholic Christian democratic DC and the anti-clerical communist PCI. Nevertheless, class-distinctiveness of voting behaviour remained at a moderate and even declining level; a process which was partly reversed during the 1980s. Surveys have shown that at the individual level, voting behaviour is rather stable and the declining effects of religion and class are primarily due to generational replacement (Franklin et al. 1992, 242; Farneti 1985, 95-96; Von Beyme 1985, 291).

The two 'outliers' in Western Europe are Ireland and the United Kingdom; Ireland for its almost total absence of class-based voting and the United Kingdom for the complete dominance the class cleavage. Political conflict within the Irish party system is still related to the nationalist cleavage (Marsh 1985). The homogeneous catholic population and rural character of the country has led some to typify Irish politics as one without social basis and Irish parties as having no distinct social profile. Whatever class distinction there was has almost disappeared and the major parties are becoming more and more catch-all as the electorates are less class distinct than previously. For a long time the class cleavage within the British 'two-party' system was, without a doubt, regarded as the most important basis of conflict between two principal social groups and two major parties (Rose 1974; Cyr 1980; Crewe 1985; Franklin 1985). The traditional pattern of class voting, being that the working class voted for the Labour Party and the middle and upper classes supported the Conservative Party, has been in decline up until the 1980s. Over most of the post-war period, the Labour party appealed increasingly successful to the middle-classes and the Conservative party succeeded in attracting voters from the working-class.

In order to summarise the trends within countries, a regression analysis was performed with the year of observation as the independent variable. The last column of table 6.1 reports a negative beta-coefficient as a summary measure when there is an overall decrease in class distinctiveness of party electorates. The regression statistics show that the only exceptions from a general decline in class-distinctiveness of electorates in Western Europe are France, Germany and the Netherlands. In Germany a moderate positive trend in class distinctive voting is discernible, whereas in France and the Netherlands class-voting is relatively stable. These generalised findings largely coincide with the findings in other studies, with the exception of the German case (see Lane and Ersson 1994, 132; Nieuwbeerta 1996, 356). In sum, with this partial exceptions of France, Germany and the Netherlands, the class distinctiveness of parties declined throughout Western Europe, in particular since the mid-1960s. This development, in line with Kirchheimer's assertions, has been particularly striking in Austria, Belgium and most Scandinavian party systems (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) as well as in Ireland and Britain. However, taking into account the restructuring of the labour force, it seems more accurate to conclude that in most West European countries the social basis of parties became increasingly dominated by middle-class voters during the 1970s and 1980s, resulting from a social upward migration which melded the working-class into the white-collar service sector. In none of the West European countries has class distinctive voting declined more rapidly than the structural regression of the manual working class (see Flora 1987;

Kitschelt 1994, 42-44; Lane et.al 1991). In fact, the rate of restructuring of the labour force is, on average, six times higher than the decline in class distinctive voting. Most (left-wing) parties, whose traditional core electorate was formed by the working-class, attempted to compensate the loss of working-class support by making inroads on middle-class voters. In the 1980s the working-class constituted less than thirty-two per cent of the European electorates and parties, particularly those whose traditional electorates were dwindling, responded in turn by appealing to middle-class voters. As is shown above, in some countries this strategy has been more successful than in others. Still, the declining standard deviation over time is ample evidence that the differences between parties have decreased, a finding in support of Kirchheimer's convergence hypothesis.

The impact of social transformation on parties of different social origin is summarised in table 6.2, which provides average levels in class distinctiveness of electorates of West European party families as well as regression coefficients calculated between the level of class distinctiveness (working class support minus middle/upper class party support) and the year of observation as the dependent variable.

Table 6.2 The social basis of party support of West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*CV*	*beta (β)*
cd	-	23.5	24.3	39.5	35.2	21.6	31.5	38.9	46.8	**32.9**	**.544**	**.29***
com	-	65.0	44.5	26.6	47.7	26.4	22.1	22.5	34.9	**34.8**	**.627**	**-.33**
con	43.9	34.8	61.2	62.8	49.4	66.0	42.5	55.4	55.7	**55.3**	**.358**	**-.00**
sd	56.9	40.0	38.2	25.8	30.6	19.6	23.9	18.9	13.9	**26.2**	**.782**	**-.39***
lib	47.2	25.0	40.6	46.9	48.2	36.3	43.5	50.9	46.5	**43.7**	**.535**	**.12**
agr	-	-	54.5	67.4	55.5	77.8	53.9	-	37.0	**65.1**	**.257**	**-.44**
X	**58.4**	**33.9**	**41.2**	**41.6**	**41.5**	**35.3**	**34.4**	**40.1**	**36.8**	**38.7**	**.612**	**-.08**
S	**30.3**	**24.0**	**23.0**	**22.0**	**22.4**	**27.1**	**20.5**	**21.4**	**22.0**	**23.7**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.519**	**.708**	**.563**	**.529**	**.539**	**.768**	**.596**	**.534**	**.560**	**.612**	**-**	**-**

For data sources see Appendix IV. Entries are levels of class-distinctiveness. The column and row indicated by an *X* provide the party family means and the average of each period respectively. The column and row indicated by '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*) for party families and time periods. The column '*b*' provides the regression coefficient between the level of class-distinctiveness and the year of the observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Table 6.2 demonstrates a moderate trend towards declining class distinctiveness of European electorates over the post-war period. There are, however, significant differences between party families. The corrosion in working class support of communist and social democratic parties has resulted in a clear weakening of their electoral class distinctiveness. Communist and social democratic parties rapidly lost their traditional working class support (β -.33 and β -.39 respectively) and solicited increasing support from middle class voters (for both parties the parameters of middle class support are β = .42*). Barring only the Finnish and Irish social democrats, most West European social democratic parties gradually transformed from basically working class parties into parties with relatively more non-working class support. Particularly the German SPD, historically the classic and prototypical example of a working class party (see Michels 1911), has transformed into a middle-class party.[92] Kirchheimer was clearly influenced by this transformation of the SPD, a party he knew well as a former active member; and it is primarily the metamorphosis of this party that drove him to construct the catch-all thesis. Moreover, it is indeed during the 1960s, as Kirchheimer observed, that the transformation of social democratic parties gained momentum. In Britain the development towards electoral catch-allism occurred somewhat later (the 1970s) when working class support for Labour dropped significantly (Minkin and Seyd 1977, 133-135). In another example Kirchheimer highlighted, the Austrian SPÖ also succeeded in its strategy of a trans-class appeal (Müller and Steiniger 1994; Luther 1988, 229-231; Jacobs 1989, 493). Agrarian parties also seem to be affected by a re-alignment of European electorates as their support has rapidly declined in class distinctiveness.

In contrast, the electoral support of Christian democratic and liberal parties has become more class-distinctive, evidenced by positive beta-coefficients in the last column of table 6.2. Over time, Christian democratic parties have lost substantial

92 Feist et al. 1978, 172; Mintzel 1982, 140-145; Franklin et al. 1992, 179-202; Missiroli 1992, 127; Merkl 1980, 625-626; Kirchner and Broughton 1988, 75; Linz 1967; Dalton 1988, 155.

working class support (β = -.26) and gained electoral backing from particularly middle class voters (β = .31*). The deliberate strategy of Christian democratic parties to avert religious working-class voters from supporting communist, socialist or social democratic parties (see Kersbergen 1995) resulted in a considerable working class support and a relatively indistinctive following concerning social class, at least until the 1960s. The electorate of the Belgian Christian-democratic PSC and CVP, for example, was very heterogeneous with a relative high level of working class support.[93] Gradually during the 1960s, the working-class support of Christian democratic parties becomes replaced by middle and upper-class voters. Despite some reversal to working class support in the 1970s, the decline of working-class support for Christian democratic parties accelerated during the 1980s. Liberal parties seem to attract a relatively high proportion of non-working class voters already during the early 1960s. Thereafter, the level of middle and upper-class support is comparatively stable until the late 1980s. Over time, nevertheless, the composition of the liberal electorate slowly increased in class distinctiveness.

Conservative parties in Western Europe consistently attracted a predominantly middle and upper-class constituency. Being better equipped to woo middle and upper-class voters, conservative parties consistently appealed with success to a high number of middle and upper class voters during the late 1950s and early 1960s. The regression coefficient of electoral class distinctiveness against time shows no trend in either direction for parties of conservative origin and the low coefficient of variance indicates a more homogeneous and stable stratification in support than most of the other party families.

In conclusion, West European electorates have become less class distinctive as a result of an increasing number of non-working class voters. Nevertheless, this development has not affected all parties to the same extent and in the same direction. Despite the fact that the relationship between social class and voting behaviour has declined significantly over the post-war period in West European party systems and the electorate of most parties has become more diffuse, significant differences in class distinctiveness between party families remain. Communist parties and, to a lesser extent, social democratic parties still have a substantial working-class segment in their constituency. Moreover, conservative, Christian democratic and liberal parties have not significantly broadened their appeal to voters outside their traditional supporters. Instead, conservative parties still basically attract middle and upper class support, while Christian democratic and liberal parties have even become more class distinctive over the years. Nevertheless, Kirchheimer's hypothesis of declining class-distinctiveness of the electorates of West European parties is largely confirmed for communist, social democratic and agrarian parties, notwithstanding significant variation between countries. To further substantiate Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, this de-alignment of European electorates, should also be discernible in higher levels of electoral change (volatility) as well as a decline in strong identification of voters with one single party. Both indicators of electoral catch-allism are discussed in the next section.

6.2 De-alignment of West European electorates

This study is certainly not the first to observe a substantial decline in explanatory

93 Mughan 1982, 168; Lorwin 1966, 162; Frognier 1975; De Winter 1990, 40; Jacobs 1989, 16; Rose and Urwin 1969, 53.

power of the social structure for electoral behaviour in Western Europe and a de-alignment of West European electorates.[94] As a result of social transformations, the values and ideologies of European electorates profoundly changed and this has weakened the traditional ties between parties and their adherents. Consistent with the argumentation in chapter 3, electoral catch-allism is characterised by this moderation in strength of the party's connection with the electorate. Next to the demise in the social stratification of party support, the **second** indicator of electoral catch-allism measures the extent to which adherents of political parties have disentangled themselves from their traditional socio-political milieu and lost durable connection with party organisations. This development is measured by both examining the level of electoral turnover (volatility) and the level of party identification.

First, without tapping actual voting behaviour, the strength of passive support for political parties is evaluated with the concept of *party identification*. Party identification estimates the enduring psychological link voters have with political parties resulting from political socialisation and party organisational activities. Theoretically, a voter's alignment with the party will decline when the social function of the party organisation is abandoned in a manner Kirchheimer described. No longer part of the integrative organisational structure of the party, the voter becomes progressively estranged from the party and identifies less with its aims and leaders. When traditional methods of linkage to the electorate are abandoned by the catch-all party, other methods have to take its place; elections have to be won. The catch-all party will increase its effort in electoral campaigning and adopt alternative styles and methods to replace the lost link with a 'natural' constituency. Decreasing party identification will eventually result in a complete break with the party and thus to individual *electoral volatility*. Electoral volatility, the second measure used to quantify the second indicator of electoral catch-allism, estimates the (dis)connection between parties and voters by tapping actual voting behaviour. But, before turning to the variation in electoral volatility in Western Europe, the level of party identification is first assessed.

6.2.1 Party identification

The concept of party identification, which is used to measure the long-term predisposition to vote for a particular party, was developed in the American political context (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944; Berelson et al. 1954; Campbell et al. 1954; 1960; Converse 1976; Budge et al. 1976; LeDuc 1981). This psychological identification with a particular party is not always considered applicable to all party systems (Butler and Stokes 1974; Thomassen 1976; Gallagher et al., 1995, 230-231). The difficulties in comparability and interpretation of the concept are less relevant to this study. Here the concept of party identification is only used as an overall measure of relative strength of the party's connection with the electorate. Although party identification does not tap real voting behaviour, the concept can be used as an indicator of developments in affective party attachment or party loyalty (Dalton 1988). When measured consistently in a similar manner, the concept of party identification is a valid measure for establishing (de-)alignment of European electorates (Van Deth and Janssen 1994, 89). If there is a process of de-ideologization and electoral re-alignment, then the relative number of voters with a strong party identification should decrease.

[94] Rose 1974; 1982; Daalder and Mair 1983; Dalton, Flanagan and Beck 1984; Inglehart 1977; 1990; Prezworski 1985; Lawson and Merkl 1987; Jennings and Van Deth et al. 1990.

As catch-all parties discontinue persistent links with voters, catch-allism is indicated by a decline in the proportion of the electorate with a strong enduring partisan preference. Evidence from several cross-national studies of party-identification lead to the conclusion that there is a general weakening of traditional ties between the parties and their voters (Dalton et al. 1985; Crewe and Denver 1985; Dalton 1988; Inglehart 1990).[95] Although the data on party identification are scarce and very incomplete, it clearly emerges, nevertheless, that party identification weakened substantially in most European countries since the late 1960s[96]. A rough estimate of this de-alignment of West European electorates over time can be obtained by computing the level of **strong** party identification with the period in which the observation was made. The overall regression coefficient is in the expected direction, yet not very high (β = -.14*) and, as we shall see below, primarily the result of a steep decline in party identification with social democratic parties. First, table 6.3 shows that in most European countries the level of strong party identification did decline over the course of time; however, some parties in Denmark and Finland seem to be excluded from this general trend in de-alignment.

Table 6.3 Trends in strong **party identification over time in Western Europe 1960-1990**

	Aut	Den	Fin	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	UK	mean
beta (β)	-.31	.02	.09	-.27	-.45*	-.07	-.09	-.04	-.29	-.14*

The column 'beta (β)' provides the regression coefficient between the level of party identification and the year of the observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05). Data for Belgium, France and Sweden were too scarce to perform a regression analysis.

The decline in strong partisan attachment is most profound in Austria, Germany, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In Austria there is a general decline in strong party identification, as the proportion of the Austrian electorate which claimed to identify strongly with a particular party (strong or otherwise) dropped from seventy-three to forty-nine percent between 1954 and 1990 (Müller 1992, 39). The share of strong party identifiers fell from over thirty percent in the 1960s and 1970s to nineteen percent in 1990 (Plasser and Ulram, 1995, 344; Haerpfer 1985, 282). In the German 1969-election, held after the dissolution of the SPD-CDU (Grand) coalition, marked a turning point when the level of strong party identifiers dropped significantly (Klingemann 1985; Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992; Kaase 1976; Dalton 1984, 126; Kolinsky 1984). The total level of strong party identification in Ireland is relatively low and declined further between 1978 and 1985 from around thirty-eight to twenty-six percent (Mair 1987; see also Marsh 1985, 194). As a result of two dominant parties in the United Kingdom, the self-placement of voters on the left-right divide is a surrogate for party identification (Butler and Stokes 1974, 331). In general, the attachment between British parties and their electorate declined significantly. In the 1960s over forty percent of the British voters had strong party identification; since the 1970s,

[95] In contrast, analysis on the basis of the Eurobarometer-data resulted in the opposite conclusion, namely that "there is no evidence of a general process of de-alignment in all countries and all party families between 1975 and 1989" (Van Deth and Janssen 1994, 96).

[96] The data to which is referred in this section are primarily from Katz and Mair, tables A.4 and Crewe and Denver 1985. Data before 1960 are lacking, while for Belgium and France very few data are available.

however, there was a substantial decline in strong party identification.[97] Major parties in Denmark, Finland, Norway and France also show declining levels of strong party identification.[98] In other countries this development has been less sweeping but still significant. Initially, the Italian electorate displayed very high levels of strong partisan identification. From 1968 through 1981 the level of strong partisan identifiers in Italy hovered been between eighty and sixty percent (Barnes 1984). Since the early 1980s, however, most Italian parties have experienced a decline in strong party identification (Farneti 1985). The Swedish electorate was solidly aligned along the class-cleavage with corresponding high levels of strong partisan identification up until the 1950s, yet in the 1960s a massive shift towards de-alignment set in. In the Netherlands the percentage of voters which strongly identify with a particular party seems to oscillate with the electoral fortunes of parties (van der Eijk and Niemoller 1985; Thomassen 1976). Nevertheless, all parties in the Dutch party system faced a loss of strong party identifiers, particularly in the 1980s (Irwin and Dittrich 1984). In Belgium the level of strong party identification is very low in a comparative perspective, however, no longitudinal data are available (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 249).

Despite this linear trend of declining party identification in most countries, there are considerable differences in strong partisan affiliation between party families as is shown in table 6.4.

[97] Alt 1984, 300; Beck 1984, 235; Crewe 1976; Heath, Jowell and Curtice 1994, 287; Crewe and Denver 1985, 6, 115-122.

[98] Borre 1985; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976, 249; Grunberg 1985, 224; Lewis Beck 1984, 432.

Table 6.4 The proportion of voters with strong **party identification by party families 1960-1990**

	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	X	S	CV	beta (β)
cd	-	26.9	17.1	21.7	22.7	19.9	20.8	13.0	.625	.06
com	-	-	15.9	15.9	13.0	12.5	13.5	3.5	.259	-.12
con	24.8	23.2	14.1	23.0	25.4	26.3	22.7	12.7	.559	.14
sd	40.3	39.9	37.9	26.2	21.9	18.7	26.9	13.8	.513	-.56*
lib	9.1	5.2	6.3	7.3	7.1	7.4	7.0	6.9	.986	.03
agr	(7.3)	(8.2)	11.5	10.4	9.8	9.9	9.9	4.6	.465	.11
X	17.9	21.1	15.6	15.2	13.7	13.0	14.9	9.1	.611	-.14*
S	16.8	18.0	15.7	13.2	12.6	11.5	13.7	-	-	-
CV	.938	.853	1.01	.868	.919	.885	.919	-	-	-

The column and row indicated by an '*X*' provide the party family means and the average score of the period respectively. The column and row marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the party family. The column and row indicated by '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). The column 'β' provides the regression coefficient between the level of party identification and the year of observation. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

In line with Kirchheimer's assertions, the evidence shows that social democratic parties in Western Europe are losing strong party identifiers at a very fast pace (β = -.56*). Whereas in the 1960s over forty percent of social democratic voters identified strongly with their party; during the 1980s this level declined steeply and incessantly to less than twenty per cent. As can be seen from the table, a more persistent level of party identification can be found among the communist adherents and, although the average level of party identification is not very high, the variation between communist parties over time is low. Apparently excluded from an almost universal declining trend in party identification are the three Scandinavian conservative parties (KF in Denmark, KOK in Finland and Hoyre in Denmark) which seem to have strengthened their connection with their voters, resulting in an increasing overall level of party identification for conservative parties. Christian democratic parties in Western Europe experienced a decline in partisan identification of the electorate during the 1970s. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the proportion of Christian democratic voters which strongly identified with their party stabilised, while the late 1980s showed a significant drop in strong Christian democratic party identification. However, some political parties, such as the CDU in Germany, not only largely retained their strong identifiers, but even attracted new strong party identifiers. Liberal parties, on average, maintain a rather stable level of voters who strongly identify with them.

Overall, this study shows that a substantial number of political parties experienced a decline in strong party identification and are thus simultaneously loosing the long term affective party attachment and loyalty from their electorate. In almost all party systems the major and more aged parties are most profoundly affected by this decline in party identification. Still, overall the disconnection with the electorate seems to have it's largest impact on the left of the political spectrum and not a universal phenomenon. Particularly the social democratic and communist parties are subject to a serious disengagement from their supporters. Kirchheimer correctly pointed to this

development of declining party loyalty of voters but he incorrectly assumed this development to be widespread and continuous. This analysis shows that the catch-all thesis can not be completely confirmed as, overall, Christian democratic, conservative, liberal and agrarian parties have been less affected by a loos of strong party identifiers.

6.2.2 Electoral volatility

Lower levels of party affiliation would, according to the catch-all thesis, increase the number of floating voters considerably. For the time being these voters may stay loyal to parties within the same party block (see Bartolini and Mair 1990, 82), yet declining levels of party identification can eventually lead to unprecedented levels of electoral volatility. To assess the extent to which this process has already occurred, this section examines the cross-national and cross-time variation in electoral volatility in Western Europe. If catch-all parties indeed loose their direct and durable connection with their adherents, in organisational, ideological and psychological terms, then the result will be higher levels of 'floating voters' and increasing electoral turnover. Kirchheimer's thesis is somewhat contradictory on this point. Logically it can be expected that increasing competitiveness of catch-all parties results in higher levels of electoral change; yet, Kirchheimer also pointed to the exclusion of extremist parties and progressive dominance of the larger parties. This is important since the number of parties operating within party systems significantly influences the degree of electoral turnover (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 135-145).

The most simple measure to analyse electoral change is *electoral volatility*, which is used here to measure the **third** indicator of electoral catch-allism. Electoral volatility is a very straightforward measure which has been applied by several authors to measure catch-allism (see section 3.4 of this book). Aside from the attractive simplicity of the measure and the convention to use it for cross-national comparative analyses of electoral change, electoral volatility is also a valuable measure for which data are available over a long period of time. Furthermore, electoral volatility is useful in this study as it can measure electoral change at the individual party level, as well as the aggregate level of countries and party families. Finally, electoral volatility gauges actual voting behaviour, not attitudes or psychological pre-dispositions.

The measure of electoral volatility was developed by Mogens N. Pedersen (1979, 3), who defined electoral volatility as "the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers, divided by two" (Pedersen 1979, 3).[99] There remains, nevertheless, substantial controversy as to what is indicated by aggregated electoral volatility. From his definition it emerges that Pedersen himself thought that volatility indicates changes in individual voting behaviour. Secondly, aggregated electoral volatility can also result from the growth and decline of the electorate. While all voters remain loyal to their partisan choice there can be aggregate volatility due to the extension of the electorate (resulting from different electoral preferences of the

[99] Electoral volatility can thus be regarded as the net electoral change within a party system between two elections. Net electoral change indicates that the differences in turnout and growth of the electorate and their effects are not accounted for in this measure. The measure of volatility is not as straightforward as it seems to be at first glance. Bartolini and Mair (1990) distinguish different types of volatility. Individual volatility which indicates the individual vote-change from election to election. This can only be done by so-called exit-polls or surveys. Party volatility which denotes the loss or gains of an individual party from election to election. Thirdly, total aggregate electoral volatility which is measured by adding the volatility of all individual parties (by country or group of parties), divided by two. The total volatility of all parties has to be divided by two as the loss of one party is the gain of another party.

newly enfranchised) or differences in electoral turnout. The assumption that volatility indicates the variation in political preferences of different generations of voters was advanced most convincingly by Prezworski (1975). Prezworski suggested that older generations have more stable voting behaviour than younger generations. In an extreme situation this could mean that there is no individual voting shift; that all individuals have stable preferences and that increasing volatility solely results from different political preferences of different age cohorts. Thirdly, electoral volatility can also indicate the changing character of political parties. In this perspective electoral volatility results from strategic and organisational transformation of party organisations by the political elites. As a result from socio-economic developments or other aspects of modernisation, voters can loose their strong party identification and become 'floating' voters. Party elites will have to adapt their organisation to these developments. Theoretically, the party of democratic integration such as described by Neumann (1956) will experience less electoral volatility than the more competitive and less socially embedded 'catch-all' party that Kirchheimer described. In a fourth approach, electoral volatility is regarded the consequence of issue effects in elections.[100] Fifthly, some argue that electoral volatility indicates the stability or weakness of traditional cleavages and 'party alignments' (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rose and Urwin 1970; Bartolini and Mair 1990).[101] In this view traditional cleavages become less salient to partisan choice and others gain in importance. This cyclical vision is the guiding principle in the studies by Dalton, Flanagan and Beck (1984) and Inglehart (1984; 1990; 1991). Its rationale is as follows; first, a cleavage is politicised and political competition polarises, then, the cleavage becomes institutionalised in political organisations and is consequently pacified by the political elite. This perspective argues that in multi-party systems where parties have to coalesce, they will converge in policy positions and seek consensus resulting in lower saliency of the cleavage. Under the influence of social, economic and cultural developments new cleavages can then emerge. Additionally, new political parties enter the party system and thereby increase electoral volatility again.

As it is impossible to settle the matter here, it suffices to accept that this measure indicates the electoral vulnerability of political parties and the strength of traditional partisan alignments. So whether or not electoral volatility is caused by changing orientations of the electorate towards political parties or the transformation of the basic structure of West European politics, electoral volatility is a valuable indicator for the transformation towards catch-allism. Here, total volatility is the sum of all individual party volatilities (the change in the percentage of the vote between two elections) of parties included in this analysis, divided by two. Table 6.5 summarises the trends in total electoral volatility in the different countries. Note that the entries in the table are based only on the electoral losses and gains of parties included in this study, so total scores of party systems are somewhat lower than country scores reported in other studies (see Bartolini and Mair 1990, appendix 2).

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[100] Budge and Farlie 1983; 287; Robertson 1976; 72, Budge and Farlie 1977; 272-273.

[101] Crewe and Denver (1985, 6-7), on the contrary, state that "electoral volatility does not necessarily signify a profound change of party system. It might be short-lived, and even if not, would not entail a fundamental enduring change of party systems; fluctuations around a party's average level of support could increase while the average remained stable. Electoral volatility does not entail partisan de-alignment; and partisan de-alignment does not entail a change of party system."

Table 6.5 Total party electoral volatilities in West European countries 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
Aut	11.9	3.6	2.5	1.5	3.0	0.9	1.3	3.9	8.0	**4.1**	**3.1**	**.756**
Bel	5.7	6.9	4.9	9.3	4.1	2.0	2.6	5.0	2.3	**4.8**	**2.4**	**.500**
Den	2.6	1.3	5.3	1.8	5.7	10.7	9.3	8.5	4.4	**5.5**	**2.3**	**.418**
Fin	4.9	1.8	4.3	2.7	5.2	2.0	3.7	4.9	4.7	**3.8**	**1.7**	**.447**
Fra	4.8	19.6	8.0	15.9	5.5	7.9	3.6	10.1	4.4	**8.9**	**5.4**	**.606**
Ger	-	10.3	6.0	3.0	4.3	3.6	2.2	8.4	3.9	**5.2**	**3.6**	**.692**
Ire	3.9	4.3	9.4	5.0	1.8	2.9	5.9	2.7	4.6	**4.5**	**3.2**	**.711**
Ita	18.1	10.4	2.9	6.2	5.2	1.8	2.8	7.4	6.2	**6.8**	**3.0**	**.441**
Net	4.4	4.2	2.9	3.1	8.6	5.1	7.3	3.1	5.5	**4.9**	**2.3**	**.469**
Nor	6.8	4.2	2.2	4.7	5.4	18.2	17.0	4.2	14.6	**8.6**	**3.7**	**.430**
Swe	9.5	3.8	2.3	2.5	3.4	8.5	4.1	4.2	6.4	**5.0**	**2.5**	**.500**
UK	2.9	3.3	3.1	5.8	1.9	13.1	7.5	11.3	3.5	**5.8**	**5.1**	**.879**
X	**6.9**	**6.1**	**4.5**	**5.1**	**4.5**	**6.4**	**5.6**	**6.1**	**5.7**	**5.6**	**3.2**	**.571**
S	**4.1**	**4.3**	**2.4**	**3.1**	**2.3**	**3.8**	**2.9**	**3.1**	**2.7**	**-**	**-**	**-**
CV	**.594**	**.705**	**.533**	**.608**	**.511**	**.594**	**.517**	**.508**	**.473**	**-**	**-**	**-**

Data from Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mackie and Rose 1974; 1989; Keesings Contemporary Archives and reports on more recent elections in the European Journal of Political Research. Note that not all parties within the party systems are included, only those included in this study are analysed here. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and the country means. The row and column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the countries respectively. The column and row indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*) of the periods and of the party system as a whole. A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Immediately following World War II most countries experienced considerable party realignment and consequently high levels of electoral volatility. Still, the period spanning from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, party systems in Western Europe demonstrated extraordinary electoral stabilisation.[102] In retrospect, particularly the period Kirchheimer marked as the advent of the catch-all era is a period of stabilisation rather than of de-alignment of European electorates. During the late 1950s and 1960s the electoral volatility is lower than any other post-war decade. Although since the early 1970s this pronounced stability receded somewhat, there is no evidence of a linear trend of increasing electoral volatility over time. To analyse the relative variance around the mean over time and the consistency of electoral volatility, by way of calculating the standard deviation of each period, it emerges that, with the exception of the 1970s, there is no proof of increasing dispersion from the mean either. Both findings contradict Kirchheimer's assertion of increasing electoral instability. When

[102] Bartolini and Mair (1990, 100) calculated that, in the Lipset en Rokkan 'freeze-period' from 1918 until 1940, the total volatility was 9,9 percent per election on average, while the electoral volatility decreased in the period of 1945 until 1985 to an average of 8,7 percent per election. If the last period is broken down into two periods (1945-1965 and 1966-1985) the total volatility declined even more; from 9,0 percent in the first to 8,5 percent in the latter period. Under the assumption that volatility is not cumulative, Bartolini and Mair conclude from this that there is 91 percent electoral stability in Western Europe. Their overall conclusion is that there was growing stability in the larger European countries and growing instability in the smaller democracies of Europe, a point also observed by Pedersen. This finding clearly contradicts Kirchheimer's assertion that electoral competition would be more restricted in the smaller democracies.

both the average level of electoral volatility as well as the standard deviation of the countries are taken into account, it materialises that the majority of countries cluster together with means ranging between four and six percent electoral volatility and standard deviations between two and four. The deviant cases are France, Norway, the United Kingdom and Italy with high electoral instability and, on the other hand, Finland and Austria with relatively stable electoral alignments.

The French and Norwegian electorates have proven to be the most volatile in post-war Western Europe. Both party systems are characterised by high mean levels of volatility and high standard deviations. France, in particular, experienced electoral instability during and immediately after the transition of the Fourth French Republic into the Fifth Republic in 1958. In Norway electoral volatility increased since 1973 as a result of controversy over the country's entry into the European Community. The electoral success of new parties and internal schisms in the Norwegian Labour Party resulted in a previously unknown electoral shift. Towards the election of 1985 the electorate seemed to return to the earlier stable electoral pattern, yet the 1989-elections showed large losses for DNA and Hoyre, while the SV and FRP gained significantly. More than average volatility is also discernible in Italy. After initial high levels of electoral volatility in the 1950s the Italian electorate stabilised. During the 1060s and 1970s the Italian party system was characterised by a very stable pattern of electoral alignment. This stability lasted until the late 1980s when electoral volatility increased significantly. The elections of 1992 and 1994 (outside the period of analysis of this study) even 'exploded' the old Italian party system.

Electoral instability of the British party system is evidenced by the combination of a relatively high level of volatility and a high standard deviation. Particularly the British elections during the 1970s and the 1980s contributed to this pattern. The 1974-election, for example, showed high levels of electoral change as a result of electoral gains by nationalist parties and the liberals. The cross-time pattern of electoral change in the United Kingdom is relatively similar to developments in Denmark, Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands, with relatively stable partisan alignments until the 1970s. That the high average volatility in Denmark is the result of only a few a-typical elections is shown by the relatively low standard deviation. The Danish population showed strong party alignment and little electoral turnover for most of the post-war era. In sharp contrast, the election of 1973 was unparalleled in electoral volatility, when five new parties entered the Folketing which together mustered more than thirty-four per cent of the popular vote. Similarly, voting behaviour in the Netherlands was strikingly stable and predictable until the mid-1960s. Party-choice depended on church affiliation, church attendance, and social class. From the 1960s onwards the confessional parties started to lose their electoral appeal in a process which became known as 'de-pillarization' (Lijphart 1968). In 1967, for the first time in Dutch political history, the Christian democratic parties together did not poll fifty percent of the votes and, more important in coalitional terms, the Catholic People's Party was no longer the largest party. Forced by this weakened electoral and coalitional position, the confessional parties merged into one interconfessional party, much like the CDU in Germany. However, since the formation of the CDA in 1980, the Christian Democrats have not been as dominant in electoral terms as were the three individual confessional parties. In the 1980s the Dutch party system became structured around four parties (PvdA, CDA, VVD and D66). Sweden also experienced a lengthy period of electoral stability which lasted until the late 1960s. In

particular, the Senterpartiet and the MUP gained electoral support during elections in the 1970s, at the expense of the social democrats. Nevertheless, electoral volatility has remained at moderate levels compared to other countries.

Levels of electoral volatility below the European average are found in Germany, Belgium and Ireland. As already mentioned in chapter 2, the German Weimar Republic was characterised by high levels of electoral volatility. The elections held in 1920 and 1924 rank among the most volatile in West European electoral history. No wonder that, when the German party system after the Second World War unveiled very stable partisan alignments and only minor electoral changes, Kirchheimer saw this as evidence of a catch-all development. This electoral stability was particularly striking during the 1960s, when the dominance of the two major parties (CDU and SPD) reinforced this stasis. Only the ascent of the Grünen resulted in increasing levels of electoral change in the elections of 1983. Stability in electoral terms in Belgium was only breached by the 1963 elections, in which the social democratic and Christian democratic parties suffered significant electoral losses. Despite the emergence of new parties in the 1980s (Vlaams Blok, Ecolo and Agalev), which increased electoral volatility, overall, the Belgian party system is characterised by relatively stable electoral alignments. In the Irish party system the dominance of Fianna Fail largely stabilised electoral alignments. Over the entire post-war period the electorates of Finland and Austria proved to possess the lowest degree of electoral volatility. Most notably, Austria is characterised by very stable electoral relations between the major political actors of the post-war party system (SPÖ and ÖVP). During the 1970s, when other European countries experienced high levels of electoral volatility, the Austrian voters remained loyal to their partisan alignments. Only the more recent elections in 1986 and 1990 demonstrated increasing levels of electoral change. The most stable partisan alignments can be found in Finland, witnessed by the lowest average volatility as well as a very low standard deviation. Particularly the consistent support for Kesk, the SDP and the SFP over several decades contributed to this stability. Nevertheless, despite the overall moderate level of electoral change Finland experienced increasing electoral volatility. The elections of 1983 and 1987 showed significant electoral losses for the SKDL and LKP, while new parties (such as the environmental VIHR) and traditional parties (KOK and SFP) gained votes. These trends can be summarised by means of regression coefficients between electoral volatility and the year of observation.

Table 6.6 Trends in party electoral volatilities in Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK
beta (β)	-.01	-.03	-.02	-.08	.05	-.20	-.05	-.06	.10	-.01	-.01	-.02

The row beta ('β') provides the regression coefficient between electoral volatility and the year of the observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Regression analysis summarised in table 6.6 shows that, with the exception of France and the Netherlands, there is a declining trend in electoral volatility in the period under observation. During the last five decades the initially very volatile electorates of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy stabilised, resulting in a general average decline in the level of electoral volatility (β = -.02).

It seems, however, premature to conclude that the larger West European democracies have increasingly stable electoral results, while the smaller European countries are experiencing increasing instability (Mair 1993, 125). More recent French elections in 1993 and 1997 as well as the 1994-election in Italy showed exceptionally high levels of electoral volatility. The British elections of 1997 also gave the 'New' Labour Party of Tony Blair an unprecedented parliamentary majority. Blair won a land-slide victory over the Conservative Party and swept the Tories from power after they had been in office for more than eighteen years. Several of the smaller European countries, particularly Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands, have experienced increasing volatile elections in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In the 1994-elections in the Netherlands electoral volatility even increased to an unparalleled level of twenty-two per cent.

In sum, the period Kirchheimer marked as the dawn of catch-allism is rather characterised by low levels of electoral volatility than by partisan de-alignment. Elections during the late 1950s up until the early 1970s were **less** instead of more volatile in electoral terms. In this period most European countries political parties were able to build 'cosy cartels' of power and share the spoils of office. It seems more accurate to typify the period which followed, 1971 until 1985, as an epoch of profound electoral flux. Nevertheless, the traditional parties of Western Europe have shown, in particular during the 1950s that, in the face of momentous social change and electoral challenges from new competitors, they are able to stabilize partisan alignments and dominate the electoral market. To pursue this line of reasoning with regard to the predominance of the traditional parties in electoral terms, table 6.7 provides the mean level of electoral volatility of parties of different origin. Average electoral volatility of party families is measured by summing all individual volatilities of parties belonging to one party family, and dividing this total volatility by the number of parties. This generates a measure of average volatility for each of the respective party families in the nine periods. To summarise cross-time trends of electoral volatility the last column gives the regression coefficient of electoral volatility with the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 6.7 Average electoral volatility of Western European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*β*
cd	3.2	6.2	2.0	2.2	1.3	1.3	1.2	2.2	2.2	**2.4**	**3.7**	**-.11**
com	3.7	1.6	1.6	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.1	1.3	**1.6**	**2.2**	**.11**
con	3.1	3.9	1.4	3.3	1.6	4.3	5.0	2.0	2.4	**3.0**	**4.4**	**-.11**
sd	2.7	1.7	1.5	2.0	2.6	2.9	2.4	4.0	2.2	**2.4**	**3.4**	**.00**
soc	0.2	-	5.8	2.0	1.9	3.1	2.2	1.1	1.7	**2.5**	**3.1**	**-.14**
lib	2.7	1.3	1.9	2.2	1.9	2.5	1.5	1.2	1.9	**1.9**	**2.9**	**-.02**
eth	1.2	1.2	0.2	2.2	1.9	0.3	1.0	0.4	0.5	**1.0**	**1.3**	**-.23**
agr	1.4	1.0	0.7	0.1	2.3	2.0	2.1	1.7	0.6	**1.3**	**2.0**	**-.13**

Entries are the means of all volatility scores of parties belonging to one party families. Data from Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mackie and Rose 1974; 1989. The column and row indicated by an '*X*' provide the party family means and the average score of the period respectively. The column and row marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the party family. The column and row indicated by '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*). The column '*b*' provides the regression coefficient

between the electoral volatility and the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

After the first highly volatile post-war elections, most parties of the larger party families were able to decrease electoral volatility and stabilise mutual relations in the electoral arena. Nevertheless, Christian democratic parties experienced an electorally volatile period during the 1950s. Over time, however, their average level of electoral volatility declined. Electoral volatility of social democratic parties in Europe increased during the 1960s and the early 1980s, yet remained stable over time. Conservative parties in Western Europe underwent the highest levels of electoral volatility, particularly during the 1970s. The negative regression coefficient of the conservative parties shows that over time these parties have become less vulnerable to electoral change. In contrast to the general trend, socialist and agrarian parties experienced their highest level of volatility in the early 1960s, however, both party families have negative regression coefficients. Generally, the liberal parties experience very moderate changes in electoral support and seem to have a very stable level of electoral support. Ethnic parties have become electorally less vulnerable over time as well.

In all, there is little evidence of increasing electoral volatility over time when parties are grouped by genetic origin. Only the communist parties have experienced significantly more electoral vulnerability over time. All other party families experienced a declining or relatively stable level of electoral volatility between 1945 and 1990. These average levels and trends of electoral volatility are partly a function of the total level of support; the electorally largest parties can relatively lose more votes. To more closely examine the association between the level of popular support and electoral volatility the mean level of electoral support for the most important party families are summarised in table 6.8.

Table 6.8 Mean levels of electoral support for Western European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	*X*	*S*	*CV*
cd	31.4	31.3	27.9	26.3	23.3	20.2	24.8	23.9	23.2	**25.4**	**27.2**	**1.071**
com	13.1	10.8	9.1	9.5	9.1	8.5	8.8	7.3	6.0	**9.1**	**9.5**	**1.043**
con	20.8	25.3	25.3	27.7	28.5	26.0	25.9	29.1	29.1	**26.4**	**13.2**	**.500**
sd	30.4	30.2	30.0	30.0	30.1	29.2	29.3	27.8	27.4	**29.4**	**13.8**	**.469**
soc	-	-	6.1	4.6	6.5	5.4	4.0	6.4	7.9	**5.8**	**3.0**	**.517**
lib	11.0	10.1	9.5	9.8	10.0	8.5	8.4	8.5	9.4	**9.4**	**6.0**	**.638**
env	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.0	2.3	3.7	**2.7**	**1.9**	**.704**
eth	5.0	4.7	4.4	5.3	7.2	8.0	6.4	7.0	6.7	**6.1**	**2.5**	**.409**
agr	14.6	14.4	14.8	15.3	15.3	16.9	16.1	13.2	12.0	**14.7**	**5.7**	**.387**
prt	-	-	-	-	-	10.1	7.7	5.6	7.0	**7.6**	**4.3**	**.566**
S	**14.0**	**14.7**	**15.4**	**15.1**	**15.0**	**14.2**	**14.8**	**14.4**	**13.8**	**17.6**	**14.6**	**.829**

Entries are average levels of electoral support calculated as the mean of the percentage of the vote obtained in elections of all parties of one party family, divided by the number of parties. Data from Mackie and Rose 1974; 1989. Reports on more recent elections are taken from the European Journal of Political Research and Keesings Contemporary Archives. Note that not all parties within the party systems are included, only those included in this study are analysed here. The column indicated by an *X* provides

the party family means. The row and column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the party families respectively. The column indicated by '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*) of the different party families. A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Table 6.8 shows the decline in electoral support for the Christian democratic and social democratic parties in Western Europe; a process which clearly contradicts Kirchheimer's assertions that these parties would increase popular support with their catch-all strategy. If Christian democratic parties have opted for a catch-all strategy, then this tactic clearly backfired and has certainly not made confessional parties electorally more appealing. Confessional parties have lost a considerable share of their popular support since the 1950s when they polled around thirty per cent of the vote. Since the 1960s this level declined and Christian democratic electoral support in Western Europe hovers between twenty and twenty-five per cent. Parties of social-democratic origin also lost electoral support, from a steadfast average of over thirty percent between the 1950s and the 1970s to less than twenty-eight percent in the 1980s. This social democratic demise is part of a wider process of electoral corrosion of traditional left-wing parties, most ardently indicated by the electoral decline or even disappearance of the communist parties in Western Europe. While their electoral fortunes were already declining in the late 1950s, the communist option now seems to have disappeared from the ballot paper in most West European countries. In some party systems (in Norway and the Netherlands) the communists have merged with other parties in broader left-wing parties. In Italy, where the communist party has traditionally been strong, the party changed its name and moderated its ideological identity into a social democratic direction. In most elections after 1989, when the communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe were overthrown by popular uprisings, electoral decline of traditional left-wing parties could be witnessed, with the exception of electoral gains by some new-left socialist parties. More recent elections have resulted in victories for social democratic parties and have swept them into power in France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands.

In contrast, conservative parties have almost continuously increased their electoral support, from an average twenty per cent in the 1950s to over twenty-nine per cent on average in the 1980s. The popular support for liberal parties has lingered around the ten per cent level. Only during the 1970s and early 1980s did this level decline marginally; merely to increase again in the late 1980s. The agrarian parties first enlarged their mean level of electoral support from fourteen per cent in the 1950s to over sixteen per cent in the 1970s; yet the 1980s showed erosion of the electoral base of agrarian or centre parties. The ethnic parties attracted a stable level of popular support of around five per cent on average until the 1960s, when their level of electoral support increased to around seven per cent. These general trends are summarised by way of the regression coefficients between the level of electoral support and the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 6.9 Trends in electoral support over time of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	soc	lib	eth	agr
beta (β)	-.17	-.19	.15	-.07	.21	-.10	.36	-.08

The column 'beta (β)' provides the regression coefficient between the level of electoral support and the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

With the exception of the conservative parties, all major party families have a negative trend in popular support over time, making Kirchheimer's assertions on widespread electoral catch-all behaviour most unlikely. Additionally, parties which were explicitly excluded from the catch-all development by Kirchheimer, namely ethnic parties and more ideologically motivated parties on the left of the political spectrum, have gained in popular support.

In conclusion, there is no evidence of a secular trend towards increasing electoral volatility, yet neither is their confirmation of a constant decline in electoral turnover. The electorally larger party families have not strengthened their electoral position over time, instead most members of the major party families have lost some popular support. Despite the obvious conclusion that politics in Western Europe was characterised by long-term stability in electoral support, substantial electoral change can be observed particularly during the late 1980s and, although outside the scope of this study, increasingly so in the 1990s. In addition, Bartolini and Mair (1990, 89) found significant association between total volatility and class-cleavage volatility (volatility between blocks of parties with a common historical origin). Although very few West European elections are actually class-competitive, class cleavage volatility is highest in the larger democracies, in particular Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Tables 6.8 and 6.9 both confirm that communist and social democratic parties declined electorally to the benefit of conservative and, in some countries, liberal parties. In addition, there is also significant electoral movement across other cleavages, such as the religious divide, which is indicated by the electoral weakening of Christian democratic and agrarian parties. Since the mid-1960s a moderate trend towards class de-alignment is discernible, a trend which accelerates in the mid-1980s. Overall, however, electoral change across 'ideological frontiers' constituted only a modest proportion of the total volatility until the mid-1980s; which justifies the conclusion that up until that point in time voters remained loyal to parties belonging to the same ideological tendency. Notwithstanding the aforementioned trends of traditional parties in Western Europe, some parties, in particular those of social democratic origin, had to cope with significant losses of partisan identification and electoral support in addition to losses of traditional working-class backing. Therefore, it can be asserted that social class declined as a dimension of competition in West European party systems (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, 105). Furthermore, the process of secularisation has eroded the electoral base of Christian democratic parties. Still, all this has resulted in very diverse and sometimes contradictory patterns of electoral change with regard to the predictions of Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis. How have parties coped with these less secure electoral alignments? One possible strategy Kirchheimer himself suggested was that catch-all parties compensate their loss of direct association with the electorate by affiliating themselves to different organised interests in order to secure pools of voters.

6.3 Interest group representation

Throughout this book it was asserted that catch-all parties no longer represent one single social or religious group; instead they seek to represent a wider range of social

interests. This chapter has shown that most major parties have disconnected themselves from traditional supporters and appealed to a wider electorate. Kirchheimer argued that catch-all parties cope with this loss of traditional support and disjointed electoral relations by establishing solid links with interest groups (labour unions, religious or business organisations). These interest groups become the intermediaries between the electorate and the political elites.[103] These links between parties and organised interests may take numerous forms, whose study has culminated in an entire field of political science research on 'corporatist structures'. Interest groups can be important as pools for membership recruitment or, in the case of indirect membership, serve as an integral part of the membership party. Organised interests can also be meaningful in financial terms; as is the case when funds are generated through these organisations. Furthermore, organised interests can perform a role in the election campaigns of political parties. Already in 1954 Kirchheimer (1954b) stressed these financial and propagandistic functions of interest groups for political parties at election time. The network of interest organisations can also act as a means for policy-formulation and -implementation. The strength of the ties between political parties and organised interests, ranging from clear ancillary party organisations to independent political actors, is evaluated here on the basis of recruitment of cabinet ministers from these associations.

The rationale behind the decision to limit the analysis to cabinet ministers is that, when parties endow the most important and powerful office to delegates of organised interests they clearly present themselves as the representatives of these interests. In defence of the choice to analyse cabinet ministers and not parliamentary representatives, it can be argued that a minister is the most important representative of a political party (see Blondel 1991). In this study I only explore the extent to which European political parties have espoused interest groups by way of examining the nomination of representatives of these organised interests for public office by parties. First, this **fourth** indicator of catch-allism at the electoral level, the *increasing influence of interest groups*, is not only related to the electoral level. Nomination of interest-group representatives into powerful intra-party positions influences the policy-making process within political parties.[104] Furthermore, recruitment for political office and the selection of these candidates is also related to the organisational dimension (see chapter 4). An increasing number of professionals educated and trained outside the party organisation also indicates increasing professionalization of political parties. Still, the focus in this section is on the representative aspect, that is the professional and political background of party elites throughout Western Europe. Kirchheimer argued that catch-all parties will recruit more ministers on the basis of their technical and managerial expertise than on the basis of ideological criteria or political experience.

Unfortunately, there are no cross-national and longitudinal comparative data available on the social and professional origin of parliamentary representatives so that I could have analysed all post-war parliamentary representatives. There is, nevertheless, one data set on the social background and profession of government

[103] Finer 1970, 152; Schmitter 1983; Von Beyme 1985, 11-13, 191-196; Kitschelt 1994, 94-104.

[104] The incorporation of a variety of interests in the party-platform and the influence of interest groups representatives on the policy making process of the party, has also been studied by Laver and Hunt (1992). Laver and Hunt asked country experts to which extent they think political actors outside the official party organization can be used to apply pressure on the policy making process within the party. Their main findings are that particularly Scandinavian parties have strong links with external groups, while also Christian democratic and social democratic parties can rely on outside pressure groups for support.

ministers in European cabinets. This data set, collected by Blondel and Thiebault (1991), provides information on the educational and occupational background of cabinet ministers and on the political careers of these ministers (see also Blondel 1985). For those parties that have entered into government, this database allows to assess changes in the social descent of cabinet ministers and their political experience. In this study the data collected by Blondel and Thiebault are combined with the data-set of cabinet ministers of Woldendorp et al. (1993) in order to establish trends in external recruitment of cabinet ministers over time. Thus, it is possible to assess the level of external (non-parliamentary) recruitment of members of governmental elites of Western European parties, which indicates the extent to which parties represent organised interests and are willing to incorporate non-political experts to represent them in the highest executive office.

6.3.1 Origin and social background of cabinet ministers

Firstly, the general pattern of ministerial recruitment is presented here as these data provide insight in the different types of expertise parties find useful to levy into their party organisation and their ministerial team. The patterns of recruitment vary considerably between parties as is shown in table 6.11. The entries are mean percentages of the total number of ministers which held governmental responsibility in Western European from 1945 until 1985. The last occupation ministers performed before being recruited is used in the analysis.

Table 6.10 Parliamentary origin and social background of ministers in Western European countries 1945-1985

	parliament	farmers	industry	cadre	jurists	teachers	civil servants	military	journalists	white collar	blue collar	politician
Aut	67.7	0.0	20.2	8.4	9.5	4.8	16.7	2.4	1.2	0.0	20.2	16.7
Bel	86.9	0.0	13.0	10.1	21.6	26.1	6.7	1.4	5.1	1.4	8.7	5.8
Den	78.8	7.9	8.6	6.6	6.6	15.8	15.2	2.0	13.2	2.0	5.3	15.8
Fin	62.4	7.5	11.7	18.2	5.3	13.9	23.5	1.3	8.6	0.5	4.8	2.1
Fra	68.9	2.0	13.4	11.0	23.2	11.4	25.2	1.6	6.3	0.4	2.0	2.0
Ger	73.6	5.8	6.6	6.7	25.8	6.6	5.8	0.0	3.3	15.0	5.0	20.0
Ire	95.9	2.1	22.7	7.2	20.6	17.6	4.2	7.2	1.0	1.0	9.3	4.1
Ita	94.3	0.9	10.9	5.2	39.6	19.6	3.5	0.4	9.1	2.2	3.9	3.5
Net	52.9	0.7	17.6	5.1	18.2	15.6	24.9	2.7	4.7	0.0	3.4	2.7
Nor	57.1	1.9	12.3	7.5	5.1	11.0	15.6	0.0	6.5	5.2	9.7	24.7
Swe	61.3	7.7	3.8	7.6	7.7	23.1	11.5	0.0	15.4	3.8	3.8	15.4
UK	95.1	2.1	19.5	3.8	17.0	11.3	9.5	4.4	10.7	0.0	14.4	7.5
X	**75.5**	**2.9**	**13.3**	**8.4**	**18.4**	**14.4**	**14.4**	**1.9**	**7.1**	**2.3**	**6.8**	**8.5**

Entries are percentages of ministers from a certain professional background. Data from Blondel 1985. parliament = percentage of ministers with parliamentary background. The other rows represent the occupation ministers held before being recruited as ministers: farmers = farmers, industry = people from business and industry, cadre = cadre/professional background, jurists = people from the legal professions, teachers = teachers, civil servants = civil servants, military = military, journalists = journalists, white collar = white collar employees, blue collar = blue collar and/or union background, politician = full time politician. The row indicated with an 'X' gives the overall European mean of ministers recruited from this professional background.

The occupational background of ministers are categorised in eleven types, summarised in columns 2 to 12. The first column provides the proportion of ministers with parliamentary experience. The first important observation is that the largest proportion of the ministers in Western Europe are recruited from the legal professions. Almost one out of every five ministers started their career as a judge, lawyer or law professor. Particularly in Italy the proportion of ministers with a legal background was very high, almost forty percent of recruited ministers studied law. Legal expertise was also very prominent among ministers in Germany and France, where a quarter of all ministers concluded a legal education. In Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Britain the proportion of legal experts was around the 20 percent. Another professional group which is highly represented in European cabinets are teachers; one in six ministers taught at schools, in higher education or at university (law professors have been included in the category of the legal professionals). The highest proportion of teachers can be found in Belgian cabinets; one in four Belgian ministers were teachers before accepting a ministerial position. Also in Sweden the proportion of former teachers is high, 23 per cent, while in Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands and Finland the percentage of teachers is also substantial. The third best represented profession in European cabinets are civil servants. Here again Belgium has the highest proportion of civil servants occupying ministerial posts. Like Belgium, also in Sweden one fifth of ministers have worked in state employment. In Italy, Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands a considerable proportion of ministers have worked as civil servants before being appointed minister. Another important observation which has to be made is that the interests of industry, business and banking are much better represented at the governmental level than workers and their unions; twice as many ministers are recruited from among the employers compared to representatives of wage dependent strata. Particularly in Ireland, Austria, Britain and the Netherlands industrialists, business men and women and bankers have been very successful in obtaining ministerial positions. Only in Austria and Britain can it be said that workers or their representatives achieve almost equal representation. In all other countries the employers are better represented in cabinet than their employees. Farmers are best represented in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark and Finland) and Germany at the ministerial level. Not surprisingly this is where (remnants) of agrarian parties are best represented in parliament. The military profession is not very successful in gaining direct ministerial control, with the exception of Ireland. Journalists are best represented in Danish, Swedish and British governments.

Important with respect to Kirchheimer's thesis of de-politicisation is the proportion of ministers parties recruit from within their party organisation. Within catch-all parties the number of internally trained politicians will decline and devoted party officials will become an endangered species since they are far too ideologically and

policy motivated, instead of electorally oriented and office-seeking. In the last column of table 6.10 the proportion of ministers which are full time professional party-politicians is given. This table shows that in Norway, Germany, Austria, Denmark and Sweden a significant share of ministerial positions is filled with full-time party officials. In Norway one quarter, in Germany one in five and in Austria, Denmark and Sweden one in six ministerial posts are occupied by people who have no career outside the party. The lowest levels of internal recruitment are found in Finland, France, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands.

As argued above, with regard to the catch-all thesis, it is also important to examine the proportion of ministers recruited from the national parliamentary party. Theoretically, a high level of catch-allism correlates with a low level of parliamentary recruitment. The mean levels of parliamentary recruitment of ministers in European countries are given in the first column of table 6.10. Overall, three quarters of European ministers held a seat in parliament before joining a government. In all countries the majority of ministers are recruited from the parliamentary party, yet substantial differences between countries exist. In Ireland, Britain and Italy more than ninety per cent of the ministers have been in the national parliament. The high scores for Ireland and Britain are not surprising as it is stipulated by law that ministers have to be members of parliament. For Belgium this percentage is also near the ninety percent level. In Germany and Denmark between seventy and eighty percent and in Austria, Finland, France and Sweden between sixty and seventy percent of the ministers have parliamentary experience before entering a cabinet. The lowest levels of experience at the national political level among ministers is found in the Netherlands and Norway. More than half of the ministers in Western Europe have been parliamentary representatives (see also De Winter 1991). This very static analysis is extended in the next section, where the external recruitment over time is summarised.

6.3.2 External recruitment of ministers

External recruitment in this section refers to recruitment of ministers who have not held seats in the national parliament. By combining the data from Blondel and Thiebault (1991) with the information from Woldendorp et al. (1993) it is possible to quantify the level of external recruitment of ministers over time. Kirchheimer regarded ministerial appointments on the basis of their expertise and skills, rather than on political grounds as an integral part of the catch-all development. Increasing proportions indicate a transformation in recruitment pattern towards the catch-all model. Table 6.11 summarises the average level of external recruitment of ministers, ministers without parliamentary experience, in the different countries.

Table 6.11 Mean proportion of external recruitment of ministers of West European parties 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	X	S	CV
Aut	51.1	16.7	22.5	20.6	18.3	19.3	29.7	58.8	51.3	**34.2**	**31.2**	**.912**
Bel	16.4	5.6	5.0	5.8	10.5	0.7	4.7	4.5	7.0	**7.0**	**9.0**	**1.286**
Den	18.7	28.5	23.8	37.9	45.8	37.4	27.9	29.6	30.8	**31.8**	**16.6**	**.522**
Fin	53.8	34.7	32.4	37.2	30.5	37.6	22.7	20.8	25.0	**32.9**	**24.3**	**.739**
Fra	28.8	0.0	7.1	5.2	27.0	6.5	18.9	22.1	51.5	**17.3**	**22.7**	**1.312**
Ger	63.4	75.0	69.9	30.8	27.3	17.8	8.7	13.3	19.3	**34.6**	**26.7**	**.772**
Ire	0.0	0.0	2.7	6.9	6.7	2.4	0.0	3.7	9.2	**3.3**	**6.6**	**2.000**
Ita	1.2	0.6	0.7	1.0	0.3	0.7	1.2	1.1	2.6	**1.1**	**2.3**	**2.090**
Net	44.4	45.4	58.8	44.1	47.7	45.7	25.5	28.3	28.5	**41.5**	**25.5**	**.614**
Nor	50.0	69.2	57.0	35.7	36.3	25.6	51.2	31.3	31.3	**36.1**	**21.3**	**.590**
Swe	48.2	16.5	19.6	35.7	35.1	38.9	13.7	20.9	25.7	**23.2**	**18.7**	**.806**
UK	20.0	27.6	18.5	11.3	8.7	0.0	2.3	4.5	4.5	**10.7**	**10.7**	**1.000**
X	**33.0**	**26.7**	**26.5**	**22.7**	**24.5**	**19.4**	**17.2**	**19.9**	**23.9**	**23.4**	**-**	**-**
S	**31.8**	**28.5**	**25.9**	**24.9**	**27.4**	**21.7**	**14.7**	**19.5**	**23.0**	**24.4**	**-**	**-**

Data from Blondel (1985) and from Woldendorp et al. (1993). Entries are the percentage of ministers which have no political experience in national parliament prior to their appointment as minister. Note that the mean score of external recruitment in this table and the overall average percentage of ministers with parliamentary expertise in column 1 of table 6.10 do not add up to one hundred per cent due to different a period of analysis by Blondel. Columns and rows indicated by an *X* provide the average score by period and the country means. The row and column marked by '*S*' provide the standard deviation for the periods and the countries respectively. The column indicated by '*CV*' provide the coefficient of variance (*S*/*X*) of the parties within one party system. A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

In contrast to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, the level of external (non-parliamentary) recruitment of ministers declined from an average of more than thirty per cent in the 1950s to less than twenty-four per cent in the late 1980s. In the mid-1960s, the point at which Kirchheimer regarded the catch-all development to mature, there is indeed an increasing propensity in external recruitment of ministers. Denmark, France, Ireland and Austria (and arguably Italy) are the cases which show a trend towards increasing external recruitment. Overall the opposite trend is dominant; increasing proportions of ministers are recruited on the basis of their political expertise which they acquired in the national parliamentary parties. During the post-war period the differences in levels of external recruitment have declined as is indicated by a decreasing standard deviation over time.

This cross-time variation can result from essentially two possible types of transformation; either parties change their source of recruitment over time or different parties with different modes of recruitment enter into governments. In examining the cases, it emerges that both types exist. The French Fourth Republic constituted a period of extensive parliamentary recruitment of ministers. During the Fifth Republic an increasing number of ministers is recruited from outside politics. The steep rise in external ministerial recruitment in the 1980s is largely the effect of socialist governmental control at play since 1981. In Austria the SPÖ shifted in the late 1970s from

total parliamentary recruitment to more external ministerial recruitment.

The highest levels of external ministerial recruitment are found in Norway, the Netherlands and Germany. The high level of external recruitment in Norway is closely related to the high level of social democratic governmental control. Two modes of ministerial recruitment seem to emerge in Norway: DNA and Venstre recruit only half or less of their ministers from the parliamentary group, while Hoyre, KrF and Senterpartiet enlisted around three quarters of their ministers from their parliamentary party. Dutch ministers are also often recruited from outside parliamentary politics on the basis of expertise and experience in certain policy fields (Andeweg 1988). During the period of 'pillarization' (until 1967) many ministers were recruited on a non-political basis (usually expertise) as broad coalitions necessitated politically non-controversial and widely acceptable ministers. As a result, many cabinets of the immediate post-war period had a high non-political character in ministerial recruitment. In the first four post-war cabinets some ministers were not even affiliated to one particular party (Bakema and Secker 1988). Nevertheless, since the early 1970s an increasing number of ministers is recruited on political grounds (see also Daalder 1987, 213). The differences in parliamentary recruitment between parties were substantial in the Netherlands; the Christian democrats recruited only fifty per cent of their ministers from their parliamentary group, while the secular parties adopted a more political mode of ministerial recruitment. The Dutch social democrats recruited more than seventy percent of its ministers from politically experienced candidates. In Germany the average high level of external recruitment is primarily a function of the highly 'technocratic' post-war CDU-cabinets in the 1950s. In the 1960s ministerial recruitment politicised rapidly in Germany. Again this can easily be explained with the differences between parties; the CDU, which controlled the executive until 1966, was also the party with the lowest proportion of ministers with a parliamentary background. Since the SPD recruited more than eighty percent of their ministers from the socialist parliamentary group, their entry in the 'Grand Coalition' decreased the number of external ministers considerably. Political recruitment has since dominated in German politics, also within the CDU/CSU. In Sweden, Austria and Finland a substantial proportion, around thirty per cent of all ministers, was also offered an executive ministerial position without any prior parliamentary experience. Here the level of external recruitment also results from the dominance of the social democratic parties, which recruited a significant number of ministers from external interests groups. In Sweden more than half of the social democratic ministers came from outside the parliamentary party. The Swedish conservatives and Senterpartiet recruited a large majority, over eighty per cent, of ministers from their parliamentary party, while half of the Fp-ministers also had parliamentary experience. The high number of non-parliamentary ministers in Finland is again largely the result of the external recruitment of the SDP; just over sixty percent of the SDP ministers have been MP's. KESK and KOK drew almost ninety percent of their ministers from the parliamentary party, whereas the Swedish People's Party had the lowest parliamentary recruitment with less than sixty percent of its ministers from their parliamentary party.

The lowest level of external recruitment and consequently very 'political' appointments of ministers, was found in Belgium and Italy, where almost all ministers are recruited from the parliamentary parties. Parliamentary recruitment of ministers is characteristic for the Italian political culture, the '*partitocracia*' (see Sartori 1971). The PSI and DC are the only parties which recruit ministers from extra-parliamentary

groups. Belgian politics is also characterised by very 'political' ministerial recruitment. External expertise is seldom incorporated in cabinet coalitions; the Christian democrats are the only party with a fair amount of ministers recruited from external organisations. Logically, high levels of parliamentary recruitment of ministers were found in Ireland and United Kingdom. This results from the Westminster model of government, where the party with a parliamentary majority elects its Prime Minister from its parliamentary party who, in turn, selects ministers from the members of parliament. In Ireland the constitution also stipulates that ministers are to be recruited from parliament. These national trends are summarised by means of regression coefficients between external ministerial recruitment and the year of observation as the independent variable in table 6.12.

Table 6.12 Trends in external ministerial recruitment over time in Western Europe 1945-1990

	Aut	Bel	Den	Fin	Fra	Ger	Ire	Ita	Net	Nor	Swe	UK
beta (β)	.18	-.29	.12	-.31*	.24	-.80*	.32	.14	-.30*	-.29	-.17	-.79*

The column 'beta (β)' provides the regression coefficient between extra-parliamentary ministerial recruitment and the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

This table conclusively shows that, contrary to the catch-all thesis, in most countries the level of recruitment of non-political experts and professionals declined over time. The overall regression coefficient between the level of extra-parliamentary ministerial recruitment and the year of observation as the independent variable is a statistically significant -.13 (β). This trend was chiefly discernible in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Belgium. The only countries where the trend is in the direction as predicted by the catch-all thesis are Austria, Denmark, France and Italy. If anything, what is occurring in Western Europe is rather politicisation of the executive power rather than the direct inclusion of organised interests in the executive branch of government. An increasing number of ministers in Western Europe is recruited from the national parliaments and have clear party-political contours. This does not mean that organised interests have not gained more access to power. It may well be that the representatives of these interests are first allocated parliamentary seats so that they can acquire the necessary political expertise. Nevertheless, direct extra-parliamentary recruitment of non-political experts and professionals from interest groups, as Kirchheimer suggested, has not come to characterise West European politics.

As described above, differences in the proportion of externally recruited ministers between parties of different genetic origin may result from historical and ideological modes of elite recruitment. The next section examines these differences between party families more closely in summarising their pattern of ministerial recruitment.

Table 6.13 Parliamentary origin and social background of ministers of West European party families 1945-1985

	parliament	farmers	industry	cadre	jurists	teachers	civil servants	military	journalists	white collar	blue collar	politician
com	80.0	4.0	0.0	8.0	12.0	8.0	16.0	0.0	24.0	0.0	12.0	16.0
sd	76.7	1.4	5.7	9.1	11.9	16.4	14.7	0.7	9.4	2.3	15.0	12.2
cd	80.3	1.2	16.1	6.0	27.0	16.0	12.3	0.5	4.8	3.6	5.0	7.5
agr	86.7	23.0	9.5	23.0	0.0	6.8	12.2	1.4	8.1	4.1	2.7	5.4
lib	82.5	3.6	16.3	6.3	29.4	21.7	7.7	1.4	7.2	2.3	0.0	4.5
con	89.7	2.8	25.5	7.5	18.8	7.6	13.1	5.5	6.2	1.0	1.7	9.0
X	**82.7**	**6.0**	**12.2**	**10.0**	**16.5**	**12.8**	**12.7**	**1.6**	**10.0**	**2.2**	**6.1**	**9.1**

Data from Blondel (1985). parliament = percentage of ministers with parliamentary background. The other rows represent the occupation ministers held before being recruited as ministers: farmers = farmers, industry = people from business and industry, cadre = cadre/professional background, jurists = people from the legal professions, teachers = teachers, civil servants = civil servants, military = military, journalists = journalists, white collar = white collar employees, blue collar = blue collar and/or union background, politician = full time politician. The row indicated with an '*X*' gives the overall European mean of ministers recruited from this professional background.

With regard to social background of ministers, it emerges that 'traditional' groups are best represented at the ministerial level of 'their' party family. Agrarian parties, for example, had the highest level of farmers as ministers; the social democrats recruited the highest proportion of blue-collar workers and union representatives as ministers and the conservatives and liberals had the highest percentage of industrialists and bankers as cabinet ministers. Social democratic and communist parties also have the highest level of full-time politicians as ministers, which is in line with the tradition of extensive political education within these party organisations and the remnants of the ideology of democratic centralism. Christian democratic parties have a very diverse pattern of ministerial recruitment indicating their ability to cross-cut class lines and occupational stratification in general. The best represented occupational group among Christian democratic cabinet ministers are those trained in the legal profession, yet teachers, industrialists, bankers and civil servants are also likely to be found among Christian democratic ministers.

On average, there are only minimal differences between party families with respect to the proportion of ministers with parliamentary experience. Thus, ministerial recruitment seems more influenced by national political cultures and practices than by the origin or ideology of parties. Within the marginal differences, social democratic and communist parties recruit less ministers from their parliamentary party and more from their own party organisation in comparison to the other party families. To evaluate the proportion of external recruitment over time, table 6.14 summarises the mean proportions of ministers without parliamentary experience in the different party families.

Table 6.14 The level of external recruitment of ministers by West European party families 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990	X	S	CV
cd	34.4	35.4	36.7	34.0	30.3	28.0	15.2	13.5	18.8	28.6	27.2	.951
con	-	7.5	12.9	16.2	15.6	14.0	5.6	15.7	11.6	14.2	18.4	1.296
sd	21.9	21.0	23.1	16.1	19.0	19.0	18.4	23.7	27.2	21.1	21.3	1.009
lib	25.1	28.2	24.0	34.6	41.4	22.7	16.0	23.8	25.8	26.3	27.3	1.038
agr	-	21.0	12.5	24.4	37.3	31.3	21.2	17.1	16.7	23.6	20.1	.851

Data from Blondel (1985) and Woldendorp et al. (1993). Entries are the percentage of ministers which have no political experience in national parliament prior to their appointment as minister. The column indicated by an *X* provides the party family means. The row and column marked by '*S*' provides the standard deviation for the periods and the party families respectively. The column indicated by '*CV*' provides the coefficient of variance (*S*/ *X*) of the different party families. A minus sign (-) means that data were not available or could not be calculated.

Of the largest party families the Christian democratic and agrarian parties recruited more external representatives and experts from organised interests. The Christian democratic parties in Western Europe showed a very stable level of thirty per cent of external, 'non-political' recruitment of ministers until the 1970s. Thereafter, Christian democratic parties have opted for more 'political', parliamentary recruitment of their ministers. The agrarian parties recruited an increasing number of external representatives during the 1970s, although the number of ministers from outside the parliamentary party declined in the 1980s. After an initial period of increasing external recruitment, the 1970s marked a turning point for liberal parties, it was then that they began admitting more people with parliamentary experience to represent them in government. Social democratic ministerial recruitment was characterised by a decline in non-political experts until the 1980s, thereafter, an increasing number of social democratic ministers have had no parliamentary political experience. The conservative parties had, over the post-war period, a relatively moderate level of external recruitment. Cross-time trends in external ministerial recruitment of party families are summarised by way of a regression analysis between the level of recruitment of ministers without political experience and the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 6.15 Trends in extra-parliamentary ministerial recruitment of West European party families 1945-1990

	cd	com	con	sd	soc	lib	eth	agr
beta (β)	-.27*	-.72*	-.17	.04	-	-.07	.20	-.16

The column 'beta (β)' provides the regression coefficient between extra-parliamentary ministerial recruitment and the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates that the significance level (*t*) is below the five percent level (t = < .05).

Over time, members of almost all party families have, contrary to the catch-all thesis, recruited less individuals which had no prior political expertise before their appointment as cabinet minister. Stated differently, most party families adopted more 'political' patterns of ministerial recruitment and selected an increasing number of ministers from their parliamentary party. Only the social democratic and ethnic parties have recruited an increasing proportion of non-political external experts as cabinet ministers.

In sum, there is little evidence to suggest that ministerial recruitment has become based more on technical and managerial skills and less on political grounds as Kirchheimer suggested. In fact, there is more testimony that the opposite trend has been dominant and ministerial recruitment became increasingly 'political' in Western Europe as the number of ministers with parliamentary experience increased. This finding clearly contradicts Kirchheimer's assertion that parties in Western Europe would seek to represent various social interests through recruitment of experts and professionals from non-parliamentary domains.

6.4 Conclusion: electoral catch-allism of West European parties

At the electoral level the catch-all thesis could only be corroborated to a limited extent. Indeed, Kirchheimer had correctly asserted that political parties in Western Europe would appeal to voter groups outside their traditional pools of support. Across Western Europe, an overall and substantial decline in class-voting is discernible at the electoral level during the post-war period, although there are significant differences between countries and party families. In France, Germany and the Netherlands, for example, the class-distinctiveness of political parties did not decline significantly. Nevertheless, in all other countries class-voting did decline, despite the fact that this process was less expeditious than the structural decline of the manual working-class in the total labour force. In general, Western European electorates became progressively middle-class dominated as the manual working-class 'disappeared' upwards into the non-manual white collar social strata. This upward social mobility of the manual working class into the middle classes resulted in increasingly middle-class dominated constituencies of social democratic, Christian democratic and liberal parties, particularly since the late 1970s. Since the working class traditionally voted for social democratic and Christian democratic parties, their constituencies have undergone the most profound restructuring. Particularly the deliberate strategy of Christian democratic parties to employ a cross-class electoral appeal has faltered in the most recent decades. Despite the fact that the working-class electorate declined, the de-alignment of European electorates should not be exaggerated; within the electorate of social democratic and communist parties there is still an overrepresentation of the working class constituency. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of social class for voting behaviour weakened decisively in the West European context.

In addition, the passive support for political parties, when measured by the level of party identification, decreased considerably in most European countries since the late 1960s. This justifies the conclusion that a general weakening of the traditional link between parties and their voters has taken place, as Kirchheimer stated. This decline in partisan attachment resulted in increasingly volatile elections, particularly in Den-

mark, the Netherlands and Norway, while the initially very volatile electorates of France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Ireland stabilised somewhat. Higher levels of electoral turnover were largely caused by the decline in electoral support of communist, social-democratic and Christian democratic parties. Still, the period which Kirchheimer marked as the ascent of the Western European catch-all party, is characterised by low levels of electoral turnover and limited party competition. In contrast, the 1970s and early 1980s were characterised by increasing electoral volatility. As a result of the post-war economic restructuring process and consequent social transformation parties have inevitably become more electorally vulnerable. The traditional parties of social democratic, Christian democratic, agrarian, liberal and conservative origin, have however, largely maintained control over the electoral market. Relatively few new political competitors have made serious electoral inroads in West European party systems.

To compensate for the loss of clear representation of social strata and strong party-voter links, Kirchheimer argued that catch-all parties seek association with the electorate through organised interest groups. This study found that parties in Western Europe have not established stronger links with the electorate via interest groups. Indeed, there is proof of a steady decline in external (non-parliamentary) recruitment of ministers; only in the mid-1970s and the late 1980s were a larger number of ministers appointed on the basis of their expertise and skills, rather than on the basis of political experience in parliament. Thus, there was little evidence to suggest that ministerial recruitment has become increasingly based on technical and managerial skills and less on political grounds as Kirchheimer suggested. On the contrary, ministerial recruitment became progressively more 'political' in Western Europe as a larger number of ministers were recruited from the parliamentary parties. Only the social democratic parties strengthened the representational links with external groups through the recruitment of ministers without any parliamentary background.

To examine Kirchheimer's claim that in particular the major traditional parties are prone to adopt catch-all characteristics, table 6.16 reports the correlations between the four indices of electoral catch-allism and indicators of ancientry (the age of party), electoral strength and organisational continuity of political parties (the number of splits and mergers).

Table 6.16 Correlation matrix of electoral indicators with party age, electoral size and organisational discontinuity

	PARTY AGE	ELECTORAL SIZE	ORGANIZATIONAL DISCONTINUITY
class distinctiveness	-.03	-.13	-.15
party identification	.38**	.94**	.01
electoral volatility	-.08	-.02	-.04
external recruitment	.02	.01	-.03

The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients. The asterisk indicate statistical significance at the 0.01 level (*) or at the 0.001 level (**). Definitions and measurement of the variables is explained in Appendix 2.

As can be seen from table 6.16, most indices of electoral catch-allism are unrelated to the indicators of seniority, significance and stamina of parties. Only the level of party identification is strongly associated with the life-span of parties and even more with its level of popular support at elections.

As in the earlier chapters, to analyse the development of catch-allism over time, all the indicators on the electoral dimension are standardised into z-scores and recalculated so that a high score indicates more electoral catch-allism than a low score in order to establish the relative level of catch-allism across time. Cross-time trends in class-distinctiveness of party electorates, external ministerial recruitment, party identification and electoral volatility are summarised in standardised z-scores in table 6.17.

Table 6.17 Cross-time developments in the level of electoral catch-allism in Western Europe 1945-1990

	1945 1950	1951 1955	1956 1960	1961 1965	1966 1970	1971 1975	1976 1980	1981 1985	1986 1990
class-distinctiveness	-.85	.20	-.11	-.13	-.12	.15	.19	-.06	.08
party-identification	-	-	-	-.22	-.44	-.04	-.02	.09	.15
volatility	.02	.04	.07	-.04	-.06	.02	.02	.01	-.07
external recruitment	.33	.03	.10	.06	.16	-.07	-.36	-.16	-.02

The variable names are explained in appendix II. A z-score is obtained by finding the deviation of the score from the mean of the distribution and dividing the result by the standard deviation (z = (x - avg)/s). The higher the standard score, the more West European parties have moved towards catch-allism on this indicator.

Clearly, this table shows that there is no evidence of a incessant development towards electoral catch-allism on all indicators. If anything, a trend contrary to the assumptions of the catch-all thesis is discernible on two indicators of the electoral dimension, namely with regard to volatility and external recruitment of ministers. Only with respect to party identification there is strong evidence that Kirchheimer correctly asserted that the party-voter link is weakening in West European party systems. Table 6.17 shows the continuous decline in the average level of party identification, indicating the disjointment of European electorates with their political representatives. Apparently, the average level of electoral volatility remains relatively stable over the entire post-war period and even declined in the late 1980s, resulting in a lower standard score of electoral catch-allism in the last period. External recruitment

declined almost constantly over the post-war period, only the mid-1970s and 1980s show a more non-political pattern of ministerial recruitment. This partially makes for a development contrary to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis on this indicator as well. Instead of incorporating more interest-group representatives, ministerial recruitment became more political over time. With regard to the class-distinctiveness of the parties' electorate, Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis is also only confirmed to a certain extent. Kirchheimer correctly observed that particularly during the 1950s and 1960 class-distinctiveness of the electorate of individual parties declined constantly. However, the late 1970 and the 1980s mark a period in which this process was reversed and the support of parties in Western Europe became more distinctive with regard to social complexion.

Similar to previous chapters, the assumption of a uni-dimensional electoral catch-all concept is examined with a reliability test and was rejected (see appendix 3). There is no single underlying dimension of electoral catch-allism. Instead, two latent factors underpin the electoral behaviour of political parties of which the first factor is the ***width of electoral appeal***. The factor analysis shows that the class basis of party support and the intensity of party identification are correlated with this first underlying factor. The level of party identification is negatively associated with this latent factor, while class-distinctiveness of party support is correlated positively with this 'electoral appeal' factor. This suggests that the more parties are class-distinctive, fewer people can identify with this party, namely only those who regard themselves part of the core constituency. Apparently, some parties still have a distinct representative image in the eyes of the electorate. People's parties with a broad social appeal, on the other hand, allow a larger proportion of the electorate to identify with the party. Both items are considered to constitute the poles of what shall be paraphrased as 'the electoral appeal-factor' of political party behaviour.

The second latent factor will be coined the ***'level of social inclusion'*** of political parties. On this factor electoral volatility is positively associated with the level of external (extra-parliamentary) recruitment of ministers. Apparently, parties which opened up their organisation to non-partisan elites from external interest groups are also more vulnerable to electoral fluctuation. Both these items point towards a party's sensitivity towards penetration by non-traditional, external influences both at the elite level as well as in terms of voters. Recruitment of ministers with no political expertise makes the party less recognisable for their traditional voters, yet these 'new and fresh faces' in the elite can also proof to have electoral advantages in attracting new voters. From the other side, non-affiliated individuals with political ambitions will rather seek contact with a party elite which does not require their members to perform all sorts of intra-party obligations and traditional 'routes' to ministerial power. Additionally, elites which are pragmatic and primarily electorally motivated, as opposed to ideologically motivated politicians, will sooner invite talented, yet unaffiliated, professionals into the party leadership in order to raise the party's governing potential.

Since the items 'party identification' and 'class-distinctiveness of the electoral profile' load substantially on one factor, the standard z-scores on both items are summated into one single score indicating the relative catch-allness or ***width of a party's electoral appeal***. Individual party scores on the items 'electoral volatility' and 'external ministerial recruitment' are similarly mediated into one standard score indicating the

level of social inclusion. All scores have been recalculated so that higher scores mean relatively higher levels of catch-allism. In table 6.17 the countries included in this study have been rank-ordered according to their level of catch-allism in descending order.

Table 6.18 Cross-time development of electoral catch-allism (in z-scores) in West European countries 1945-1990

WIDTH OF ELECTORAL APPEAL						SOCIAL INCLUSION					
1945 1960		1961 1975		1975 1990		1945 1960		1961 1975		1976 1990	
Ita	.60	Ita	.73	Ita	.58	Ger	.85	Net	.30	Aut	.24
Aut	.44	Fra	.24	Bel	.42	Net	.38	Nor	.30	Fra	.21
Ger	.34	Bel	.20	Nor	.38	Fin	.38	Den	.29	Net	.10
Fra	.19	Nor	.11	Den	.28	Aut	.20	Ger	.16	Nor	.05
UK	.11	Ire	-.05	Fra	.24	Den	.08	Fin	.11	Den	.02
Net	-.10	Den	-.09	Aut	.06	UK	.04	Aut	-.08	Swe	-.06
Nor	-.75	Ger	-.21	Fin	-.11	Nor	.04	Swe	.05	Fin	-.09
Swe	-.75	Net	-.27	UK	-.06	Swe	.01	UK	.01	Ger	-.12
Den	-.84	Fin	-.40	Ger	-.26	Fra	-.11	Ire	-.11	UK	-.19
Fin	-1.06	Swe	-.42	Ire	.27	Bel	-.13	Fra	-.17	Bel	-.21
		UK	-.42	Net	-.40	Ita	-.23	Bel	-.23	Ita	-.25
		Aut	-.63	Swe	-.47	Ire	-.37	Ita	-.33	Ire	-.32

Entries are average z-scores, measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. The first column provides the standard score of the width of the electoral appeal, INCLUSION = the level of social inclusion (openness) at both the elite level as well as the level of voters.

The relative standing of party systems differs substantially on these factors; highest levels of catch-allism in terms of the electoral appeal of political parties are found in Italy and France, with Belgium and Norway also ranking in the upper bracket of the distribution. Concerning the level of social inclusion, however, France, and particularly Italy score relatively low on the catch-all scale. Lowest levels of transformation in electoral appeal towards the catch-all model are discernible in Sweden and Finland, yet at the elite level these party systems are also very inaccessible. Regarding this social inclusion at the elite level, the Netherlands consistently ranks at the upper echelons of the distribution, while Norway, Austria and Finland can also be found among the highest ranking countries. At the bottom of the distribution in terms of social inclusion are, next to Italy, also Belgium and Ireland. In very few party systems parties have both adopted a very inclusive strategy at the level of the voters as well as at the elite level. In most countries the relative level of catch-allism increased in terms of the width of the electoral appeal of parties, with the exception of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. With respect to the social inclusion of parties, parties in most countries have not transformed in a manner Kirchheimer predicted. Levels of electoral volatility have not increased significantly

over time and recruitment of cabinet ministers in not progressively on the basis of expertise outside parliamentary politics.

In terms of transformation at the electoral dimension, Kirchheimer rightly asserted that parties of different origin are not equally successful in adopting the catch-all strategy. This proved to be a valid hypothesis as table 6.19 shows. Party families are rank-ordered in descending order according to the extent to which they have developed towards the catch-all model on the electoral factors.

Table 6.19 Cross-time development in electoral catch-allism (in z-scores) of West European party families 1945-1990

WIDTH OF ELECTORAL APPEAL						SOCIAL INCLUSION					
1945 1960		1961 1975		1975 1990		1945 1960		1961 1975		1976 1990	
cd	.63	sd	.20	com	.44	cd	.31	agr	.36	sd	.05
lib	.06	cd	.19	sd	.22	lib	.20	lib	.17	con	.03
sd	-.06	com	.11	agr	.22	con	.14	com	.14	lib	-.01
com	-.29	lib	-.13	lib	.15	agr	-.01	cd	.05	cd	-.22
con	-.67	agr	-.65	cd	-.22	sd	-.03	sd	-.20	agr	-.27
agr	-1.55	con	-.78	con	-.62	com	-.37	con	-.23	com	-.36

Entries are average z-scores, measured as the deviation from the mean of the distribution divided by the standard deviation. A high score means a relative high level of catch-allism, while a low or negative score indicates a low level of catch-allism in comparison to the other parties. APPEAL = the width of the electoral appeal, INCLUSION = the level of social inclusion (openness) at both the elite level as well as the level of voters.

In terms of electoral appeal, the social democratic parties have moved most substantially into the catch-all direction and consistently rank at the top in the distribution. The liberal parties also have a relatively high level of catch-all characteristics at the electoral level as well. Over the last five decades, the Christian democrats however, transformed from parties which succeeded in their historical attempt to cross-cut social class divisions and attract voters from all social strata, into a party family with a more distinct and limited class appeal. Conservative and agrarian parties have proportionally the lowest level of electoral catch-allism with respect to electoral appeal, since they are characterised with the clearest class-distinctive constituencies. In the 1970s and 1980s the agrarian parties, or centre-parties, moved progressively towards a popular appeal in line with the catch-all model.

Exactly as Kirchheimer asserted, in terms of social inclusion the social democratic parties adopted a relatively high catch-all character. Social democratic parties initially had a very low level of catch-allism until the late 1960s, yet they transformed rapidly in the late 1970s to more electoral openness and more inclusive, non-political ministerial recruitment. In contrast, the Christian democratic, liberal and conservative parties already possessed these electoral catch-all characteristics. Still, while the Christian democratic, liberal, agrarian and communist parties regressed to lower levels of social inclusion and less penetration by non-affiliated voters and members of the party elite, the social democratic and conservative parties increased their electoral catch-allism during the 1980s and opened their doors to external social influences and

support. These relative standings in the distribution of parties of different genetic origin are also found when individual parties are rank-ordered as in the league tables below. Clearly, many individual Christian democratic parties could be found at the top of the table in terms of their cross-class appeal, yet in the last period, spanning 1976 to 1990, there are hardly any representatives of the confessional party family. Many of the social democratic parties can be found in the higher brackets of the distribution of both the catch-all aspects of electoral appeal as well as their openness to new voters and elites. Conservative parties, on the other hand, are primarily found at the bottom of the league table with respect to their 'catch-allness' in electoral appeal.

Time and again this study showed that Kirchheimer depicted certain trends within West European party systems with an astounding precision, yet he exaggerated the scope and swiftness of these changes. Perceptively, Kirchheimer sketched us a picture in which parties in the larger continental democracies would transform most rapidly towards the catch-all model, while parties in the smaller democracies (particularly in Scandinavia) and in the British and Irish party system would not experience similar incentives to modernise their strategies. The evidence presented above does not completely duplicate Kirchheimer's geographical distribution, yet the relative standings of the countries come relatively close to Kirchheimer's predictions. Similarly, Kirchheimer correctly asserted that certain parties are more prone to catch-all tactics than others. Kirchheimer proved right in that social democratic parties in Western Europe have shown strong inclinations to adopt catch-all characteristics.

Nevertheless, Kirchheimer was mistaken in that he assumed that this process would continue incessantly. In fact, this study showed that developments in West European party systems are rarely perpetual and uni-directional. A multitude of parties attempt a wide range of alternative strategies in order to raise their competitiveness at the electoral as well as the governmental level. Additionally, certain institutional constraints and specific national features of West European party systems have clearly prohibited a full-scale adoption of the catch-all model. The ramifications of this process of 'partial catch-allism' is extensively discussed in the final chapter of this book.

Summary of the main findings:

- West European parties have substantially broadened their electoral appeal and have become less class-distinctive over the last five decades, although this trend is not universal.
- Strong party identification among voters has declined from an average level of around 20 percent to 13 percent of the electorate in the 1980s. Particularly the social democratic parties have lost a substantial number of strong identifiers.
- There is no evidence of a secular trend towards increasing levels of electoral volatility, yet there is no proof of a constant decline in electoral turnover either.
- In contrast to the catch-all thesis, the level of external parliamentary recruitment of ministers declined from an average of more than thirty per cent in the 1950s to less than twenty-four per cent in the late 1980s. Ministerial recruitment has become increasingly 'political' in Western Europe.
- At the electoral level two dimensions of party behaviour can be distinguished, namely the width of the electoral appeal of political parties and, secondly, their level of social inclusion (or openness to new groups) at both the elite level as well as in terms of voters.
- The geographical dispersion of electoral catch-allism on these two dimensions is very erratic. Highest levels of catch-allism with respect to the width of electoral appeal can be found in Italy, Belgium, France and to a lesser extent in Norway. Swedish and Finnish parties have the lowest level of catch-allism concerning their electoral appeal. On the dimension of social inclusion, Italy and Belgium have relatively low levels of catch-allism. Dutch as well as Austrian and Norwegian parties have transformed most towards the catch-all model at the level of social inclusion.
- Social democratic as well as liberal parties have transformed most extensively in the catch-all direction at the electoral level. Christian democratic parties have moved away from the electoral catch-all model in general. Lowest levels of electoral catch-allism is found among conservative parties.

Electoral appeal and social inclusion 1945-1960

Table 6.20 Parties rank-ordered according to width of electoral appeal and level of social inclusion 1945-1960

Country	Family	Party	social inclusion	Country	Family	Party	electoral appeal
Ger	cd	CDU	2.16	Fra	sd	PSF	1.49
Den	soc	SF	1.88	Swe	sd	SAP	1.49
Ire	soc	WP	1.66	UK	lib	LIB	1.34
Net	cd	CHU	1.59	Net	cd	KVP	1.29
Fra	con	GAUL	1.36	Ita	cd	DC	1.13
Fin	lib	LKP	1.29	Aut	sd	SPO	1.06
Nor	sd	DNA	1.09	Net	cd	ARP	1.04
Ger	lib	FDP	1.03	Ita	lib	PLI	0.95
Aut	lib	FPO	0.94	Ita	lib	PRI	0.91
Swe	lib	FP	0.93	Ita	fas	MSI	0.76
Fin	sd	SSP	0.65	Fra	com	PCF	0.70
UK	con	CON	0.59	Fra	cd	MRP	0.63
Net	cd	KVP	0.58	Ger	cd	CDU	0.62
Net	cd	ARP	0.51	Ita	sd	PSDI	0.59
Ita	fas	MSI	0.47	Ita	sd	PSI	0.48
Aut	com	KPO	0.40	Ger	sd	SPD	0.33
Bel	eth	VU	0.40	UK	con	CON	-0.02
Ger	sd	SPD	0.38	Den	lib	RV	-0.14
Fra	lib	UDF	0.37	Fra	con	GAUL	-0.19
Fin	agr	KESK	0.36	Aut	cd	OVP	-0.19
Swe	sd	SAP	0.33	Ger	lib	FDP	-0.19
Net	sd	PVDA	0.32	Nor	con	HOYR	-0.31
Fin	com	SKDL	0.32	Net	cd	CHU	-0.60
Nor	cd	KRFP	0.21	Ita	com	PCI	-0.64
Nor	con	HOYR	0.17	Fin	sd	SSP	-0.67
Den	lib	VEN	0.15	Den	sd	SD	-0.68
Nor	agr	S	0.10	Net	sd	PVDA	-0.70
Den	lib	RV	0.04	Nor	sd	DNA	-0.83
Ita	soc	DP	0.04	Fra	lib	RAD	-0.92
Fin	cd	SKL	0.04	Nor	lib	V	-0.92
UK	lib	LIB	-0.02	Fin	com	SKDL	-0.95
Net	lib	VVD	-0.02	Fin	con	KOK	-0.99
Ita	cd	DC	-0.05	UK	sd	LAB	-1.00
Den	com	DKP	-0.05	Fra	lib	UDF	-1.09

Aut	cd	OVP	-0.08	Den	lib	VEN	-1.18
Fra	lib	RAD	-0.08	Swe	agr	C	-1.22
Swe	con	MSP	-0.10	Net	lib	VVD	-1.51
Fin	eth	SFP	-0.10	Den	con	KF	-1.52
Den	sd	SD	-0.11	Swe	con	MSP	-2.04
Fin	con	KOK	-0.11	Fin	agr	KESK	-2.21
Bel	cd	CVP	-0.11				
Bel	lib	PVV	-0.23				
Ita	sd	PSI	-0.26				
Den	con	KF	-0.26				
Ita	sd	PSDI	-0.26				
Bel	sd	BSP	-0.27				
Bel	com	KPB	-0.43				
UK	sd	LAB	-0.44				
Nor	lib	V	-0.45				
Aut	sd	SPO	-0.46				
Ita	com	PCI	-0.47				
Ire	cd	FG	-0.49				
Fra	com	PCF	-0.50				
Swe	agr	C	-0.50				
Ita	lib	PRI	-0.50				
Ire	sd	ILP	-0.57				
Swe	com	VPK	-0.64				
Ita	lib	PLI	-0.66				
Fra	sd	PSF	-0.68				
Net	com	CPN	-0.68				
Ire	con	FF	-0.72				
Nor	com	NKP	-0.91				
Ger	com	DKP	-0.92				
Fra	cd	MRP	-1.15				

Table 6.21 Parties rank-ordered according to width of electoral appeal and level of social inclusion 1961-1975

Country	Family	Party	social inclusion	Country	Family	Party	electoral appeal
Den	prt	FRP	2.10	Swe	sd	SAP	1.44
UK	lib	LIB	1.56	Fin	cd	SKL	1.36
Nor	prt	FRP	1.54	Ita	fas	MSI	1.29
Net	cd	CHU	1.14	Ita	sd	PSDI	1.16
Ger	sd	SPD	0.98	Fra	sd	PSF	1.12
Swe	agr	C	0.86	Nor	prt	FRP	1.04
Nor	soc	SV	0.84	Nor	soc	SV	0.99
Den	lib	RV	0.82	Ita	cd	DC	0.95
Fin	lib	LKP	0.70	Ita	com	PCI	0.88
Net	lib	D66	0.65	Fra	com	PCF	0.86
Bel	eth	VU	0.58	Ita	sd	PSI	0.83
Net	lib	VVD	0.58	Bel	sd	BSP	0.70
Den	cd	KRF	0.53	Nor	lib	V	0.69
Nor	com	NKP	0.53	Nor	cd	KRFP	0.66
Nor	lib	V	0.51	Ita	lib	PRI	0.64
Ita	com	PCI	0.43	Net	cd	KVP	0.62
Fin	agr	KESK	0.37	Den	lib	CD	0.50
Den	lib	VEN	0.34	Den	cd	KRF	0.49
Den	lib	CD	0.32	Net	sd	PVDA	0.47
Aut	cd	OVP	0.30	Swe	cd	KDS	0.46
Fra	com	PCF	0.30	Den	lib	RV	0.46
Nor	cd	KRFP	0.30	UK	lib	LIB	0.42
Fin	con	KOK	0.27	Bel	cd	CVP	0.40
Net	cd	ARP	0.26	Den	soc	SF	0.29
Fin	cd	SKL	0.22	Ire	con	FF	0.26
Swe	cd	KDS	0.16	Ire	sd	ILP	0.12
Net	com	CPN	0.15	Fra	cd	MRP	0.07
Ire	sd	ILP	0.14	Aut	lib	FPO	0.05
Swe	sd	SAP	0.09	Den	com	DKP	0.05
Den	com	DKP	0.09	Den	prt	FRP	0.03
Fra	con	GAUL	0.08	Fin	sd	SSP	-0.07
Swe	com	VPK	0.08	Ger	sd	SPD	-0.08
Ger	com	DKP	0.07	Bel	lib	PVV	-0.14
Fra	lib	RAD	0.07	Ger	lib	FDP	-0.14
Ire	cd	FG	0.05	Bel	eth	VU	-0.14
Nor	sd	DNA	0.05	Net	cd	ARP	-0.16
Fin	sd	SSP	0.05	Den	con	KF	-0.27

Den	soc	SF	0.05	Fin	com	SKDL	-0.27
Net	cd	KVP	0.02	Net	cd	CHU	-0.29
Bel	com	KPB	-0.03	Nor	agr	S	-0.35
Ita	lib	PLI	-0.04	Net	lib	D66	-0.37
Ita	fas	MSI	-0.07	Nor	con	HOYR	-0.38
Den	sd	SD	-0.08	Ger	cd	CDU	-0.42
Fin	com	SKDL	-0.09	Fin	eth	SFP	-0.47
Swe	con	MSP	-0.10	Ita	lib	PLI	-0.49
Fra	sd	PSF	-0.10	Nor	sd	DNA	-0.56
Aut	com	KPO	-0.15	Swe	lib	FP	-0.57
Nor	agr	S	-0.16	Den	sd	SD	-0.60
Aut	lib	FPO	-0.18	Fin	lib	LKP	-0.65
Den	con	KF	-0.20	Swe	com	VPK	-0.74
Ger	lib	FDP	-0.20	UK	con	CON	-0.77
Ire	soc	WP	-0.28	Swe	agr	C	-0.77
Ger	cd	CDU	-0.28	UK	sd	LAB	-0.89
Aut	sd	SPO	-0.30	Aut	cd	OVP	-0.89
Bel	lib	PVV	-0.32	Fin	agr	KESK	-0.89
Nor	con	HOYR	-0.39	Aut	sd	SPO	-0.90
Ire	con	FF	-0.40	Fin	con	KOK	-0.90
Ita	lib	PRI	-0.41	Den	lib	VEN	-0.97
Net	sd	PVDA	-0.55	Ire	cd	FG	-1.00
Ita	cd	DC	-0.64	Fra	con	GAUL	-1.00
Fin	eth	SFP	-0.69	Net	lib	VVD	-1.89
UK	sd	LAB	-0.69	Nor	com	NKP	-1.99
Bel	cd	CVP	-0.70	Swe	con	MSP	-2.08
Bel	sd	BSP	-0.71	Ger			
Ita	sd	PSDI	-0.73	Fra			
Fra	lib	UDF	-0.73	Fra			
Ita	sd	PSI	-0.76	Ire			
Swe	lib	FP	-0.81	Fra			
UK	con	CON	-0.84	Ire			
Fra	cd	MRP	-0.99	Net			

Table 6.22 Parties rank-ordered according to width of electoral appeal and level of social inclusion 1976-1990

Country	Family	Party	social inclusion	Country	Family	Party	electoral appeal
Fra	sd	PSF	1.60	Swe	sd	SAP	1.55
UK	sd	SDP	1.35	Net	cd	KVP	1.54
Aut	lib	FPO	1.21	Fra	com	PCF	1.21
Swe	env	MP	0.72	Ire	env	GRE	1.07
Nor	prt	FRP	0.71	Nor	prt	FRP	1.01
Fin	lib	LKP	0.68	Ire	soc	WP	0.97
Aut	env	GA	0.58	Ita	soc	DP	0.96
Den	con	KF	0.57	Ita	env	PR	0.95
Nor	sd	DNA	0.53	Swe	com	VPK	0.95
Ger	env	GRU	0.47	Nor	soc	SV	0.94
Net	lib	VVD	0.46	Ita	sd	PSDI	0.90
Nor	con	HOYR	0.43	Ire	lib	PD	0.84
Net	cd	KVP	0.40	Nor	lib	V	0.79
Den	sd	SD	0.38	Ita	fas	MSI	0.79
Fra	lib	UDF	0.35	Fra	sd	PSF	0.77
Fin	sd	SSP	0.28	Ita	lib	PLI	0.77
Den	lib	CD	0.27	Ger	env	GRU	0.76
Swe	sd	SAP	0.25	Nor	agr	S	0.75
Net	cd	CDA	0.22	Ita	lib	PRI	0.74
Ita	env	PR	0.21	UK	sd	SDP	0.69
Den	soc	SF	0.21	Bel	sd	BSP	0.69
Net	lib	D66	0.19	Ire	sd	ILP	0.68
Ire	soc	WP	0.18	Nor	cd	KRFP	0.65
Ita	soc	DP	0.15	Den	cd	KRF	0.64
Bel	env	ECO	0.11	Den	lib	CD	0.62
Net	sd	PVDA	0.09	Den	lib	RV	0.59
Fin	eth	SFP	0.07	Bel	lib	PVV	0.50
Swe	cd	KDS	0.02	Aut	lib	FPO	0.47
Nor	lib	V	-0.02	Ita	sd	PSI	0.43
Fra	con	GAUL	-0.02	Den	soc	SF	0.43
Ger	com	DKP	-0.04	Fin	eth	SFP	0.42
Ita	fas	MSI	-0.05	UK	lib	LIB	0.36
Ger	cd	CDU	-0.05	Den	sd	SD	0.27
UK	con	CON	-0.06	Den	prt	FRP	0.21
Swe	com	VPK	-0.06	Den	com	DKP	0.16
Ire	lib	PD	-0.06	Aut	sd	SPO	0.11
Fin	con	KOK	-0.07	Fin	com	SKDL	0.09

Fin	agr	KESK	-0.08	Fra	lib	UDF	0.08
Aut	com	KPO	-0.08	Bel	eth	VU	0.07
Fin	cd	SKL	-0.10	Ita	com	PCI	0.03
Nor	cd	KRFP	-0.14	Den	con	KF	0.01
Ita	sd	PSI	-0.15	Fin	agr	KESK	-0.01
Bel	com	KPB	-0.17	Net	sd	PVDA	-0.04
Den	cd	KRF	-0.18	UK	sd	LAB	-0.07
Den	lib	RV	-0.18	Fra	lib	RAD	-0.08
Bel	lib	PVV	-0.19	Aut	env	GA	-0.14
Nor	agr	S	-0.19	Ger	sd	SPD	-0.16
Den	com	DKP	-0.19	Bel	cd	CVP	-0.19
Aut	sd	SPO	-0.20	Aut	cd	OVP	-0.27
Aut	cd	OVP	-0.20	Nor	con	HOYR	-0.28
Bel	eth	VU	-0.22	Fin	con	KOK	-0.31
Nor	soc	SV	-0.23	Net	lib	D66	-0.32
Fra	lib	RAD	-0.25	Ita	cd	DC	-0.37
Ita	com	PCI	-0.25	Den	lib	VEN	-0.37
Ger	lib	FDP	-0.27	Ire	cd	FG	-0.52
Swe	con	MSP	-0.27	Fin	sd	SSP	-0.57
Den	lib	VEN	-0.27	Fra	con	GAUL	-0.60
Net	cd	ARP	-0.28	Ger	lib	FDP	-0.62
Swe	lib	FP	-0.28	Swe	agr	C	-0.65
Bel	sd	BSP	-0.29	Fin	cd	SKL	-0.66
Ire	con	FF	-0.38	Ger	cd	CDU	-0.70
Net	com	CPN	-0.44	Ire	con	FF	-0.76
Ire	sd	ILP	-0.44	Net	cd	CDA	-0.89
Den	prt	FRP	-0.45	UK	con	CON	-0.98
Ita	lib	PLI	-0.45	Net	lib	VVD	-0.99
Ita	lib	PRI	-0.45	Fra	cd	MRP	-1.00
Bel	cd	CVP	-0.48	Swe	lib	FP	-1.02
Swe	agr	C	-0.53	Nor	sd	DNA	-1.20
Ita	sd	PSDI	-0.57	Swe	con	MSP	-1.56
UK	lib	LIB	-0.60				
Ita	cd	DC	-0.65				
Ger	sd	SPD	-0.71				
Nor	com	NKP	-0.73				
Ire	cd	FG	-0.73				
Fra	com	PCF	-0.75				
Fin	com	SKDL	-0.88				
UK	sd	LAB	-0.94				

7 Catch-allism in Western Europe: an arrested development

7.1 Catch-all parties or partial catch-allism?

In the 19th century, people's representatives, assembled in national parliaments, founded the first extra-parliamentary organisations which became known as 'political parties'. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century Western Europe has witnessed the genesis of hundreds of political organisations attempting to rally voters behind their platform in order to gain access to parliamentary and governmental power. An analysis of the diversity in organisational format of these parties, the differences in their ideological dispositions and policy preferences, their varying methods of elite recruitment as well as the significant disparity in the social basis of the electoral appeal of these political parties would be impossible without some theoretical framing. This study tested one of the seminal theories in the study of transformation of West European political parties, Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, as a means of analysing party change at the organisational, ideological and electoral level.

Departing from the conviction that the social structure of society should be reflected at the political level, Kirchheimer asserted that politicians in post-war Europe no longer compete against each other but instead form a co-optive oligarchy as their political parties progressively converge on ideology and policy. This would culminate in the waning or even total vanishing of principled political opposition against the dominant political and economic system. Since it is much easier to reach agreement over incremental policy adjustments than on a major framework for society, political leaders of catch-all parties would no longer offer distinct political alternatives to the public, resulting in immutable and unchallenged ruling political elites. According to Kirchheimer, the sovereignty of the people is clearly undermined by this 'oligarchisation' of power. Kirchheimer perceived a shift from the painstaking business of building effective and democratic institutions and an accountable civil service by the traditional mass parties towards the 'personification' of political power in catch-all parties, in which political leaders seem increasingly oriented towards their own political careers, instead of concerned with the responsiveness and accountability of the party system as a whole.

Empirical analyses in the previous chapters have revealed that, despite the portrayal of the mass party as an ideal model in political rethorics, in reality the mass-party mould is indeed no longer applicable to most political parties in Western Europe. Mass parties, characterised by their strong embeddedness in civil society through mass membership and their representation of clearly defined social or religious groups, if they ever existed in the first place, have by now been replaced by new types of political organisation. Yet, the dominant party type which constitute West European party systems is **not** the catch-all party Kirchheimer predicted would emerge. This does not mean, however, that certain developments Kirchheimer depicted have not occurred in West European party systems. In fact, it will be argued in this final chapter that although catch-all parties as such do not generally exist, a

partial transformation towards catch-allism can nevertheless be observed. Certain developments Kirchheimer described did occur, while other features of catch-allism did not fully materialise in Western Europe. Moreover, the transformation towards catch-allism has not been a linear process, but was at times interrupted or even reversed.

In the following section I will briefly summarise the main empirical findings of the previous chapters, before going on to section 7.3 to review which dimensions of party transformation, if not catch-allism, can then be differentiated and to what extent political parties in Western Europe have remodelled themselves.

7.2 Catch-allism in Western Europe

One of the major findings in this study is first and foremost that no uniform and continuous trend of party transformation towards the catch-all model is discernible in Western Europe. In journalistic as well as scientific accounts of politics certain developments Kirchheimer identified are often accentuated, sometimes leading to the conclusion that catch-all parties thrive in West European party systems. Certainly, at the time Kirchheimer unfolded his thesis some of the developments he sketched were clearly manifesting themselves within certain parties. In the period spanning 1954 to 1966, during which the catch-all thesis was developed, the aim of building democratic extra-parliamentary membership organisations was precipitously abandoned. Political elites began to professionalise their organisations and started to allocate state finance to their own political parties. Kirchheimer also correctly perceived that political parties in post-war political systems were downgrading their old ideological rigidity and put less emphasis on their traditional issues. The centripetal movement of German parties, the SPD in particular, was not missed by many political observers either. Still, Kirchheimer misinterpreted certain other developments or simply misconstrued them. Party members have not been progressively excluded from all internal decision-making processes, although their influence has remained scanty. Neither is there evidence of an unvarying trend of parties moving towards the centre (space) in their party system, nor of a constant tendency towards political consensus. Kirchheimer was also mistaken in believing that a smaller number of parties would come to increasingly dominate the political systems in West European countries. Shortly after Kirchheimer had sketched his gloomy picture of cartel-forming powers, vanishing opposition and political apathy on behalf of the population, the opposite occurred. Since the mid-1960s a process of social protest set in, expressing popular demands for new forms of political participation and representation. Furthermore, the emergence of radical political parties and social movements, rhetorical polarisation and parliamentary fragmentation seemed to be part of the grit of increasing electoral change as well as governmental instability. This all leads to the conclusion that West European political parties did not totally transform along the lines of the catch-all theory.

In essence, Kirchheimer was correct in his claim that the importance of membership declined as a substructure for the human and financial resources for most parties in Western Europe. In most West European countries party membership declined over the post-war period. Despite the rapid professionalization of political parties since the

1950s, however, party members have not been totally marginalised and still remain important to the elites of political parties. At party conferences and other public meetings party members legitimise the party leadership by vesting them with authority and by publicly ratifying their decisions. Furthermore, membership remains important as it provides a pool from which the future party leadership can be selected. In addition, many party members find executive power at the lower echelons of public government. Indeed, major political parties often pride themselves in that their policies can be carried out so effectively and efficiently because of their network of loyal and influential local politicians. Although membership is still valued for these reasons, overzealous membership participation is not encouraged by modern party leaders as it seriously reduces the flexibility in policy stances of their parties and radical party activism can also hamper a party's ability to enter into government.

Despite the fact that the room for manoeuvre for the party leadership in general has increased and party members have lost some influence over the selection of parliamentary candidates, members have been given more leverage in the selection of the party leader. My data do not confirm Kirchheimer's assertion that members are progressively excluded from all inner-party decision making structures. What was found instead is that party elites empower individual, unorganised party members rather than marginalising them in the internal decision-making process. Party activists, who have been progressively restricted in the opportunity to speak their mind on the policies of the party, are the real victims of the ambitions of party elites. That said, there are three reasons why the minor democratisation of leadership selection should hardly be heralded as a great victory of democracy.

First, despite the fact that the level of intra-party democracy varies substantially across party systems and among party families, internal decision-making procedures overall have usually been very centralised to begin with and could hardly be further centralised without parties losing all of their democratic substance.

Secondly, the unorganised member is given more power over that part of the political process which has become increasingly irrelevant to party politics. True, the number of congresses held by parties has not been reduced and neither have procedures to put motions to the national congress been centralised in the majority of West European countries. However, national party conferences can hardly be considered to constitute important policy making bodies in that they have become primarily geared towards public expressions of unity and governability of parties. Open leadership contests and disputes over policy alternatives are a rare sight at party conferences. As media attention increasingly focused on these party congresses, party elites have preferred to maintain tight central control over the agenda and format of these national conference meetings.

Kirchheimer did correctly predict an accumulation of power and resources at the level of the party leadership. This study found that particularly the parliamentary party organisation has become the dominant part of political parties, primarily as a result of the electoral orientation of parties. With the disappearance of the mass-party format, the extra-parliamentary party loses much of its function. Considering the modern means of communication available to the parliamentary leadership, it has less need for the membership party organisation in its interaction with voters. Parliamentary representatives have used their legislative prerogative to accumulate their own resources for political competition. As a result, in financial terms and regarding professional staff, parliamentary party organisations are increasing their resources at

an unprecedented rate. Kirchheimer justly asserted that these growing resources would not be generated from membership fees, yet his claim that parties would come to rely primarily on state subsidy is not corroborated. What was found, instead, is that parties did not progressively extract their resources from the state after the 1970s but directly from private and corporate donations or other (economic) activities. Rather than spending their vast resources on expansion of the membership organisation, party elites vigorously professionalised their election campaigns and the parliamentary party organisation, bringing this already most powerful part of the party under even stricter central control of the leadership itself. These increasingly professional party organisations aim primarily at short-term electoral success instead of the long-term integration of citizens into the body politic.

The third reason why the minor internal democratisation of the leadership selection should be not be overstated is that the electoral orientation of parties has resulted in further domination of the parliamentary party over the party organisation, evidenced in that the parliamentary party is more than ever the pool from which ministers are recruited. Decisions on participation in government as well as the route to power remain firmly in the hands of the national elites of the traditional parties of government. This solid central control in the decision-making structures is not a modern trend, as Kirchheimer seems to argue, but rather a consistent characteristic of West European politics. Half a century before Kirchheimer, Roberto Michels (1911) had already pointed this out to us, although he argued it was a feature of all organisations without regard to its ideological or sociological character. The growing influence of the parliamentary party over the party organisation is in one sense beneficial to the democratic process as representative and accountable politicians come to dominate political decision-making, instead of extra-parliamentary party officials. On the negative side, however, as the selection of political leaders remains relatively centralised and parliamentary representatives are accountable only to the electorate at large from whom concerted action is less likely to occur, popular influence on political decisions will be minimal at best.

Traditional democratic theory assumes that parties present distinct policy programs from which voters choose that closest to their own preferences. As against this, this study shows that, at times, some major parties do converge to more centrist positions within their party system. Nevertheless, Kirchheimer was mistaken in his assertion that this centripetal movement of parties was universal and inexorable. The evidence presented in this book reveals that particularly Christian democratic parties tend to occupy the centre space of party competition. Frequently, social democratic, liberal and agrarian parties can also be found in or close to the centre position, yet no linear centripetal trend is discernible (see also Keman 1992; 1997). Instead, what was found was that over time fewer parties adopt centrist positions and that the range and direction of party competition differ considerably across Western Europe and across time. Parties move in and out of the centre of political competition in accordance with their expectations of electoral rewards or for reasons of governmental control. Moreover, the shift to the left of most political parties during the 1970s and the rightward trend of party competition in the 1980s suggests that the Downsian model of centripetal movement, which Kirchheimer duplicated and enriched with sociological notions, is not validated by the empirical evidence. Parties can actually extricate significant electoral gains from adopting more extreme policy positions on

either the left or right of the political spectrum.

Being well aware of this, political parties adopt dissimilar policy positions and have become more willing to revise their policy stance when this is beneficial to their electoral appeal or chances of government participation. This research shows that, in line with the catch-all thesis, parties have become less rigid concerning their traditional issue-emphasis. This increasing flexibility of political parties at the ideological level was first depicted with a manifest decreased emphasis on traditional issues, notwithstanding substantial cross-national variation. In all, parties are more willing to emphasise issues which are unrelated to their historical origin. Still, this investigation also found that political parties, given the chance, reveal clear and distinct policy preferences and return to more traditional policy profiles when this is possible. Not completely in line with the findings in this study, Kirchheimer assumed that parties would become increasingly power-hungry and office-seeking motives would guide their behaviour, rather than the execution of a specific political program. Evidence presented in this study shows that political parties indeed have a steady inclination to accept governmental office even when traditionally preferred policy fields cannot be controlled through ministerial responsibility. However, it also emerged that when parties have the power to (re)claim traditionally preferred portfolios they will seize this opportunity with both hands. Office-seeking and policy-seeking motives are apparently very closely intertwined and political elites carefully counterbalance their aspirations and ambitions for public office with their ideological convictions and policy objectives. Consistent with this outcome, it was found that political parties in Western Europe have a very stable level of 'opportunism' in ministerial control. Contrary to the catch-all thesis, control over ministerial portfolios of some party families became more conventional at times, as the allocation of ministerial positions develops increasingly in accord with traditional policy preferences of these political parties. Christian democratic and social democratic parties, as Kirchheimer inferred, have been less interested in (or capable of) controlling portfolios which are traditionally important to them. Nevertheless, the growing aptitude and willingness to adopt flexible policy positions as well as an enduring inclination to accept control over non-traditional ministerial portfolios both indicate a substantial level of office-seeking behaviour on behalf of West European political parties.

If it is true that Christian democratic parties are "catch-all parties avant-la-lettre" (Kersbergen 1994) then catch-allism is not a strategy to be recommended for parties which want to increase their effectiveness in control over the executive. Christian democratic governmental power has declined significantly, both in scope and duration. Social democratic parties, which fulfilled Kirchheimer's criteria of catch-allism more than the other party families, have experienced some erosion of their power base as well. In contrast, conservative, agrarian and, to a lesser extent liberal parties, have gained more control over traditionally preferred portfolios as well as over the number of ministerial posts in general. Furthermore, the conservative, agrarian and liberal parties, which comply relatively little with the catch-all model, have increased their tenure in office over the last five decades.

As a consequence, political competition in Western Europe has altered towards more competitive interaction between parties, be it only amid members of the traditional party families. What can be seen is that the major traditional parties continue to dominate the executive branch of government and by and large divide the

spoils of office among themselves by admitting few new contenders through the portal of executive power. Thus, political competition increased but only among a fixed number of parties who are very disinclined to allow new competitors into the governmental arena. Although it proved relatively easy to enter the parliamentary arena by appealing to new groups of voters or disillusioned supporters from the traditional parties, gaining access to governmental power is infinitely more complex. Acquiring admittance to governmental responsibility not only necessitates a certain level of electoral support, but also the approval of the traditional party elites. So far, traditional parties have not fully succumbed to the forces that are slowly undermining their power bastion.

Central to Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis is his assertion that political parties adopt an electoral appeal beyond their traditional social bases of support which will make their electoral profile less class-distinctive. This study showed that, in general, parties have indeed been very successful in their cross-class appeal and that class voting in Western Europe declined substantially. During the post-war period, electorates of political parties have become increasingly characterised by middle class voters. Social democratic parties in particular transformed from primarily the representatives of the working class into parties which attract a majority of middle class voters. Christian democratic parties became transfigured from parties with a very heterogeneous social representation to parties with a predominately middle class support. Overrepresentation of the middle class in the electorate of conservative parties has remained stable over time, whereas for liberal parties the level of support from non-working class voters increased. By comparing these developments to changes in the social stratification of West European societies it was found that this process of de-alignment is much in line with the structural transformation of the total electorate, which makes the claim of a deliberate strategy of cross-class electoral appeal problematic. In addition, parties which are traditionally associated with working class representation, communist and social democratic parties, still attract the bulk of the residue of the working class vote in most countries. Instead of the conclusion drawn in many other studies, namely that the explanatory power of social class for voting behaviour has declined, it seems more accurately to conclude that the sharp differences in class-distinctiveness between parties was reduced by the structural transformation of West European societies, yet that the remaining social stratification is still visible in terms of party support.

De-alignment of West European electorates was also assessed by the level of party identification and electoral volatility. Paradoxically, the electoral orientation of political parties has not strengthened their long-term link with the electorate and modern political parties increasingly aim for short-term electoral support at the next general or local election, rather than constant political participation. Long term affiliation with one particular party can still be found only among a rapidly declining number of European voters. Kirchheimer had anticipated this disconnection of political parties from their supporters at a very early stage and he was very concerned about its consequences for the quality of the democratic process. This loss of identification with one single political party has particularly affected the traditional representatives of the working class, namely social democratic and communist parties. This is not surprising in light of the finding that their traditional social basis of support withered away with the upward social mobility of the working class across West European

countries. In addition, this process also affected Christian democratic parties which previously had attracted a substantial segment of the working class at elections in some countries.

Contrary to the catch-all thesis, however, this loss in stable affiliation between parties and voters did not result in a continuing rising trend in electoral volatility. In fact, what was found instead was a declining trend in electoral turnover in most countries between 1945 and 1990. Increasing levels of electoral flux, which Kirchheimer predicted would result from the adoption of catch-all features, could only be witnessed between the early 1970s until the mid-1980s. Still, almost all traditional major party families, with the exception of the conservatives, have seen some erosion of their electoral base and their electoral performances have become less secure.

This study found little evidence to support the catch-all assumption that parties aim to communicate primarily with the electorate through organised interest groups. At the elite level parties have not been progressively penetrated by individuals from non-traditional social groups supporting the party. In contrast to Kirchheimer's predictions there is little evidence of a linear trend towards external recruitment of ministers from organised interests. Ministerial recruitment has not become characterised by the assimilation of an increasing number of experts and professionals into the party elite. Instead, a progressively more 'political' pattern of ministerial recruitment is dominant because national party leaders of most West European parties recruited more of their colleagues from among the parliamentary representatives. Rather than vesting experts and professionals with direct executive power and ministerial responsibility, political elites have opted to maintain direct executive control themselves. This is not to say that politics in Western Europe has not professionalised; indeed as was also shown above, politicians hire an increasing number of experts and professionals. Still, these experts only advise them on the decisions that are taken; politicians themselves have maintained firm control over the executive. The increasing resources party elites allocate to themselves, while preserving power over who has access to this select group of powerholders, are all indicators of concentration and centralisation of power at the elite level. On the other hand, organised interests have found it less practical to enlarge their influence by seeking ministerial representation and think it far more advantageous to make financial contributions to political parties or establish influential lobby organisations in West European capitals where the national governments reside.

The major conclusion from all this is that not one of the eighty-three parties in this study completely fulfil all the criteria of the catch-all party model. This outcome is partly an artefact of the multi-dimensional test of the catch-all thesis, of course, which renders it almost impossible to satisfy all the requirements of catch-allism on all the indicators. Nevertheless, some parties and party systems come relatively close to the catch-all model. In line with Kirchheimer's hypotheses on the geographical pattern of catch-allism, it was found that, in particular, parties in the larger West European continental democracies (France, Germany and Italy) have advanced towards the catch-all model at the organisational level, while parties from the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) as well as Irish and British parties have not progressed at the same speed in this direction. A similar pattern was found at the ideological dimension; relatively higher levels of catch-allism were found in Germany,

Italy and France and relatively low levels of ideological transformation towards catch-allism can be seen in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and the United Kingdom. A less transparent picture was found at the electoral dimension, but here too higher levels of catch-allism were discernible in Italy and France, while Danish, Swedish and Finnish parties were less marked by catch-all characteristics at the electoral level.

With regard to the genetic origin of parties this study found considerable substantiation of Kirchheimer's assertion that social democratic and Christian democratic parties would transform more into the catch-all direction than parties from another lineage. On the organisational dimension, social democratic and Christian democratic parties indeed acquired a higher level of catch-allism compared to their liberal, agrarian and conservative competitors. Kirchheimer also correctly claimed that the social democratic and Christian democratic parties moved relatively closer to the catch-all model with regard to ideological catch-all characteristics: social democratic and Christian democratic parties are more catch-all in their ideology than members of the other party families, yet liberal and conservative parties also transformed towards the catch-all design at the ideological level. It was seen that at the electoral level the social democratic parties could be found in the upper brackets of the distribution of relative catch-allism again, while conservative and liberal parties also adopted electoral catch-all practices. Christian democratic parties scored relatively low on the electoral catch-all dimension. Furthermore, there is some confirmation of Kirchheimer's hypothesis that most communist parties are largely excluded from the catch-all development, particularly as far as the ideological and electoral dimension are concerned.

In sum, despite the fact that there is *no evidence of a universal and linear development towards catch-allism*, this study clearly substantiated several of the trends and patterns Kirchheimer pointed out, justifying the conclusion that *a partial development towards catch-allism has come to characterise West European party systems*.

In an earlier study on Christian-democratic parties in European countries Schmidt (1985, 392; 1989, 174) arrived at a similar conclusion (see also Sundberg 1985, 315). According to Schmidt, Christian democratic parties were on their way to becoming catch-all, yet their transformation came to a grinding halt halfway, because of the continuing importance of traditional cleavages. Schmidt asserts that ideological distances between socialist and non-socialist parties diminished on issues such as religion, social welfare, economic intervention and defence. He argues that, although parties clearly try to maximise popular support, significant differences in socio-political profiles of the larger parties remain visible. By confining the catch-all thesis to its ideological dimension and only including Christian democratic parties, Schmidt's analysis is, of course, quite limited. As Keman notes, Schmidt's "contention makes sense for most countries where de-confessionalisation emerged during the sixties. The Christian democratic parties were organisationally and ideologically well suited to appeal to different (sub-)classes of the electorate and are often already near the centre of the party system. ...Only those in the German speaking countries show a tendency towards catch-all parties. ...Perhaps the FRG should be considered as the only party-system with genuine catch-all parties" (Keman 1988, 174-178). This latter assertion is not corroborated by the present study, however. Despite the fact that German parties rank relatively high in terms of catch-allism on all three dimensions, there are other countries where this process is at least as far advanced.

My findings also contradict Wolinetz's (1991) assertion that the emergence of catch-all parties in the Low Countries (Belgium and the Netherlands), Scandinavia and Switzerland is constrained by highly structured electorates as well as by strong and persistent patterns of party identification in the electorate. By failing to include the organisational and ideological dimension of catch-allism, Wolinetz could not detect the relative high level of organisational and ideological catch-allism in the Netherlands. Moreover, at the electoral level, parties in Scandinavian countries, in particular Norway and Denmark, have been transformed relatively closely towards the catch-all model. Wolinetz (1979) had claimed earlier that where catch-all parties did develop, namely in Germany and France, this is caused by disruptions in political development and in the specific operation of these party systems. Kirchheimer (1966a, 185) also assumed significant differences between the larger European countries: "Germany and Great Britain would appear at opposite ends of the spectrum rather than showing a similar speed of transformation." This geographical dispersion of catch-allism is by and large confirmed by my analysis, though I am unable to determine whether disruptions in the political development caused this pattern.

Kirchheimer himself suggested that: "As a rule only major parties can become successful catch-all parties" (Kirchheimer 1966a, 187). Apart from any disagreement over which parties could be considered to be 'major' parties, this assertion is not corroborated when we look at the ranking of individual parties. Taking electoral strength to indicate whether or not we are dealing with a 'major' party, it becomes evident that the larger as well as smaller parties can be found in the upper brackets of the distribution, while some of the 'major' parties in electoral terms can also be found at the bottom of the (league) tables.

Evidently, the analysis provided above rebuts most, if not all, assertions of these authors. The catch-all development is neither limited to one particular family, nor to one particular country. Different patterns of geographical distribution and among party families were found on the various indicators of party transformation. Overall, this study found significant cross-national variation in catch-allism as well as divergences among parties of different genetic origin. Several indicators of catch-allism hardly differentiate between parties, one example being the power distribution between members and the party leadership, while other indicators, such as the position on a left-right scale, signify substantial and important differences between political parties, across time and within different party systems. An although these geographical patterns of catch-allism as well as the variation among party families were sketched reasonably accurately by Otto Kirchheimer, he was perhaps inaccurate in assuming this process to be linear. In this sense, Kirchheimer was too deterministic.

Of course, it might be argued that this general assessment of catch-allism is in some sense inadequate. A number of potential criticisms might be advanced here. First of all, it could be asserted that the operationalisation of catch-allism in this study is invalid. Still, the conscientious method of concept reconstruction on the basis of Kirchheimer's complete oeuvre, including the investigation of his personal archive at German Refugees Archives of the State University of New York at Albany as well as a thorough review of secondary literature on catch-allism does seem to offer sufficient guarantees for a valid measurement. Second, the finding that the items do not tap one

single phenomenon could result from an inaccurate conceptualisation with regard to the measurement of catch-allism. However, the selection of indicators of catch-allism is largely based on Kirchheimer's own references and propositions. Furthermore, the large number of indicators on three dimensions makes for a wide range of analysis of party transformation, rendering it unlikely that the inclusion of more or other indicators would increase the validity of the conceptualisation. Third, the multi-dimensionality of the outcomes could result from incomplete or unreliable data which were collected to measure the extent of party transformation. To be sure, the most comprehensive data that are available at present were used and where possible supplemented with data from additional sources. Nevertheless, it proved impossible to collect a complete data-set for all cases; some figures are simply not available. Moreover, the need to integrate so many data-sets from such a variety of different sources will always cause problems with deficiency, consistency and comparability.

Nonetheless, and despite these evident limits, I believe that this analysis does reflect the most comprehensive inquiry into catch-allism that is possible at present, and provides a valid and reliable evaluation of the level of catch-allism in Western Europe, which illuminates several cogent and useful measures of party behaviour. Furthermore, this analysis allows for four different approaches to the evaluation of party transformation, namely cross-time analysis over the post-war period, cross-party analysis based on historical genetic origin, cross-national investigations over twelve party systems, as well as examinations at the level of individual parties. This made it possible to see if change occurred, when change occurred and where change occurred.

7.3 Dimensions of party transformation

One of the key conclusions of this study is that party transformation is far from uni-dimensional. Rather than one single model of the mutation of political parties, what we see instead is a multiplicity of features, some of which, indeed, appear to work in opposite directions to one another. Parties are complex multi-faceted creatures, and their patterns of transformation are neither uni-directional nor linear. Moreover, even with the broad electoral, organisational and ideological categories which have been explored in the previous chapters, change, when it occurs, tends both to flow and to retreat, and sometimes, even concurrently, it appears to run in contradictory directions. It is this conclusion more than any other that belies the otherwise appealing simplicity of the original catch-all thesis.

In an effort to boil down the multi-dimensional complexity which characterises the transformation of parties in modern European democracies, and to try and make sense of what is a multi-faceted phenomenon, this final section will draw on the various factor analyses which were conducted within each of the three categories of change to suggest that there are seven key dimensions through which the behaviour of parties may best be understood (see appendix 3). Three of these may be associated with the organisational character of parties, two may be associated with their electoral behaviour, and two with their ideological character. These seven dimensions certainly do not over-simplify the study of party behaviour or party style, and in this sense they cannot be seen as an alternative to the catch-all model. But they do offer a more readily grasped summary of the complexity that was revealed in the previous chapters, and in this sense they merit some further elaboration.

Below, I will first enumerate the seven extracted factors on which parties in Western Europe deviate. Second, I will discuss their mutual relationships. Third, the seven factors will be employed to make some general observations on party transformation across party systems, party families and over time. Finally, on the basis of the factor plots provided in appendix 3, I will attempt to interpret this complex pattern of party transformation and its consequences for democracy in western Europe.

1. The first extracted factor is interpreted as the **professionalization of leadership organisation**, because the number of professionals at the parliamentary party organisation is positively related to this factor. Thus, a higher score on this factor means that parties employ more professional staff in relation to the strength of the parliamentary party. However, income from membership is also positively correlated with this factor, while the level of state finance is negatively correlated. On this 'professionalisation of the central office-factor', all scores have been recoded so that high scores in tables 7.2 and 7.3 indicate a high level of professionalisation of the parliamentary party, even if the financial resources for this professionalization comes from members, instead of state subsidies.

2. The second factor is best interpreted as the **professionalization (or 'de-massification') of the extra-parliamentary party organisation** (the central party office). High correlations to this latent factor is established of both the level of membership (which is negatively associated with this underlying factor) as well as the level of professionalization of the central office (which is positively associated to this underlying factor). Scores on the professionalization of the membership party in tables 7.2 and 7.3 below have been recoded in the same direction so that higher scores indicate lower membership levels and higher numbers of staff employed at the party central office. Low scores thus suggest highly unprofessional parties that have remained relatively close to the mass party model in terms of the membership organisation. High scores denote professional parties that have only a small membership pool.

3. The third factor is the level of **centralisation of intra-party decision-making**. To this underlying factor both the openness of the party leadership selection and the selection of parliamentary candidates are positively related, as well as the number of congresses held by the parties (see appendix 3). Scores on this centralisation-factor have been recoded so that higher standard scores in tables 7.2 and 7.3 below mean less influence of members on the selection of party leaders and parliamentary candidates and also fewer opportunities to speak their mind at national party congresses.

Low scores on all three organisational factors indicates that parties have a relatively democratic structure and members have some influence in the party internal decision-making structures, while at the same time the extent of professionalization is low within the party organisations. A relatively high score on all three organisational factors means that parties tend to have highly centralised decision-making procedures and professional party organisations 'on the ground' as well as in parliament.

4. The fourth factor is very straightforward: all items indicate the degree of **office-seeking behaviour**. To this factor both the number of controlled ministries, traditional and non-traditional, as well as the accumulated time in government are positively correlated. Higher scores on this factor denote more control in office and prolonged time in government. Little desire or less ability for taking on governmental responsibility is indicated by low scores on this office-seeking factor.

5. The fifth factor is the degree of **policy-seeking behaviour**. Positive correlations

of both traditional emphasis as well as the policy distance from the centre position makes for the interpretation that this factor indicates the strategic equilibrium parties attempt in their pursuit of a particular policy. On the policy-seeking dimension all scores have been recoded so that higher scores indicate a higher propensity to seek this optimum between traditional issue emphasis and a strategic centrist position, that is the propensity to downgrade ideology (traditional issues) and a tendency of centripetal movement of the party. Parties which have low scores on the policy factor put more emphasis on their traditional policy preferences and adopt positions outside the centre of party competition.

On the two ideological factors higher scores indicate parties that have a high propensity for office-seeking and policy seeking behaviour.

6. The sixth factor represents the **popular appeal or vote-seeking behaviour** of parties. The extent to which parties attract voters from different social groups is positively associated with this underlying factor, while the level of identification is negatively correlated with this latent factor. This means that the more parties cross-cut social cleavages, the more people are able to identify with the party. All scores have been recoded so that a higher score on this factor in tables 7.2 and 7.3 below means a broader and more indistinct electorate in terms of social class and a larger number of voters which can identify with the party. Low scores on this factor indicate that parties have a very distinct appeal to a core electorate which strongly identifies with one party.

7. The seventh and final extracted factor will be coined the level of **social inclusion**, to denote more openness at both the level of voters and the elite. Positively associated with this factor are the level of external, non-parliamentary recruitment of the party elite as well as the level of electoral volatility of the party. This means that higher scores on this factor indicate that parties are more vulnerable to electoral shifts and more accessible for elites which have no prior political experience in the parliamentary party. Low scores of social inclusion denote a very distinct and stable electorate and less penetration of the party by external influences.

Higher scores on the two electoral factors means that parties make a broad electoral appeal and have opened their party to external influences at the elite level as well.

These seven extracted factors can, to some extent, be related to the five original aspects of catch-allism Kirchheimer (1966a, 190) emphasised. The "drastic reduction of the party's ideological baggage" can be seen as the trade-off between policy and office motives in favour of the latter. "Further strengthening of top leadership groups" coincides with the extracted factor concerning the professionalization of the party organisation, while "downgrading of the role of the individual party member" is similar to the centralisation of the internal decision-making processes. "De-emphasis of the class-gardée in favour of recruiting voters among the population at large" is interchangeable with the electoral appeal-factor and "securing access to a variety of interest groups" is relatively identical to the social inclusion-factor. It is, however, my assertion that all these factors do not indicate one underlying phenomenon but that these factors tap seven different aspects of party transformation. To substantiate this

assertion, table 7.1 summarises the relationships between these seven dimensions by way of correlation coefficients and reveals that in most cases they are generally only weakly associated with one another.

Table 7.1 Correlation matrix of seven dimensions of party transformation in Western Europe 1945-1990

	PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE LEADERSHIP	CENTRALISATION OF DECISON MAKING	PROFESSIONALISATION OF CENTRAL OFFICES	OFFICE-SEEKING	POLICY-SEEKING	WIDTH OF POPULAR APPEAL	SOCIAL INCLUSION
PROFESSIONALISATION OF LEADERSHIP	1.00						
CENTRALISATION OF DECISION-MAKING	.00	1.00					
PROFESSIONALISATION OF CENTRAL OFFICE	.00	.00	1.00				
OFFICE-SEEKING	.15 (99)	-.24* (98)	.39** (98)	1.00			
POLICY-SEEKING	.04 (99)	.04 (98)	-.01 (98)	.00	1.00		
WIDTH OF POPULAR APPEAL	-.31 (37)	.40* (37)	-.19 (37)	-.51** (76)	.09 (76)	1.00	
SOCIAL INCLUSION	.01 (37)	.06 (37)	-.21 (37)	-.09 (76)	.01 (76)	.00	1.00

The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients between factor scores. One asterisk (*) indicates statistical significance at the 0.01 level, (**) indicates significance at the 0.001 level. The number of cases (N) is given in between brackets.

As can be seen from table 7.1, in particular the level of professionalization of the parliamentary leadership organisation, the extent of policy-seeking behaviour and the level of social inclusion of parties are virtually uncorrelated to any of the other factors. Office-seeking behaviour, on the other hand, is significantly correlated to three other factors. First, the fact that office-seeking behaviour is negatively correlated with the level of centralisation in internal decision-making contradicts the idea that solid elite control over the organisation makes the party better equipped to enter into government. Apparently, influence by members over the selection of the party elite as well as over the policy of the party does not interfere with the ability of the party elite to gain and maintain control over the executive branch of government. Secondly, it emerges that office-seeking behaviour is positively associated with the professionalisation of the central office, which indicates that professional party organisations are more inclined to office-seeking behaviour that to policy-seeking. Finally, the level of office-seeking behaviour is negatively correlated with the width of the electoral appeal of the party. In contrast to what was expected by Kirchheimer, it seems that parties which are better able to attract voters from outside their traditional social basis of support also face more difficulties getting into office. Apparently, winning elections does not automatically result in control of office (with the exception of majoritarian systems like the United Kingdom). It seems that representation of clearly definable social groups with strong partisan affiliations still constitutes a valuable asset for political parties to obtain governmental power, suggesting that

ridding political parties completely of their social embeddedness and their membership organisation would seriously undermine the party's ability to control the administration. Additionally it is established that the width of electoral appeal is positively associated with the level of centralisation of the internal decision-making procedures and negatively with the professionalization of the leadership organisation. This provides corroboration for my previous conclusion, namely that party leaders have been very willing to open up their parties to new voters, but only when they can increase their grip on the decision-making processes by way of centralisation. In this way they ensure that the newly recruited voters cannot successfully rebel against the ruling 'classe politique'. More generally, however, the infrequency of strong associations between these different dimensions suggests again that catch-allism itself is far from being a uni-variate phenomenon.

7.3.1 Party systems compared

These seven extracted factors can also be utilised to determine which type of political parties characterises party systems in West European countries. Again I use standard scores (z-scores) to compare countries as well as party families. Table 7.2 provides the mean standard-scores of the parties within each country aggregated up to the level of the national party system itself. Again the method of simple summation of variables with high factor loadings is applied. All scores have been recoded so that a higher score means a higher relative level of catch-allism (see above). In presenting these summary data in table 7.2 I have ranked the countries in descending order according to their relative level of catch-allism over the post-war period.

Table 7.2 Mean standard scores on seven dimensions of party behaviour in West European countries 1945-1990

PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE LEADERSHIP		CENTRALISATION OF DECISION-MAKING		PROFESSIONALISATION OF CENTRAL OFFICE		OFFICE-SEEKING		POLICY-SEEKING		WIDTH OF POPULAR APPEAL		SOCIAL INCLUSION	
Ger	1.57	Ita	2.16	Ita	1.11	Fra	.64	Ita	.59	Den	.58	Ger	.37
Ita	1.52	Fra		Net	.28	Fin	.31	Ger	.45	Ita	.53	Net	.35
Swe	.69	Aut	.81	Ger	.07	Ita	.26	UK	.41	Nor	.02	Fra	.15
Nor	.51	Bel	.58	Den	.00	Net	.18	Bel	.41	Fin	-.27	Nor	.10
Den	.19	Net	.47	Fin	-.15	Bel	.14	Aut	.40	Ire	-.34	Fin	.09
Fin	.16	Ger	-.05	Nor	-.21	Ger	.05	Fra	.23	Swe	-.55	Den	.08
Ire	-.58	UK	-.43	Aut	-.21	Den	-.12	Net	.22	Aut	-.56	Aut	.01
Net	-.89	Den	-.65	UK	-.29	Aut	-.17	Fin	.13	UK	-.83	Swe	-.14
Aut	-1.16	Fin	-.66	Ire	-.32	Ire	-.18	Nor	-.42	Net	-.89	Bel	-.47
UK	-.1.35	Ire	-.96	Swe		Nor	-.25	Ire	-.50	Ger	-.92	Ita	-.50
		Nor	-1.49			UK	-.41	Den -	.61			Ire	-.51
		Swe	-1.81			Swe	-.49	Swe	-.73			UK	-.66

Entries are average standard-scores (z-scores).

The first point that can be noted from table 7.2 is that the national party systems in the various European countries tend to have very distinct characteristics. The Austrian party system, for example, is characterised by relatively undemocratic, centralised mass parties which have a mediocre level of professionalization. Austrian parties rank high in terms of policy-seeking. Additionally, Austrian parties are characterised by a relatively traditional electoral appeal and a traditional and closed mode of elite recruitment, reminiscent of the consociational grip Austrian political parties have on civil society. In contrast, Danish parties are comparatively professional organisations with relatively democratic internal decision-making procedures. Parties in Denmark by and large balance their office-orientation with their policy-seeking ambitions and adopt wide electoral appeals, while they also apply relatively open patterns of elite recruitment. Finnish parties are characterised by low levels of professionalization and fairly democratic internal procedures (as is stipulated by national law). Nevertheless, Finnish parties are more oriented towards control of office than to the execution of a particular policy. Like in Denmark, parties in Finland appeal to a relatively wide electorate and have a relatively open structure for people with political ambitions. Party organisations in Germany are highly professional with undemocratic internal decision-making procedures and low membership participation. German parties are policy-oriented and grant relatively low weight to office-seeking behaviour. The electoral appeal of German parties is very traditional, yet their pattern of elite recruitment is very open. Parties in Ireland are, in European perspective, relatively traditional, unprofessional political organisations with relatively democratic internal procedures. In general, Irish parties rank at the bottom of the distribution on most factors as they have remained close to the mass-party model. Irish parties balance the propensity to put forward a political program with the need to obtain governmental power. Furthermore, Irish parties have a relatively traditional electoral

appeal and the route to power for elites is very conventional as well. Bearing in mind that some of the Italian parties included in this analysis no longer exist, it can be concluded that party organisations within the Italian party system were very distinctive creatures. In the period under analysis, Italian parties had relatively professional structures and were by far the most centralised and thus undemocratic parties found in Western Europe. In all, Italian parties consistently rank at the top of the table on six of the seven factors. On only one factor can Italy be found at the bottom of the distribution: the Italian political elite have not opened their mode of elite recruitment. Most of the political activity is geared to fulfil the office-seeking ambitions of a 'closed' political class, a characterisation that neatly fits the numerous descriptions of the clientelist Italian partitocracia. To enhance their chances at gaining governmental power, Italian parties did appeal to a relatively wide audience.

Central party organisations in the Netherlands tend to be very professional parties, without having rid themselves of all internal democracy. Parties in the Dutch parliament have been extensively staffed with experts and professionals, and rank among the most professional in Western Europe. This can be explained by the fact that the Netherlands is the only country without direct state finance to central party organisations, while the parliamentary party is allocated sufficient resources for extensive professionalization. The typical Dutch tendency to seek political representation in the state structures instead of aiming for civic organisation is also witnessed by a relatively strong office-seeking orientation of political parties in the Netherlands and their open pattern of elite recruitment. Compared to parties in other European countries, the appeal of Dutch parties is fairly restricted, no doubt a heritage of the formerly pillarised social structure of the Netherlands.

Norwegian and Swedish parties have relatively professional parliamentary party organisations while they maintained a substantial mass membership at the 'party on the ground'. Members are granted a comparatively high level of influence on internal decision-making procedures. In both countries parties put relatively much emphasis on traditional issues compared to parties in most other party systems. This is where the similarities end between Norway and Sweden. Parties in Norway have a relatively wide electoral appeal and open method of elite recruitment, whereas Swedish parties have a far more restricted and traditional electoral appeal and mode of elite recruitment. Swedish parties are also characterised by a large discrepancy between the high level of professionalisation of the leadership party and the very low level of professionalisation of the membership party. Finally, parties in the British polity are relatively unprofessional organisations which offer little democratic participation by the membership. British parties rank very high on the policy-seeking dimension, in contrast to the Downsian assumption of office-seeking behaviour of parties operating in majoritarian (two-party) systems. Moreover, British parties also rank among the most traditional parties with regard to the breadth of their electoral appeal and type of elite recruitment.

7.3.2 Party families compared

Chapter 2 and 3 showed that Kirchheimer suggested that political parties will not all transform at a similar speed, nor will all parties find themselves in the same stage of development. Moreover, since parties differ in genetic origin they do not begin their metamorphosis from the same point of departure. Thus, even with similar social and

institutional forces at work upon the party organisation, the responses may differ. Next to substantial cross-national differences discussed above, table 7.3 reviews the relative scores on the seven dimensions of the different party families as derived from an aggregation of their family members in the different countries. Here also the party families are rank-ordered in descending order.

Table 7.3 Mean standard-scores on seven dimensions of party behaviour of West European party families 1945-1990

PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE LEADERSHIP		CENTRALISATION OF DECISION-MAKING		PROFESSIONALISATION OF CENTRAL OFFICE		OFFICE-SEEKING		POLICY-SEEKING		WIDTH OF POLPULAR APPEAL		SOCIAL INCLUSION	
com	1.13	com	1.61	com	.63	sd	.65	agr	.72	lib	.41	lib	.09
lib	.73	cd	.64	lib	.16	cd	.46	cd	.42	com	.11	con	-.00
agr	.51	sd	.05	con	-.01	agr	.37	lib	.35	agr	-.43	cd	-.10
con	.12	lib	-.49	cd	-.34	lib	.17	sd	.04	cd	-.53	sd	-.13
sd	-.31	con	-.73	sd	-.69	con	-.06	con	-.66	sd	-.75	agr	-.17
cd	-.63	agr	-1.23	agr	-.79	com	-.85	com	-.77	con	-.89	com	-.40

Entries are mean standard-scores (z-scores).

As is clear from table 7.3, Christian democratic and social democratic parties are political organisations with a fairly similar format that distinguishes them from parties with other genetic origins. The heritage of an extensive extra-parliamentary mass party organisation has in fact impeded the professionalisation of Christian democratic and social democratic parties, as well as that of agrarian parties. Their relatively high level of membership constitutes one of the persisting characteristics of their former mass-party format. At the same time Christian and social democratic parties are also characterised by relatively low levels of internal democracy. In addition, both social democratic and Christian democratic parties are the most office-seeking parties in Western Europe, although they have not abandoned their traditional policy objectives. Neither have these parties distanced themselves from their traditional voters, resulting in a relatively narrow electoral appeal compared to other party families. Furthermore, social democratic parties and Christian democratic parties have maintained their historic modes of elite recruitment and their party organisations have remained relatively closed to external influences. Agrarian parties, which have transformed themselves into Centre-parties, have also preserved some features of their former mass-party characteristics: a comparatively low level of professionalism particularly at the central party office, large party memberships which are granted relatively little democratic participation in the internal decision-making processes. Agrarian parties, however, give proportionately more weight to policy-seeking motives than to office-seeking motives.

Conservative parties differ from this mass-party model in that their organisations are more professional and their internal decision-making procedures are more democratic than in Christian or social democratic parties. This may have resulted from a different organisational ideology and practice characterised by decentralisation and more autonomous branches. Parties belonging to the conservative party family rank relatively low with respect to policy flexibility, indicating their ideological rigidity

and strong inclination for policy-seeking behaviour. Control of government by conservative parties is still guided by a clear political program. With respect to their electoral appeal, conservative parties also deserve their name; they have a very traditional and narrow electoral appeal to middle and upper class voters. In contrast, at the level of elite recruitment conservative parties are relatively open to external influences compared to other party families.

Liberal party organisations in Western Europe differ from both models described above in that they have a wider electoral appeal and are also more 'liberal' in their openness and accessibility at the elite level. Additionally, liberal parties are very distant from the mass-party model in that they have relatively democratic decision-making structures. These open and democratic liberal party organisations have shown a lower ability to control governmental office.

Consistently ranked at the most extreme position on six of the seven factors, communist parties make for a very unique type of party in Western Europe. Their ideology of democratic centralism resulted in the most undemocratic internal structures of all party families included in this study. This practice of co-optation and ideological fundamentalism has also resulted in very closed recruitment patterns for party elites. The rapid dissolution of traditional working class support has forced communist parties to open their electoral appeal to middle-class voters, yet they have largely remained excluded from governmental responsibility.

7.3.3 Trends of party transformation over time

By way of regression analyses it is possible to sketch some of the broad trends of the manner in which parties have transformed over time in Western Europe. Table 7.4 provides the regression coefficients of the seven factors with the year of observation as the independent variable.

Table 7.4 Trends on seven dimensions of party behaviour in West European countries 1945-1990

	PROFESSIONALISATION OF THE LEADERSHIP	CENTRALISATION OF DECISION-MAKING	PROFESSIONALISATION OF CENTRAL OFFICE	OFFICE-SEEKING	POLICY-SEEKING	WIDTH OF POPULAR APPEAL	SOCIAL INCLUSION
Aut	.37	.18	-.08	-.14	.23	.55*	.18
Bel	-	.27*	-	-.10	.49*	-	-.02
Den	-	-.10	.49*	.05	-.32*	-.16	.03
Fin	-.59*	-.27*	.18	-.01	.64	.03	-.15
Fra	-	.62*	-	-.40*	-.09	.09	-
Ger	.07	-.35	-.28	-.30*	-.23	.17	-.54*
Ire	.63*	-.37*	.47	-.09	.19	.42	-.11
Ita	-.58*	.03	.33	.09	-.11	-.51	-.06
Net	.79*	-.19	-.00	.04	.09	-.07	-.10
Nor	.35*	.19	.31	.15	-.24	.06	-.41*
Swe	.14	-.22	.25	.05	.30*	-	-.11
UK	-.68	-.54*	.82*	-.01	-.67*	.14	-.15
total	.07	-.05	.23*	-.05	-.04	.06	-.08

Entries are regression coefficients of the factors scores with the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates a significance level above the .05 level.

Overall, as these figures make clear, parties in most West European countries have moved away from the mass-party model and professionalised their party organisations over time. Particularly in the Netherlands and Ireland this process is most noticeable, precisely the countries where financial support from the state is relatively limited, which suggests that state funding is not a prerequisite for professionalisation. In general, the originally very centralised power structure of internal decision-making procedures has become more inclusive and democratic in most countries, although this process is only marginal with regard to the remaining central control over elite recruitment and policy-formulation. In contrast to the general trend, parties in France and Belgium have progressively centralised their internal decision-making procedures. Another significant finding is that while control of office is still the most important objective of political parties, policy-seeking behaviour remains pivotal as well. Across Western Europe there is little evidence of a progressive trend towards pragmatic office-seeking behaviour regardless of the political program which is to be implemented. Still, parties in Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium have increased their orientation towards the realisation of a specific political platforms. Apparently, policy still clearly matters to a large number of political parties in Western

Europe. Throughout Western Europe parties are gradually appealing to voters outside their traditional bases of party support, most rapidly in Austria. The only countries where this process of wider electoral appeal is not found are Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark. At the elite level, however, most West European parties are very reluctant to open up their organisations to ambitious politicians without any prior party political experience. In general, table 7.4 shows substantial differences between party systems, which suggests that the specific operations of the national party system seems to deeply influence the type of party transformation. The types of transformations have been in very divergent directions and little evidence can be found of convergence over time of West European party systems.

This pattern of very different directions in transformation of political parties over time can also be found among the various party families. The results of a cross-time analysis of transformation of party families are summarised in table 7.5.

Table 7.5 Trends on seven dimensions of party behaviour of West European party families 1945-1990

	PROFESSIONALISATIO OF THE LEADERSHIP	CENTRALISATION OF DECISION-MAKING	PROFESSIONALISATION OF CENTRAL OFFICE	OFFICE-SEEKING	POLICY-SEEKING	WIDTH OF POPULAR APPEAL	SOCIAL INCLUSION
cd	.55*	-.12	.13	-.24*	.18	-.21	-.17
com	.64	-.24	.36	-.07	.18	-.79	-.59
con	-.52*	-.11	-.05	.25*	.07	-.19	-.28
sd	-.38*	.15	.18	-.01	-.03	.57*	-.01
lib	.24	.01	.32*	.03	-.08	-.29	.13
agr	-.31	-.11	.32	.23	.31	.58	-.31

Entries are regression coefficients of the seven factors with the year of observation as the independent variable. An asterisk (*) indicates a significance level above the .05 level.

As can be seen from table 7.5, parties of different genetic origin have followed dissimilar trajectories of transformation. Apparently, the genesis of parties exerts influence on the type and speed of transformation. Liberal, Christian democratic as well as communist parties have professionalised their parliamentary party most rapidly over the post-war period. This analysis shows that parties of conservative, social democratic and agrarian origin, in contrast, have not modified their parliamentary party in this direction. Professionalization of the central party office, however, seems to constitute an almost universal trend among parties, regardless of their descent. From another general trend, namely that of moderate democratisation of West European party organisations, some social democratic and liberal parties are partly excluded. The access to power at the governmental level has remained relatively closed and few new parties have been allowed to enter into governmental responsibility. Only Christian democratic parties have lost considerable control of government. Furthermore, it emerged that office-seeking behaviour is a dominant motivation for political action. Conservative party leaders, in particular, have given more weight to office-seeking motives. Nevertheless, policy motives remain important as well for the endeavours of West European party elites. Overall, policy has remained important for all party families; none of the party families have

collectively shed all ideological heritage and traditional policy preferences.

Since democracy necessitates popular legitimisation for political activity of political representatives, the investigation of the vote-seeking behaviour shows that many parties appealed to a wider audience over time, although the structural transformation of West European societies left party leaders with little alternative. Party leaders progressively mould the party image to the perceived needs of the electoral market and preferences of the unaffiliated electorate. With regard to this electoral appeal of parties, the social democratic and agrarian parties diverge from the general trend among parties of other historic origin in that they have most ardently solicited a wider social spectrum, while the other party families have been less 'vote-seeking'.

The modes of elite recruitment have remained largely traditional within most West European party systems; the liberal party family is the only group which has collectively opened up their recruitment pattern to non-traditional external influences. In this respect, liberal parties have an edge over the other party families, in particular over conservative, agrarian and communist parties, which have all regressed to more traditional modes of elite recruitment and conventional representation of social interests. In conclusion, there is little evidence for the convergence of political parties from different genetic origin on these dimensions of party transformation.

7.4 Directions of party transformation in Western Europe

As will be recalled from the analysis presented above, three organisational factors were extracted along which West European party organisations diverge. From the factor matrices and factor plots provided in appendix 3, it can be seen that these three latent factors describe a two dimensional space in which, on one axis, capital intensive and professional party organisations face non-professional membership organisations on the opposite pole. The second dimension is constituted by two polar positions, one indicating a very centralised parties versus parties with internally democratic power structures. For sake of illustration these two axes can be transformed into a four-fold categorisation as is visualised in figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1 Organisational dimensions of party behaviour in Western Europe



This exploratory two-dimensional model thus generates four possible ideal types of political parties, which, however, will not be used as a new typology of political parties in Western Europe. Political parties do not uniquely fit into one cell. What I want to demonstrate here is that the seven extracted dimensions can be used to typify different directions of party transformation by analysing the movement of parties over time between these cells.

On these two organisational dimensions four ideal types of party organisation can be categorised as follows:

- First, *traditional mass parties*, which are characterised by a considerable membership organisation and derive a substantial proportion of their income from membership fees. These mass parties grant their members only marginal and indirect influence in internal decision-making procedures, while in general power is centralised at the leadership level within these parties.

- Second, *democratic mass parties* characterised by mass-membership and a democratic internal structure as well. This party type is not prevalent in the West European political culture, but it approximates the old ideal type of mass parties.

- On the opposite pole we find parties which have only a moderate membership organisation, making them essentially dependent on state finance or alternative sources of income. These parties are unable to use the 'party on the ground' for the daily organisational activities, instead the leadership of these parties has to employ a substantial number of professional staff and experts to administer the

party organisation. These 'cadre' parties exist in two varieties: on the one hand some of these parties adopt relatively democratic structures and allow members significant influence in the decision-making processes. These parties could best be characterised as ***democratic cadre parties***.

- On the other hand some of these 'cadre' parties exclude the relatively few members of the party from any significant influence in the internal decision-making, culminating in a fourth type, ***traditional, non-democratic cadre parties***.

What can be seen in Western Europe is a reluctant shift from traditional mass and cadre parties towards a more dominant presence of democratic cadre parties.

At the ideological level two basic dimensions of party transformation were found (see appendix 3), which are consistent with the concepts of policy-seeking behaviour and office seeking-behaviour. If the items are plotted in a two-dimensional space of ideological behaviour, it emerges that all items indicating government control cluster at one pole of the office-seeking dimension. In all, it materialises that the raison d'être for political parties is to control national executive power, which shows that one strategy, namely ***office-seeking***, dominates at the ideological level. The factor-plot reveals nothing to indicate the existence of ***non office-seeking party behaviour***, epitomised by the fact that the other pole of this dimension is void of any substance. This is not surprising, since by definition parties which would not be office-seeking would best be labelled 'social movements', rather than political parties.

On the second dimension which was extracted from the ideological items it was found that the tactics of ***strategic policy-flexibility*** or of ***traditional ideological fundamentalism*** constitute both poles. Traditional issue emphasis as well as distance from the political centre both constitute one pole. Apparently, emphasis on traditional issues does not exclude the possibility of adopting a position close to the centre of the political spectrum. This type of behaviour, best labelled as 'strategic policy flexibility', indicates that parties are willing to move into (centrist) policy positions that are of beneficial to them in electoral and governmental terms, without losing their traditional policy preferences. Few parties manoeuvre themselves in a policy position which would automatically condemn them to the opposition benches in parliament. Nevertheless, there are parties which remain loyal to their traditional ideology and program, whatever the consequences for participation in government. Considerable variation among parties was found concerning the distinctiveness of their policy position, indicating the continuing importance of the left-right policy dimension in political competition. This is evidenced by the position of the item 'policy position on the left-right scale (LRMANIF)' on the opposite pole in the plot, although the item does not correlate highly with the policy factor. Apparently, this opposite strategy of ***traditional ideological fundamentalism*** is less appealing to political parties. All this culminates in the conclusion that two dimensions predominate, namely one dimension at which ***office-seeking behaviour*** constitutes the one and only extremity, without any viable antagonist strategy available to political parties and a second dimension, ***policy-seeking behaviour***, where traditional issue emphasis and party distance from the centre both constitute one pole facing traditional ideological fundamentalism as a weak antagonist strategy which few parties find an attractive

tactic.

Figure 7.2 Ideological dimensions of party behaviour in Western Europe



The two extracted ideological dimensions can be used to distinguish four stereotypical types of party behaviour as is visualised in figure 7.2.

- Although at times parties do adopt distinct and traditional policy positions, they also need to avoid distancing themselves too far from the centre space of party competition (see also Keman 1997). As a dominant strategy, political parties in Western Europe seek to carefully balance both office-seeking and policy-seeking ambitions, a type of behaviour which comes close to ***catch-all behaviour***. In real life, political parties oscillate between the need to attract voters and the need to appear able to govern in the eyes of their political opponents.

- Kirchheimer, as well as Downs for that matter, were incorrect in their assertion that a vague policy position near the centre of the political spectrum is a necessary prerequisite for gaining governmental responsibility. Parties have not massively converged on the centre space of party competition. Strategically, parties are clearly capable of using a strategy whereby they ***emphasise traditional issues and policies*** (and appeal to a core electorate) to strengthen their position in the governmental arena. Perhaps the conclusion that Kirchheimer was partially correct is more fair; parties are very strategic creatures, yet they have not undergone a process of de-ideologisation (see also Budge, Hearl and Robertson

1987).

- A strategy whereby parties adopt a fundamentalist traditional ideological position without any regard for the consequences in terms of office control is not prevalent in Western Europe, indicated by the fact that the cell in the left hand corner is practically empty. This shows that few parties in Western Europe can be categorised as ***opposition of principle***.

- Some parties do adopt strategic policy positions close to the political centre without too much emphasis on their traditional ideology. Yet, for some reason or another these parties are unable to gain governmental responsibility, condemning them to a strategy of (permanent) ***democratic opposition***.

In Western Europe party leaders must steer their party between the Scylla of maintaining a recognisable and typical ideological profile towards the electorate and the Charybdis of flexibility in policy stance to seek the optimal strategic position for obtaining governmental power. What seems to be occurring is that political parties move back and forth between traditional policy emphasis and catch-all behaviour.

A two-dimensional pattern of factor scores could also be extracted at the electoral level (see appendix 3).

Figure 7.3 Electoral dimensions of party behaviour in Western Europe



In electoral terms, parties are first characterised by their differences in class-distinctiveness and strength in their connection with the electorate. The negative relationship between the social heterogeneity of party support and party-electorate link demarcate the difference between parties with a broad electoral appeal and a weak connection with their core constituency, while other parties have a more narrow social base of party supporters which strongly identify with 'their' political party. Strategic vote-seeking behaviour indicates that parties seek voters outside their traditional voter groups, while at the same time attempt not to alienate their traditional electorate. This external solicitation for popular support is duplicated at the elite level as well. The second dimension at the electoral level shows that political parties either recruit both voters and members of the elite from outside the traditional social basis of support or they remain closed to external influences at both levels. Once parties open their doors to new groups of voters, then newcomers from more diverse social background at the elite-level are also increasingly numerous. Still, this process of social inclusion does not fully dominate in West European parliamentary democracies, where traditional patterns of elite recruitment continue to dominate, while the openness at the level of the electorate is more advanced.

These two dimensions of electoral behaviour of party elites results in four ideal types of parties:

- parties can both have a strong link to their core constituency and an elite recruitment from a very narrow social base, a party type which resembles political parties during the times of pillarised consociational democracies and are best typified as a ***closed shop parties***;

- parties can also have a broader electoral appeal towards voters with a weak link to the party, yet recruit their elite from a very well-defined social group, which parallels the behaviour of ***traditional people's parties***;

- parties with a narrow electoral appeal, but which are open to external recruitment of new members of the party elite can be characterised as ***democratic devotee parties***;

- the fourth type of party behaviour comes closest to the catch-all model, whereby parties are open to external influences at both the elite level as well as in their popular appeal. These parties become ***strategic electoral machines*** which are primarily geared to winning elections.

In West European party systems 'closed shop' parties are rapidly disappearing, yet parties approaching the three other stereotypes can still be found in significant numbers.

7.5 Conclusion: the arrested development of catch-allism

The last four chapters provide ample proof that parties adapt effectively to the national context in which they operate, enabling them to perpetuate their prominent position in the democratic process of West European countries. It seems that it is not so much the innate qualities of political parties that determine their survival and success, but rather their capacity to adapt themselves to a changing environment. Formal responses by parties to external challenges are visible in their organisational choices, mode of elite recruitment and strategic behaviour in terms of office, policy and vote. The present study sought to determine the type and extent of party transformation in Western Europe and the extracted factors enabled an evaluation of the relative importance of the different motives underpinning the behaviour of party leaders in Western Europe.

Taking into account the obvious limitations, this study found **no linear trend** towards catch-allism in Western Europe over time, although there was a clear trend towards catch-allism on several of its indicators until the early 1960s. The problem with Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis is his assumption of a continuing trend. For this assumption of a linear development towards catch-allism I found no evidence. On the contrary, during the late 1960s up until the 1980s there was a decline in the overall level of catch-allism. West European party systems have witnessed an arrested development of catch-allism in the post war period. However, it is almost impossible to generalise this finding to all parties and countries included in this study. Across Western Europe I also found large variation in the extent, timing and direction of party transformation. Therefore, Kirchheimer's hypothesis of convergence of parties to one single model of transformation could not be corroborated either. European parties do **not converge** to one single type of political party, with similar organisational, electoral and ideological strategies. There are still substantial differences between parties in one country and across Western Europe regarding their organisational format, their office and policy-seeking behaviour as well as their electoral appeal. Moreover, all over Western Europe political parties transform their organisation, reorient their policy positions and revise their electoral strategies in

different directions. Party transformation, therefore, is not a single story. None of the individual indicators showed a similar trend in all countries and across all party families. Basically, this study found **no uniformity in development**. There are vast differences across countries and party families regarding the timing, the level and the direction of party change. All in all, it is almost impossible to generalise about all individual parties. This detailed study over a time span of forty-five years did not find one unilateral and uni-dimensional development. At the different dimensions and indicators contradictory developments could be recorded, allowing for the ***main conclusion that over the post war period a partial transformation towards catch-allism has occurred in West European party systems, a development which was discontinued in the late 1970s, early 1980s.***

Notwithstanding these divergent trends, the analysis above proved that the items used to measure catch-allism constitute an internally valid measurement tool to quantify the transformation of political parties in Western Europe in the post war period. Also, this study developed an analytical instrument which can test not only Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis, but which by means of a multi-dimensional approach and a wide range of indicators, can also be used to address wider questions of party transformation and party system change. Finally, this study has tried to show that Otto Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis remains relevant to the debate on the transformation of West European party systems, not necessarily because of its currency and validity, but because of its rich argumentation. In this sense Kirchheimer's catch-all thesis has proved to be a valuable working hypothesis that can be employed to delineate the transformation of political parties over the second half of the twentieth century.

Evidently, the type of party which Kirchheimer himself joined in the interbellum no longer exists, yet neither did post war parties develop into full-blown catch-all parties. And although it is uncertain which type of parties will characterise the West European party systems of the 21st century, it is clear that the last decade of the 20th century already reveals a sense of unravelling in some of the party systems. The Italian case has shown that even rapid and total system breakdown is not impossible, while in France, Germany and Austria extreme right-wing parties seem capable to alter the hitherto structured patterns of interaction between parties. No doubt that the end of Cold War and subsequent disappearance of a bi-polar world system will have other effects on the ideological complexion, the electoral appeal and the internal organisation of parties. This study can perhaps serve to describe and understand the character and consequences of such profound changes that have taken place in recent times and serve as a tool to analyse future developments.

Appendix 1. The West European parties under analysis

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
01	Austria	**Kommunistische Partei Österreichs** Founded in Vienna on 3 November 1918.	KPÖ	COM
02	Austria	**Die Grüne Alternative** Founded in 1987 out of the merger of the Alternative Liste Österreichs (ALÖ), the Vereinigte Grüne Österreichs (VGÖ founded in 1982) and a number of citizens' initiative groups.	GA	ENV
03	Austria	**Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs** Originates from the Deutscher Nationalverband (1910) and the parties of the nationalist Lager: the Grossdeutsche Volkspartei and the Landbund. The FPÖ is the result of a merger in 1955 of the Verband der Unabhangigen (VdU founded in 1949) and the Freiheitspartei (founded in 1955).	FPÖ	LIB
04	Austria	**Österreichische Volkspartei** Originates from the Christlich Soziale Partei (1889). The ÖVP itself was founded in 1945, after attempts of uniting Christian democracy as early as 1870.	ÖVP	CD
05	Austria	**Sozialistische Partei Österreich** Originates from Sozial Demokratische Partei, founded on 30 December 1888-1 January 1889. The SPÖ is founded in 1945.	SPÖ	SD
06	Belgium	**Parti Réformateur Libéral/Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang** Originates from the Brussels Alliance Libérale and the Parti Libéral (founded in 1846). Parti Réformateur Libéral (PRL) was founded in November 1976 out of the Parti Liberal and Rassemblement Wallone (RW). Other RW-members merge with the Parti de la Liberté et du Progrès (PLP founded in 196) into the Parti des Réformes et de la Liberté Wallone (PRLW). In 1971 the liberals split into the linguistic parties: the Partij voor Vrijheid en Vooruitgang (PVV) and Parti Réformateur Libéral (PRL).	PRL/PVV	LIB
07	Belgium	**Parti Social Chrétien/Christelijke Volkspartij** Originates from Catholic organizations Unions Conservatrices et Constitutionelles (1864), the Cercles Catholique (1855) and the Federations des Sociétés Ouvrières Catholique. The three groups merge into the Parti Catholique in 1888. In 1936 the party is renamed Bloc Catholique. In 1945 the unitary party Christelijke Volkspartij/Parti Social Chrétien is founded. In 1968 the party splits into its Walloon and Flemish wings.	PSC/CVP	CD
08	Belgium	**Parti Communiste de Belgique/Kommunistische Partij van België** The party was founded in 1921 out of the Parti Communiste de Belgique and the Ancien Parti.	PCB/KPB	COM
09	Belgium	**Parti Socialiste Belge/Belgische Socialistische Partij** Originates from the Parti Ouvrier Belge, founded in 1885. The PSB is founded in 1945. The party splits in October 1978 into the Socialistische Partij (SP) and the Parti Socialiste (PS).	PSB/BSP	SD
10	Belgium	**Volksunie** The Volksunie originates from the Flemish Frontpartij and the Vlaams Nationaal Verbond (VNV). The VU was founded in 1954 out of the Vlaamse Concentratie, a split from the CVP. In 1978 a right wing group broke away into the Vlaams Blok.	VU	ETH
11	Belgium	**Écologistes confederés pour l'organisation de luttes originales** **Originates, like AGALEV, from the Green movement. The** party was founded by a RW member in 1978.	ECO	ENV

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
12	Denmark	**Venstre** Venstre was founded in June 1870. In 1895 the party transforms into the Venstre Reform Party. In 1905 the reformist members brake away into the Radikale Venstre. In 1910 the Venstre Reform Party and the Moderate Venstre Party merge into Venstre.	VEN	LIB
13	Denmark	**Radikale Venstre** Founded in 1905 by the reformist wing of Venstre.	RV	LIB
14	Denmark	**Socialdemokratiet** Originates from the Danish section of the First International, which was established in 1871. The first congres was held in 1976. In 1878 the party changes its name to Det Socialdemokratiske Forbund, which is usualy regarded as the predecessor of the Socialdemokratiet, the party's name since 1965.	SD	SD
15	Denmark	**Socialistisk Folkeparti** The Socialistisk Folkeparti was founded in 1959 as a result of a split from the Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti.	SF	SOC
16	Denmark	**Centrum-Demokraterne** Founded on 7 November 1973 by a breakaway from the Socialdemokratiet.	CD	LIB
17	Denmark	**Fremkridspartiet** Founded in 1972.	PP/FRP	PRT
18	Denmark	**Det Konservative Folkeparti** Founded in 1915 by members from Hoyre.	KF	CON
19	Denmark	**Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti** The Danish Communist Party was founded in 1919 from a merger of several left-wing groups. Initially its name was the Danish Left Socilaist Party. In 1922 the party adopted its current name.	DKP	COM
20	Denmark	**Kristeligt Folkeparti** The Kristeligt Folkeparti was founded in April 1970.	KrF	CD
21	Finland	**Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto/Demokraattinen Vaihtoe** The Finnish People's Democratic League was founded on October 29, 1944 by communists and left-wing socialists. The Finnish Communist Party (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue), founded in 1918 in Moscow, remains the core element of the SKDL. In 1985 some communists left the SKDL to form the Democratic Alternative (Demokraattinen Vaihtoe) together with the SKP-Y (Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue- Yhdenälsyys, the Communist Party of Finland-Unity).	SKDL/DEVA	COM
22	Finland	**Liberaalinen Kansanpuolue** The party originates from the Finnish Party and the Kansallinen Edistyspuolue (National Progressive Party) of which the latter was founded in 1894. In 1951 the liberal party split into the Finnish People's Party (Suomen Kansanpuolue) and the Liberal League (Vapamielisten Liitto). In 1965 the two parties merged again into the present Liberal People's Party.	LKP	LIB
23	Finland	**Kansallinen Kokoomus** KOK was founded on December 9, 1918 by members of the Old Finnish Party. In 1933 the party joined shortly in an elecoral alliance with the Isänmaallinen Kansanliike, the Patriotic People's Movement.	KOK	CON
24	Finland	**Suomen Kristillinen Liitto** The Finnish Christian Union was founded in 1958.	SKL	CD
25	Finland	**Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue** The first socialist party in Finland, the Finnish Workers Party was founded in 1899. In 1903 the Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue adopted its present name. In 1959 a group, the Social Democratic League of Workers and Smallholders (SKOG), breaks away from the party. In 1973 most members of the SKOG-group join the SSP again.	SSP	SD

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
26	Finland	**Keskustapuolue** The Agrarian Union was founded in 1906. In 1965 the Union changed its name into Center Party.	KESK	AGR
27	Finland	**Svenska Folkpartiet** Originates from the Swedish Party which was founded in 1906. In 1973 some members of the party joined the Constitutional Party of the Right (POP).	SFP	ETH
28	France	**Parti Socialiste (SFIO/PSF + PSU)** The Parti Socialiste is the successor of the Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere (SFIO), founded in 1905. From 1969 until 1971 the movement was known under the name Nouveau Parti Socialiste. From 1972 to 1977 the party constituted a part of the Union de la Gauche togeher with the PCF and MRG. In 1960 a radical-left group forms the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU).	PSF	SD
29	France	**Gaullistes** The parties in the Gaullist tradition are the Rassemblement pour la France (RPF) which existed from 1947 until 1953. In 1958 the Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) was formed from several party organisations among which the Union pour la Renouveau Francaise and the Union Civique were the most important. This amalgamation dissolved into the Union de Démocrates pour la République (UDR) in 1967. In 1976 the UDR transformed into the Rassemblement pour la République (RPR). In the 1981 election the UDR joined the Union pour la Majorité Nouvelle. In 1988 the UDR joined the UDF in the Union Républi-que et du Centre (UDC).	GAUL	CON
30	France	**Union pour la Democratie Française (+ CDS + Parti Républicain)** This current, originating from the Parti Republicain (1901) reconstructed the first post-war liberal party in 1945 from elements of the Independent Republicans and the Independent Paysans. In 1948 the CNIP was formed and co-existed along with the Parti Republicain Radicale and the Radical Socialists within this liberal tradition.. The Centre National des Independants et Paysans (CNIP) existed from 1951 until 1966. In 1962 the CNIP split into the Centre National des Independants (CNI) and the RI. The Parti Républicain originates from the Républicain Independant (RI) which was founded in 1966. From 1974 until 1978 the party was named FNRI. In 1978 the UDF was founded. The main components of the UDF are the Parti Républicain (founded in 1977), the Parti Radical, the Centre des Democrats Sociaux (CDS) and the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD). The christian democratic current of the UDF , the CDS, is the successor of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP). The CDS was formed in 1976 as a result of a fusion of the Centre Démocratique et Progrés and the Centre Democrate. One other wing of this movement, the PSD, was founded in 1973 as the Mouvement Démocrate Socialiste de France (MSDF), later renamed Mouvement Démocrate Socialiste (MDS). In 1982 the party adopted its present name: Parti Social Démocrate (PSD).	UDF	LIB
31	France	**Mouvement Republicain Populaire** The Mouvement Republicain Populaire (MRP) is founded in 1944. The origin of French christian democracy can be found in the Parti Démocrate Populaire (PDP) of the interbellum and the Catholic labour unions (Confédération Francaise des Travailleurs Chrétiens) and other catholic organizations.	MRP	CD
32	France	**Parti Communiste Française** The French Communist Party was founded after a split from the SFIO in 1920 at the Congres in Tours. The party joined the Union de la Gauche together with the PSF and MRG in 1972, which it left again a few years later.	PCF	COM
33	France	**Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche** The MRG is a split from the Parti Radical in June 1972 and was part of the Union de la Gauche.	MRG	LIB

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
34	France	**Parti Républicain Radical et Radical Socialiste (PRR/RS) + Radical Socialist Party (RSP)** The origin of the radical movement in France can be traced back to the activities of Louis Blanc from 1839 until 1848. The radical tendency is represented by the Parti Radical, founded in 1901. Before that time the radical tendency was never well organised. In 1972 the MRG broke away from the party. The UDSR is also considered to belong to the radical tendency.	RAD	LIB
35	Germany	**Christlich Demokratische Union** The CDU was founded in 1945 (officially at the Goslar conference in 1950) by prominent members of the former Weimar catholic Zentrum party and other local community leaders.	CDU	CD
36	Germany	**Christlich Soziale Union** The CSU, founded in 1945, is a local party which competes in elections only in Bavaria. At the national level the CSU forms a united parliamentary party together with the CDU.	CSU	CD
37	Germany	**Die Grünen** The Grünen originate from local environmental groups such as the Grüne Liste Umweltschutz (GLU), Aktionsgemeinschaft Unabhangiger Deutscher (AUD) and Grüne Aktion Zukunft (GAZ). These and other groups merge for the 1979 European elections into Die Grünen. The first national conference was held in Karlsruhe in 1980. In 1981 some conservative members broke away into the Ökologisch-Demokratische Partei (ÖDP). Under the name Alternative Liste and Grüne Alternative Liste the Grünen compete in local elections between 1980 and 1983.	GRU	ENV
38	Germany	**Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands** The SPD originates from the Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterspartei (DSAP) and the Allgemeiner Detscher Arbeitersverein (founded in 1863), which joined forces in 1875 and was renamed Sozialistische Arbeiterspartei Deutschlands (SAPD). In 1891 the party adopted its present name. German participation in World War I led to a split into the nationalist MSPD and the independent USPD. In 1918 part of the socialist movement broke away into the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD). In 1945 the party was re-established.	SPD	SD
39	Germany	**Deutsche Kommunistische Partei** The Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP) was founded in 1918. In 1945 the party was reconstituted. In 1956 the party was banned as unconstitutional as it rejected the German Basic Law. In 1968 the party was refounded.	DKP	COM
40	Germany	**Freie Demokratische Partei** The FDP originates from two liberal parties of the Weimar Republik, the Deutsche Staatspartei (DSP) and the Deutsche Volkspartei (DVP). The DVP was founded as the Volkspartei in 1866 in Württemberg. In 1945 the DVP was re-founded. In other regions liberal parties emerged: the Deutsche Partei, the Demokratische Volkspartei, the Partei Freier Demokraten, the Bremer Demokratische Volkspartei, the Liberale-Demokatische Partei and others. The first attempt to unite these regional parties into the Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (DPD). In December 1948 the regional liberal parties merged into the FDP at the Heppenheim-conference. In 1956 several FDP ministers broke away into the Freie Volkspartei (FVP). In 1983 some prominent members found the Liberale Demokraten.	FDP	LIB
41	Ireland	**Worker's Party** The Pairtí na nOibrí, or Workers' Party (WP), originates from a split within Sinn Féin in 1969. In 1977 the party was renamed Sinn Féin-The Workers' Party, an addition which was dropped again in 1982.	WP	SOC
42	Ireland	**Fine Gael** Fine Gael (FG) originates from the pro-Treaty party Cumann na nGaedhael, which was founded in 1922. The defeat of Cumann na nGaedhael in the 1932 election resulted a merger with the National Centre Party and the National Guard of Blueshirts into Fine Gael in September 1933. In 1986 some members join the Progressive Democrats (PD).	FG	CD

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
43	Ireland	**The Communist Party of Ireland** The Irish version of a communist party was founded in 1921. Soon thereafter the party changed its name into the Irish Worker's League (IWL) and later Revolutionary Worker's Groups. In 1933 the party was renamed Communist Party. In 1948 the party revived as the Irish Worker's League. In 1962 the party reorganized under the name of Irish Worker's Party (IWP). In 1970 the IWP merged with the Communist Party (of the North) into the Communist Party of Ireland (CPI).	CPI	COM
44	Ireland	**Fianna Fáil** Fianna Fáil ("soldiers of destiny") originates from members of Sinn Féin which refused to accept the Treaty with Britain after the Civil War ended in 1921. On May 16, 1926 the party was founded. In 1973 the "Arms Crisis" resulted in a split of the Aontacht Éireann (Irish Unity Party). In 1985 some members found the Progressive Democrats (PD).	FF	CON
45	Ireland	**Irisch Labour Party** The foundation of the Irish Labour Party (ILP) was in 1912. A national organization was completed in 1922. In 1944 some members, together with labour unionists, split into the National Labour Party (NLP). In 1950 the two groups merge again. In 1986 some members join the Progressive Democrats (PD).	ILP	SD
46	Ireland	**Progressive Democrats** The Progressive Democrats (PD) is founded on December 21, 1985. The origins of the party lie in an internal conflict within Fianna Fáil over the leadership of Charles Haughey.	PD	LIB
47	Ireland	**The Green Alliance** The Green Alliance was founded as the Ecology Party of Ireland in 1981 by members of environmental and anti-nuclear protest groups, and with support of the Ecology Party in the United Kingdom.	GRE	ENV
48	Italy	**Democrazia Proletaria** The Democrazia Proletaria (DP) was founded in 1978 out of several left-wing parties of which Vanguardia Operaia is the most important. First named the Partito di Unita Proletaria (PDUP) and later Sinistra Democrazia Proletaria (SDP) the alliance broke up. A new party was formed, the PDUP per il Communismo, which soon joined the Communist Party. A minority of PDUP members and the majority of the Vanguardia Operaia found the DP.	DP	SOC
49	Italy	**Partito Radicale** The Radical Party, more a movement than a party, is founded in December 1955 as the result of a split from the Liberal Party. In the 1958 elections the Radical Party presented a joint list together with the Republican Party. In 1962 the party collapsed only to revive in 1969. In January 1988 the party congres decided to no longer compete in national elections and rename the party as the internationalist Partito Federalista Europeo.	PR	ENV
50	Italy	**Partito Socialista Italiano/Partito Socialista Unificato** The Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) originates from early socialist movements like the Italian Revolutionary Socialist Party (1882), the Workers Party (1885) and the Milanese Socialist League (1889). At the 1892 conference in Genova, these groups merge into the Party of Italian Workers. In 1895 the party changes its name into Partito Socialista Italiano. In 1907 the first major schisms occured and the revolutionary syndicalists were forced to leave the party. In November 1914 Mussolini is expelled from the party on the grounds of being in favour of Italian participation in World War I. In 1921 another group splits away into the PCI. In 1922 there is another internal dispute and a group of reformists is expelled, which results in the creation of the Partito Socialista Unitario (PSU). In 1924, after the murder of the PSU leader Matteotti, the two socialist parties join forces again. Some dissatisfied members join the Communist Party. In 1934 the PSI and the PCI enter into a "pact of unity of action" against the fascists. This pact is renewed in 1943 when the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) joins the pact. In 1947 a large reformist wing of the PSI breaks away into the PSLI/PSDI. In 1964 a left-wing group of the PSI splits from the party in order to revive the Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP). In 1966 the PSI and PSDI start the proces of a merger, but this is never completed and in 1969 the merger collapsed.	PSI/PSU	SD

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
51	Italy	**Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano** The origins of the PSDI are found in January 1947 when a group of PSI deputies and members split away from the party over the issue of cooperation with the communists. The newly founded party was first named Partito Socialista dei Lavoratori Italiani (PSLI). In 1951 the PSLI and the Partito Socialista Unitario (PSU) merge into one party which is officially named Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (PSDI) in 1952. From October 1966 until 1969 the PSI and PSDI enter into the proces of closer cooperation in order to unite again. On July 4, 1969 some social democrats leave the semi-merged party in order to reestablish the PSU. On February 16, 1971 the former name, PSDI, is again adopted.	PSDI	SD
52	Italy	**Partito Liberale Italiano** Liberal organization can be traced back to 1848. The origin of Partito Liberale Italiano (PLI) can be found in the Unione Democrazia Nationale (1946) and the Blocco Nazionale (1948). In 1955 a group of left-wing Liberals break away into the Radical Party.	PLI	LIB
53	Italy	**Partito Repubblicano Italiano** The Partito Repubblicano Italiano (PRI) originates from republican (workers) associations which were combined into the patto di fratellanza in 1871. In April 1895 a first formal Republican Party organization is set up. After World War II the party splits into the PRI and the Partito d'Azione. In 1946 the Partito d'Azione dissolves and some of its former members join the PRI again. In the 1958 national elections the PRI presents a common list with the Radical Party and for the 1984 European elections with the PLI.	PRI	LIB
54	Italy	**Movimento Sociale Italiano** The origins of the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) have to be traced back to the pre-war fascist movements. The MSI was formally founded in 1946. In 1972 the MSI join in an electoral alliance and in 1973 into a formal merger with the Italian Democratic Party of Monarchical Union (PDIUM) under the label of Destra Nazionale. In 1976 the party split into the MSI and Democrazia Nazionale.	MSI	FAS
55	Italy	**Democrazia Cristiana** The origin of the christian democratic party lie in the early catholic movements such as Opera dei Congressi e dei Comitati Cattolici (1874) and its successor Azione Cattolica (Catholic Action, founded in 1905). In 1919 the Catholics reorganized under the name of Partito Popolare Italiano (PPI). In 1929 the party was dissolved by an agreement between Mussolini and the Church. In November 1942 prominent members of the Partiti Popolare and the Milanese Movimento Guelfo found Democrazia Cristiana (DC).	DC	CD
56	Italy	**Partito Communista Italiano/Partito Democratico de la Sinistra** The Partito Communista Italiano (PCI) was founded in January 1921 as a result of a split of the Socialist Party over joining the Third International. In 1934 the PCI concluded a pact with the Socialist Party, which was renewed in 1943. In 1947 this cooperation resulted in the creation of a Popular Front together with the socialists. In the late 1950 the socialists distanced themselves increasingly from the PCI.	PCI/PDS	COM
57	the Netherlands	**Democraten '66** The Democraten '66 (D66) was founded in 1966 as an attempt to 'explode' the Dutch party system. The party joined in an electoral agreement with the PPR and the PvdA in 1971.	D66	LIB
58	the Netherlands	**Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie** The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) originates from the Liberale Unie (1885) and the Radicale Bond (1982) which merge into the Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond (VDB) in 1902. Part of the VDB, the Bond van Vrije Liberalen (1906) and the Economische Bond (1918) merge into the Vrijheidsbond, later renamed the Liberale Staatspartij in 1921. In 1946 some of the liberals joined the PvdA, others founded the Party of Freedom (PVV). In 1948 the PVV and the liberal breakaway from the PvdA found the VVD.	VVD	LIB

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
59	the Netherlands	**Christelijk Historische Unie** The Christian Historical Union (CHU) is the result of a split from the ARP into Vrije Anti-Revolutionairen. Together with the Christelijk Historische Kiezersbond these Free Anti-Revolutionaries establish the Christian Historical Party in 1903. In 1908 the party is joined by a Frysian Christian Historical group and the CHU is formally established. In 1945 left-wing members joined the PvdA in its 'breakthrough'-attempt, others continue to organize themselves in the CHU.	CHU	CD
60	the Netherlands	**Anti-Revolutionaire Partij** The Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) was established in 1879. In 1894 the party split into the ARP and the Vrije Anti-Revolutionairen, the latter joined the CHU in 1903. In 1918 the Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (SGP) breaks away and in 1948 some dissidents jion the Gereformeerde Politiek Verbond (GPV). In 1970 some members of the left-wing of the party break away to join the Politieke Partij Radikalen (PPR). In 1981 some members join the newly founded Evangelical People's Party (EVP).	ARP	CD
61	the Netherlands	**Katholieke Volkspartij** The Catholic People's Party (KVP) originates from the Catholic organizations in the 1880's. In 1897 the Catholic organizations adopt a common electoral program. In 1904 the General League of Roman Catholic Associations is formed. In 1926 the Rooms Katholieke Staats Partij (RKSP) is established. In 1945 the Catholic People's Party is founded. In 1948 a right-wing group splits into the Katholieke Nationale Partij (KNP) and another group reassembles into the Rooms Katholieke Partij Nederland (RKPN) in 1972.	KVP	CD
62	the Netherlands	**Christen Democratisch Appel** The Christian Democratic Appeal originates from the merger of three parties: the Catholic People's Party (KVP), the protestant Christian Historical Union and the orthodox protestant Anti Revolutionary Party. In 1971 a common programme was presented and in 1975 a federation is estabished. In the 1977 elections the christian democrats present a common list. The CDA was formally founded in 1980.	CDA	CD
63	the Netherlands	**Communistische Partij Nederland** The Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) was founded in 1909 as a result from a split from the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij. Initially the party was named the Sociaal Democratische Partij. In 1918 the party was renamed the Communist Party. In 1958 prominent members of the party are expelled for 'revisionist ideas'. In 1984 a group of orthodox marxists form the Verbond van Communisten in Nederland (VCN). The CPN cooperates since 1984 with PPR, PSP, the EVP and ecologists in Groen Progressief Akkoord, later renamed Groen Links (Green Left).	CPN	COM
64	the Netherlands	**Partij van de Arbeid** The origin of the Dutch Labour Party can be traced back to the Sociaal-Democratische Bond founded in 1882. In 1894 the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP) is established. In 1909 the radical wing is expelled and they found the Communist Party (CPN). The Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) was founded in 1946 as an attempt to create a broad movement of socialists, christians and liberals; a strategy named the 'Breakthrough'. In 1947 some liberals split away into the VVD. In 1956 part of the left-wing leaves the party to join the Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP) in 1957. In 1970 some right-wing socialist break away into Democratic Socialists 1970 (DS'70). In 1971 and 1972 the PvdA forms an electoral alliance with the PPR and D66.	PVDA	SD
65	Norway	**Norges Kommunistiske Parti** The Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) was founded in 1923 by left-wing members of DNA. In 1972 the NKP joins forces with the SF and the Demokratiske Sosialister-AIK into the Sosialistisk Valgforbund (Socialist Electoral Alliance). In 1975 the NKP leaves the Alliance and operates independently.	NKP	COM

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
66	Norway	**Det Norske Arbeidersparti** The Norwegian Labour Party (DNA) was founded in 1887. In 1921 the moderate wing of the party splits into the Norges Sosialdemokratiske Arbeitersparti (NSA). In 1923 the radical wing leaves the party to found the Norges Kommunistiske Parti (NKP). In 1927 the DNA and NSA reunite. In 1961 part of the left-wing left the party to join the Sosialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's Party).	DNA	SD
67	Norway	**Venstre** Venstre originates from the liberal organizations of the 1870s. In 1888 conservative members break away into the Moderate Venstre. In 1905 a serious schism results in Venstre members joining Hoyre, while others established Frisinnede Venstre (National Venstre) later renamed as Frisinnede Folkparti (Liberal People's Party). In 1972 a further schism split the party into Det Nye Folkeparti (New People's Party) and Venstre. In 1980 Det Nye Folkepartiet renamed itself Det Liberal Folkepartiet (DLF). From 1987 DLF and Venstre cooperated again and the parties were reunited in 1988.	V	LIB
68	Norway	**Hoyre** Hoyre originates from conservative groups in the 1870s. In 1884 Hoyre is founded. At the turn of the century the party is renamed Samlingspartiet. In 1910 the party is renamed Hoyre.	HOYR	CON
69	Norway	**Kristeligt Folkeparti** The Christian People's Party is founded in 1933 by members of the Venstre party. In 1939 a national organization is completed.	KRFP	CD
70	Norway	**Socialistisk Venstreparti** The origin of the Socialistisk Venstreparti (SV) lies in 1961, when part of the left-wing left the DNA join independent socialists in the newly founded Sosialistisk Folkeparti (Socialist People's Party). In 1972 the SF joins forces with the NKP and the Demokratiske Sosialister-AIK into the Sosialistisk Valgforbund (Socialist Electoral Alliance). In March 1975 the party is renamed Socialistisk Venstreparti (Socialist Left Party). From 1975 the NKP no longer participates in the Alliance.	SV	SOC
71	Norway	**Senterpartiet** The Center Party is founded as the Bondepartiet (Agrarian Party) in 1920. In 1959 the Bondepartiet changes its name into Senterpartiet.	SP	AGR
72	Norway	**Fremskrittspartiet** The origin of the Fremskrittspartiet (Progress Party) is found in April 1973 as (and by) Anders Lange Party for Strong Reduction in Taxation and Public Intervention. In 1977 the party changed its name into Progress Party.	FRP	PRT
73	Sweden	**Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet** The Christian Democratic Community Party is founded in 1964 as the Kristen Demokratisk Samling. In 1985 the party enters into an electoral alliance with the Senterpartiet. In 1987 the party renames itself Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet.	KDS	CD
74	Sweden	**Folkpartiet** The Liberal Party originates from the liberal groupings in the 1860s. In the 1890s the first Parliamentary organization is set up. The 1902 the national party under the name Frisinnade Landsföreningen is founded. In 1923 the Liberal Party splits into the Frissinade Folkpartiet (Liberal People's Party) and the Sveriges Liberale Parti (Swedish Liberal Party). In 1934 the two parties reunite within the Folkpartiet.	Fp	LIB

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
75	Sweden	**Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna** The Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna originates from the establishment of the Vänstersocialister (Left Socialists) in 1917. In 1921 the Vänstersocialister splits into the Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti (Swedish Communist Party) and Left Socialists. The last group joins the Social Democrats again in 1924. In 1924 the a part of the Communist Party breaks away into the Socialistiksa Vänsterparti (Socialist Left Party). In 1929 there is another schism and the Socialist Party is founded. In 1967 the Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna (VPK) is founded as a result of another internal conflict. In 1977 a further schism leads to the establishment of Sveriges Arbetarepartiet Kommunisterna.	VpK	COM
76	Sweden	**Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet** The Social Democratic Labour Party was founded in 1889. The SAP originates from the Labour movement, the Social Democratic Club, established in 1883. In 1917 a number of members broke away into the Vänstersocialister (Left Socialists), some of which return again in 1924.	SAP	SD
77	Sweden	**Moderata Samlingspartiet** The Moderate Unity Party originates from the conservative Allmänna Valmansförbundet (National Campaign Union), founded in 1904. In 1935 the major conservative groups the Nationella Partiet (National Party) and the Lantmanna och Borgare Partiet (Farmers and Burghers' Party) merge into the Högern (Right Party). In 1969 the party changed its name to Moderate Unity Party.	MSP	CON
78	Sweden	**Senterpartiet** In 1910 the Bondeförbundet (Agrarian Party) was founded. In 1915 another agrarian party, the Jordbrukarnas (Farmer's Union), was founded. In 1921 the two parties merge into the Bondeförbundet. In 1957 the party changes its name to Senterpartiet (Center Party). In the 1985 election the Senterpartiet forms an electoral alliance with the Christian Democratic Party, which is not renewed in 1988.	C	AGR
79	Sweden	**Miljöpartiet de Gröna** The Green Ecology Party was founded in September 1981, as a result of the split of a Liberal member of parliament.	MP	ENV
80	United Kingdom	**The Conservative Party** The origin of the Conservative (or Tory) Party can be traced back to 1832 when the party organized in response to the Reform Act. In 1846 the Conservative Party split and the Conservative Protectionist Party is is founded. The National Union (founded in 1867) under the leadership of Disreali establishes a new Conservative Central Office in 1870. The official name for the organization is National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations. In 1912 the Conservative Party merges with the Liberal Unionists.	CON	CON
81	United Kingdom	**Labour Party** The origin of the Labour Party can be traced to the Independent Labour Party (ILP) founded in 1893 and the Social Democratic Federation (SDF) established in 1883. These groups merge in 1900 into the Labour Representation Committee, together with the trade unions and the Fabian Society (1884). In 1901 the first schism led to the breakaway of the marxist SDF. In 1906 the Committee changed its name into Labour Party. In 1931 Labour split over participation in a national government with the Liberals and Conservatives. In 1932 the Labour party splits into three: the (fascist) New Party, the ILP and Labour. In 1981 some prominent members of Labour break away to found the Social Democratic Party (SDP).	LAB	SD

No	Country	Name of the political party	Abbreviation	Party family
82	United Kingdom	**Liberal party** The origins of the Liberal Party lie in the foundation of the first Liberal Party established in 1859 out of a merger of Whigs, Radicals and Peelites. In 1877 a Liberal National Federation is founded. In 1886 the the Liberal Unionists break away to merge with the Conservatives. In 1916 the Liberal Party split again, only to reunite in 1923. The creation of the 1931 national governments split the party once more into three groups: the Liberal Nationals, Independent Liberals and Liberals. In 1980 the liberal leader Steel established the SDP/Liberal Alliance with members of the Labour Party which founded the SDP.	LIB	LIB
83	United Kingdom	**Social Democratic Party** The Social Democratic Party (SDP) was established on March 26, 1981 by former members of the Labour Party who declared themselves independent from Labour as the Council for Social Democracy earlier that year. The SDP had already formed an electoral alliance with the Liberals (the SDP/Liberal Alliance). In 1988 the SDP splits and the majority of the party merges with the Liberal Party into the Social and Liberal Democrats (SLD). The other fraction establishes the SDP as a seperate party.	SDP	SD

Appendix 2. Variable list

variable	code	abbreviation	source
COUNTRY n = 628	1 = Austria 2 = Belgium 3 = Denmark 4 = Finland 5 = France 6 = Germany 7 = Ireland 8 = Italy 9 = Netherlands 10 = Norway 11 = Sweden 12 = United Kingdom	Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Ire Ita Net Nor Swe UK	
PERIOD n = 628	1 = 1945-1950 2 = 1951-1955 3 = 1956-1960 4 = 1961-1965 5 = 1966-1970 6 = 1971-1975 7 = 1976-1980 8 = 1981-1985 9 = 1986-1990		
YEAR n = 628	the last year of the period		
FAMILY n = 628	1 = communist 2 = socialist 3 = social democrat 4 = Christian democrat 5 = liberal 6 = conservative 7 = ethnic 8 = agrarian 9 = protest 10 = environmental 11 = fascist	com soc sd cd lib con eth agr prt env fas	The classification is based on Lane, Mackay and Newton 1991; Wende 1981; Jacobs 1989.
PARTYNR n = 628	1 to 83		See Appendix I for the complete name of the party and the partynumber.
PARTY n = 628	abbreviation of the party name		See Appendix I.
SPLITMER n = 628	the number of splits of the party or the number of mergers with other party organisations within the period of five years.		Based on Mair 1990; Jacobs 1989: Wende 1981
STAFMEM n = 274	the proportion of staff in the central party organisation in relation to the number of members. The number of staff in the central office is divided by the number of members.		Katz and Mair 1992
STAFSEAT n = 222	the proportion of parliamentary seats in relation to the parliamentary staff. The number of seats in parliament is divided by the number of parliamentary staff.		Data from Katz and Mair 1992, tables C1 and Mackie and Rose 1974; 1991
STAFTOT-PAR n = 235	the proportion of staff in the central party organisation in relation to the total seats in the national parliament. The number of staff in the central office is divided by the number of seats in parliament.		Based on Katz and Mair 1992; Mackie and Rose 1974; 1991
STAFCOPAR n = 215	the proportion of staff in the central party organisation in relation to the parliamentary staff. The number of staff in the central office is divided by the number of parliamentary staff.		Based on Katz and Mair 1992;

variable	code abbreviation	source
MOTIONS n = 215	the openness or inclusiveness of the procedure by which motions can be put to the national congress. 1 = the party leader decides which motions are discussed at the national congress. 2 = motions are put to the congress by external (interest) groups, formally outside the official party organs. 3 = the parliamentary leader or group decides which motions are discussed at the congress. 4 = a national committee or board decides which motions will be put to the national congress. 5 = party members have to attend (local) meetings or congresses to have their motion accepted by this lower party body before the motion is send to the national congress. This category also includes a procedure in which only the local board or policy committee is allowed to send in motions for the national congress. 6 = the most open and democratic procedure: all members can put motions to the national congress.	Based on Katz and Mair 1992; 1994; Janda 1980 and numerous country studies
OBLIMEM n = 492	the number of requirements or obligations people have to fulfil in order to join the party organisation.	Based on Katz and Mair 1992; Janda 1980
MEMFIN n = 284	MF/TI-ratio = the proportion of membershipfees in relation to the total income of the party.	Based on Katz and Mair 1992.
STATFIN n = 228	SF/TI-ratio = the proportion of state finance in relation to the total income of the party.	Based on Katz and Mair 1992.
AGE n = 628	the age in years of the party at the end of the period.	Data from Jacobs 1989; Wende 1981
CANDSEL n = 564	= the openness or inclusiveness of the procedure by which the parliamentary candidates of the party are selected. 1 = the incumbent party leader selects the parliamentary candidates. 2 = the party central office or executive selects the parliamentary candidates. 3 = the selection of parliamentary candidates is dominated by groups outside the official party organs (interest groups). Usually the selection requires ratification by the party central body. 4 = the parliamentary leader or group selects the parliamentary candidates. This procedure can include ratification by party members after the selection. 5 = the official congress representatives or local leaders select the parliamentary candidates. Members can only ratify the candidate selection afterwards. 6 = party members (party activists) have to attend (local) meetings or congresses to be admitted in the selection procedure. This category also includes a procedure in which special election committees are established. 7 = the most open and democratic selection procedure. All members of the party formally have the right and opportunity to participate in the selection procedure in open primaries, referenda or polls among all party members.	Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Katz and Mair 1992; 1994

variable	code abbreviation	source
LEADSEL	= the openness or inclusiveness of the procedure by which the party leader is selected. 1 = the incumbent party leader selects the new party leader. 2 = the party central office or executive selects the party leader. 3 = the selection of party leader is dominated by groups outside the official party organs (interest groups). Usually the selection requires ratification by the party central body. 4 = the parliamentary leader or group selects the party leader. This procedure can include ratification by party members after the selection. 5 = the official congress representatives or local leaders select the party leader. Members can only ratify the candidate selection afterwards. 6 = party members (party activists) have to attend (local) meetings or congresses to be admitted in the selection procedure. This category also includes a procedure in which special election committees are established. 7 = the most open and democratic selection procedure. All members of the party formally have the right and opportunity to participate in the selection procedure in open primaries, referenda or polls among all party members.	Gallagher and Marsh 1988, Katz and Mair 1992; 1994
SOURCE-MEM n = 577	the source of membership of the party. 1 = entirely indirect membership 2 = mainly indirect, but some direct 3 = membership equally divided 4 = mainly direct, but some indirect 5 = entirely direct membership	Janda 1980; Wende 1981; Jacobs 1989
NOCONGR n = 586	the number of congresses to be held according to the official statutes.	Katz and Mair 1992; Janda 1980; Wende 1981: Jacobs 1989.
MVRATIO n = 428	the member-voter ratio: the number of members in relation to the number of voters for the party.	Mackie and Rose 1971; 1991; Katz and Mair 1992: Charlot 1967; Borella 1990; Chagnollaud 1993; Galli and Prandi 1970; Flechtheim 1973; Beyme 1985
MERATIO n = 441	the member-electorate ratio: the number of members of the party in relation to the total electorate of the country.	Mackie and Rose 1974; 1991; Katz and Mair 1992; Charlot 1967; Borella 1990 Chagnollaud 1993; Galli and Prandi 1970: Flechtheim 1973: Beyme 1985
POPSUPP n = 576	the average percentage of the vote in national elections.	Mackie and Rose 1971; 1991
SEATSPAR n = 572	the average percentage of the seats in national parliament	Mackie and Rose 1974; 1991
VOLATIL	= electoral volatility: the net change within the electoral party system resulting from (individual) vote transfers: The formula for electoral volatility is: Electoral Volatility (EV) P i,t = Ù P i,t - P i,t-1 Ù = change P i,t = the percentage of the vote for party i in election t P i,t-1 = the percentage of the vote for party i in election t-1	Pedersen 1979; Bartolini and Mair 1990
GOVTCONT n = 630	the average percentage of the ministerial posts held by the party.	Woldendorp et al. 1993
TIMEGOVT N = 617	the percentage of time in office of parties in each period	Woldendorp et al. 1993

variable	code abbreviation	source
TRADCONT n = 630	the percentage of traditional portfolio control (for traditional portfolios see table).	Woldendorp et al. 1993; Budge and Keman 1992
CONTLAOR n = 630	the average percentage of the ministerial posts held by the party in the cluster of law and order ministries: Interior, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Defence.	Woldendorp et al. 1993
CONTECMA n = 630	the average percentage of the ministerial posts held by the party in the cluster of the economic management departments: Finance, Economic Affairs, Labour, Agriculture, Industry and Public Works.	Woldendorp et al. 1993
CONSOWE n = 630	the average percentage of the ministerial posts held by the party in the cluster of social welfare portfolios: Education, Health, Housing, Social Affairs and Environment.	Woldendorp et al. 1993
OPTCONT n = 629	= opportunistic portfolio control. The percentage of control over non-traditional ministerial portfolios relative to the total ministries controlled.	Budge and Keman 1992; Woldendorp et al. 1993
LRMANIF n = 474	the left-right position of the party on the basis of the Manifesto Data. The position of the party on the left-right scale is constructed by subtracting the sum of emphasis of the 'left-wing-issues' (variables 105, 106, 202, 413, 701 and 503) from the sum of the emphasis on the 'right-wing' issues (variables 104, 303, 401, 402, 505, 507, 414 and 605). The poles of the scale are +100 (when the entire manifesto consists of emphasis on left-wing issues) and -100 (when the entire manifesto consists of emphasis on right-wing issues).	Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1989: Volkens 1992
DISTCNTR n = 474	= the distance from the mean policy position of the party system	Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1989: Volkens 1992
CLASSDIS n = 251	This measure of class-distinctiveness is obtained by subtracting the percentage of non-manual workers (SUPPUPP and SUPPMID) from the percentage of manual workers (SUPPWORK). The measure is based on Alford's Index of Class-Voting.	Alford 1963; Lane and Ersson 1994 and various country studies (see appendix 4).
SUPPWORK n = 311	= the average percentage of working-class support for the party.	various country studies (see appendix 4).
SUPPMID n = 295	= the average percentage of middle-class support for the party.	various country studies (see appendix 4).
SUPPUPP n = 251	= the average percentage of upper-class support for the party.	various country studies (see appendix 4).
SUPPAGR n = 202	= the average percentage of agrarian support for the party.	various country studies(see appendix 4).
IDENTIFY n = 189	= the level of party identification: the long-term predisposition to vote for a particular party. The score is the percentage of the voters that strongly identify with a party.	Katz and Mair 1992; Denver and Crewe 1988 and various country studies (see chapter 6).
POLEMPH n = 461	the score on this variable is obtained by correlating the party profile with the country's average policy profile.	Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987.

variable	code	abbreviation	source
TRADEMPH n = 454	= the score on this variable is obtained by adding the five issues that are most emphasised by parties belonging to the party family in the period 1945-1960. These issues are considered as the traditional issues: 1. communist = 701 + 106 + 504 + 503 + 105. 2. socialist = 504 + 703 + 701 + 503 + 408. 3. social democrat = 504 + 703 + 701 + 503 + 408. 4. Christian democrat = 603 + 504 + 503 + 201 + 703. 5. liberal = 401 + 504 + 703 + 201 + 706. 6. conservative = 414 + 504 + 401 + 410 + 703. 7. ethnic = 504 + 305 + 703 + 410 + 101. 8. agrarian = 703 + 414 + 305 + 411 + 606. 9. protest = 504 + 706 + 401 + 414 + 404. 10. environmental = 703 + 502 + 705 + 301 + 303. 11. fascist = 504 + 305 + 410 + 101 + 703		Budge, Robertson and Hearl 1987: Volkens 1992
CAMPAIGN n = 218	= the percentage of the total party income spend on electoral campaigning.		Katz and Mair 1992
POLEXPRT N = 324	= the percentage of ministers recruited which have political (parliamentary) experience.		
EXTRECRUT n = 324	= the percentage of ministers recruited from outside the parliament.		Woldendorp et al 1993; Blondel 1985

Appendix 3. Methodological Considerations

The Comparative method

This study tests the catch-all thesis by using the comparative method of social science. The comparative method can be used develop and test general theories (Prezworski 1987, 35) as well as to identify and explain similarities and deviations from general patterns. This study adopts a variable-oriented strategy (Ragin 1989), analysing a large number of cases on a limited number of variables, in order to falsify or validate the catch-all thesis. The variable-oriented strategy allows for some generalisation, if only for a limited number of variables as a result of considerable simplifications (ceteris paribus-assumptions). First, reliable and valid measures of the variables have been specified (see chapter 3 and appendix 2). Secondly, these measures guided the systematic collection of data, which have been subjected to statistical analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6.

The variable-orientated strategy permits the use of quantitative methods. Although the quality of the research will always increase with the investigator's familiarity of all the units under investigation, compared with the case-orientated strategy less knowledge about the individual cases is required and possible, due to the large number of cases. For discussions of the distinctiveness of the comparative scientific method see Prezworski and Teune 1970, 50-51; Lijphart 1971, 684; Lijphart 1975, 164; Ragin 1987, 6; Ragin 1989, 68-69; Mayer 1989, 56-57; Dalton 1991, 15; Sartori 1991, 244; Aarebrot and Bakka 1992; Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, 27-39; Keman 1993, 37; Lane and Ersson 1994, 6; Ragin 1994, 93; Mair 1995; Marsh and Stoker 1995, 173-188.

The number of cases and indicators

In this study 83 parties are included in 12 West European countries (see appendix 1). For all 83 parties data have been collected on 18 indicators (see appendix 2 for a complete variable list) for the period spanning 1945 to 1990. Since data-collection on an annual basis proved impossible, this period has been broken down into nine periods and scores have been aggregated into 5 year averages. So, for each party there are nine scores available over the period 1945-1990. This format increases the maximum number of cases to 747 (83 parties times nine post-war periods of five years). Since not all parties existed in all nine periods, the actual number of cases is 628, when non-existing cases are omitted.

Validity and reliability

There are two important criteria for the quality of a conversion of theoretical concepts into operational definitions: its validity, i.e. does the concept measure what it is intended to measure?, and its reliability, i.e. does it measure the same in different

contexts? (Müller and Schmidt 1979, 30).

In the operationalisation of catch-allism the validity was maximised by way of an elaborate literature study. In this chapter a core definition of Kirchheimer's catch-all concept was formulated on the basis of the original catch-all conception (see chapter 2) and the ensuing scientific debate (see chapter 3). This debate on the definition and measurement of the catch-all concept, which still continues, shows a widespread bias towards the electoral dimension. The neglect of the organisational and ideological dimension acerbated the confusion insofar as the defining elements of catch-allism are concerned. Using the core definition as a starting point, a valid operational definition of the three dimensions of catch-allism was constructed. For each dimension multiple indicators were selected in order to empirically scrutinise the catch-all development in West European party systems (chapters 4, 5 and 6). The selection of these empirical indicators is based on the notes and references of Kirchheimer himself as well as on the secondary literature regarding catch-allism. The claim of this study is that the empirical operationalisation of catch-allism presented here reflects more precisely Kirchheimer's original conception and allows a more comprehensive examination than earlier empirical assessments of the catch-all development.

Uni-variate analysis:
measures of central tendency and dispersion

The present study sought to chart the degree of catch-allism across West European countries and over time. To empirically test the catch-all thesis, first a measurement of transformation towards the catch-all model is performed in separate uni-variate analyses of all individual variables. For each individual indicator of catch-allism, the cross-national variance, cross-time variations as well as the different levels of catch-allism of party families are summarised in chapters 4 to 6. Explanations for cross-national, cross-time differences as well as for the diversity among party families concerning their relative level of catch-allism were evaluated by assessing the major source of variation.

Analyses of these patterns of variation was facilitated by using summary measures of central tendency and measures of dispersion. To analyse the level of homogeneity within one party family and convergence among all parties over time, standard deviations and coefficients of variance were included in most tables. Aware of ecological and particularist fallacies, some generalisations were nevertheless made about certain clusters of parties and countries. Next to average scores of parties within one party system and parties belonging to one party family, the tables also provide standard deviations (indicated by an *S*). Horizontally, the standard deviation shows the variation between parties within one party system, while the standard deviation for each of the nine periods shows whether parties in Western Europe are converging or diverging from one another over time. To compare "groups with respect to their relative homogeneity in instances where the groups have very different means" I have chosen to report the coefficient of variance (see Blalock 1979, 84). The coefficient of variance (*CV*), obtained by dividing the standard deviation by the mean value, indicates the homogeneity or variety of all parties in each period or within one country, allowing for conclusions on either convergence or divergence of parties

within and across West European party systems.

In addition to these measures of central tendency and dispersion, statistical analyses is used to cross-time variation. This development over time on each of the indicators was summarised by means of regression analysis (Lewis-Beck 1980).[105] This type of analysis can clarify the direction and extent to which parties in Western Europe are transforming towards the catch-all model, as well as provide evidence to whether this transformation constitutes a linear trend. Regression coefficients summarise the trends over time on the individual indicators, yet these trend parameters no not denote linear developments or infer causality. The linear regression parameter represents the straight line which mathematically is the 'best fit' to all points in a scattergram of all scores. It constitutes only a summary measure of an overall negative of positive trend, without regard to fluctuations in this trend over time. For each variable in this study the regression coefficient is determined by computing the variable scores with the year in which the observation was made as the independent variable. On each of the regression coefficients a significance test was performed (see Gujarati 1988) and this level of significance of reported in the tables by way of asterisks (*).

Multivariate analysis

In order to test Kirchheimer's assumption of uni-dimensionality, the variables which together constitute one dimension of either organisational, ideological or electoral catch-allism are analysed in conjunction with one another utilising multivariate reliability and factor analysis. A reliability test is performed in each chapter to establish whether all indicators tap the same dimension of catch-allism. The assumption that items 'scale' (that is, measure the same empirical phenomena) is usually tested with a 'reliability procedure', the so-called 'scalability' analysis. The measure for reliability is Chronbach's alpha (Swamborn 1982), which evaluates the extent to which the items correlate in an equal extent to one another. With this measure the number of items is important; the higher the number of items of the scale, the higher the score of Chronbach's alpha must be in order to indicate an internally consistent scale. In theory all items are *different* indicators for the *same* phenomenon, namely catch-allism. Items or indicators of the same phenomenon must correlate to an equal extent with each another in order to assume one underlying dimension.[106]

[105] The lineair regression parameter represents the straight line which mathematically is the 'best fit' to all points in a scattergram of all scores. It constitutes only a summary measure of an overall negative of positive trend, without regard to fluctuations in this trend over time. For each variable in this study the regression coefficient is determined by computing the variable scores with the year in which the observation was made as the independent variable. On each of the regression coefficients a significance test will be performed (see Gujarati 1988).

[106] The assumption that items 'scale' (that is, measure the same empirical phenomena) is usually tested with a 'reliability procedure', the so-called 'scalability' analysis. The measure for reliability is Chronbach's alpha (Swamborn 1982), which evaluates the extent to which the items correlate in an equal extent to one another. With this measure the number of items is important; the higher the number of items of the scale, the higher the score of Chronbach's alpha must be in order to indicate an internally consistent scale.

Two problems had to be addressed for the integration of the various individual indicators into one general measure of catch-allism. First, the techniques used here require that the **level of measurement** of all variables is transformed to the interval level of measurement. The variables 'rules of putting motions to the national congress (MOTIONS), the 'procedure for the selection of parliamentary candidates' (CANDSEL) and the 'procedure for the selection of the party leader' (LEADSEL) are modified from the ordinal to the interval level for this aim (see section 4.5). Furthermore, in order to be able to perform a reliability test all individual party scores are expressed in standard deviation scores (z-scores), which indicate the relative standing in a distribution without regard to the unit for measurement in the original raw scores (Blalock 1979, 97). Finally, all standard scores are recoded so that on all indicators a high score signifies a high level of catch-allism and a low score denotes a low level of catch-allism. The second difficulty is **the weighting of different variables**. In the enumeration of the original elements, Kirchheimer does not specify the relative importance of the different elements. The solution adopted in this study is to consider all variables of equal importance. Below I present the results of these reliability tests and scalability analysis.

Reliability tests

The organisational dimension

Reliability test on the organisational dimension

ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM DELETED	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM DELETED	CORRECTED ITEM-TOTAL CORRELATION	SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION	ALPHA IF ITEM DELETED
ZSTATFIN	-1.0439	9.8263	.2205	.5203	.1544
ZMEMFIN1	-1.2333	10.4860	.1179	.6094	.2087
ZMERATI1	- .7635	11.2153	-.1007	.3909	.3482
ZSTAFMEM	-1.1107	8.8516	.1545	.4408	.1745
ZCAMPAIG	- .6834	11.9377	-.0644	.1680	.2668
ZSTAFSEA	- .9037	12.5911	-.2285	.4680	.3338
ZMOTION1	- .7656	10.7829	.1165	.2738	.2127
ZCANDSE1	- .6484	9.2800	.2739	.6053	.1156
ZLEADSE1	- .4472	10.1116	.2278	.4255	.1608
ZNOCONG1	- .9170	9.8350	.1087	.3905	.2101

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 10 ITEMS
ALPHA = .2438 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = .2144

The inescapable conclusion from this reliability test is that there is little homogeneity between the items at the organisational level (α= .24) and no single underlying dimension of organisational catch-allism was found. The most commonly used condition of a sufficiently reliable scale (α > .80) is not fulfilled, therefore it is concluded that the items at the organisational level do not tap one single phenomenon. All the indicators which Kirchheimer suggested to underpin one organisational dimension of catch-allism tap, in reality, multiple phenomena.

The ideological dimension

Reliability test on the ideological dimension

ITEM-TOTAL STATISTICS

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM	CORRECTED ITEM-TOTAL	SQUARED MULTIPLE	ALPHA IF ITEM

	DELETED	DELETED	CORRELATION	CORRELATION	DELETED
ZLRMANIF	.0751	4.0781	.0283	.0202	-.4276
ZTRADEM1	.0753	3.6529	.1486	.0779	-.6314
ZTRADCO1	.2375	8.1486	-.6573	.9182	.4455
ZTIMEGOV	-.0178	3.8620	.0864	.5554	-.5245
ZGOVTCON	-.0976	4.4981	-.1144	.9194	-.2048
ZDISTCN1	.0717	3.0789	.3294	.1241	-.9849

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 6 ITEMS
ALPHA = -.2949 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = -.1862

Reliability analysis of the indicators of ideological catch-allism found little homogeneity between these indicators, evidenced by a low alpha score of these coefficients (α = -.29). Since the condition of a sufficiently reliable scale (α > .80) is not fulfilled, it stands that the items at the ideological level do not tap one single phenomenon.

The electoral dimension

Reliability test on the electoral dimension

	SCALE MEAN IF ITEM DELETED	SCALE VARIANCE IF ITEM DELETED	CORRECTED ITEM-TOTAL CORRELATION	SQUARED MULTIPLE CORRELATION	ALPHA IF ITEM DELETED
ALFORD	1.4745	.2977	-.1507	.1333	.2354
IDENTIFY	1.4570	.2563	-.0214	.1621	.0770
EXTRECRU	1.6286	.0869	.2099	.0540	-.7637
VOLATIL	1.6684	.2965	.0706	.0152	-.0013

RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS 4 ITEMS
ALPHA = .0325 STANDARDIZED ITEM ALPHA = -.0524

The four items of the electoral dimension are not reliable in the statistical sense of measuring one single phenomenon (α = .44) Indeed, when factor analysis is performed to detect which common underlying factors can be found beneath these variables, two latent factors are extracted which fulfil the criteria of Eigenvalue > 1, jointly explaining 62.4 per cent of the variance in the dependent variables.

Scalability analysis

The outcome of the reliability tests shows that the items which measure catch-allism at all three dimensions do not indicate a uni-dimensional phenomenon. Therefore factor analysis (Principle Component Analysis) is used to explore how many and which other latent factors lie beneath the different variables (Kim and Mueller 1978a; 1978b). Factor-analysis attempts to test whether or not all the scores of a multidimensional scatter-gram can be described as a one-dimensional space. The main assumption of factor analysis is that, beneath the observed variables a system of underlying source, variables (factors) exist and observed co-variation is due to these underlying common factors (Kim and Mueller 1978a, 8). This study utilised factor analysis to exploratively identify these latent factors and consequently determine which of the variables load significantly on these underlying factors. The extent to which an observed variable is related to an extracted factor is referred to as factor (or component) loadings. These factor loadings of the observed variables on the extracted factors are crucial for the interpretation of the underlying dimensions (see below). This dual method of reliability and factor analysis will shed some light on the

directions and dynamics of the transformation of political parties in West European party systems.

The organisational dimension

An analysis of factors underpinning the organisational variables of catch-allism does not deduce a simple pattern of underlying factors. In fact, the Principle-Components Analysis of the organisational indicators extracts four latent factors when the widely accepted Kaiser or Eigenvalue criterion (whereby only factors with Eigenvalues greater or equal to 1 are included) is used (Kim and Mueller 1978a, 49). Taken together, these extracted factors explain almost seventy per cent of the variance in the dependent (or observed) variables.

Principal-Components Analysis (PC) Final Statistics: Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
		*				
MERATIO	.75075	*	1	2.69207	24.5	24.5
STAFSEAT	.65389	*	2	2.24751	20.4	44.9
MEMFIN	.81856	*	3	1.61617	14.7	59.6
STATFIN	.77602	*	4	1.09690	10.0	69.6
CAMPAIGN	.65263	*				
STAFMEM	.57981	*				
CANDSEL	.82014	*				
MOTIONS	.64270	*				
LEADSEL	.66699	*				
MVRATIO	.70204	*				
NOCONGR	.58912	*				

One conventional method to simplify the structure of factor loadings is varimax rotation (Kim and Mueller 1978b, 35). Close examination of the component loadings (excluding factor loadings below .4) after one varimax-rotation leads to the conclusion that of the four initial factors, three reasonably clear interpretable factors can be seen on which the items load significantly high.

Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.

Rotated Factor Matrix:

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2	FACTOR 3	FACTOR 4
MEMFIN	.88966			
STATFIN	-.87118			
STAFSEAT	.73632			
MVRATIO		.82319		
MERATIO		.81050		
STAFMEM		-.67137		
CANDSEL			.88008	
LEADSEL			.77510	
NOCONGR			.40760	.54666
CAMPAIGN				-.79609
MOTIONS				.72939

The items MEMFIN, STATFIN and STAFSEAT constitute the first latent factor. Professional staff in relation to the strength of the parliamentary party and income from membership are both positively correlated with this factor, while the level of state finance is negatively correlated with this underlying factor. The interpretation of this factors is not crystal-clear, yet all items seem to point towards aspects of professionalization of the organisation surrounding the party leadership, be it that the resources for this professionalisation are not derived from the state but from membership fees. The second factor, which consists of the items MERATIO, MVRATIO (membership) and STAFMEM (staff in central office) is somewhat easier to interpret. The level of membership is negatively associated with this factor, while the professionalization of the central office is positively associated to this latent factor, allowing for the interpretation that this factor denotes the professionalization of the membership organisation. The third factor designates the dimension of internal democracy of parties or centralisation of power and consists of the variables CANDSEL, LEADSEL and NOCONGR, whic are all positively correlated to this underlying factors. The fourth factor, constituted by the items MOTIONS and CAMPAIGN is less interpretable and has little explanatory power. It will be excluded from further analysis.

When these items are plotted in a two-dimensional space, the following pattern emerges.

Factor plot of organisational items: Horizontal Factor 1 / Vertical Factor 3



Symbol	Variable	Coordinates	
1	MERATIO	-.085	-.277
2	STAFSEAT	.736	.002
3	MEMFIN	.890	-.162
4	STATFIN	-.871	-.033
5	CAMPAIGN	.018	.000
6	STAFMEM	-.158	-.218
7	CANDSEL	-.141	.880
8	MOTIONS	.100	.314
9	LEADSEL	-.087	.775
10	MVRATIO	-.146	-.049
11	NO-CONGR	.408	.547

Factor plot of organisational items: Horizontal Factor 1 / Vertical Factor 2



Symbol	Variable	Coordinates	
1	MERATIO	-.138	-.293
2	STAFSEAT	.742	.050
3	MEMFIN	.878	-.160
4	STATFIN	-.867	.009
5	CAMPAIGN	.048	-.272
6	STAFMEM	-.137	-.120
7	CANDSEL	-.122	.871
8	MOTIONS	.078	.543
9	LEADSEL	-.064	.805
10	MVRATIO	-.197	-.035
11	NO-CONGR	.452	.454

The ideological dimension

The Principal-Components Analysis on the ideological items extracts two relevant latent factors (with Eigenvalues > 1), which explain sixty-five per cent of the variance in the dependent variable.

Principal-Components Analysis (PC) Final Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
		*				
GOVTCONT	.87199	*	1	3.09479	44.2	44.2
DISTCNTR	.60667	*	2	1.27010	18.1	62.4
OPTCONT	.52976	*				
LRMANIF	.10407	*				
TIMEGOVT	.79766	*				
TRADCONT	.84751	*				
TRADEMPH	.60723	*				

After one varimax-rotation, the component loadings on these factors (again excluding factor loadings below .4) authenticate the existence of two meaningful factors as is shown below.

Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization

Factor Matrix:

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2
GOVTCONT	.92383	
TRADCONT	.90907	
TIMEGOVT	.89306	
OPTCONT	.72313	
TRADEMPH		.77924
DISTCNTR		.71711
LRMANIF		

The first factor clearly designates 'office-seeking' (OFFICE), as it consists of the items GOVTCONT, TRADCONT, OPTCONT and TIMEGOVT, which are all positively associated with this latent factor. A second ideological factor consists of the two items 'distance from the centre' (DISTCNTR) and 'traditional issue emphasis' (TRADEMPH) which are both positively correlated with this underlying factor, and this factors will therefore be coined 'policy-flexibility' (POLICY). The item LRMANIF is not strongly associated with any of these factors.

When the items are plotted in a two dimensional space, the pattern is as follows:

Factor plot of ideological items: Horizontal Factor 1 / Vertical Factor 2



Symbol	Variable	Coordinates	
1	GOVTCONT	.930	.080
2	DISTCNTR	-.260	.734
3	OPTCONT	.717	-.126
4	LRMANIF	-.064	-.316
5	TIMEGOVT	.892	-.044
6	TRADCONT	.916	.090
7	TRADEMPH	.042	.778

The electoral dimension

The Principal-Components Analysis on the electoral items extracts two relevant latent factors (with Eigenvalues > 1), which explain sixty-two per cent of the variance in the dependent variable.

Final Statistics:

Variable	Communality	*	Factor	Eigenvalue	Pct of Var	Cum Pct
IDENTIFY	.70555	*	1	1.39032	34.8	34.8
ALFFIN	.65856	*	2	1.10396	27.6	62.4
VOLATIL	.51843	*				
EXTRECRU	.61174	*				

Varimax Rotation 1, Extraction 1, Analysis 1 - Kaiser Normalization.

After varimax-rotation, the component loadings on these factors (again excluding factor loadings below .4) indicate that two meaningful factors can be extracted from these electoral items.

Varimax converged in 3 iterations.
Rotated Factor Matrix:

	FACTOR 1	FACTOR 2
IDENTIFY	-.82595	
ALFFIN	.80361	
EXTRECRU		.76506
VOLATIL		.71044

The level of strong party identification is negatively correlated with the first latent factor, while the extent to which parties attract voters from different social groups is positively associated with this factor. This suggests that this factor could be interpreted as a factor which indicates the broadness of popular appeal or level of vote-seeking behaviour. On the second factor the items EXTRECRUT (extra-parliamentary recruitment of ministers) and VOLATIL (electoral volatility) are both positively associated with the. This factor can therefore best be characterised as the level of social disclosure at the elite level as well as at the level of voters.
A plot of the electoral items in a two-dimensional space presents the next picture:

Factor plot of electoral items: Horizontal Factor 1 / Vertical Factor 2



Symbol	Variable	Coordinates	
1	IDENTIFY	-.826	-.153
2	ALFFIN	.804	-.113
3	VOLATIL	-.117	.710
4	EXTRECRU	.163	.765

Appendix 4. Sources for the social composition of party electorates

Data for ***Austria*** from:
Sully 1977, 232; Merkl 1980, 643; Haerpfer 1985, 279; Jacobs 1989, 489; Müller 1992a, 155.

Data on ***Belgium*** from:
Oppenheim 1956, 161; Hill 1974, 47 ff.; Dalton et al. 1984, 84; Jacobs 1989, 22; Mughan in Franklin et al. 1992, 86-97; De Winter 1992, 185; Lucardie and ten Napel 1994, 57-59.

For ***Denmark*** from:
Rustow 1956, 183; Nilson 1980, 223; Rokkan 1966; Thomas 1977, 241; Faurby and Kristensen 1982, 84-88; Borre 1985; Borre 1987; Thomas 1988, 287-290; Borre 1992, 149, 159-166; Karvonen 1994, 132.

Data for ***Finland*** from:
Pesonen 1974, 295; Helenius 1977, 278; Arter 1988, 337-340; Karvonen 1994, 124-133.

Data for ***France*** from:
Micaud 1956, 128-141; Lipset 1966, 422; Criddle 1977, 31-32; Lecomte 1982, 242; Lewis-Beck 1984; Grunberg 1985; Frears 1988; Grunberg 1992, 80-96; Lewis-Beck and Skalaban 1992; Chagnollaud 1993; Elgie 1994, 156-158.

Data for ***Germany*** from:
Liepelt 1966; Linz 1967; Urwin 1974, 147; Paterson 1977, 192-193; Feist et al. 1978, 172; Merkl 1980, 625-626; Mintzel 1982, 140-145; Klingemann 1985; Kolinsky 1984; Kirchner and Broughton 1988, 75; Dalton 1988, 155; Dalton et al. 1992, 202; Pappi and Mnich 1992, 179-202; Missiroli 1992, 127; Broughton 1994.

Data for ***Ireland*** from:
Whyte 1974, 631-633; Orridge 1977, 165; Carey 1980, 271; Merkl 1980, 660; Chubb 1982; McAllister and O'Connel 1984; Gallagher 1985, 132-134; Marsh 1985, 186; Mair 1987, 40; Laver et al. 1987; Mair 1992; Marsh 1992, 235-236; Marsh 1992; Breen and Whelan 1994.

Data for ***Italy*** from:
Lipset 1966, 415; Dogan 1966, 711; Barnes 1974; Hine 1977, 84; Zarneti 1980; Zariski 1980; Caciagli 1982, 266; Farneti 1985, 91-96; Pridham 1988; Mackie, Manheimer and Sani in Franklin et al. 1992, 246-251; Donovan 1994, 80.

Data for ***the Netherlands*** from:
Wolinetz 1977, 368; Van der Eijk and Niemoller, 1985; Daalder and Koole 1988; Van Deth et al. 1991; van der Eijk and Niemöller in Franklin et al. 1992, 289-290; Koole 1992, 212; Lucardie and Ten Napel 1994, 59-60.

Data for ***Norway*** from:
Rose and Urwin 1969, 65; Valen and Rokkan 1974; Heidar 1977, 301; Nilson 1980; Kristiansen and Svasand 1982, 125-128; Leiphart and Svasand 1988, 317; Valen in Franklin et al. 1992, 323-324; Karvonen 1994.

Data for ***Sweden*** in:
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Samenvatting

De catch-all partij in West Europa 1945-1990
Een studie naar een verstomde ontwikkeling

De catch-all these is oorspronkelijk geformuleerd door Otto Kirchheimer (1954a; 1959a; 1966a). Kirchheimer stelde dat de op klasse of religie gebaseerde massa-partij zoals Duverger die beschreef, langzaam verandert in wat hij noemt '*catch-all people's party*'. Kirchheimer's these over de ontwikkeling van de '*catch-all*' partij is zeer geschikt voor een analyse van partijverandering, omdat Kirchheimer's these luidt dat partijen op ideologisch, organisatorisch en electoraal vlak een bepaalde ontwikkeling doormaken. Kirchheimer acht vijf kenmerken van de ontwikkeling van massapartij tot catch-all partij belangrijk: a) een drastische reductie van het ideologische karakter van de partij; b) een versterkte positie van politieke leiders die eerder worden beoordeeld op hun betekenis voor het totale politieke en sociale systeem dan op de mate waarin zij de specifieke doelen van de partij bevorderen; c) een minder sterke positie van gewone partijleden; d) minder nadruk op specifieke sociale of confessionele kiezersgroepen: catch-all partijen trachten kiezers te winnen uit alle bevolkingsgroepen; e) een verminderde loyaliteit van leden en kiezers die partijen dwingt samen te werken met een groot aantal belangengroeperingen om zich op deze manier van permanente electorale steun te verzekeren. Desalniettemin is de precieze betekenis van het catch-all concept niet altijd even duidelijk. Pogingen om tot een éénduidige definiëring van het vaak geciteerde catch-all concept te komen hebben geleid tot een nog steeds voortgaand debat. Ook bestaan er aanzienlijke meningsverschillen over welke partijen als catch-all partijen kunnen worden beschouwd. In dit proefschrift is gepoogd een operationele definitie van catch-allism te ontwikkelen vanuit de oorspronkelijke context waarin deze is ontwikkeld.

De onderzoeksvraag luidt: *Hoe kan Kirchheimer's concept van de catch-all partij worden geoperationaliseerd en in welke mate is er in de naoorlogse periode sprake van catch-allisme in West Europese landen?*

Op basis van het gehele gepubliceerde oeuvre van Kirchheimer alsmede zijn persoonlijke aantekeningen en met behulp van de secundaire literatuur over de catch-all these is de originele betekenis van catch-allisme zo zorgvuldig mogelijk gereconstrueerd. Om te bepalen in welke mate politieke partijen zich op ideologisch, organisatorisch en electorale vlak catch-all karakteristieken hebben aangemeten zijn de 83 belangrijkste politieke partijen in twaalf West Europese landen vergeleken. Politieke partijen zijn gecategoriseerd naar partijfamilie om ook de verschillen tussen partijen van verschillende origine in kaart te brengen (zie appendix 1).

Kirchheimer's catch-all these

Wanneer men de catch-all these in de context van Kirchheimer's totale oeuvre plaatst wordt duidelijk dat hij de vooroorlogse partijen in West Europa zag als representanten van specifieke sociale of religieuze groepen. Na de Tweede Wereldoorlog verdwijnen volgens Kirchheimer deze scherpe klassentegenstellingen en confessionele scheidslijnen langzamerhand als gevolg van ongekende economische groei en de uitbreiding van de welvaartsstaat. De levensstandaard van velen wordt zozeer verhoogd, dat partijen in staat zijn te appelleren aan een brede groep kiezers wier belangen niet veel uiteenlopen. Dit is mogelijk geworden door het ontstaan van een brede middenklasse. Partijen worden gedwongen de 'wet van de electorale markt' te aanvaarden en zich te richten op een breder deel van de bevolking dan de traditionele achterban. Hierdoor ontstaat een nieuw type partij: de catch-all volkspartij. De oude, sterk ideologisch geladen, doelstelling van representatie van bepaalde sociale groepen in het politieke bestel wordt gematigd, met als oogmerk de gunst van zoveel mogelijk kiezers te winnen. Partijen concentreren zich daarom steeds meer op issues die breed worden gedragen in de samenleving, in plaats van de onderlinge tegenstellingen te benadrukken. Kirchheimer heeft dit fenomeen aangeduid met 'het verdwijnen van de oppositie'. Volgens Kirchheimer worden politieke partijen en de staat in toenemende mate afhankelijk van elkaar. De staat legitimeert haar acties middels de politieke partijen in het parlement, terwijl deze partijen steeds afhankelijker worden van de staat voor hun (financiële) middelen. De catch-all partij leidt dan ook tot vervaging van de democratische machtenscheiding. De wetgevende, uitvoerende en ook rechterlijke macht vormen tezamen een kartel. Politieke partijen trekken zich steeds verder terug uit de samenleving en machthebbers misbruiken de wetgeving voor de eigen politieke doeleinden. De consequentie van deze ontwikkeling is dat burgers een zeer beperkte en passieve rol hebben in de politiek en hun partijkeuze steeds meer laten afhangen van het charisma van een lijsttrekker. Deze wordt steeds bepalender voor het electorale succes van de partij. Dit hangt samen met de veranderende functie van politieke partijen. Catch-all partijen integreren niet langer nieuwe groepen in de politieke samenleving en articuleren niet langer de belangen van deze groepen. In plaats daarvan is de rekrutering van politieke kandidaten verreweg de belangrijkste functie van een moderne catch-all partij geworden. Volgens Kirchheimer is dit een zorgwekkende ontwikkeling omdat hij er van overtuigd is dat een regime alleen legitiem kan zijn wanneer de sociale structuur in de politieke arena wordt gerepresenteerd.

In Kirchheimer's optiek wordt de organisatorische, ideologische en electorale transformatie van politieke partijen beïnvloedt door politieke factoren (de structuur van het partijstelsel, de politieke cultuur en de electorale wetgeving), structurele factoren (de grootte van het land), sociale en economische factoren (de sociale scheidslijnen en professionele stratificatie) De toenemende economische welvaart, massaconsumptie en uitbreiding van de welvaartsstaat verminderen de sociaal-economische tegenstellingen en doen een brede middengroep ontstaan. Dit is nadrukkelijk van invloed op de ontwikkeling van catch-all partijen. Een brede middenlaag maakt het partijen mogelijk te appelleren aan kiezers buiten de traditionele clientèle.

Achter de oude namen gaan geheel veranderde partijen schuil omdat politieke partijen zich uit electorale overwegingen aanpassen aan de snel veranderende omgeving. Hier ontstaat de connectie van verandering van een individuele partij naar de verandering van het gehele partijenstelsel. Volgens Kirchheimer is de catch-all ontwikkeling is een 'besmettelijk' fenomeen. Wanneer één partij met succes de catch-all strategie aanwendt, moeten andere partijen volgen om electoraal te overleven. Dit zal zowel het soort, als het aantal partijen in het politieke stelsel beïnvloeden.

De catch-all partij: een definitie en operationalisatie

Om te beoordelen in hoeverre er sprake is van een catch-all ontwikkeling is in hoofdstuk 3 het catch-all concept geoperationaliseerd. Hiervoor is gebruik gemaakt van Sartori's methode van concept-ontwikkeling en -reconstructie (Sartori 1984). Voor de reconstructie van het catch-all concept gebruik ik de discussie die volgde op Kirchheimer's publikatie. Uit deze discussie kunnen zes elementen worden gedestilleerd waarover brede consensus bestaat dat zij de kern van het catch-allisme vormen. Deze elementen komen sterk overeen met de vijf kenmerken die Kirchheimer zelf opsomt en leiden tot de definiering van een catch-all partij als *een partij die wordt gekarakteriseerd door een laag ideologisch profiel, een breed electoraal appèl, een geringe connectie met haar electoraat, een machtsbalans in het voordeel van de partijleiding versus de leden en een professionele en gecentraliseerde organisatie, wiens personeel en kapitaal voornamelijk uit externe bronnen afkomstig zijn.*

Vanuit deze definitie is vervolgens een operationele definitie geconstrueerd. Om zo dicht mogelijk bij de originele betekenis van het concept te blijven is gezocht naar empirische verwijzingen in Kirchheimer's werk. De hierboven genoemde vijf kenmerken van de catch-all ontwikkeling op individueel partij niveau kunnen worden ondergebracht in de drie dimensies van aanpassing en verandering van politieke partijen: een ideologische dimensie (punt a van Kirchheimer's kenmerken), een organisatorische dimensie (punten b en c) en een electorale dimensie (punten d en e). Op basis van Kirchheimer's teksten en verwijzingen zijn tot tien kenmerken van catch-allisme ontwikkeld die gemeten kunnen worden met vijftien indicatoren (zie hoofdstuk 3).

De organisatorische dimensie van catch-allisme

Uit hoofdstuk 4 blijkt dat Kirchheimer's catch-all these genuanceerd dient te worden en dat niet alle organisatorische veranderingen binnen West Europese politieke partijen conform de catch-all these zijn. Conform de catch-all these is er sprake van een substantiële afname van het aantal partijleden in de meeste West Europese landen. Uitzondering op deze regel vormen de meeste partijen in Duitsland, België en Ierland. Partijleden zijn, zoal Kirchheimer veronderstelde, veel minder belangrijk voor partijen geworden in termen van inkomsten. Inkomsten uit staatsfinanciering, daarentegen, zijn toegenomen in de naoorlogse periode en partijen verkrijgen nu gemiddeld één-derde van hun inkomsten van de staat. Kirchheimer stelde dat catch-all partijen professionaliseren en uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat West Europese partijen in een snel tempo een proces van professionalisering ondergaan, zowel wat betreft de buiten-parlementaire

organisatie als, in nog sterkere mate, de parlementaire fracties. Deze accumulatie van menselijke en financiële middelen bij de parlementaire partij hebben geleid tot een dominantie van parlementaire fracties binnen de gehele partijorganisatie. Kirchheimer's these wordt echter niet geheel bevestigd. Alhoewel de absolute bedragen die aan verkiezingscampagnes worden uitgegeven aanzienlijk toenemen, zijn de totale inkomsten van partijen zo sterk gestegen dat een relatief kleiner aandeel van het totale inkomen aan campagnes wordt uitgegeven.

Op andere punten is ook een ontwikkeling te zien die niet geheel spoort met Kirchheimer's catch-all these. Politieke partijen in West Europa hebben niet stelselmatig de invloed van leden verminderd op de selectie van het partijleiderschap. Daarbij dient aangetekend te worden dat de invloed van leden op deze keuze al zeer gering was en nauwelijks verder kon worden verminderd. Verder is het buiten-parlementaire leiderschap van partijen een steeds marginalere rol gaan spelen, waardoor leden iets meer zeggenschap hebben gekregen over een minder belangrijk aspect. Conform the catch-all these is de invloed van leden op de selectie van kandidaten voor het parlement in de meeste landen iets afgenomen over de naoorlogse periode, maar van een continue trend van uitsluiting van leden uit het interne besluitvormingsproces is geen sprake. Echter er is evenmin sprake van een democratiseringstrend binnen West Europese politieke partijen. De laatste vijftig jaar wordt de besluitvorming over machtsposities binnen West Europese partijorganisaties en in het parlement gedomineerd door het partijleiderschap, de partijleiding heeft op zijn minst een vetorecht over kandidaten. Vastgesteld kan worden dat de greep van de partijtop op de interne besluitvorming een reeds lang bestaand kenmerk is van West Europese democratieën en niet een moderne ontwikkeling.

Uit de analyses blijkt verder dat de door Kirchheimer genoemde kenmerken niet duiden op een één-dimensionaal fenomeen. Eerder is er sprake van drie dimensies van partijverandering op het organisatorische vlak, namelijk van centralisatie van de interne besluitvorming, van professionalisering van de buiten-parlementaire ledenorganisatie en van professionalisering van het parlementaire leiderschap. Ontwikkelingen op deze drie dimensies staan relatief los van elkaar. Wat betreft de centralisatie in de interne besluitvorming zijn met name de (nu veelal verdwenen) communistische partijen het meest in de catch-all richting opgeschoven, evenals de christen-democratische en sociaal-democratische partijen. Liberale, agrarische en 'groene' partijen zijn relatief democratisch. Op het gebied van de professionalisering van de buiten-parlementaire partijorganisatie zien we een geheel ander patroon. Conservatieve en liberale partijen hebben een veel hoger niveau van professionalisering dan andere partijen. De traditionele, uitgebreide ledenorganisaties van de christen-democratische, sociaal-democratische en agrarische partijen zorgen voor een relatief langzame ontwikkeling in professionalisering van de buiten-parlementaire partijorganisatie. Vergelijkbare verschillen tussen partijfamilies zijn ook waar ten aanzien van de professionalisering van het parlementaire leiderschap. Ook hier blijven met name christen-democratische en sociaal-democratische partijen achter bij hun liberale en conservatieve concurrenten.

Tussen landen bestaan er eveneens aanzienlijke verschillen in ontwikkeling op deze drie organisatorische factoren. Met name partijen in de grotere continentale West Europese democratieën (Italië, Duitsland en Frankrijk) hebben zich relatief

verder ontwikkeld in de richting van catch-all partijen. In deze landen zijn partijen sterk gecentraliseerde en professionele organisaties waar leden weinig invloed hebben in vergelijking met andere landen. Partijen in de Scandinavische landen, Ierland en het Verenigd Koninkrijk verschillen aanzienlijk van partijen in deze continentale grootmachten. Noorse, Zweedse, Britse en Ierse partijleden hebben relatief meer invloed op de interne besluitvorming. Partijen in België, Nederland en Oostenrijk laten een veel minder eenduidige trend zien. Concluderend kan worden gesteld dat Kirchheimer ten onrechte veronderstelde dat er een universele en lineaire trend richting het catch-all model bestaat, maar dat hij wel de geografische patronen van deze ontwikkeling juist heeft weergegeven.

De ideologische dimensie van catch-allisme

Op ideologisch niveau is evenmin een lineaire ontwikkeling richting catch-allisme waar te nemen. Alhoewel een groot aantal politieke partijen in West Europa een beleidspositie in of dichtbij het politieke centrum verkiest boven een meer extreme positie laat de analyse in hoofdstuk 5 zien dat er geen uniforme trend richting centripetale partijcompetitie is. Ook neemt het aantal partijen in het politieke centrum niet significant toe over de naoorlogse periode: er is juist sprake van minder centrumpartijen. Met name conservatieve, liberale en sociaal-democratische partijen hebben tussen 1970 en 1990 het politieke centrum verlaten. Kirchheimer stelde wel terecht dat voornamelijk christen-democratische en sociaal-democratische partijen het politieke centrum domineren in West Europa. In de onderzochte landen is evenmin sprake is van een algemene trend in de richting van ideologisch meer gematigde posities. Sinds de jaren '80 is bij veel partijen een verschuiving naar rechts in het politieke spectrum waarneembaar. In het bijzonder de sociaal-democratische partijen zijn door deze algemene ruk naar rechts vaker in het politieke centrum te vinden. Kirchheimer veronderstelde ten onrechte dat er ideologische convergentie zou plaatsvinden in West Europese partijstelsels. Dit onderzoek wijst uit dat partijen eerder een grotere 'manoeuvreerruimte' hebben verkregen door een verbreding van het politieke spectrum. Wel is het juist dat er minder polarisatie was in de periode vanaf eind jaren '50 tot begin jaren '70, maar dat de jaren '70 en '80 laten duidelijk grotere beleidsafstanden kennen tussen politieke partijen in de meeste landen.

Uit de analyses blijkt verder dat Kirchheimer maar gedeeltelijk gelijk had met zijn veronderstelling dat partijen steeds flexibeler zouden worden in hun ideologische opstelling. Hiervoor kon slechts bewijs worden gevonden voor de periode tussen de late jaren '50 en de eerste helft van de jaren '60, met name bij 'rechtse' partijen van conservatieve en liberale origine. Tussen 1965 en 1985, daarentegen, is sprake van meer ideologische rigiditeit. Het lijkt correcter te stellen dat politieke partijen in West Europa altijd al flexibel genoeg zijn geweest om volledig gebruik te maken van de door de politieke 'tegenstanders' geboden ideologische ruimte om zichzelf zodoende in een optimale positie te plaatsen voor electoraal gewin, vergroting van de kans op regeringsdeelname of maximalisering van invloed op het beleid.

West Europese politieke partijen hebben, met name in de jaren '60 en begin jaren '70, minder nadruk gelegd op hun traditionele beleidsvoorkeuren en politieke issues. Maar, in tegenstelling tot hetgeen Kirchheimer veronderstelde, leggen

partijen sinds eind jaren '70 weer meer nadruk op hun traditionele gedachtengoed. Ook hier is dus geen sprake van een lineaire trend richting catch-allisme. Wel worden politieke partijen steeds pragmatischer in hun voorkeuren voor ministersposten en accepteren zij steeds vaker niet-traditionele portefeuilles wanneer ze aan een regering deelnemen. Echter, uit het onderzoek blijkt ook dat politieke partijen, wanneer ze daartoe de kans krijgen, snel terugkeren naar hun traditionele preferenties. Verder blijkt dat, hoewel in sommige landen nieuwe coalitiepartners zijn toegelaten aan de regeringstafel, de traditionele regeringspartijen van christen-democratische, sociaal-democratische, liberale en conservatieve origine grotendeels de regeringsmacht monopoliseren. Met name partijen met een beleidspositie in of dichtbij het politieke centrum hebben een hogere frequentie en duur van regeringsdeelname. Een belangrijke uitzondering hierop vormen de West Europese christen-democratische partijen die een aanzienlijk deel van hun regeringsmacht hebben moeten inleveren sinds de jaren '70. In de naoorlogse periode zijn (sommige van) deze traditionele regeringspartijen dus flexibeler geworden in hun beleidsposities en hun voorkeur voor regeringsportefeuilles, maar dat betekent niet dat zij hun traditionele beleidsvoorkeuren geheel overboord hebben gezet.

Er blijkt geen één-dimensionaal proces van ideologische partijverandering te bestaan. Op het ideologische niveau van partijverandering kunnen twee dimensies worden onderscheiden die samenvallen met strategisch gedrag ten aanzien van beleid (*policy-seeking behaviour*) en met de mate waarin regeringsmacht wordt veroverd (*office-seeking behaviour*). Uit het onderzoek blijkt verder dat een zekere nadruk op traditionele issues niet strijdig is met het innemen van een strategische positie in of dichtbij het politieke centrum. Wel blijkt dat, naarmate politieke partijen meer pragmatische '*office-seekers*' zijn, zij minder rigide zijn in hun beleidspreferenties. Politieke partijen laveren tussen de noodzaak om kiezers te winnen met een duidelijk en herkenbaar eigen programma en de wil om te regeren waardoor een partij zich doorgaans niet te ver van het politieke midden kan positioneren.

Wanneer we kijken naar de verschillen tussen landen, dan blijkt dat partijen in Duitsland, Frankrijk, Nederland, België, Oostenrijk en Finland pragmatischer en meer *office-seeking* zijn dan partijen in Ierland, Verenigd Koninkrijk, Denemarken, Noorwegen en Zweden. Ook wat betreft strategisch gedrag ten aanzien van beleid zijn de politieke partijen in Frankrijk, Duitsland, België, Nederland en Italië meer naar het catch-all model opgeschoven dan partijen in Zweden, Denemarken, Noorwegen en Ierland. Wederom blijkt dat Kirchheimer terecht veronderstelde dat de ontwikkeling naar catch-allisme verder gevorderd zou zijn in de grotere, continentale democratieën en minder in de Scandinavische landen.

Kirchheimer moet eveneens in het gelijk worden gesteld wat betreft zijn veronderstelling dat met name sociaal-democratische en christen-democratische partijen zich op het vlak van strategisch '*office-seeking*' gedrag meer hebben ontwikkeld in de richting van catch-all partij dan liberale, conservatieve en communistische partijen. Voor wat betreft '*policy-seeking*' gedrag zijn liberale, agrarische en christen-democratische partijen juist flexibeler en strategischer dan hun sociaal-democratische, conservatieve en communistische concurrenten.

De electorale dimensie van catch-allisme

Op het electorale vlak is er maar een zeer beperkte ontwikkeling richting het catch-all model. Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat Kirchheimer terecht stelde dat een groot aantal politieke partijen in toenemende mate kiezers aantrekt van buiten hun traditionele achterban. Door heel West Europa is er een duidelijke neerwaartse trend in stemgedrag op basis van sociale klasse, alhoewel er duidelijke verschillen zijn waar te nemen tussen de verschillende landen en partijfamilies. In het algemeen wordt het electoraat in West Europese landen steeds meer gedomineerd door kiezers uit de middenklasse met name omdat de arbeidersklasse een sterke opwaartse sociale mobiliteit vertoont. In het bijzonder heeft het electoraat van sociaal-democratische partijen een grondige herstructurering ondergaan en stemmen in veel landen nu meer kiezers uit de middenklasse op sociaal-democraten dan kiezers uit de arbeidersklasse. De traditionele inspanning van christen-democratische partijen om tot een vergelijk te komen tussen verschillende maatschappelijke groeperingen en hun vaak tegenstrijdige belangen, het innemen van een politieke middenpositie en het tegelijkertijd streven naar machtsvorming maken dat christen-democratische partijen meer dan andere partijen een breed spectrum van de bevolking kunnen aanspreken. Meer recentelijk lijkt deze strategie te falen: de kiezer van christen-democratische partijen rekent zich steeds vaker tot de middenklasse. Alhoewel de verschillen in electoraal profiel tussen de partijfamilies afnemen en sociale klasse steeds minder verklarende kracht heeft voor stemgedrag, moet het verval van de structuur van het electoraat (*'de-alignment'*) niet worden overdreven. Nog steeds stemmen kiezers uit de lagere arbeidersklasse vaker op communistische en sociaal-democratische partijen dan op kandidaten van andere politieke partijen.

Uit dit onderzoek is ook duidelijk gebleken dat het aantal kiezers met een sterke partij-identificatie aanzienlijk afneemt in de meeste West Europese landen, met name sinds de jaren '60. Dit bevestigt Kirchheimer's assumptie dat er een algemene verzwakking is van de traditionele band tussen kiezers en politieke partijen. Deze achteruitgang in partijbinding leidt tot grotere electorale verschuivingen in landen als Nederland en Noorwegen, maar niet overal. In Frankrijk, Italië, Duitsland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Ierland neemt de electorale volatiliteit juist af over de naoorlogse periode. Grote electorale verschuivingen worden voornamelijk veroorzaakt door het verlies van kiezers door communistische, christen-democratische en sociaal-democratische partijen. Desalniettemin wordt de periode die Kirchheimer duidde als de periode waarin de catch-all partij tot bloei kwam, eerder gekenmerkt door electorale stabiliteit en beperkte partijcompetitie dan door grote electorale verschuivingen. In de jaren '70 en '80 is er wel sprake van toenemende electorale volatiliteit. Ondanks het feit dat de traditionele politieke partijen van christen-democratische, sociaal-democratische, liberale, conservatieve en agrarische origine electoraal kwetsbaarder zijn geworden, domineren deze partijen nog immer de uitvoerende macht. Relatief weinig 'nieuwe' partijen hebben een plaats aan de regeringstafel kunnen veroveren.

Om het verlies aan partijbinding en representatie van een specifieke sociale groep te compenseren, zo stelde Kirchheimer, zouden catch-all partijen sterkere banden ontwikkelen met belangengroepen. Aan de hand van buitenparlementaire rekrutering van ministers laat dit onderzoek zien dat de banden tussen politieke partijen en belangengroepen niet sterker is geworden. Er is geen bewijs dat

ministers steeds vaker zouden worden gekozen op basis van hun managerskwaliteiten of technische expertise. Er is zelfs een duidelijke trend naar een steeds 'politiekere' rekrutering: een groeiend aantal ministers heeft parlementaire ervaring. Beide laatste ontwikkelingen, afnemende electorale volatiliteit en toenemende parlementaire rekrutering van ministers weerspreken de catch-all these. Conform de veronderstellingen van Kirchheimer blijkt uit dit onderzoek dat de link tussen politieke partijen en kiezers langzaam wordt verbroken.

Uit de analyse (zie appendix 3) blijkt verder dat op het electorale vlak twee dimensies onderscheiden kunnen worden, namelijk de breedte van het electoraal appél en de openheid van de partij voor niet-traditionele externe invloeden. Wat betreft de breedte van het electoraal appél zijn politieke partijen in de meeste landen in de richting van het catch-all model opgeschoven, met name in Italië, Frankrijk, België en Noorwegen. Deze catch-all strategie om een breder kiezerspubliek aan te spreken is relatief minder courant onder partijen in Oostenrijk, Duitsland, Nederland en Verenigd Koninkrijk. Partijen in Oostenrijk, Duitsland, Nederland en de meeste Scandinavische landen zijn wel meer catch-all wat betreft de openheid in rekrutering van elites en electorale kwetsbaarheid. Met uitzondering van Noorwegen zijn er echter weinig landen waar partijen zowel op het vlak van de kiezers als op het gebied van de rekrutering van elites meer openheid laten zien.

In termen van transformatie tot catch-allism blijkt dat met name sociaal-democratische en liberale partijen hoger scoren wat betreft de breedte van hun electoraal appèl. Over de laatste 50 jaar zijn christen democratische partijen veranderd van partijen met een breed sociaal spectrum in een partijfamilie met een beperkter electoraal naar voornamelijk de middenklassen. Conservatieve en agrarische partijen hebben hun karakteristieke electorale klasseprofiel grotendeels behouden. Voor wat betreft de rekrutering van partijelite zijn de sociaal-democratische partijen ook meer in de richting van het catch-all model getransformeerd, terwijl christen democratische, liberale en conservatieve partijen van oudsher al meer openheid hadden in de toegang tot de partijtop. Bij deze laatste drie partijfamilies is er sprake van een ontwikkeling naar een meer eenzijdige rekrutering van de partijelite.

Kirchheimer had correct voorspeld dat partijen in de grote continentale democratieën, en in het bijzonder de sociaal democratische partijen, zouden veranderen in de catch-all richting, maar hij veronderstelde ten onrechte dat andere partijfamilies ook een dergelijke ontwikkeling zouden doormaken. Verder blijkt er op het electorale vlak geen sprake te zijn van een lineair proces richting het catch-all model. Alhoewel Kirchheimer met redelijke precisie de geografische distributie van catch-allisme in West Europa heeft geschetst, heeft hij zich vergist in de duur en de continuiteit van dit proces. Dit onderzoek heeft laten zien dat de transformatie van West Europese partijen niet een één-dimensionaal en lineair proces is geweest, maar dat institutionele kenmerken van nationale stelsels en kenmerken van partijfamilies hebben geleid tot uiteenlopende en ongelijktijdige transformatie van politieke partijen.

Catch-allisme in West Europa

In hoofdstuk 7 wordt deze belangrijke conclusie, dat partijverandering in West Europa niet één-dimensionaal en lineair is, verder uitgewerkt. Uit de analyse wordt duidelijk dat het concept van de massapartij niet langer toepasbaar is op de meerderheid van de West Europese politieke partijen. Massa partijen werden gekenmerkt door hun sterke inbedding in de civiele samenleving middels een uitgebreide extraparlementaire ledenorganisatie en een duidelijke vertegenwoordigende functie voor een specifieke sociale of religieuze groep. Dit type partij is niet (langer) dominant in West Europese partijstelsels, maar politieke partijen zijn evenmin volledig getransformeerd tot catch-all partijen. Er is eerder sprake van een partiële transformatie van politieke partijen in West Europa in de richting van catch-allisme. Een aantal ontwikkelingen die Kirchheimer voorspelde is duidelijk waarneembaar, terwijl andere aspecten van de veronderstelde catch-all ontwikkeling niet zijn gematerialiseerd. Ook is er geen sprake van een continu en lineair proces richting het catch-all model, maar was partijverandering in sommige perioden in West Europa onderhevig aan stilstand en terugval.

Uit nadere analyse blijkt dat er zeven factoren van partijverandering kunnen worden onderscheiden (zie bijlage 3). De eerste organisatorische factor is de professionalisering van de parlementaire fracties van politieke partijen. Een tweede factor is de professionalisering (of beter 'de-massificatie) van de extraparlementaire partijorganisatie. De derde factor op het organisatorische niveau is de centralisatie in de interne besluitvorming. Wat betreft ideologie kunnen twee factoren worden onderscheiden van partijgedrag: gedrag gericht op het maximaliseren van de beleidsuitkomsten (*'policy-seeking'*) en optimalisering van de regeringsmacht (*'office-seeking'*). De electorale dimensie van partijverandering valt uiteen in twee factoren: de breedte van het electorale appèl (*'vote-seeking'*) en het niveau van sociale openheid van de partij (*'inclusion'*).

Op basis van deze zeven dimensies is het mogelijk de verschillende partijstelsels en partijfamilies met elkaar te vergelijken. Er bestaan aanzienlijke verschillen tussen West Europese partijstelsels, tussen partijfamilies en in de verschillende perioden wanneer zij op deze zeven factoren worden vergeleken (zie paragraaf 7.3.1 tot en met 7.3.3). Op basis van deze dimensies kan eveneens de richting van de transformatie van West Europese politieke partijen worden geanalyseerd. Op het organisatorische vlak kunnen vier typen partijen worden onderscheiden. De traditionele massapartij die wordt gekarakteriseerd door een aanzienlijke ledenorganisatie en die haar inkomsten voornamelijk uit lidmaatschapsgelden haalt. Binnen deze partijen hebben leden slechts een geringe invloed op de besluitvorming en is de macht gecentraliseerd in de partijtop. Een tweede type partij, die weinig voorkomt in West Europa, is de democratische massapartij met een democratische interne structuur. Aan de andere kant van het organisatorische spectrum vinden we twee typen kader partijen. De traditionele, niet democratische kader partij waar leden geen of weinig invloed uit kunnen oefenen op de interne besluitvorming en de democratische kader partij. Dit laatste type partij, dat steeds dominanter aanwezig is in West Europa, wordt gekarakteriseerd door een minimale ledenorganisatie en is voor de inkomsten met name afhankelijk van bijdragen van de staat, belangengroepen en commerciële belangen. Democratische kaderpartijen beschikken niet over een groot potentieel van vrijwilligers om de partijorganisatie te laten functioneren, maar voeren hun taken uit met behulp van een groot aantal professionals. Wel hebben deze partijen

een relatief democratische interne besluitvorming waar leden in kunnen participeren.

De transformatie van politieke partijen op het ideologische vlak kent twee belangrijke dimensies. Partijen verschillen aanzienlijk in de mate waarin zij streven naar maximalisering van macht ('office-seeking behaviour') en de mate waarin zij flexibel of star zijn in hun beleidsuitspraken (in verkiezingsprogramma's). Op basis van deze twee dimensies kunnen vier typen van partijgedrag worden onderscheiden. Partijen kunnen sterk de nadruk leggen op traditionele issues en beleidsvelden met de intentie hiermee een duidelijk regeringsmandaat te verkrijgen. Andere partijen zijn eveneens ideologisch rigide en leggen ook sterke nadruk op traditionele beleidsissues, ongeacht de consequenties voor regeringsdeelname. Dit heb ik, in navolging van Kirchheimer, principiële oppositie genoemd. Partijen die veel flexibeler zijn in hun nadruk op issues volgen twee strategieën in West Europa. Sommige van deze partijen nemen positie in dicht bij het politieke centrum, maar zijn ondanks hun ideologisch gematigde opstelling niet in staat regeringsmacht te veroveren. Andere partijen, eveneens flexibel in hun issue-benadrukking en met een positie in het politieke centrum op pragmatische gronden zijn wel in staat het regeringspluche te bezetten. Dit laatste type partij heeft meer een catch-all karakter in ideologische zin. In West Europa volgen de meeste partijen, en zeker partijen van de belangrijkste partijfamilies, een koers tussen enerzijds het behoud van een duidelijk herkenbaar en karakteristiek beleidsprofiel en anderzijds een strategische positionering in het links-rechts spectrum door een zekere mate van flexibiliteit in de mate waarin (traditionele) issues benadrukt worden.

In electorale termen zijn ook vier partijstrategieën te onderscheiden. Partijen kunnen tegelijkertijd een sterke link hebben met een duidelijk herkenbare sociale groep en een zeer traditionele rekrutering van de partijelite. Dit model, dat overeenkomt met politieke partijen in een verzuilde samenleving, kan worden gekarakteriseerd als *'closed-shop'*. Wanneer partijen een breder electoraal appèl hebben naar kiezers met een zwakke band met de partij, maar de elite uit een zeer specifieke sociale groep wordt gerekruteerd, dan is er sprake van een traditionele volkspartij. Partijen die daarentegen een zeer beperkt electoraal appèl hebben, maar wel openstaan voor rekrutering van de elite buiten de traditionele sociale basis kunnen worden gekenmerkt als democratische *'devotee'* partij. Het laatste type partij, gekarakteriseerd als een *'electorale machine'* komt het dichtst bij het catch-all model en kent zowel een brede electorale gerichtheid als een zeer open rekruteringsstructuur voor wat betreft het partij leiderschap.

Concluderend kan worden gesteld dat het niet zozeer de historische kenmerken van een partij zijn die de overlevingskans van politieke partijen beïnvloedt, maar eerder hun capaciteit zich aan te passen aan veranderende omstandigheden. Alhoewel Kirchheimer terecht heeft gewezen op dit fenomeen veronderstelde hij ten onrechte dat er een lineaire ontwikkeling richting het catch-all model gaande is. Partijen in West Europa convergeren niet naar één partijtype met dezelfde ideologische, organisatorische en electorale kenmerken. Er zijn nog steeds substantiële verschillen in de timing, richting en snelheid van partijverandering tussen politieke partijen in de onderzochte landen en tussen partijen van uiteenlopende genetische origine. Binnen West Europese landen en partijfamilies is

geen continue, uniforme trend in partijtransformatie gevonden, hetgeen leidt tot de centrale conclusie dat in de naoorlogse periode er in West Europese partijstelsels sprake is van een partiële transformatie richting catch-allisme en deze ontwikkeling in de late jaren '70, vroege jaren '80 tot stilstand is gekomen.